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The vertiginous transformation of the 
worldwide cultural situation, the many 
competing value systems and beliefs, 
radical pluralism, and the reliance of modern 
structures on the science and technology 
governing the entire knowledge industry and 
informational system all suggest intellectuals 
now serve as mere “interpreters” or as 
technocrats, “real-time” opinion-makers
 with media stars increasingly taking 
centre-stage in key areas of public life and in 
the production apparatus.
Does this mean we are confronted with a 
culture that has failed to establish an effective 
connection between intellectual work 
and the politics of local and transnational 
citizenship? How does the post-modern 
status of intellectuals differ from that of their 
forerunners? How can public-intellectual 
activities be improved?
These are some of the issues the authors of 
this book address from different standpoints. 
By capturing and expanding on some of 
the trends that the history of intellectuals, 
the history of ideas, politics, sociology, 
anthropology, African-American studies 
and Native-American studies have been 
exploring, this book will prove of interest to 
students and professionals in those areas.
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Introduction
This book gathers together writings on the transformation of the intellec-
tual and the challenges posed by citizenship against the backdrop of dis-
mantling the Modernity project, the decline of Marxist ideology and the 
contradictory and competing value-systems of our times; it also includes 
several studies regarding the Portuguese and Spanish intelligentsia, parti-
cularly in the context of dictatorial regimes and as an inherited framework 
for more recent intellectual topographies. The analysis they provide draws 
relevant implications for our understanding of the changes in the condi-
tionings, nature and meaning of the intellectual’s function. 
The 20th century, characterized by omnipresent change and serious 
conflict, ended with the disintegration of one of the most powerful uni-
versal utopias. The new millennium began with the violence of September 
11 and all its subsequent political and social implications amidst financial 
deregulation and economic turmoil. Meanwhile, growing globalizing pres-
sures, the vertiginous transformation of the worldwide cultural situation, 
and the reliance of modern structures on science and technology govern-
ing the entire knowledge industry and informational system suggest that 
the technocratic or professionalized intellectual will increasingly occupy a 
dominant position not only in the production apparatus but in most areas 
of public life. 
We may refuse to endorse Adorno and Horkheimer’s views about the 
neutralization of critical thinking by a system of total domination, Virilio’s 
detection of lethal risks in technological development and Baudrillard’s 
remarks on the implosion of meaning. Nevertheless, we cannot fail to note 
the many restraints on intellectual autonomy in the form of technology, 
the commodification of social life and bureaucracy. Nor can we escape the 
impression that it is inevitable for today’s intellectuals to be progressively 
and organically integrated in institutionalized power relations where they 
are entrusted with providing expertise and decisions; mobilizing public 
opinion; or becoming just another voice in the global Babel of noises that 
definitely discards any possibility for promoting the sort of ideal speech 
envisaged by Jürgen Habermas. 
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In his article A Plea for Intellectuals (1966), Sartre, for whom the intel-
lectual should be “someone who meddles in what is not his business”, points 
out a basic contradiction in the intellectual’s situation, caught between a 
call for questioning and inquiry along the lines of the classic intellectual, 
and the particularistic requirements of employability. This contradiction 
between the universal and the particular is also pointed out by others such 
as Alain Touraine, for whom, in an advanced industrial society, there is a 
perpetual conflict between the imperatives of organizational control and 
the struggle for personal autonomy. Alternatively, Edward Saïd and Noam 
Chomsky have no doubts about their obligations as public intellectuals. 
Although lamenting the decline of the public intellectual, they make a 
clear distinction between the critical intellectual, who emerged during the 
Dreyfus Affair, and the technocratic intelligentsia, heir to the rationaliz-
ing intellectuals espousing Enlightenment values which, according to Max 
Weber, gave rise to the paradigm of technological rationality that would 
redefine education, culture, social life and politics, while also forming the 
basis of Antonio Gramsci’s “organic intellectual”. In the Representations of 
the Intellectual: the 1993 Reith Lectures, Saïd conveys an image of today’s 
critical intellectual as an outsider and a nonconformist, in line with Chom-
sky, for whom the values of truth and objectivity remain a priority. Among 
other things, the intellectual’s role is, in Saïd’s words, “to raise embarrassing 
questions, to confront orthodoxy and dogma (rather than produce them)”, 
acting “on the basis of universal values”. They are good examples of the 
direct connection between the intellectual as someone who systematically 
attempts to make a serious contribution to improve social life and the issue 
of citizenship. It is stimulating to see that, in Saïd and Chomsky’s public 
commitment, they are not discouraged by difficulties. Quite the opposite: 
they both consider themselves as belonging to a privileged minority that 
enjoys favourable conditions for carrying out their activities, such as train-
ing, access to qualified information, relative freedom of speech and publics 
for their views. We could say that, together with Sartre and Marcuse among 
others, they fall into the categories of nonconformists and iconoclasts that, 
as such and in certain circumstances, are very often marginalized.
Meanwhile, Bloom’s ideal of a recoiled community of scholars, as pre-
sented in his Closing of the American Mind (1987), nowadays seems to be a 
relic from the past, though we cannot help admiring many of those elitist 
intellectuals, apologists of ‘high culture’, for their vigour, autonomy of mind 
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and faith in the redeeming power of a legacy of humanistic values and ideals 
that philosophically addressed the meaning of life and explored the questions 
of history, politics, religion and aesthetics, so perfectly expressed in George 
Steiner’s Errata: An examined life (1997). Some of these older scholars are still 
very much active, reminding us of the imperative to expand the intellectual 
dialogue across generations in search of continuities and connections that 
may provide answers for today’s epistemological and historical deadlocks.
The last few decades have seen the rise of an intelligentsia that is flour-
ishing in the form of influential figures, mostly associated with academic 
projects, institutes and foundations, with newspapers, TV, and in cyber-
space, as well as with party politics, social movements and grassroots cam-
paigns. Their practices are conditioned or bound by pressures produced by 
multiple interdependences and polarizations coming out of diversity, vari-
ous positioning, and fractured identities (in the domains of class, gender, 
ethnicity, age, religion , sexuality, and so on).
Their predicament also reflects the endorsement by post-modern theory 
involving social complexity and radical pluralism that has been deconstruct-
ing binary oppositions and other notions such as origins, causes, structure, 
and sovereignty. The axiological shift from Modernity enables value re-
assessment, options and discourses which are more independent of doxa 
and normativity as an open-ended process of intellectual engagement – a 
process that builds up new ways of understanding social interaction, dis-
embedding phenomena and more subtle dislocations. The impossibility of 
contriving any single or unified vision has stimulated more localized and 
fragmented discourses, the increase of critical sub-cultures and a techno-
cratic or professionalized intelligentsia; in addition, it has brought forward 
the figure of the more localized specific intellectual, as well as competing or 
hostile public spheres and subaltern counter publics. 
Moreover, if the immense broadening of the public sphere by the Web’s 
trans-local and transnational networks has brought compensations, confer-
ring more visibility and choice on the intellectuals, it has also meant a higher 
degree of dispersal, volatility and disarray. This fact, combined with the rapid 
deterioration ever since the 1960s of the historic linkage between universal 
belief-systems and political action, seems to have thwarted the formation of 
any sustainable intellectual front or concurrence that might have led to major 
cultural change. Even the traditional Left, according to Terry Eagleton, has lost 
its initially radical impulse as the purpose of transforming has given way to a 
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desire to subvert mainstream society. In challenging the process of Modernity, 
with its facile equation of power, knowledge and universal social progress, en-
vironmentalists seemed to have gathered strength over the years to promise 
enough cohesion to configure an intellectual movement, but with time they 
too came to display signs of having been caught up in the vortex of conflicting 
pressures and interests. 
Does this mean that we are confronted with a culture that has failed to 
establish an effective connection between intellectual work and the politics 
of local and transnational citizenship? Will abstract thinking, the discursive 
and ‘high culture’ give way to the tabloidization of culture and “the civi-
lization of spectacle” as prophesized by Mario Vargas Llosa in 2008? Are 
today’s intellectuals simply a repository of technocratic ideology? Does this 
all mean that their problematic and debilitated situation makes them less 
needed or even irrelevant?
If they are no longer capable of being legislators or ideologists, and if most 
of them do not fit into the radical category defended by Saïd and Chomsky, 
the majority, whatever their relative or deadlocked positions amidst the dis-
ruptive factors and conflicting rationalities of our societies, will, however, 
continue to have a genuine interest in critical dialogue, human rights and 
democracy as Sartre had already observed. Such interest derives fundamen-
tally from the basic recurrent historical demonstration that mankind’s salva-
tion lies precisely in the possibility to amend error and evil and make things 
better. Hence, it is reasonable to expect that as regards the crisis of and the 
implementation of an ethics of global governance, at a time when the uto-
pia of the ends (“Real Socialism”) and the utopia of the means (Capitalism) 
reached their limits, the answer must be cultural and this requires perma-
nent responsible commitment – a commitment that goes beyond the refusal 
of official optimism, which in wolf lepenies view characterized the “active 
melancholic” or the european intellectual of the socialist regimes. Against 
the more pessimistic out looks, it is sensible to expect that today’s and future 
intellectuals will continue to act as a transforming force within the mounting 
interplay of local and larger social forces and the relativism that distinguish 
our post-industrial, informational societies. As Zygmunt Bauman explains 
in his theory of post-modernity, because relativism has become a common 
feature in the world, intellectual work should be understood in metaphori-
cal terms, as interpretation, i.e. as cultural translation, a strategy devised for 
greater hermeneutic transparency and better communication. 
Introduction
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Therefore, regardless of the conflicting intellectual topographies, the 
quandaries and uncertainties that erode the social impact of the intellec-
tuals’ output and public messages, the need for their function is probably 
greater than ever before, whether as scholars, activists and creative writers, 
as guiding figures at particular moments, as interpreters or mediators, as crea-
tors of consensus or as innovators. Indeed, they are being called upon to 
deconstruct harmful stereotypes and “discursive formations” that, in Fou-
cault’s view, structure society and often shape their own intellectual prac-
tices; to think, verbalize and show the world from the multidimensional 
perspective of its diversity and ever more boundlessness; to critically access 
the new forms of citizenship and intervene in the budding multi-level public 
space shaped through digital engagements – the space of interpersonal and 
intercultural communication which we create and discover everyday in our 
ordinary adventures with each other; to read our multiple cultural heritages 
adequately; help in healing old and more recent wounds; denounce policies 
and practices that violate human that violate human rights and condemn 
abusive and spurious conflicts. In other words, they are being summoned 
to force ethics into politics, be of assistance in averting the ever-increasing 
systemic risks the world is progressively more exposed to, probe and question 
practices, conceive alternatives and negotiate values and choices in defence 
of a more sustainable and democratic global order.
These are some of the issues that this book addresses in its three parts: 1. 
The Intellectual and the Postmodern World; 2. Intellectual Commitment, 
Identity and Citizenship; 3. Intellectual Topographies in the Iberian Context. 
All the sections offer theoretical and pedagogical approaches, capturing 
and expanding on some of the trends that the History of Intellectuals, the 
History of Ideas, Political History, Sociology, Anthropology, African-Amer-
ican Studies and Native-American Studies have been exploring. Seen from 
this angle, the book also vivifies a debate that has an established tradi-
tion, thereby adding to the intellectual narrative itself. The first and second 
parts display different levels of analyses, involving philosophical, scientific, 
aesthetic, media and culture studies. The third part stands out for the spec-
ificity of the cultural and political contexts in which the topic is inscribed. 
It focuses on the intellectual circumstances in Portugal and Spain, from the 
beginning of the 20th century through the dictatorial contexts in which 
both countries were immersed for decades, and up to the present, debat-
ing continuities between past and current forms of intelligentsia and the 
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re-drawing of traditional intellectual topographies. The issues raised in the 
three sections are relevant to today’s pressing problems and to numerique 
ongoing public controversies, even when some of the intellectual figures 
pertain to previous ages, since by deepening our understanding of the pos-
sibilities of intellectual response in different historical circumstances, we 
can envisage today’s situation in a wider perspective. 
Intellectual Topographies and the Making of Citizenship is neither a comprehen-
sive nor a representative sample of work on the topic. Rather, it is a selection 
of writings by academics, some of whom are also prestigious public intellectuals 
who are in the privileged situation of speaking from the double perspective 
of theory and praxis; a couple of contributions are by students working for 
their Master’s and Ph.D degrees. On the whole, the assortment included in the 
three sections is the product of seminars and of an international conference 
held in November 2011, at the Universidade Católica Portuguesa, on the in-
tellectual functions, on citizenship and on how intellectuals and post-modern 
culture interrelate in a broad sense. 
Finally, the idea of this book is also routed in the apprehension about the 
ongoing course of our contemporary world and the nature of the modern 
university, namely the specialization and professionalization of academic 
life, its tendency to become a market and its growing incapacity o safeguard 
the necessary autonomy to create knowledge, respond with strong ideas to 
the present civilizational crisis and recreate the ideal of a universal human-
ism based on solidarity and intercultural values. No wonder, the university 
as one of the key factors accountable for the deterioration of the inde-
pendent public intellectual has been tackled, among others, by Bauman, 
Bourdieu, Smith and Weber, Posner, Sousa Santos and Freudi. Questioning 
and re evaluating the issue of the intellectual from within academia is also 
a positive way of reacting to such apprehension. More so because, being 
mostly a multi-perspective inquiry into the intellectual’s situation, the book 
avoids establishing overgeneralizations, sustaining gloomy prophecies or a 
simplistic celebration. Let us hope these writings capture the current state 
of debate and prompt further productive work on the topic.
Finally, a note on our editing policy: we have kept to both British and 
American English out of respect for the authors’ individual choices. 
Helena Gonçalves da Silva
Introduction
I – The Intellectual and the
Postmodern World

The myths of the end or the unperceivable 
dislocation from saying to showing
João Barrento
So often have I seen a candle flame flicker. But in that instant, I saw it dif-
ferently. I was not sensitive to colour, but to the glimmering and wavering of the 
flame; to its hesitant and persistent way of breathing. As it was dark, the flame, 
rising and falling in intensity, created a larger or smaller pool of light. And in 
this rare coincidence of fluctuations, I felt the parity between flame, sound and 
vibration. 
(…) 
Nothing fades away, everything passes from heap to heap, hand to hand, lis-
tening to itself. As if the reverse of history had reached me folded back, and I had 
seen it ever so slightly opening up…*
(Maria Gabriela Llansol, Finita. Diário II, 1985) 
There is no end
The epigraph by Maria Gabriela Llansol, at the centre of which there is 
a motif – the flame of a candle –, that occasionally is the almost-figure of 
many of her books, seems to be a metaphor that gives visibility to the ways 
of intervention of those social and cultural agents who today act as an er-
satz of the dimmed figure of the classical intellectual. I mean dimmed but 
not extinct in what his functionality was: a fold happened once more, yet 
another of the recurrent folds in the fabric of history. This folding back, in 
contrast to what happened half a century ago, has opened up a flickering, 
intermittent, unequal landscape, very often discreet and infinitely more 
varied. To a pattern dominated by a certain manichaeism of shadow and 
light, political power and critical voice, there succeeds a situation that in 
more recent decades has been configured and today openly revealed, and 
*All translations into English from the original works as well as from the Portuguese 
translations of such works are mine (J. B.).
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may be represented by an apparently paradoxical image: on the one hand 
(the “right” side of the civilization fabric) a new configuration of powers, 
all mighty but opaque and unpredictable; on the other hand (the “reverse” 
side of this same fabric) the fragmentation of small resistance centres, di-
versely configured, varying in intensity, that try to undermine, sabotage 
and subvert through the “cunning of the imagination”, the phantasmic ma-
chine for moulding and managing minds created by formal democracies. 
The alternation between the reverse and the right sides of the great tapes-
try of history is sometimes slow and barely perceptible and, at other times, 
abrupt and violent. This alternation also seems to apply to the progressive 
transition from the 20th to our incipient 21st century, undertaken in the 
forms of social, political and cultural intervention. 
I am now providing a summary of what I will attempt to say and show 
in my analysis concerning the place or non-place of the “intellectual” in 
the contemporary world, the causes of his mutation – since it is mutation 
and not the end of the intellectual we are dealing with – and the political, 
civilizational and cultural conditionings that may explain it.
I start with a basic statement by the philosopher Hans Blumenberg, but 
it might easily come from various other contemporary thinkers, whom I 
shall evoke in due course: “In history, there are no beginnings – they are 
established by someone” (Hans Blumenberg). Just as there are no begin-
nings there are no ends. The latter are almost always established against 
the complexity of reality – neither the end of history, nor of the subject, 
nor of the grand narratives, nor of art, nor obviously of the “intellectual”, 
if we bear in mind not a secular (and French) model, but rather a figure 
with functions and mutating modes of action adjusted to the prevailing 
circumstances. The mutation undergone over the last half century may be 
placed in parallel with that which Foucault conceptualises when proclaim-
ing the “death of the author”, proposing his replacement by the figure of 
an “author-function”. Whenever theory descends from the stars to the level 
of praxis, there is a place for the “intellectual” (who may also be presented 
as a philosopher or as an artist): ideas are his target, Lebenswelt his inexo-
rable destiny. It is then the “non-actuality” of this figure that, under new 
disguises, renders it still and always contemporary. 
What sort of disguises? Those that result from the changes operated in 
the nature and relative position of the interventional subject within society 
and “life world”. The previously dominant and opposing forms of the “or-
João Barrento
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ganic intellectual” (Gramsci) and critical intellectual have been substituted 
by a creative an-archy, not always reflexive, but still and always critical, 
under its artistic, media, theatrical and visual clothing. The “intellectual” is 
no longer the singularised figure of the critical thinker of the system or the 
moral conscience of the nation: therefore (and this being my underlying 
thesis), he has assumed various other names, he has become plural. Some 
decades ago he underwent an unperceivable process of dislocation that 
made him act and intervene not necessarily at the level of saying (the lost 
power of the word), but more so at the level of showing (the multifaceted 
power of the spectacle, no longer in Guy Debord’s or Baudrillard’s sense of 
simulacrum, but in a great diversity of forms of performative intervention that 
are less discursive in nature).
What I mentioned earlier as a possible basic statement, taken from Das 
Lachen der Thrakerin [The Laughter of the Thracian Maid] by Hans Blumen-
berg, to which I shall later return, was based on the conviction that, among 
many others, the lucciole – the fireflies – remain lighting up the landscape 
in which we live, following the era of the grand luminaries, as put forward 
by Georges Didi-Huberman in his most recent book Survivance des lucioles 
(2009). Here, he sets out the plurality and mutability that define the nature 
of the contemporary historical fabric, in opposition to Pasolini’s apocalyp-
tic theses in his renowned and desperate article “Articolo delle lucciole” 
(Pasolini 1975), inspired upon the 26th Canto of Dante’s Inferno. Here, he 
denounced the disappearance of the lucciole: with their intermittent light, 
they had thus far provided the tenuous illumination of the Summer nights 
and the heavens of culture, having totally disappeared in the apocalyptic 
darkness in which industrialized Italy was immersed; or, alternatively, some 
would say today, on the global stage on which we view the spectacle of the 
“Shipwreck with Spectators” of a not-at-all divine comedy under the blind-
ing lights of contemporary societies. However, there is also purgatory that 
awaits us as our destiny and where we have to learn how to live by paying 
attention to the little lights – candles, fireflies – that are there as visible 
images or that we ourselves have to light up.
In addition to this, Didi-Huberman’s work also confirmed a common-
place that I had already become aware of in relation to other realities and 
times: the notion that, more than heralds and epigones, and forerunners 
and followers, very often there is in the reading of our time and in the ves-
sel on which we are all embarked, a common perception, or a simultane-
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ous intuition, of what is in the air, marking our time and affecting us all. 
In the end, it is a matter of seeing and of the various ways we face up to real-
ity, being sure that reality and the order of immanence and contingency that 
defines it (still on this side of all the “horizons” or “final ends” proclaimed by 
some others, although with contradictory signs – from Heidegger to Agam-
ben or from Carl Schmitt to Pasolini) “is always right” in a certain way, as 
already stated by Hegel in the formula “alles, was ist, ist vernünftig” (“every-
thing that is has a rational foundation”). The question is however, contrary 
to what Hegel conceived when he envisioned a teleological order for history 
that modernity would confirm, that reason is not universal but contingent, 
nor is it the reason of the history of the world but a certain absurdity inherent 
to the course of the world itself. This is what I think is repeatedly stated in 
Musil’s self-critical mirror, The Man Without Qualities, for example in a con-
versation between the “intellectual” Arnheim and the sceptical inquirer of 
meaning Ulrich, when the former affirms in a Hegelian way that “in universal 
history nothing takes place outside the orbit of reason”. To this the latter 
responds: “but that is always happening in the world”. In the two centuries 
that have elapsed since the Hegelian postulate and that of his followers, the 
course instead seems to have been rather that of un-reason in history. This 
allows us to conclude – as many others have already done, from Nietzsche 
to Lukács and from the Frankfurt School to Sloterdijk – that “alles, was war, 
war unvernünftig” (“everything that was was unreasonable”), that the ab-
surd is always happening in the world and the destructive irrationalism (i.e. 
paradoxically: still a form of reason, but an “instrumental” one), which has 
progressively replaced the light of practical reason, would necessarily lead to 
the hallucinating phantasmagoria in which we live. 
Today, we have reached a point in which societies and the “life world”, as 
we know it, have nothing to do with the embryo that was their origin over 
two centuries ago: the negative dialectics of the Aufklärung definitively came 
to an end and superseded itself. Hence, our perspective of reality has to be 
different, new and adjusted to something we call “world” and which does not 
have any defined “form” since it is, instead, to a greater or lesser extent, a 
sequence of arbitrary “facts” (in the sense inferred in Wittgenstein’s Treatise: 
a “state of things” [Sachverhalt], which is dynamic, and not a “thing” [Ding], 
which is static) and of apparitions in mutation (Er--scheinungen, phenomena – 
literally: flashes that burst through, “luminous signs that emerge”). And this 
is how the world asks to be read and apprehended.
João Barrento
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With a new perception. New... or possibly the oldest one; the problem 
is not of today but of all times, ever since Power ceased to be based upon 
unquestionable consuetudinary truths and became State power, and Logos 
acquired its role as critical thinking that intervenes in praxis. Before draw-
ing conclusions or proposing theses as regards the end, the disappearance 
or the destruction of whatsoever in the contemporary world (in this case, 
the so-called “intellectual”), it is, therefore, necessary to diagnose, to un-
derstand the contours of the disease, as well as the healthy signs of our 
time that also exist. It will have to be a comparative, relative diagnosis, and 
never an absolute one. 
Where are we?
Diagnosing an epoch means, not so much asking where are we heading, but 
rather attempting to understand where we are. “It is time to know on which 
landing we are and what kind of intelligible discourse on the world and on 
ourselves is possible” (Touraine 2005, 12). Casting light on this question is 
a feat in itself; and the pretension of wanting to tell where we are heading 
is dangerous and bears a mark of totalitarianism or, at the least, of political 
haughtiness. The question “where are we?” results in a vision that, as already 
stated, does not aim at imposing a form, but rather highlighting a proposition 
such as Wittgenstein’s at the beginning of his Treatise: “The world is every-
thing that is the case”, i.e. an uninterrupted and uncontrollable sequence 
of events (not an abstraction or a territory to be dominated, whether by the 
power of force or by the force of ideas). There is no world but worlds in the 
world. The best available mirror to confirm that the world is that which hap-
pens (or rather: that which is happening) nowadays is television, Internet and 
its power, both subtle and simplistic, offering immense diversity, but betray-
ing the eternal return of the same, that is, infinitely diversified and totally 
standardised. We are in a paradoxical situation today: despite standards be-
ing more uniformly global than ever before, the diversity is immense and 
there has never been such an appeal to difference. However, the vision of 
the whole, in this phase that is not one of finalism, but of transition, has yet 
to reencounter an ethics. I am talking of the exploratory phase of a culture 
that has shifted from the political to the aesthetical in its broad sense – rec-
reational, hedonistic, narcissistic –, after having been through a long period 
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in which the main references were social and economic. This vision remains 
complex and opaque – in the sense that, “format” and “invention”, to use 
concepts by Michel Serres, still seek new forms of equilibrium.
Obviously, this equilibrium is not compatible with catastrophic visions 
that set out the paradigm of the end based upon deterministic assumptions. 
The end of something can only be proclaimed if it ever had a beginning, 
which, in turn, would have been what happened after another end that 
preceded it and so forth. All beginnings follow an end and all ends generate 
new beginnings. There are neither beginnings nor ends – only that which 
is happening, metamorphosis and transitions. As far as we are concerned, 
we are far from any “end”: the beginning of the end, of the so-called crisis 
of values, has hardly begun in terms of the historical dimension of our neo-
imperial, neoliberal and above all pan-communicational era. Homi Bhabha 
identifies a tension between “technological connectivity” (in expansion) 
and “cultural connection” (in decline), concluding that the former would 
impede or has already radically transformed the possibility for transparent 
and direct relationships between individuals. He considers the logo of Ap-
ple Macintosh, presented to us with the fatal bite of paradise lost, as the 
symbol of this loss of innocence. However, none of this is obvious when 
the machine itself has almost become a sort of third nature, a central or an 
opening to the planet, thus enabling all forms of intervention and creativ-
ity – body-less but with its own respiration, bloodless but with countless 
other forms of nourishment, circulation and energy, skinless but increas-
ingly sensitive and almost erotic to touch, to tactile contamination... The 
intellectual’s new functional place, or of those who come in his wake, is 
inevitably implicit in all this.
Let us go back to our attempt to diagnose the present situation. One 
of the aspects that perhaps best reveals the perplexity and the disorien-
tation of intellectuals, thinkers and the field of symbolic production as a 
whole is their apparent incapacity nowadays to deal with the crisis in so-
ciety and values, contrary to what happens in the sectors of added value 
production or politics where the commonest slogan is crisis management. 
I believe that this may be explained as a certain intellectual myopia that 
frequently tends to see only half of the crisis: that which relates to the loss 
of values (though, looking around us, we have no difficulties in finding 
them, as we shall see later) or the threat of their ending (intellectuals have 
always had the magna virtue, or the awful defect, of interpreting threats as 
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endings); the other half, the critical look at the reality of the crisis, the pro-
ductive scepticism, seems to have been stifled or to have fallen into decline. 
Within the current context of great “ethical indetermination” (something 
the intellectual did not experience before?), in which ambivalence is “the 
structuring principle of our affective and political existence”, Homi Bhabha 
proposes a displacement or an investment at the aesthetic level, one which 
more naturally would allow for what he designates as “interlocution” or 
the right to narration and to being heard. As a matter of fact, one of the 
approaches followed by the interventional function in contemporary socie-
ties is precisely performative (and no longer discursive). The problem to be 
solved is the frequency with which this type of “intervention” still falls into 
the hedonistic or narcissistic pose, into increasingly present and influential 
forms of media populism, manifest even in the domain of art, in manifesta-
tions of a more or less radical counterculture, very often innocuous to the 
large stomach of decadent Western capitalist culture, without the neces-
sary ethical moment ever coming to the fore. The very post-colonial artistic 
manifestations, which we encounter ever more, blowing in fresh from plac-
es experiencing renewed energies, so often run the risk of being perceived 
more as examples of “exoticism” than bearers of values and experiences 
that might in fact prove of use to us. And the question posed by Homi 
Bhabha – to which I have already responded in an essay on the state of the 
world (cf. Barrento 2006) – is the following: what is the place of ethics in 
the aesthetics, in the “dynamic ambivalence of globalisation”, within the 
scope of the universal mercantilism of this world that has become – in the 
dual sense of the term – flat and dull (cf. Thomas L. Friedman The World 
is Flat 2005)? My response, based upon what seems to be the most clearly 
“interventive” literary work in current Portuguese literature, that by Maria 
Gabriela Llansol, can be summarised in the following terms (returning to 
the aforementioned idea): what is worth knowing – acting and thinking 
in conformity – is what present-day world lacks so as to become (more) 
“humane”. Llansol proposes, in the wake of Spinoza and his pact of kind-
ness and beauty, a hyper-human (or trans-human) vision of the human, 
open to Being and free of the reductionist avatars of all autistic humanisms 
and of shackles – whether teleological, moral or of any other schemes of 
power (including the intellectuals of classical profile, who really did aspire 
to it: otherwise, how might it be possible to understand the slogans of May 
1968, “power to the imagination”, “power is in the street”, etc.?). Such a 
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philosophical (and practical) conjecture, with a profile of “pondered hope” 
and an imminently aesthetic vision of the world, may represent the basis 
of a “sensualethical” – of an “ethiaesthetic” – culture (not to be confused 
with the classical utopias of the aesthetic State, since, within this situation, 
which I would rather qualify as having an eudemonistic, anarchistic or, in a 
soft version, radical foundation, the State has no role). This culture is very 
different from the forms of liberal society that we know and it supposes a 
relearning of desire beyond mere name (here, overlapping Bernard Stie-
gler’s thought) and a perspective on the world that is neither critical nor 
deferential but simply free as “a story unworthy of regrets”. In following this 
route, we come to some of the names that I shall refer to later, and which 
are on the other side of the apocalyptical. However, it is clear that none 
of these “apocalypticals” are any of Umberto Eco’s in the 1970s, nor are 
they the “integrated” ones of today, unreservedly backing the new means 
and the new proposals for reconfiguring the world of life. Everything has 
diversified far further.
And there are also the positions that I see as phantasms of a more or 
less surpassed recent past, of which I would highlight the following: the 
remnants of Gramsci’s “organic intellectual”, at a time when neither par-
ties nor organisations need ideologues; the posturing of the “great refusal” 
(Marcuse’s große Weigerung, or Blanchot’s le grand refus). However, they 
still serve as examples of a straightforwardness that contrasts with the “in-
ner emigration” to which intellectuals and many writers recur today. There 
are cases such as Edward Saïd who I see as hostages of the “but syndrome” 
(proposals to which the current situation of the relationship with power 
immediately responds with an adversative that annuls them – in this case, 
proposals that are conditioned by a historical situation that seems to have 
no end in sight); and, more recently, the place given to a new variant of 
the masses of the past, dispersed over the immaterial empire of our days, 
designated as “the multitude” by the ex-radical intellectual Toni Negri in 
his latest books, inspired on a currently displaced Spinoza; books that are 
permeated by angelic and unrealistic projections, the wishful thinking of 
the “interactive singularities” which would form that new multitudo – a spe-
cies of transgenic creation that will have to await, perhaps indefinitely, the 
passage to its post-philosophical condition.
Homi Bhabha, in turn, and differently from others I shall mention, does 
not give up, even in his ethical protestations, in taking the “role of repre-
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sentation”, in representing the classical type of intellectual and the “best” 
of his heritage in this new situation. He does so by proposing doubt (global 
doubt) and interpretation, but also negotiation and consensus, which are, 
as he argues, the marks of the new intellectual language (without the facet 
of combat, which has been lost). His perspective at long term is one of “ver-
nacular cosmopolitanism”, that is, the half paradoxical utopia of a globali-
sation of the local (or “glocalisation”, as it has already been termed). This 
is more a strategy than a frontal position in which what happens is only the 
expression of dissatisfaction or a global (formal?) doubt without any traces 
of indignation – after all the strategy of Bhabha himself as paradigm of the 
post-colonial, mundane intellectual who speaks from the safe heaven of the 
academic world (American academia, of course!).
Beyond the social
Very different are the points of view – and, in some cases, the diagnoses 
of the situation – by the sociologist Alain Touraine, who is rightly sceptical 
of the feasibility of the absorption of the local by the global. If we believe 
in the new tasks he attributes to sociology that, just like the intellectual, 
has shed its “classical” and golden phase, sociology will have to abdicate 
from its assumptions, objects and traditional methodologies. Given the new 
conditions, which are far removed from the decades of the cold war and 
the various totalitarianisms, when the intellectuals’ role was to warn about 
abuses of power and the alienation of the masses, Touraine supports new 
profiles of the “subject” – individual and collective, cultural and bearer of 
“individual universal rights” – along with new forms of creative individu-
alism. Consequently, the problems have undergone a dislocation: from a 
political (national, regional or local) to a predominantly cultural and no 
longer strictly social configuration. “A grand alliance is needed of every-
thing that is not social, given that the social has become almost entirely 
the zone of power. For this reason, notions such as ‘globalisation’, in as 
far as they are powerful ideologies, indicate to us the path that we should 
not take. [...] On the contrary, nothing prevents us from thinking it may 
be possible to live as in the last century, in a world in which the scope of 
rights ceaselessly expands and combats power”. The actors in this combat 
are necessarily different, guided by a new conception of the subject(s) and 
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subjectivity: “Without this escape beyond the social, we run the risk of be-
ing dominated by the world of power” (Touraine 2006, 206).
The implications of such an ethical-cultural shift are enormous, since 
responsibilities in principle fall to all, and not only to governments, nor to 
an elite of intellectuals (still perceived by another French sociologist, Pierre 
Bourdieu, in the context of a “sociology of symbolic forms”, as the cen-
tral piece in a relatively autonomous “field of forces”). Today’s intellectual 
is the thinker, the artist, the actor in forms of performative and multiple 
intervention given that thinking is not only done through the intellect – 
there are also the body and the effective value of emotions (something that 
television happens to know very well how to exploit to its advantage).
I will highlight some of the other approaches that have been conceptu-
alized in recent years with particular mention of the theories of the biopoli-
tics “of the State” or beyond the State (Foucault-Agamben-Esposito) and 
of psychopolitics (Bernard Stiegler), as well as of the new stances generat-
ing readings of our contemporaneity as a moment of survival of the minor 
lights amidst the spotlights of present-day mass and media culture (Didi-
Huberman), or the need for a repoliticization of art as a “mute manifesto”, 
an intervening form without deliberate intervention (Jacques Rancière).
Biopolitics beyond the State?
The following readings are almost always a diagnosis rather than a prog-
nosis in that they pay particular attention to the mutations of the very con-
cept of the “political”, which has always been decisive to the configuration 
of the intellectual’s role. Foucault put forward one of these new concepts in 
coining the formula “biopolitics of the state”, with roots in Nietzsche and 
his philosophical “guiding thread of the body”, continued and developed 
by thinkers such as Roberto Esposito and to a certain extent superseded by 
Giorgio Agamben. The latter has sought his own way since Infanzia e storia 
(Infancy and History, 1977), following a more speculative than analytical 
approach through a biopolitics beyond the State. He affirms the relative 
place of the human and the need for a new global ethics that integrates the 
entire Living Being (L’ Aperto: L’uomo e l’animale [The Open: Man and Ani-
mal], 2002); in La communità che viene (The Coming Community, 1990), he 
also defends the notion of “any being” (best: any-will, quod-libet), i.e. that 
João Barrento
Intellectual Topographies 29
which “establishes an original relationship with desire”, a desiring singular-
ity (Agamben 1993, 11). In this speculative vision, we are not far from the 
illuminated multitudes of Negri. Agamben’s reading of the contemporary 
world emphasises a trend that is inherent to his thinking since the outset 
and which Didi-Huberman, in his last book (where Agamben is submitted 
to rigorous criticism), sums up as follows: “What is the modus procedendi of 
Agamben? He begins by affirming a radical destruction and then builds a 
transcendence” (Didi-Huberman 2009, 66). Giorgio Agamben’s thought, 
even in essays of a more analytical nature, such as Che cos’è il contempora-
neo? (What is the Contemporary, 2008), would, in fact, seem overly depend-
ent on messianic, metaphysical and scatological points of view in order to 
really account for what is taking place in the contemporary world. Some 
of the doubts advanced by Didi-Huberman thus do make sense. Agamben 
applied the metaphysics of the “world of ends” to the living movement of 
immanence in a para-theological and apocalyptical approach. As a result, 
he makes frequent recourse to the figure of the “horizon” (the promise of 
the great distant light), rather than taking notice of the near images and 
lights. Didi-Huberman writes that “the first political operator of protest, 
crisis, criticism or emancipation has to be designated as image, in the sense 
of that which proves able to cross the horizon of totalitarian constructs” (Di-
di-Huberman 2009, 101). Alternatively, as can be read in one of the paral-
ipomena to Walter Benjamin’s theses On the Concept of History: “Organis-
ing pessimism [that which fundamentally needs to be done today] means 
discovering the space of the image within the space of political action. This 
space of the image, nevertheless, is no longer measurable in contemplative 
terms..., it is the world of full and integral actuality” (Benjamin 2010, 156). 
The French author sets the belief that there is no absolute destruction in 
opposition to the affirmations of radical destruction in Agamben (that lead 
him to transcendentalisation or redemption as an exit route). In this, he 
is seconded precisely by Walter Benjamin, a thinker both authors hold in 
esteem. That which survives is there and affirms itself; it does not have any 
redemptive value, interrelating merely with the immanence of historical 
time. 
Reaffirming the image as the “temporal operator of the survivals” (Didi-
Huberman 2009, 102), Didi-Huberman insists that there is no total disap-
pearance of light or the state of things in the world but only decline or 
“declination”, a term which serves far better the present times of expecta-
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tion and the mutant forms characterising them. The essential feature of 
the phases of decline is the “bifurcation”, the small dislocations (which are 
indeed referred to by Agamben in his The Coming Community, chapter “Au-
reoles”), or the ball of fire (Benjamin) that crosses the horizon and always 
brings the invention of a new form. Michel Serres formulates the problem 
in a similar fashion by operating with the concepts of “format” and “inven-
tion”. The overlaying of format by invention, which is constantly happen-
ing, nowadays corresponds to modes of updating the discrete but present 
counter-powers in the social and cultural scene. The retreat to those niches 
of counter-power does not necessarily mean a dismissal but the choice of a 
place of freedom of movement that allows action – naturally the possible 
and relative action in a situation in which direct confrontation has become 
almost impossible and inglorious in the face of the absence of a centre of 
power or that which we might designate as the evasive centre of the post-
modern era dominated by the as if (the simulacrum, appearance, the pure 
contingence that opens up to the uncertain but which at the same time 
allows for every type of intervention). 
This new situation is a direct consequence of tough regimes and their 
intellectuals’ certainties. Today, without any centre or even dominant ref-
erences, the very notion of transgression, central to a certain vision of the 
intellectual and the artist in a period predating our time, no longer makes 
sense. Ten years ago, I made a diagnosis of the cultural situation of our 
time (I say situation and not cultural condition as the latter would imply a 
clear and stable trend that does not exist). My diagnosis, established in a 
comparative framework within what was the so-called 20th century “mod-
ern” phase, highlighted features such as: the dissemination of countercul-
ture poles among a totally open and permissive cultural humus; cultural 
media populism; the discrediting of any form of intellectual “authority” 
(which previously could be intolerably moralising); the lack of causes when 
there were only strategies; the expanding radical culture (as against serious 
ruptures in modern culture); a performative and transgenic culture, both 
hybrid and permeable (in response to a critical, rigorous and tragic era); 
the passage from a culture of the word to a culture of happening and spec-
tacle... (Barrento 2001, 40-42 and 47 onwards).
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From biopolitics to psychopolitics
The change that occurred and led to what Foucault, Agamben and 
Esposito designate as “biopolitics”, a practice guided by the recognition 
of the individual as a body to care for, with the consequential weakening 
of the traditional political categories of sovereignty, representation, State 
authority, may also be seen as a factor of change in the very status of the 
intellectual. The question is ascertaining to what extent biopolitics, which 
perceives individuals as living beings, contributed towards the “extinction” 
of the classical type of intellectual, far more concerned about individuals as 
social and “moral” beings. There would in fact seem to be a direct relation-
ship between both factors. The forms of intervention in the polis change 
(despite not dying) because the forms of politics change. Roberto Esposito, 
one of the philosophers espousing biopolitics and who openly continues 
and develops Foucault’s thesis, speaks of a relationship between what he 
terms the “non-political” and biopolitics: it would prove to be non-political 
as it applies to a situation – our own – in which the means of political 
functioning are radically altered. Therefore, it may be stated then that, just 
as the body of the individual has increasingly become transformed into a 
factor, an object and a subject of a State biopolitics, that same body – those 
who act in the political scenario, under new forms of organisation and crea-
tion – has substituted the intervening, “authorised” voice of the intellectual 
(the voice, as we know, has always been, ever since Genesis, something 
sacral and oracular – and neither aspect is taken into account nowadays). 
The weight of the voice – the original one, that is origin and authority, and 
which was also the intellectual’s in the wake of Zola and Sartre – has given 
way to multiple ways of speaking in the Babel of the contemporary polis.
Bernard Stiegler is one of the contemporary thinkers who has come clos-
est to a diagnosis that does not look sideways, upwards or backwards but, 
rather, frontwards towards that which our contemporaneity has brought 
us, lying visible at the surface. He seeks to articulate the condition of be-
ing in the world (the old and the eternal condition of being) with today’s 
technology against all resistance to the so-called alienating actions of capi-
talism. Stiegler proposes as a possible route “creating desire with technics”, 
revaluing the libido and life through this alliance that, for more conserva-
tive mentalities, is a decidedly impossible marriage. The promethean, ex-
clusivist, intransigent and tragic pose of the hard intellectual is put aside 
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and replaced with an alliance between Prometheus and Epimetheus. More 
recently, in being attentive to what is happening and based on concrete 
statistics, Stiegler realizes that the cultural state of the supposedly civilised 
world is one of “disattention”, generated by the dependence on the audio-
visual (especially television) and the programme industries that nourish 
it. While before there was talk of a biopolitics with the State controlling 
the bodies and some thinkers wanting to save them by a return to forms of 
“bare life”, we now have to face up to the reality of a “psychopolitics” and 
“psychopower”, “as soon as technics emerge that enable ever more efficient 
means of controlling the mental activities of individuals” (Stiegler 2007, 
157). Capitalism itself absorbs the great mass of cultural production and 
assumes the role of the intellectuals, which the new “society of control” 
(Deleuze) is able to dispense perfectly. In a situation in which symbolic 
misery reigns throughout the whole territory of “culture”, in which the 
deceiving information saturation de-socialises its consumers, and the de-
struction of attention (that “natural prayer of the soul” as Montesquieu put 
it) de-forms minds with hallucinating audiovisual technologies, the great 
question of our time involves, according to Stiegler, finding exit routes from 
this way of life and inventing new modes of human existence within totally 
technologised societies.
The fireflies still fly or the re-politicisation of art
Contemporary thinkers, such as Georges Didi-Huberman and Jacques 
Rancière, follow the same proposed “endogenous” routes, which are not 
external to the social arena where everything happens (nowadays, even 
that which is, or seeks to be outside it).
In his latest book – Survivance des lucioles, published in late 2009 –, 
which is a direct response to the famous aforementioned article by Pasolini 
on the supposed fading out of the last final luminous points (in Pasolini’s 
words: lucciole, or fireflies) of resistance to the “culture industry” in the 
1970s, Didi-Huberman refuses the idea that we have fallen into such a 
purgatory of semi-dead fireflies to never more escape from it, after the era 
of the great luminaries, in which the intellectual shone (as did the power 
under whose spotlight he stood). The “disappearance” of the lucciole an-
nounced by Pasolini has instead given way to their reappearance, thereby 
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contradicting the theses of their end. Today’s clusters of resistance continue 
to have (or have again) something of an innocence about them (although 
without the illusions of the 1970s), when compared to the prevailing cyni-
cism in politics, advertising and media in all the world life of advanced and 
wild capitalism with its neo-cryptic forms of cultural fascism – witnessed 
in the imposed “taste”, the loathing of thought, the subalternization of the 
book and reading and in its aesthetic conservatism. All of this is naturally 
accompanied by a liberalisation characteristic of the formal democracies 
that precisely allows for the dispersed proliferation of those luminous points 
of counterculture. The problem is – indeed, as in all periods – the impact 
and the repercussions of such clusters, although we know that the place of 
thought and creativity has always been that of small resistant reserves and 
not of the masses that today are fed by a media-based cultural populism 
that demands nothing of them while giving them everything – the price 
still having to be ascertained.
In this era of the image that, however, is not a time for seeing, the world 
itself is still there, now and for ever, waiting to be... not interpreted (its 
meaning always escapes us), neither transformed nor revolutionised but 
simply looked at with eyes that see it along with that which shines within 
– in its multiple and permanent apparitions (images) and not in the exces-
sive exposure given by the great lights, the levellers of all experience. This 
is probably the great paradox of a so-called civilisation “of the image”: a 
large number of people have become incapable of image (of imagining and 
creating or animating, i.e. giving life and soul to the images that surround 
us or are conveyed to us). What is more, they are also incapable of seeing 
those other-images that within this society of great lights continue to be 
produced – intermittently, multiply destabilising the larger brilliance. This 
seems to be the destiny, the fatality – but not the destination – of the so-
ciety of the spectacle, information and globalisation at its advanced (and 
already decadent?) stage.
It is illusionary to affirm that the destination (the telos towards which 
something tends) of this civilisation of the image, though image blind, 
might finally be to open its eyes to the “apparitions” on its margins. How-
ever, it is not illusionary to affirm, contrary to pessimistic proclamations of 
the end, that there is place and space in our societies for those apparitions 
that have come to replace the strong intellectual luminary. Never has the 
stomach of capitalism been so large, never have permissiveness and plural-
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ity been so real and at the same time so fictitious. The insatiable voracity of 
this ultraliberal system is both capable of tolerating all the lucciole shining 
within as it is capable of assimilating and placing them at its service (in this, 
the advertising industry has reached an unsurpassable point).
What then survives in this intolerable and overly tolerant purgatory 
into which history has plunged us? Didi-Huberman replies (against the 
apocalyptic and seconded by his reading of Walter Benjamin, that “Marxist 
Rabi” – in the end not at all messianic?): the minor lights, the unstable but 
persistent will-o’-the-whisps that act today across various levels, generat-
ing desire in an era that is poorly or not at all receptive to major ideologies. 
Desire is, or might be, a driving force raising awareness and transformation 
(Bernard Stiegler grounds his way of reading the present in this fact, as we 
have seen). Furthermore, the receptiveness to images, the capacity to be at-
tentive to the small lights that animate the night of our days may take on a 
highly political role. Didi-Huberman reminds us – along with Foucault, and 
returning to Benjamin’s notion of the “dialectic image” – that “imagination 
is political” and, together with Aby Warburg, of the political function of 
the survival of images, tradition and memory (D.-Huberman 2009, 51-52). 
What is most profoundly contemporaneous, and should not be confused 
with any surface actuality, has somehow to do with this (but with different 
assumptions and arguments than those put forward by Agamben in What 
is the Contemporary?).
However, is it not precisely this surface actuality – that which happens 
and is perceived in the domain of thought and creativity at the crux of the 
polis itself – that is most appropriate to our contemporariness?
The mute manifesto: meta-politics of art and thinking
This, in fact, seems to be the main and most productive idea of an author 
with a plural perspective like Jacques Rancière. His way of understanding the 
relationship between art (or thought) and current politics, emerges when 
he proposes the removal of art and thought from the straight and simplistic 
quadrant of the present situation, from an opposition of distinct fields. What 
happens today is that art and politics take up the same unique space that, 
according to Rancière, “is configured as a spatial-temporal sensorium deter-
mining ways of being together or separated, outside or within” (Rancière 
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2005). That is the space of aesthetics and of the polis, of aesthetics and the 
thought of the polis within the polis. The 18th century theorised and con-
ceived a politics of aesthetics, just as the place and the limits of thinking 
within the polis had been defined since Socrates. Since the Enlightenment 
and Marxism the intellectual assumed the function of denouncing the 
“aesthetic illusion”, generating an irreconcilable and apparently natural op-
position in bourgeois society between society/politics and art (the bourgeois 
novel reflects this theme to exhaustion). This situation endured through 
to the second half of the 20th century with peak moments in Romanti-
cism and Modernism. Everything seems to have changed in recent decades, 
in a phase that we may designate as post-bourgeois – but not, Rancière 
states, thanks to “post-modernism”, rather because art and thought have 
always been an intrinsic part of politics. Today, this has become evident in 
a dual sense: politics has never been more ludic and theatrical (artistic and 
staged); never have so many art forms been confused with the actual social 
humus and the political material wherein they prosper. And sometimes, 
the more autonomous and “indifferent” art and thought seem to be, the 
more they become instruments for political intervention: not from out-
side inwards, but within the political and social theatre itself. They thereby 
become a form of meta-politics (the term is also used by Pierre Bourdieu) 
which intervene directly in life, acting above legislative and managerial 
politics. In their loneliness, the work/thought promise emancipation, show 
what is happening, gaining the strength of presence. Classical oppositions no 
longer make sense, such as between the autonomy and heteronomy of art, 
pure and engaged art, art and the culture industry (which in the 1970s, still 
informed the aesthetic theories of Adorno as well as of Marcuse in his final 
phase, that of The Aesthetic Dimension). As Rancière counterposes, this is 
because art and active thinking create not works but life forms that are “in-
different” (as they renounce the function of denouncement and the explic-
it message), attaining a new critical potential (this is almost a (neo)Dadaist 
program). In the open, multiple space of the social and virtual, where eve-
rything takes place today, the shock of the opposites and the discursive de-
bate have transformed themselves into a unique game where “experience 
is reconfigured” (generating new forms of being aware of the real) – with 
the danger, certainly, of the chaotic profusion of information confusing all 
and affecting the critical spirit. However, one could also say: the spirit, per-
haps, but not critical action. This is present everywhere, in the street, in 
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cultural life in general, on the Internet, even in the museum – effervescent, 
diverse and alive. What happened was not the end of the intellectual and 
other cultural actors but, as I have been stressing, the dislocation, various 
and imperceptible on occasion, of the traditional functions towards diverse 
alternative areas of intervention. The great change – the new paradigm of 
the intervening figure? – is advanced by Rancière in the following terms: 
“The demystifying machine begins to operate alone”. This means: it begins to 
show, rather than to say, to appeal to the recipient’s sensory faculties and 
not so much to bombard him with discursive messages; without absolute 
models, and always in relation to precise contexts. The work (photography, 
installation, film, “action”, text) has become a “mute manifesto”, assuming 
within its own existence and visibility the function of denouncement. The 
intellectual has thereby given way, within this process of subtle dislocation, 
to other participative figures, almost always artistically predominant. The 
arena is now the installation, the blog or You Tube.
This is then the significant passage that has led into our present, from 
argumentation to the power of evidence, from discursive denunciation to 
the exposition of tensions. What happened – I would say, turning to the 
well-known poem by Kavafis – was the barbarisation of the intellectual (his 
necessary de-sacralisation) in the historical epoch in which we are living, 
perhaps not yet of open decadence but certainly of decline, or declina-
tion. The “barbarians” are among us when the discursive gives way to the 
performative, rhetoric to action, abstract thinking to forms of living art, 
theoria to life world. An era in decadence, which has annulled any self-
critical perceptions and, in total blindness, proceeds along a path heading 
into the abyss, like those at the end of the Roman Empire or the Western 
Middle Ages, or during the great crisis of the bourgeois world relentlessly 
exposed by Musil in The Man Without Qualities, the fascist and communist 
dictatorships, and in a certain sense also the current era. The latter perhaps 
craves in the depth of its weak awareness, some type of “salvation” that 
never arrives and, on arriving, can only come from the barbarians who, in 
Kavafis’ poem, are anxiously awaited at the gateways of the city because the 
situation has become unsustainable and intolerable. The new barbarians 
setting up shop inside the city might be the thinkers or the activists, the 
artists or the press columnists, the writers and the cultural programmers, 
the historians and the scientists... Kavafis’ poem, reread in the light of our 
current expectation, is a possible allegory of our times, the current winter 
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of our discontent, and of the many small lights that briefly flare up before 
fading away.
From the intellectual to the “intellectual-function”
We have not arrived at the end of an era; but its centre or one of its 
most audible centres (not actually visible, as of now) – the Voice of the 
intellectual – has splintered. He, too, (and all those, as well as others, 
whose names have arisen during the course of this reflection) remains as 
a truncated but real presence. What has changed then have been the in-
tellectual’s relative positions in society and the world of life in general, as 
well as his pretensions of transformative intervention. The intellectual (the 
“intellectual-function” distributed among many actors) is found in today’s 
thinker and agitator, visionary and protester, resistance group and NGO, 
creative artist and performer, writer (still and always) and humorist. The 
results of all these atomised forms of intervention are different, more un-
predictable, more plural, in general “lighter”, and perhaps more quantifi-
able in our informational society. The great profound alteration is probably 
of a qualitative order: interventions in the “social” fabric are not as clearly 
and explicitly political, but this is due to the fact that politics itself is no 
longer what it once was. It no longer needs ideas; it is no longer an “art” 
– that of the possible – to increasingly transform itself into a show always 
on the eve of elections, a sophistic discourse at the level of advertising, an 
illusory game of sovereignty (almost only economic and not even that), and 
the ignoble and tiresome endeavour to escape from the web that is being 
woven by the global financial empire. Time itself and its scope of action, 
more prolonged and incisive in some figures that provided substance to the 
classical intellectual type, have changed: the new forms of intervention, 
with emotions very often loudly on display, probably no longer impact onto 
our consciences in a lasting way; they are more ephemeral and superficial, 
lacking the power of penetration and duration in the mutant and frothy 
humus from which they stem. However, it is possible that many of them 
are destined, like so many “outdated” figures from the past, to join the list 
of the “posthumous”. But even in such a condition, they would not have 
reached the “end”. They would transverse this period of expectation, this 
interim, prior to the return of new gods. For the meanwhile, we still do not 
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know which. But I suspect that we shall still remain under the reign of the 
gods of images (the visual, the gestural, the performative) for some time yet, 
more than of those of the committed word, in an (unequal) “partage du sen-
sible” as gesture and the act of showing will prevail over discourse and the saying. 
Unless the latter are what allow man, a being of time, differently to the gods 
that simply are, to gain an over-life: that which the word brings them through 
efabulation, the imagination in all its variants (as suggested in Cesare Pavese’s 
fabulous Dialogues with Leucó). Because – wrote Ernst Jünger at the end of 
the last century in a book that reflects upon this disturbing side of all transi-
tions – “in the moment in which the images fall, they have to be replaced by 
images: otherwise we fall under the threat of loss” (Jünger 1990, 7).
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DECONSTRUCTING EXPECTATIONS: ON THE 




Man wird nie betrogen, man betrügt sich selbst, one is never betrayed, one 
betrays himself (or herself), wrote Goethe in his Maximen und Reflexionen 
(Goethe 1982, 12, 522) against too high expectations of any kind. But this 
should not be a declaration of defeatism or cynicism. In an interview in the 
Portuguese newspaper O Público (October 19, 2010), about the changes 
within European religious geography, the Italian sociologist Enzo Pace as-
serted that “people have no intellectual instruments for handling multicul-
turalism”. But who are “people”? May “people” be the German chancellor 
Angela Merkel when she echoed, not long ago, a verdict by the former 
Berlin senator Thilo Sarrazin about the failure of the multicultural model? 
And yet it would be a rather satisfactory experience to sit side by side with 
such defeatists watching the wonderful movie Crash by Paul Haggis, a film 
where all clichés find themselves confirmed, just in order to be afterwards 
deconstructed. And deconstructed by what? Deconstructed by moments of 
recognition, of common feeling, of astonishment.
Such moments are also said, since the Greeks, to be the beginning of 
all philosophy. In the present case, they may be felt like a rupture. But 
if viewed retrospectively under an analytic eye, such moments of aston-
ishment cannot historically exist, i.e. be understood without all previous 
discussions on multiculturalism. To those discussions surely also belong the 
statements about failure or incapacity to understand. And each accusation 
of failure concerns us all.
But this was just an example. Let us therefore not betray ourselves about 
the role of intellectuals in the 21st century. Times have changed and places 
too. We must descend to the level of microanalyses. But as far as we may 
generalize for our latitudes, the sense for uniqueness tends to replace the 
sense for universality on the scale of the mental dispositions of audiences 
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in discussing such important issues like multiculturalism and the so-called 
clashes of civilizations, like the environment and sustainability, value crises 
and alternatives for getting out of these crises. And this happens because 
“in the culture we inhabit, recognition has to be fairly instantaneous or it 
will evoke loss of confidence in the attachment on both sides” (Raz 2001, 
24, note 11). It seems that the former sense of History, which was able to 
push the will to discuss so many problems in specific time-space contexts, 
has crumbled into a lot of senses. It seems that our capacity of judging is 
moving from market places to marked spaces: market places in the mean-
ing of H. Arendt’s public discussion of issues that concern the interests of 
people assuming their citizenship (in the Kantian tradition), marked spaces 
in the meaning of the values that each one of us attaches to the matters 
discussed in the media, that seem to have become the main public space.
As a possible result of this, discussions still continue but they seem to 
have lost the passionate quality that they showed in their golden age be-
tween the forties and the seventies, at least in the countries with freedom 
of expression. One is tempted to push forward the hypothesis that the au-
diovisual media could have contributed, precisely because of the presence 
of the image, to cause a certain skepticism or even distance towards all 
problems, as a possible reaction to the illusion of immediacy. This is not as 
paradoxical as it seems, if we recall the passion with which my generation 
still reads books and newspapers, possibly compensating through the facul-
ty of imagining the distance from the immediate events – the same distance 
which can nowadays be deceived through the simultaneity of a satellite 
report. But I would not like to oppose the depth of the reading-writing dy-
namics to the superficiality of the use of the information made possible by 
new technologies. They are complementary, therefore promoting comple-
mentary competences, since they also stimulate different parts of the brain. 
The medium is not always the message: it often even hides the message 
under the struggle about the means, without reaching the ends, that is, the 
discussion about the conditions of possibility for producing leading ideas.
It seems clear today that we can no longer claim the role of a Voltaire 
or a Zola, writing or speaking to a constant and predictable audience as in 
the 18th and the 19th centuries, succeeding in carrying along huge amounts 
of people behind the causes of innocents like Jean Calas or Alfred Dreyfus. 
At least not in the same way these writers did. Audiences, like majorities of 
any sort, have become either diffuse and indistinct, or specific and differ-
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entiated. The nostalgia of becoming a sort of leading conscience may also 
go along with an unconscious desire of getting support from a mass basis, or 
at least from a broad audience. The consequence is clear: paradigms have 
changed, because they had to change.
In our days, we have to depart from a position of weakness. It is no 
more a gender issue, as it still was in 1964, when Hannah Arendt answered 
Günter Gaus, in a TV interview, that for her the task of thinking and pub-
lishing was not to “want terribly to produce effects (furchtbar gerne wirk-
en)”, as men were supposed to do, but simply to “understand (verstehen)” 
(Arendt 1996, 46). Such an assertion may contain much more than a pas-
sive observatory position. It is surely also something more than a gender 
dispute. It can disclose a sort of intermediary platform for that necessary 
paradigm change, not only from the multitude orator to the differentiated 
analyzer. The change is deeper, must be deeper because it has a lot of im-
plications which we are able to follow in a second degree observation, as 
self-observation.
The platform I mean is made up of time and space: it is the place from 
which we observe the world, speak and act, recognize our own perspectives, 
our own memories, our own evolution, and our own relativity. And also the 
sum of the critical voices that have been making us acquainted with the 
pluralité des mondes. Therefore, we can amplify our vocabulary according to 
a wide semantic field that includes irregularities, exceptions, tensions, mis-
understandings, disagreements. The capacity of translating and relativizing 
differences tends to make such differences more porous, letting contrasts 
become varieties. But the process of such translations, which are inherent 
to the process of reading any study object, is everything but linear. Since 
there is no translation without treason, no traduttore without being tra-
dittore, because each message transfigures itself while it runs through the 
transmission channel, we cannot but constantly find understanding nodes 
and barriers in our way. 
Precisely here begins our task, following Hannah Arendt’s wish to un-
derstand while communicating. For instance, by asking whether it is our 
fate to give credit to the voices that are only able to make copy-paste with 
the reasons of a so-called loss of values on a plurality of fronts: morally, eco-
nomically, politically, existentially. Crises are, as we know, made of threats 
and chances, as well as of marked and unmarked spaces. A collective read-
ing of any crisis is therefore as suspect as the problematic of collective iden-
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tity: both tend to blur any differentiated analysis. Setting unknown paths, 
leaving behind the reproductive character of all normative or predictable 
registers, all this requires a sense of opportunity and risk. But even this risk 
is necessarily minimized, if we see the world as an integrated, multilinked 
system, where communication channels appeal to our expectations and to 
our capacity of marking changes onto our maps of marked and unmarked 
spaces. It is the time to question a possible dialectical relationship between 
the speed of communication and the redundancy of the amount of infor-
mation. The answer to such a question often goes through sheer silence.
After that silence we may realize that public opinion, an opinion that 
was still intrinsically needed by such voices like Voltaire or Zola, is perhaps 
no more the culturally reasoning audience from former times of struggles for 
liberty of expression. But we should avoid moving between extremes and 
in this case also avoid mourning the directly deliberative space of the an-
cient polis in order to accuse a contemporary gloomy, vicious space, where, 
according to some apostles of authenticity, we are irremediably bound to 
lose our own authenticity. This topos, although often deconstructed, seems 
to retain certain attractiveness, incidentally due to the persistence of the 
romantic heritage in its diffuse impetus to show a permanent aversion to all 
patient, daily civic duties. 
Today, civic duties, among which we may count intellectual interven-
tion, may have moved, as said above, from market places to marked spaces. 
This means making a detour from the former, taken symbolically as opinion 
making channels, over historical memories that help us in seeing the fac-
tors of contingency and predictability better, as well as the meanings of 
universality and particularity throughout the last decades. In this sense, we 
may discover, taking the former example, that multiculturalism might be a 
mask for conglomerated forms or particular tribalism. The latter does not 
need to be deconstructed in its evidence. It just needs to be surpassed by 
individual dialogues, singular analyses, unique narratives, which are always 
able to get superposed so as to form new common senses. This also shows 
the limitations of sociological laws and all kind of rules within human 
sciences. 
We should further ask ourselves whether any adopted models do not 
produce more triviality while pretending to oppose trivialization. The mul-
ticultural example is still expressive in itself. But the cultural analyst, a 
dimension that must be inherent to each intellectual, has only to reset and 
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to readjust his or her optical lens, in order to attain a finer grain, in order to 
differentiate and individualize. We may also ask with Judith Butler whether 
humanities get disintegrated through relativism or whether this job was 
done by opponents to relativism and criticism (Butler 2004, 129).
But such questions have once more the function of proving the super-
fluous character of any answer that we might be tempted to give. No one 
is entitled either to making definitive conclusions or to erasing anything, 
but just to complete it. In this sense, any analysis object may come under a 
new light. In this sense, the most pertinent question could be: Why repro-
duced objects and ideas, that do not surprise us but rather throw us back 
to a status of believing in regular laws, or even in any kind of fate, still find 
an audience? On the opposite side, the simple life, as praxis, as well as any 
nature pattern, never repeats itself (Abram 2007, 65). Both invite us, life 
and nature, to become aware of the infinite forms of analogy, as varieties. 
Here, I would like to stress that my point is by no means to set any op-
position between natural and artificial realms, since such opposition is itself 
artificial and ignores the complexity and the entanglement of both. We just 
need for the moment to keep in mind the differences between, on the one 
hand, the dialectics of means and ends, which determine the functional 
perspective, and, on the other hand, the open problematic of purposeless-
ness, of self-fulfilled situations, as the open paths of sheer life. 
Where does the sense of further researching lie? We could turn this ques-
tion upside down and give an answer like “precisely in the illegibility of the 
world”. Let us mistrust not only all recipes, but also all generalizing opinions, 
that come inevitably from the voices that seem to take pleasure in remaining 
seated on crisis scenarios, and not even stand up in order to try to discern a 
wider horizon. But even the apparent a-historicity of such methods discloses 
a lot of “micro-histories” if we take any scenario under our lens; in a certain 
way, it would be the remaking of Hegel’s pointing at the modern subjectivity, 
which had been able to tear down the normative veil of historical symbolic 
dreams (Hegel 1802/1986, 2, 290). But that subjectivity, formerly new as a 
manifestation of modernity, has nowadays to be corrected. It cannot be free 
from the suspicion of trying to compensate for the narrowness of a single 
view through reproductive formulas. In any case, this could be a way to un-
derstand why so many scientific premises are never questioned. Is such an 
uncritical attitude not rather the search for a kind of excuse for giving up on 
any effort to research further, to question established positions?
46
We have to deal with all this, and always from that perspective of weak-
ness as mentioned above. Whether we see ourselves as belonging to post-
modernity or late modernity, such a question at the end becomes irrel-
evant. We have to face the enormous challenge represented by the claim 
of reconstructing frames of reference, and this repeatedly, even if seeming 
to be a Sisyphean task. But we are neither Sisyphus nor Penelope. We do 
not need to undo neither former schemata, nor the schemata that we build, 
but instead of that we have to learn from both in order to be able to work 
independently from any historical normativity. Historical knowledge is es-
sential to open our horizons and to deepen our views, not to bestow us with 
any kind of specific competence. The ivory tower, in which intellectuals 
have been seen for so many centuries, has become uncomfortable in its 
narrowness. It was also, we realize it now, a metaphor from the semantic 
field dictated by the illusion of stability or by the need of shelter. The sea 
metaphor, so familiar to our culture, seems to fit better to our present con-
tingent world. And in it, the intellectual has to manage his or her boat, as 
tiny as a nutshell, as Schiller used to say in the 18th century when he took 
conscience of his historicity, also as a form of contingency. 
The most difficult, but perhaps also the most attractive challenge, seems 
to be the search for a source of energy that could be able to function as a 
replacement for any identity illusion. The empty space left by the institu-
tional support given to the exact sciences has caused a sort of complex of 
exactness with a huge amount of negative consequences, such as an obses-
sive claim of objectivity by the social sciences that makes these often un-
able to deal with the principle of contingency and uncertainty. Even such 
theories like the theory of chaos or of catastrophe do not abdicate to claim 
forms of regularity and predictability. Another negative consequence is the 
reservation status given to literature and art: they have become tout le reste, 
in spite of their prophetical character, which often gives them the honor of 
being quoted at the beginning or at the end of scientific papers. But what 
would be necessary is a real dialogue between these codes. It is no question 
of abolishing the limits, but of crossing them. Neither is the question of giv-
ing up the claim of objectivity, but to overrule a narrow, positivistic view of 
objectivity. We lived for centuries with the belief in a separation between 
a so-called real world and a so-called apparent world. After metaphysics 
has been replaced by the hegemony of science, this same science gives us 
the instruments to understand not only the laws of causality, but also the 
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implications of their consequences. All forms of objectivity imply moments 
that are not visible, but no less real. 
We live in a schizophrenic world, among several forms of fundamental-
ism. They often remain unnoticed; and when noticed, they may be neither 
named nor analyzed. Religious fundamentalism is just one sort of it. In our 
latitudes today, we have to put under the lens the consequences of scien-
tific and economic forms of fundamentalism, rather than the religious. If 
we are aware of the mental predisposition of many citizens (in Western 
countries) to question religious issues but not to question scientific or eco-
nomic expert positions, we have to go a step further. To go a step further 
means to get involved in the atmosphere, the mental disposition that seems 
to paralyze so many of us in order to make us accept apparently unques-
tionable measures or decisions, not asking for the conditions of possibility 
of acting differently. And this is not only a question of freedom, but also 
of availability to the adventure of thinking and judging and not to leave 
one satisfied with ready-made formulas. This is, then, a possible way on 
the path of intellectual citizenship. Let us not be afraid of asking our own 
questions, and let us not be afraid of saying that only the development of an 
interactive discussion may lead us to a possible answer. Let us not be afraid 
to hold the rudder of our nutshell.
Hannah Arendt and the zero degree of politics: 
a case study
“All the words like Peace and Love / All the same affirmative speech / 
Had been soiled, profaned, debased / To a horrid mechanical screech”. W. 
H. Auden, whose words are here quoted by H. Arendt, at the beginning of 
her work Responsibility and Judgement, out of the volume Nones, published 
in the fifties, testimonies a full archeology of devastations throughout the 
twentieth century. Auden and Arendt are contemporaries – both were 
born in the first decade of the same century and both know what they are 
talking about. The process of desertification, both of culture and public 
spaces, showed several dimensions: existential, linguistic, urban, dialogi-
cal, political, economical, biological, and many others. Some decades be-
fore the two world war machines produced the well known ravages, the 
ideological milling of stable values had already caused a radical erosion, 
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denounced for instance by Nietzsche in his essay about truth and lying in 
the extra-moral sense.
The image of desertification is recurrent in the sense of any form of dev-
astation and not just the consequences of both world wars. In The Promise 
of Politics, H. Arendt mentions the space in-between, which had been seri-
ously damaged as a space of living, building, communicating, interacting. 
This action had already been carried out and in a much higher degree by 
totalitarian systems, as the author had pointed out in her work under the 
same title. But the implicit question in all the works that followed seems to 
be of another kind. After 1945, we had the chance, as citizens, to rebuild 
the world and to implement democratic structures by communicating and 
reflecting about the conditions of possibility for acting together. 
Why did this not happen, at least in a satisfactory way, on a widespread 
basis? In fact, such “world alienation” (Arendt 1958, 248) has deeper roots 
than the totalitarian regimes. It means the result of a long historical process 
(as the author demonstrated in the last chapter of The Human Condition), 
which has also led to a loss of capacity to contextualize reference themes in 
time and space. In this sense, it could be a form of amnesia and inability to 
differentiate, letting the individuals become potential objects of all kinds of 
manipulation, or even worse, pieces of machinery that they cannot over-
view any more. Such a loss of availability to face worldly issues would come 
not only out of solipsistic individuation or adverse socialization processes, 
but most of all out of an atrophy of judging and self-reflective capacities. 
The individuals are seen as being responsible for the consequences of such 
a process, precisely due to their lack of responsibility. This is the paradox 
which we all have to deal with.
Upon each step of her expositions, H. Arendt develops her reflections, 
dialoguing silently and implicitly not only with her readers, but also with 
other authors of the history of ideas. Although she partly agrees with Ni-
etzsche’s denunciation of the world as a desert, she still refuses the belief 
that the same desert would dwell inside us, thus refusing what she consid-
ers to be a form of fatalism, a yielding towards an inner conviction of the 
impossibility of living, thinking, judging, dialoging and creating even under 
adverse conditions.
In spite of such refutation, such desert around the human beings could 
become a reality, beyond the well-known tragic historical situation of the 
concentration camps. The real danger of our times would be the feeling 
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that the desert is a sort of homeland, a place where life has been submitted 
to mere reproductive categories and schemata, as a result of the victory of 
the animal laborans upon the homo faber and the homo politicus. The individ-
uals who feel at ease in such a world would be living examples of the inca-
pacity and unavailability to think and judge under democratic conditions, 
but at the same time submitted to the cyclic mechanisms of production and 
consumption. The burned-out environment would therefore be the result 
of a refusal to think within space-time contexts, a denial of the courage to 
assume defense of one’s own judgments. This might be, but must not be a 
consequence of a “Madison Avenue function” (Arendt 2007b, 237), of an 
entertainment society where nobody conceals the purpose of helping to sell 
commodities. We would like to stress that such assertions were formulated 
in the year of her death, 1975, when she regrets the American intervention 
in Vietnam overshadowing the glory of a two century democracy.
Although pointing out the barbarian and ruinous consequences of the 
entertainment society, yet she does not stick to a complaining negative dia-
lectics like Adorno and Horkheimer. The denunciation both of consump-
tion priorities and the uses of culture as a function, as a means to reach 
forms of social prestige is but a station in Arendt’s thinking path, which 
sees in a general lack of sense (incidentally caused by both attitudes men-
tioned before) an effect of the absence of a critical and self-critical praxis by 
the individuals. At the end, it could be seen as a result of not questioning 
how it would be possible to make things become better, under the given 
circumstances.
Developing such capacities is a process that requires the exercise of re-
activating historical memories. It may begin with a question: Can we learn 
from unspeakable horror, from the confrontation with facts that should 
never have happened, with situations from which no human being could 
be expected to exit with energy to look at the world in its eyes, to dialogue, 
to smile, to create? And yet: If in such situations human beings interact 
and testify mutually to their presence, it is in such an in-between space, on 
such a tabula rasa or zero degree of politics, that may arise the most amazing 
occurrences, worth to be told as lessons for posterity. Such is the mean-
ing of the quotation Victrix causa deis placuit, sed victa Catoni at the begin-
ning of Men in Dark Times, upon the example of individuals who had given 
such proof of crossing existential deserts, and not only under totalitarian 
regimes. Therefore, the ability for action with a political dimension has to 
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do with forms of interaction in the in-between space, creating profiles of 
singular humanization which can be retraced later on. 
Thus, we see that a differentiation between totalitarian and democratic 
systems does not hinder the author from discerning some analogies among 
them and pointing out how the latter are undermined by economic impera-
tives and the subsequent reduction of culture objects and works to spec-
tacular, trivial commodities. In other words: The paradigm of resistance has 
changed since most of such dark times, but neither has it disappeared nor 
has it become superfluous in times of peace and liberty of expression. The 
struggle of former decades has given way to deliberate steps and attitudes 
against the doxa, the mainstream of trivialized opinions.
Beyond the well known distinctions between the absence of independ-
ent jurisdiction in a totalitarian state and the warranty of basic rights of 
individuals in a democratic state, the similitude between both can be ana-
lyzed under the spotlight of the threat of extinction of the separation be-
tween public and private realms. Let us go back to the image of the desert, 
in order to understand better what is at stake. It can be used as a compari-
son, in neutral terms, to domains that are strange to us, ruled by laws that 
we ignore and in which people speak languages that we do not understand, 
without the possibility of any help from a lingua franca. In such spaces, we 
do not know how to find any kind of orientation. But such a desert – as 
H. Arendt points out in the last pages of The Promise of Politics – harbors 
in itself a bigger risk, that of sand storms that threaten, like totalitarian 
regimes, the human faculties of passion and action (Arendt 2007a, 168). 
In this context, H. Arendt stresses the importance of the oasis, as fountains 
of affective regeneration, like a private realm to which individuals may ac-
cede but where they should not remain confined. Such a realm should be 
considered just as a necessary station to regain forces that may empower 
the same individuals in order to interact again on the public arena. 
We should hereby notice the full positivity of Arendt’s vision of the 
public realm in The Human Condition, contrasting with the admitted pos-
sibility of the existence of a desert-like dimension, in the same realm, in the 
last years of her life. As a matter of fact, the oases should not be places of 
amusement, but life fountains that would allow us to live in the desert in 
spite of the eventual impossibility of our reconciliation with it. No details 
are given to us about what such a desert might contain or imply. The au-
thor does not capitulate before any destructive reality, not worthy of figur-
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ing in world history. Instead of this, she draws our attention towards the 
inexhaustible potentials of human capacities even if submerged in cultural 
trash.
The loss of stable criteria or the question of traditional values is there-
fore a mere process that is inherent to modernity. We should learn how to 
handle it. Such a loss can be solved neither by old time’s nostalgia nor by 
the arbitrary adoption of new criteria. In this context, the author draws 
our attention towards the risks of ignoring the historical dimension or of 
subsuming it under social or psychological sciences. This means that she 
pledges to bestow us with all the instruments to cross the desert, either in 
the dark times of totalitarian regimes, or in the times of confusing lights 
and noises of the post-war. 
The blank platform of what we may call the zero degree of politics can 
also be seen ex negativo. The banality of evil circulates as a marked expres-
sion ever since the Eichmann report as the configuration of any insignifi-
cant administrative worker, as a depersonalized function of a bureaucratic 
state. We should yet go further than the problematic of state machinery, to-
talitarian or democratic, and question the crumbling of all presuppositions 
of civility, of culture. This leads us to the mentioned desertification of the 
world in-between. Such a desertification, with its subsequent sand storms, 
becomes possible when the human being gives up the claim of stopping in 
order to think, to unfold him- or herself into perspectives corresponding to 
points of view which are strange to him or her, to engage him- or herself 
in conceptual operations which should have as an object a reality basis. 
The transition from the invisible realm, where the problems are formulated 
in full awareness about the limitations of one’s own perspectives, to the 
space of appearance where in each moment the interactive possibilities are 
played out, such a transition has to do, in our way of reading H. Arendt’s 
thought, with the non linear paths of achieving liberty.
These paths can only be fulfilled out of a reserve fund of reflection and 
memory, of a conscientious exercise in thinking and willing as a critical, so 
to say, “proto-communicative” attitude. In the afterword of the first volume 
of Life of the Mind (Thinking), the author admits the intention of putting to-
gether in a next volume analysis of the will and the faculty of judging. One 
comes to judgments, as she wrote in the notes that she left for that volume, 
neither by deduction nor by induction, but by a process in search of a kind 
of “silent sense” analogue to the aesthetic conscientiousness and as a result 
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of a “peculiar talent” (Arendt 1999, 237) that could only be practiced, not 
taught – as a path than only can be made by walking. Judgment, as she as-
serts, deals with particularities and forces the thinking self to return to the 
world of appearances and to develop a special endowment to deal with it, 
using History in its etymologic sense, which means researching in order to 
tell how it has been.
We are now able to understand why what we call the “zero degree of 
politics” may never be found in the lack of reflection that leads to a blind 
obedience by a functionary, or confines an animal laborans to a cyclical, 
conditioned existence. While lack of reflection obliterates any political po-
tentialities, such a zero degree dwells, as a form of latent interaction, in 
each individual who should not only be able to communicate his or her 
judgment about a problem that he or she might face, but also to act accord-
ing to the circumstances. In other words, while the faculty of judging would 
be a common endowment to all human beings, the possibility of acting 
would have to be repeatedly formulated from the start, taking account of 
the virtualities of adaptation of judgments to a constantly changing reality.
The criteria of judgment are based upon experience. Such experience 
is reported by the five senses, by action in the in-between space and by the 
exchange of memories. Latest is made possible by reading, writing and cor-
respondence. It is not by chance that the Denktagebuch, published in 2002, 
shows us the author’s practice of a silent dialogue of the individual with 
him- or herself and with authors of the philosophical and literary tradition, 
so to say in a movement of a rocking chair, used by Arendt to speculate and 
think, but interrupted by the movement of getting up from the chair and 
sitting at the table in order to write a letter or an essay. She always typed 
her texts directly on the machine, without using a previous, manual written 
version.
Besides the hundreds of pages with notes of the Denktagebuch, Arendt 
left us a huge amount of letters to the persons around her: Martin Heidegger, 
Karl Jaspers, Heinrich Blücher, Mary McCarthy, Hermann Broch and Kurt 
Blumenfeld. All notes and letters can also be seen as an in-between space, 
where one can measure and judge what is revealed and what is concealed. 
The recognition of such space and the achievement of practices of inter-
action and dialogue presuppose an in-between time, which does not care 
about the immediacy of modern life but shows itself as being indispensable 
in order to articulate thinking, willing and judging with worldly action.
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Articulating means mediation between the instances of thinking and 
acting, in the simultaneous conscience of their contingency. In this sense, 
Arendt’s understanding (against masculine producing effects, as men-
tioned above) is a kind of “reconciliation in action”, as she writes in the 
Denktagebuch (Arendt 2002, 315). Reconciliation means therefore opening 
oneself to the world, because there is no other world besides this one. In 
this sense, we could reformulate the Pascalian question about the use of 
having faith, for our times, as W.H. Auden put it – and H. Arendt quotes 
it at the beginning of her volume about thinking: “Does God ever judge us 
by appearances? I suspect that he does”.
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INTELLECTUALS AND THE MEDIA
rita Figueiras
In the beginning of 2010, soon after releasing a book called Axolotl Roadkill,1 
the 17-year-old German author Helene Hegemann was accused of plagia-
rizing from a blogger’s book,2 but instead of causing embarrassment the au-
thor was surprised. In an interview with the German newspaper Der Spiegel 
3 she said “I can’t understand what all the fuss is all about” and in her 
defence regarding accusations of plagiarism she claimed: “there is no such 
thing as originality anyway, there’s only authenticity”.
According to the net-generation mentality, epitomized in this young 
author, if everything has already been said, originality is a fallacy and le-
gitimacy resides in authenticity.4 According to this perspective, an author’s 
1 Helene Hegemann’s Axoloti Roadkill was published in the beginning of 2010 by Ul-
lstein publishing house, one of the largest publishers in Germany. Two weeks after the 
novel was released, the publishing house had already printed 100,000 copies. In Febru-
ary, in the major critical moment of this literary scandal, the book was second place on 
the German bestsellers lists and it was also short-listed in the best fiction category of 
the Leipzig Book Fair. Sources: “Helene Hegemann, the art of cut and paste” by Dirk 
Pilz, http://goo.gl/3OL1Z (accessed October 2, 2010); “Did the New Star of German 
Literature Steal from a Blogger?” by Tobias Rapp, //goo.gl/TKDPq (accessed October 2, 
2010); “Author, 17, Says It’s ‘Mixing’, Not Plagiarism” by Nicholas Kulish, http://goo.gl/
MztNN (accessed October 2, 2010); “The Free-Appropriation Writer” by Randy Ken-
nedy, http://goo.gl/vGv48 (accessed October 2, 2010).
2 Helene Hegemann plagiarized mainly from Strobo, a novel by Airen published 
in 2009 by Sukultur, a small publishing house in Berlin. “Helene Hegemann, the art 
of cut and paste” by Dirk Pilz, http://www.presseurop.eu/en/content/article/188711-
helene-hegemann-art-cut-and-paste (accessed October 2, 2010); “Did the New Star 
of German Literature Steal from a Blogger?” by Tobias Rapp, http://www.spiegel.de/
international/zeitgeist/0,1518,678165,00.html (accessed October 2, 2010); “Au-
thor, 17, Says It’s ‘Mixing’, Not Plagiarism” by Nicholas Kulish, http://www.nytimes.
com/2010/02/12/world/europe/12germany.html (accessed October 2, 2010); “The 
Free-Appropriation Writer” by Randy Kennedy, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/28/
weekinreview/28kennedy.html?_r=1&ref=europe (accessed October 2, 2010).
3 Tobias Rapp, http://www.spiegel.de/international/zeitgeist/0,1518,678165,00.html 
(accessed October 2, 2010).
4 Excluding the legal debate and dimension of copyrighting, for a long time now, in dif-
ferent perspectives and theoretical backgrounds, there is a vast literature addressing the 
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creativity is revealed through authenticity. Creativity is expressed in the 
way one approaches an existing text, in the way the text is reorganized. 
From a different order in a distinct context, a “new” text is born. Profound-
ly shaped by one’s subjectivity, reconfiguration is always unique and that is 
each author’s distinguished signature. 
This “remix culture” emerging out of the new generations has neverthe-
less been legitimized by several traditional cultural instances, whose repu-
tation and business have always been based on the economy of creativity, 
on the principle of originality and on a different definition of authorship. 
The publishing house, a reputable one, did not remove the book from the 
market after the scandal; the book was nominated for a literary book prize, 
in the category of best fictional writing at Leipzig’s book fair, and through 
this process the book became a bestseller. 
In this era of users producing content and sharing – two of the main 
seductive and widely promoted characteristics of social networks – this 
episode illustrates this new trend well and adds to the debate surround-
ing blogs, Wikipedia and YouTube contents created by individuals without 
the credentials and intellectual background to validate what they produce. 
Within this discussion, a set of questions on the cultural consequences of 
these new practices, especially concerning the authority of knowledge, has 
been raised. If anyone, regardless of his or her knowledge, can collaborate 
with these social networks, what place is reserved for the specialist and 
intellectual knowledge? 
In this paper, entitled Intellectuals and the Media, the social and culture-
wide reconfiguration that has been taking place in contemporary society is 
debated. These changes have been framing the loss of relevance of intel-
lectuals as well as their disappearance from the media. The paper proceeds 
as follows: in the first section, I wish to analyze the concept of the intel-
interconnections among the concepts of authenticity, originality, individuality, identity 
and authorship, such as: Schwarz, Hillel. 1998. The Culture of the Copy; Coombe, Rose-
mary. 1998. The Cultural Life of Intellectual Properties: Authorship, Appropriation, and the 
Law; Randall, Marilyn. 2001. Pragmatic plagiarism: Authorship, Profit, and Power; Mac-
farlane, Robert. 2007. Plagiarism and originality in nineteenth-century literature; Vicinus, 
Martha and Caroline Eisner. 2008. Originality, Imitation, and Plagiarism: Teaching Writing 
in the Digital Age; Blum, Susan. 2009. My Word!: Plagiarism and College Culture; Boon, 
Marcus. 2010. In Praise of Copying; Perloff, Marjorie. 2010. Unoriginal Genius: Poetry by 
Other Means in the New Century.
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lectual and its changes throughout time, and in the second, the media de-
motic rendered through the growing presence of the vox populi in the public 
sphere, and the increasing invisibility of intellectuals as a consequence, is 
addressed. I end by debating how the invisibility of traditional intellectuals 
in present-day Western society may be seen as a consequence of the “melt-
ing powers” of modernity (Bauman 2000, 6). 
Melting power
Intellectuals: from legislators to interpreters and facilitators
According to Bauman (2000), modernity has instituted its own model 
by substituting traditional society’s structure, while the contemporary era 
of modernity has been characterized by dismantling the modern project 
without replacing it with any other. Within this context modern institu-
tions such as the church, the family, the nation-state, the political parties, 
and the education system are collapsing and may be seen as “zombie cat-
egories”, as Ulrich Beck calls some dimensions of modernity, dead and yet 
still alive in contemporary society (in Bauman 2000, 6). 
Relevant works on intellectuals in present-day Western society are a 
good example of Beck’s expression: The last intellectuals by Russell Jacoby; 
Public Intellectuals: a history of decline by Richard Posner and Where have all 
the intellectuals gone? by Frank Furedi. Bridging decline, disappearance, and 
extinction, these titles illustrate well the non-optimistic tone of the debate 
surrounding the topic. 
The epithet “intellectual” was initially created to offend men of let-
ters heading a press campaign against the French state over the “Drey-
fus Affair” (1898). Since then, the term has been associated with con-
troversial individuals imbued with a spirit of public culture and critical 
participation in society. By publishing his famous article J’Accuse, in 
the newspaper L’Aurore, Émile Zola is one of the first examples of the 
relationship between the figure of the intellectual – characterized by 
independence, knowledge and critical spirit – and public intervention 
through the media (Debray 1979; Carey 1992; Jacoby 2000; Posner 
2004). 
Throughout times, these attributes have given visibility, prestige, cred-
ibility, and respectability to intellectuals, leading authors such as Gramsci 
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(in the early 1930s), Mannheim (1936) or Foucault (1980) to an informed 
discussion as to the relevant role of intellectuals in disseminating ideas and 
the formation of knowledge. However, society nowadays is very different 
from the years when each respective author wrote about intellectuals and it 
is even further set apart from those times when the reputation of the public 
thinkers was conquered. 
The invisibility of intellectuals in the media and in public life is also the 
corollary of other social changes, such as the growth of relativism and spe-
cialization, as well as of the professionalization of academic life (Baumann 
1987; Gagon 1988; Bourdieu 1989; Giroux 1995; Smith and Weber 1997; 
Posner 2004; Furedi 2005). Specialization, which is detectable in an ever 
more fragmented and narrower knowledge, and the professionalization of 
intellectual life by academy expansion also led academic intellectuals to 
centre themselves increasingly on their careers, and keep busy with multi-
ple bureaucratic tasks.
In this process, the already mentioned traditional intellectual attrib-
utes of independence, autonomy, public intervention and universality of 
thought were compromised and led, according to Bauman (1987), to the 
loss of their role as cultural “legislators” to assume a more modest role as 
“interpreters” of culture. Invested in their role as legislators, intellectuals 
used to make authoritative statements. On several occasions, they were 
not appreciated, either because they were considered subversive, danger-
ous or naysayers, but they were always respected and asked to participate 
in public debate. Some of these intellectuals tended to have a difficult re-
lationship with the status quo, even while some represented the dominant 
power(s) – the ideologists and apologists –, whom Gramsci (1983) called 
“organic intellectuals”. 
The transformation of knowledge into “knowledges” also compro-
mised the status of intellectuals, and their erudition started to be seen 
as a point of view without any given relevance to society. Simultane-
ously, the increase in specialization started to discourage a wider per-
spective on subjects and to privilege the particular and the concrete. In 
the role of post-modern interpreters, intellectuals have become com-
munication “facilitators”, some of whom have been converted into me-
dia celebrities. 
For many authors (Debray 1979; Baumann 1987; Bourdieu 1989; Said 
1994; Louw 2001; Posner 2004; Furedi 2005; Chaplin 2007; Fleck et al. 
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2009; McKee 2002), changes do not lead just to a variation in scale regard-
ing being an intellectual, but to a structural redefinition of the concept. 
According to Eric Louw (2001, 13) and Alan McKee (2002, 221), nowa-
days there are new kinds of “intellectuals” deriving from communication 
and popular culture, such as television producers, screenplay writers or 
publicists. These authors view themselves as intellectuals by highlighting 
the growing power of these media professions and emphasizing their role in 
defining, producing and disseminating public knowledge. This perspective, 
besides reflecting un-sacred knowledge trends, emphasizes the media’s rel-
evance and social influence in contemporary societies, just as intellectuals 
did in the past. 
The transformation happening in the cultural sphere, built both on the 
growing relevance of the media and the devaluation of knowledge and of 
those who know, the intellectuals and experts, is also reflected in govern-
ment education policies enacted in several Anglo-American countries, in 
Germany, the Netherlands, Italy, France5 or Portugal.
Education oriented to personal and intellectual growth has been sub-
stituted by an education policy in which the tension between the “old” 
and “new” “knowledges” is expressed. The political project to guarantee 
wider access and success in school can be seen as representing a continuous 
decrease in the levels of demand and quality and by increasingly despising 
cultural heritage and over-rating “reality” (Furedi 2005 and 2009; Vieira 
2009 and 2010). 
An episode that occurred in Portugal in 2003 illustrates well the po-
lemic surrounding the education reform ideology in which the favouring 
of materials related to everyday life elbows aside the reading of the classics 
and erudite knowledge (Vieira 2009 and 2010). The reality TV show Big 
Brother’s regulations were included in one of the schoolbooks from one of 
the most reputed Portuguese publishing house in the field. In the textbook, 
students were asked to comment in class on the television show accor-
ding to what they knew about the program, and then to write a “techni-
cal opinion” about Big Brother’s rules and regulations. This exercise raised 
5 “Entre les murs” (Class) directed by Laurent Cantet and “La journée de la jupe” 
(The day of the skirt), directed by Jean-Paul Lilienfeld, are French movies, released in 
2008, that had huge visibility. Both addressed real events regarding teacher authority 
in terms of both knowledge and discipline in French high schools.
60
such public indignation from teachers to experts that the publishing house 
removed that specific exercise from the textbook.6
According to Furedi (2009, xi), in a time where education is the flagship 
of all governments and lifetime learning is valued – presented as the land of 
new opportunities –, this translates into one of the biggest paradoxes of the 
contemporary era: the more society values education, the less schools and 
universities demand of their students. 
Icing Power
The media: from the cult of the expert to the cult of the vox populi
For commercial reasons, television has suffered a significant social 
transformation from a rational and civic enlightening sphere to an enter-
taining and demotic space, leading to “the increasing visibility of the ordi-
nary person” (Turner 2009, 2).7 Umberto Eco’s (1985) concepts of “Paleo-
TV” and “Neo-TV” help understand this change from television as a civic 
cultivation space to a space of affective sociability. Television started out 
conceived as a debating space for public issues, structured on a formal re-
lationship, hierarchized and built into distance between specialists and the 
audience. Two different kinds of examples, from Portugal and France, con-
vey this role well. 
“If I remember well” (1969-1975), led by Vitorino Nemésio, and “Im-
ages of European Poetry” (1969-1974), presented by David Mourão-Ferrei-
6 LUSA, “PCP pede explicações ao ministro da Educação sobre manuais esco-
lares do 10.º ano”, Público, December 3, 2003. http://www.publico.pt/Educação/
pcp-pede-explicacoes-ao-ministro-da-educacao-sobre-manuais-escolares-do-10º-
ano_1177583?all=1 (accessed October 2, 2010); “Big Brother retirado do manual es-
colar”, Correio da Manhã, December, 6. http://www.cmjornal.xl.pt/detalhe/noticias/na-
cional/portugal/big-brother-retirado-do-manual-escolar (accessed October 2, 2010). 
7 In Turner’s view, the turn towards the media demotic is systematically demon-
strated by the reality TV programmes, such as Big Brother or Idols; however, nowadays 
ordinary people have turned themselves into media content through diversified con-
tent and media. “From the vox pops in news bulletins to the celebrity that comes with 
participation in reality TV, from calling up your local talk radio host to competing for 
stardom in Idol, from posting your favorite images on Facebook to becoming one of the 




ra, were two weekly programs broadcast on the Portuguese state television 
channel, RTP. The authors were both Portuguese intellectuals (poet, au-
thor, professors in the Faculty of Arts at the University of Lisboa and mem-
bers of the Academy of Sciences of Lisboa), and in both programs several 
topics related to erudite culture were discussed for an audience addressed 
directly, as if delivering a lecture.
The second example comes from France. Les Télé-clubs were created in 
1952 by the French state broadcasting television channel, TF1, and were 
produced for schoolchildren, but also adults, and targeted mainly rural 
areas. The success of the show extended its concept to other countries, 
including Great Britain, Italy, Japan (Chaplin 2007, 19), and Portugal. 
All these programs were conceived as civic debate promoters both for 
educating and working. However, for commercial reasons television was 
converted into an emotional “proximity place” (Mehl 2002) by transfer-
ring itself to a living room, a garden bench, a doctor’s office and its wait-
ing room. Television started to centre itself on ordinary citizens, valuing 
him/her and legitimizing his/her ways of expression and interests, creating 
an open cultural arena, accessible and intelligible to all. Throughout this 
process, the privatization of the public sphere and the private sphere’s in-
creased publicizing was verified. 
“Neo-TV” started to devalue experts and value the instant popularity 
of ordinary people to the detriment of artistic talent or intellectual work. 
This is what talent shows, such as Idols,8 are telling society by giving viewers 
the power to choose the winners without needing to know anything about 
what is being judged, and therefore overriding the panel of experts. 
Hence, the mainstream media, one of the most relevant institutions 
sponsoring the emergence and social affirmation of intellectuals in the 
past, seem now an accomplice in the disappearance of this knowledge elite. 
They are ever more distant from expressions of high culture and comple-
xity of thought, and increasingly centred on superficial debate and on vox 
populi. Anchored in emotion, spectacle, speed, shallowness, (Gitlin 2007; 
8 The entertainment show “Idols” is one of the most popular transnational televi-
sion formats in 21st century television history. It started in Britain as “Pop Idol” in 
2001, but soon after its format was exported to Australia, Malaysia, the US, Brazil, 
Belgium, Canada, Norway, Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands, Pan-Arabia, Portugal 
and Spain.
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Patterson 2010), these attributes “grew, however, from this kind of specific 
application to the point where the label of tabloidization was expanded to 
cover a broad-based cultural movement, that was not only evident in me-
dia forms but also in the wider culture” (Turner 2009, 28).
In this social context, throughout this ascendant trajectory of media-
pop culture in several Western countries, it is easy to find examples that 
illustrate this trend: the intellectualization of football, television person-
alities becoming university teachers (and some raised to the status of au-
thors), and the promotion of Twitter and Facebook to official sources for 
quality media, such as New York Times, CNN or BBC newscasts.
At the same time, the tabloidization of cultural institutions also repre-
sents a growing trend. Academics popularize their work in order to reach 
an uninterested audience; schools decrease their levels of demand and 
quality so as not to compromise universal education; newspapers popular-
ize themselves in order to guarantee audience share and financial survival; 
publishing houses invest in hyped themes and authors, compromising book 
quality and the status of erudition and authorship. 
According to Andrew Keen (2007), the Internet is amplifying this phe-
nomenon, as already illustrated by the example from Helene Hegemann. 
For this author, the Internet is one of the main factors responsible for the 
loss of relevance of erudite culture, knowledge, and as well as for the emi-
nent ruin of its modes of expression, like books or newspapers. For Keen, 
the positive aspects of the Internet do not prevent technology from de-
stroying culture and its business models. 
Further to this point, French philosopher and sociologist Gilles Lipovet-
sky in World Culture states that “going to the web to obviate lack of knowl-
edge and by being too occupied in living in the present time to cultivate a 
not immediate culture, human beings from hyper-modernity tend to lose the 
notion of perspective, but also the shared base of shared knowledge, which 
is culture” (Lipovetsky 2009, 98). And the author continues: “the absence 
of structuring cultural pillars and the existence of easy-to-find abundant 
knowledge is reflected in a lack of ability to hierarchize information”.9




I have tried to highlight the wider cultural reconfiguration that is hap-
pening in contemporary society. It argues that the institutions that en-
dorsed the emergence and prestige of intellectuals are those that are cur-
rently contributing most to the decline, disappearance, and, who knows, 
potential extinction of intellectuals. Through a logic of cultural and social 
liquidity, modern institutions are collapsing – melting in Bauman’s words 
(2000, 6) – and authorities of knowledge, such as intellectuals and their 
type of thought, may no longer be adequate to the emerging liquid institu-
tions. 
As I have shown, education, governments and the media, dealing with 
their own liquidity, are redefining themselves, changing their values and 
practices and simultaneously valuing kinds of knowledge and thought, 
namely the vox populi, different from that offered by intellectuals. Everyday 
citizen living experiences posed as a certain kind of expertise are increas-
ingly being valued by society’s main institutions. 
This tendency can be explained by exploring one of the most esteemed 
values of the cultural rhetoric of Western societies: the abstract equality 
between individuals (Wolton 1999) that is taken to its extreme by promot-
ing vox populi and by attributing it the same level as the “voice” of experts. 
Having said that, this cultural turn is also contributing to the intellectual 
malaise (Furedi 2005, 102) that characterizes contemporary societies. Using 
Bauman’s metaphors, this may be seen as the infiltrations corroding some 
of the foundations of Western culture, such as erudite knowledge, reflec-
tion, intellectual and specialist status, authorship, knowledge hierarchies, 
and the levels of demand and quality that society demands of itself. 
If between “equality” and “distinction” (Bourdieu 1989) the latter is 
renounced by society in the name of one of the most esteemed values re-
garding Western societies’ cultural rhetoric and all voices are valued equal-
ly, there is, at least, one question that must be raised: when everybody is 
speaking, who is listening? 
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FROM A CULTURE OF SEPARATION TO A 
SEPARATION OF CULTURES: AND NOW?
João Caraça
The intellectual strength of modernity springs from the surprising capac-
ity and robustness of “separation” as a method of analysis of natural phe-
nomena. Starting with the invention of linear perspective (which clearly 
separates the object from the observer, the subject) and the development of 
new critical cultural and experimental trends, a new worldview took form. 
This worldview, “geometrical” in character, stemmed from the search for 
symmetries in nature which, in themselves, conceal principles of invariance 
that in turn lead to the formulation of laws for the natural world. The use 
of instruments, namely the “camera obscura” – which enabled the separa-
tion of light from vision, and the deployment of the printing press – against 
the general background of growing trade and business activities related 
to oceangoing navigation, led to the separation of a private sphere within 
what until then was considered the public domain – that of (agrarian) soci-
ety. The Reformation initiated the separation of the state from the church 
and “matter” naturally followed this path, becoming separated from “mind” 
during the following century. The 19th and the 20th centuries saw further 
drivers of separation – economy and society; home and work; science and 
technoscience; i.e. the separation impetus has promoted a “macedoine” of 
cultures with no clear cut future direction: and with a loss of purpose for 
human endeavour.
In fact, the triumph of modernity, which was based on the introduc-
tion of a symbolic language (mathematics) to represent nature (enabling 
the separation of beings from rules, objects from models, ontology from 
epistemology) has turned into a cognitive crisis where the sense of anguish, 
short-termism, oppression and insecurity are rampant. The fade-out in 
daily language and concerns of concepts like nature, science, universals 
and sovereignty, and the pre-eminence of new notions (yet to be fully un-
derstood) like environment, knowledge (as with the knowledge-economy), 
global and governance, as their substitutes, unveiled a world filled with 
uncertainty and complexity to astonished westerners.
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If uncertainty is clearly not a new subject, requiring responses that cre-
ate redundancies (which mean more expenditure), thinking about the fu-
ture and defining a strategy (which may appear as a waste of resources to 
common sense), a complex world brings about a complete confrontation in 
terms of values and perceptions with that hitherto perceived as reality. This 
is because what complexity really means is the impossibility of separating 
the system from its context, the object from the measuring instrument, the 
living being from its environment. Either we invent a new mathematics to 
deal with complexity or we are severely hampered in our capacity of under-
standing that going on. Thus, a crisis has developed.
This crisis merged with the intrinsic crises of the modern world-system 
(based on the operation of markets, in particular financial) and amplified 
them in our corner of the world, by tying them to the systematic mecha-
nisms of structural change in the world economy which will occur in this 
century (on the 2030 horizon).
Many disruptive factors are clearly discernible among Western societies: 
(i) a major weakening of existing institutions; (ii) a major, wide reaching 
and long lasting war for resources; (iii) a possible fading-out of higher-edu-
cation systems due to fiercely competitive mechanisms; (iv) a possible new 
techno-economic paradigm implemented (for the first time in history) by a 
non–Western country; (v) the emergence of a new set of unchecked values: 
no longer “transform nature” but “live together”, especially challenging if 
deployed under non-democratic principles.
The answer to the crisis must therefore be cultural: from the ashes of 
the culture of modernity and its geometrical worldview we have to be able 
to (re)create a culture that embraces both the ethics and aesthetics of “in-
terrogation” (of self, of society and of the universe) leading to a socially 
and environmentally accountable cooperative economy, supported by rules 
for the common good and new institutions at world level. Only with a 
planetary culture based on the “recognition” of the values of diversity and 
identity will this century become brighter again. We must let new ontolo-
gies flower. And cherish the new mathematics that will replenish the holes 
left by greed and hubris, opening up new avenues onto the future.
João Caraça
THE LAST PARADIGM? 
DELIBERATE VISIONS ON A SUSTAINABLE 
WORLD
gaston meskens
Introduction – Sustainably clearing up conceptual fog
What is the purport of global politics around global challenges within 
the framework of sustainable development today? It does not need thor-
ough and in-depth research to conclude that global negotiations on how 
to tackle serious issues such as climate change, poverty, environmental 
degradation and unsustainable production and commodity consumption 
have made little to no progress during the last decades. The first reason for 
this might indeed be called “situational”, as it is obviously very difficult to 
“turn the tide” of the dynamics of a set of interlinked processes that func-
tion according to their own rationalities. Global politics recognises that 
the world has become more complex, and that the challenges mentioned, 
multifaceted in themselves, are essentially emergences of the complexity of 
the dynamics and inter-linkages of these global socio-economic processes. 
Taking into account declarations such as the Universal Declaration of Hu-
man Rights and Agenda 21,1 one can say that our society has made pro-
gress in developing and formulating ideas about what needs to be done. 
These ideas are ethically grounded as they typically (and rightly) refer to 
fundamental values such as human equity and the value of nature, but 
also in the way they refer to more modern “organisational” values such as 
transparency and fair play in politics and the market economy. Guided by 
these ethics, while faced with the observed or expected malaises, one could 
wonder why deliberations on what would be the right thing to do remain 
deadlocked over conflicting rationalities or, in the best case scenario, in 
1 Agenda 21 is a comprehensive plan of action to be taken globally, nationally and 
locally by organizations of the United Nations system, governments, and major groups in 
every area in which human beings impact on the environment. See http://www.un.org/
esa/dsd/agenda21/. 
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vague (re)formulations of non-binding commitments. Is it only political 
self-interest to blame or is there more at stake? 
The adagio goes that interest groups (nation states, private sectors, cul-
tural communities, etc.) would need to “show political will” by putting the 
higher interest first and then seek to maintain their integrity consistent 
with (or despite) the policies and measures that would serve this higher 
interest. Everybody would agree that this is an extremely difficult exercise. 
In contemporary arenas, however, the complexity of the challenges faced 
is only perceived as that of a thorny political exercise of negotiating trade-
offs between conflicting interests in the social-economic-ecological play-
ing field. In this arena, politics only focuses on negotiating socioeconomic 
incentives and disincentives at the level of the practices under investiga-
tion, but deny the fact that the reference knowledge used to motivate argu-
mentations in these negotiations tends to be ill-considered or strategically 
mediated already in itself. In deliberating what to do, actors seek to protect 
their integrity and their search for evidence to stimulate what to do is trou-
bled by the search for evidence to motivate the maintenance of their own 
integrity. The reference knowledge used to motivate both argumentations 
is thereby typically mediated into “thin rationalisations” that undermine 
the quality of the debate. One can observe that, in the face of cognitive 
and axiological complexity, political actors strategically “talk next to each 
other”, as they avoid jointly scrutinising references for consent and dissent 
and refrain from critically assessing proclaimed mutual understandings of 
each other’s interests. Open debate about realities is to a large extent se-
mantic and conceptual discourse aiming only at maintaining actor integri-
ties instead of clarifying uncertainties and ambiguities. The result is that 
trust, in essence the prime quality criterion of political deliberation, in itself 
also needs to be negotiated. And, beyond semantics, this seems to be a lost 
cause in any case. 
I state this tendency as a second reason why deliberations do not result 
in significant practical progress. It would be a mistake to think that con-
flicting values unambiguously relate to conflicting interests. Before a socio-
political society can see how interests really conflict, it should be prepared to 
“clear up conceptual fog at the knowledge-policy interface”. It can do this 
by also engaging in “negotiations of meaning” and in reflections on what we 
can and cannot know and should and should not need to know with respect 
to a particular issue. 
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With the previous consideration in mind, my intention is to present a 
reflection on the need for a new politics of and for sustainable develop-
ment, and shall do this in a rationale that develops in two sections. The 
first takes a critical look at how sustainable development is understood and 
tackled today, and focuses on issues that, each in their own way, represent 
specific challenges to understanding, using and instrumentalising the prin-
ciple of sustainable development. While taking into account their rather 
“philosophical” nature, the relevance of these issues is recognised as such 
in academic and informed civil society circles, one can also observe that 
they do not feature prominently on the political agenda. A second section 
makes some key considerations on what I understand as these new politics.2 
They can best be described as “advanced deliberate approaches” to policy 
supportive of knowledge generation and subsequent decision making in 
face of the socioeconomic and ecological challenges nowadays tackled un-
der the rationale of sustainable development. While this description may 
seem too vague and too general, it becomes more specific with the basic 
premise that underpins this view, namely that the quality of governance 
essentially depends on the quality of the working of the knowledge-policy 
interface. 
In the general context of agreeing on what development should be in 
order for it to be called “sustainable”, the global political community would 
in principle need to make a fundamental choice: it could continue the de-
bate by “bargaining over conflicting evidences”, or engage in more deliberate 
approaches to knowledge generation in order to “better” deal with cog-
nitive factors (uncertainty, ambiguity, complexity) and axiological factors 
(values, identities, abstract “ideological” references) in political decision 
making. In practice, this would mean that, within the context of a specific 
theme or issue, the arenas of negotiations that face these cognitive and 
axiological factors would be prepared to engage in deliberate generations 
of (what I call) “critical consensus knowledge”, and this as an intermediate 
phase preceding traditional negotiations on policy options. Critical consen-
sus knowledge does not converge on “truths”, but integrates scientific facts 
and ideas, observations, discourse and reference with the outcome of joint 
2 The views presented in this paper are based on the research programme performed 
by the author under the title “The Reflexive Knowledge Society” (v. http://www.theac-
ademia.org). 
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reflections on the usability of those facts, ideas, observations, discourses and 
references and on the motivation of actors to bring these “knowledges” into 
the debate. 
I state that, in the absence of a rational link between “normative ethics 
and pragmatic architectures” in the context of designing fair and effective 
sustainable development governance policies, building trust in negotiating 
the way forward can only be done through these deliberate and advanced 
approaches, as they constitute in themselves “the possibility to generate 
trust”. I call a socio-political society that makes these approaches work a 
“reflexive knowledge society”. The conditions for a reflexive knowledge 
society to “happen” are twofold and simple in principle: they are set “in 
the academy” and need to be enabled in the Agora around the governance 
negotiation arena. Today, there is no excuse for the academy not organis-
ing applied research and reflection in transdisciplinary inclusive settings 
for the sake of global governance of/for sustainable development. Neither 
is there any excuse for political delegations and civil society not to enable 
and stimulate “dialogues” – in the sense of concrete reflexive and transpar-
ent knowledge generation settings – in global negotiation processes. These 
settings by themselves would not generate pragmatic architectures, but at 
least “liberate” actors from the pressure of choosing between references to 
ethics on the one hand and proposals for pragmatic architectures on the 
other hand. This kind of “capacity building” for reflexive and transparent 
knowledge generation is, in a way, the most important responsibility of all 
actors involved, and is also the only one key responsibility that is shared 
without differentiation.
A critical assessment of sustainable development – 
thinking
1. Sustainable development appropriations
The concept of sustainable development is, as a policy principle, some 
40 years old. While its main understanding was still connected to “environ-
mental protection” at the time of the first World Summit on Sustainable 
Development in Rio de Janeiro in 1992, the second World Summit saw a 
shift towards a more humanitarian approach, with poverty eradication and 
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equity at the centre of concerns. At the same time, sustainability gained a 
last, new connotation. Instead of denoting a limiting factor on development, it 
came to be understood as a positive quality of development. The basis of this 
positive vision was the understanding that the organisation of economy, ecol-
ogy or social systems cannot be tackled in isolation. The famous “three-pil-
lar” approach to sustainable development persists in supporting sustainable 
development policies through to today. Henceforth, it was only a small step 
to starting to use “sustainability” as a quality touchstone for (or the necessary 
condition of) policies that had the ambition to tackle socio-economic chal-
lenges taking into account their context and interconnection. The concept 
of “sustainability assessment” was born (see for example (Gibson 2005)). As 
expected, together with this ambition came the obvious question of how sus-
tainability can and should be understood, and how it can be used as a guiding 
principle and be translated into concrete policies that, in turn, are amenable 
to “testing” in terms of their effectiveness after implementation.
Today, the adjective “sustainable” is used to characterise a “wanted” 
quality for virtually every possible, imaginable human activity, from the 
original policy context related to energy, environment, and production 
& consumption to tourism, cities, families, cars, livelihoods, health care, 
design, leadership, sports, buildings, value chains and dance clubs. This 
trend is no sign of a democratisation or effective instrumentalisation of 
the concept. The proliferation of appropriations of the concept, and the 
tendency to stretch the characteristic from the narrowest to the broad-
est all-embracing areas of human activity make “sustainability” a paradigm 
that can remain forever, but this tendency makes it at the same time hollow 
and essentially meaningless. Furthermore, the observation that in most of 
these popular-cultural appropriations, no attempt is made to rationalise 
the link between the sustainability of the activity on the one hand and the 
overall paradigm of sustainable development on the other hand, one could 
also note the absence of a usable set of criteria and indicators to “test” the 
sustainability of these specific practices bottom-up.
2. Questioning growth
The least one can say is that, thus far, sustainability has an ambivalent 
meaning, as it denotes both “stability” or “continuity”, as well as the idea 
of “progress”. One could say that the meaning of what needs to be “con-
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tinued” under the banner of sustainability has shifted throughout modern 
history. The scheme in Figure 1 aims to suggest this by identifying four 
“periods” marked by a specific vision on the economic and related politi-
cal challenges to tackle in the interest of preserving the environment and 
humanity as such. 
Figure 1 – Four phases of understanding sustainability
Reading the scheme from the top downwards, the second phase 
came with industrialisation and the third with economic globalisa-
tion. While the original meaning of continuity (denoting stability in 
the sense of protecting the integrity of local communities) was typi-
cal for pre-industrialised cultures, it was the very modern development 
through industrialisation and economisation that, based on the raised 
awareness for the “limits to growth”, resulted in another understand-
ing of the meaning of continuity. The rising awareness of the human 
impact on the ecosystem made scientists, analysts and policy makers 
connect the notions of stability and continuity to the societal “collec-
tive well-being”, taking into account the limits of our planet, both in 
terms of resources and capacity of recovery from environmental impact. 
That stance inspired a rethinking of the relationship between man and 
nature, but the approach was essentially pragmatic, as environmental 
impact assessment was about anticipating and avoiding the higher costs 
of restoring the negative impact of practices; the first conceptions of 
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sustainable development spoke of anticipating and avoiding develop-
ment that would lead to the complete exhaustion of “resources” (in-
cluding the earth’s recovery capacity). 
The third phase describes the world today, in its continuing economic 
globalisation. The focus is on development, or more precisely, on the need 
to continue development. Based on the classical view of seeing econom-
ic growth as a measure for the “well-being” of a socioeconomic society, 
development is thereby understood in the sense of “progress” and, more 
concretely still, in the sense of “growth”. In the vision of, for example, the 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), sus-
tainability is a means to the end of economic growth. In the introduction 
of (OECD 2001), it is noted that “… without sustainable practices, eco-
nomic growth can also lead to excessive degradation of natural and social 
resources. Governments face the complex challenge of finding the right 
balance between the competing demands on natural and social resources, 
without sacrificing economic progress (…)”. According to this rationale, 
the responsibility of our socioeconomic society is thus to make sure that 
specific sub-practices are sustainable in order to ensure “proper” economic 
growth. Although the previous language suggests that national political au-
thorities have prime responsibility here, the logic is extended by suggesting 
that the capacity to ensure the sustainability of practices can in principle 
be created within the economy itself: “As levels of material welfare have 
increased, so have opportunities for addressing a range of unmet social and 
environmental concerns and the abilities of societies to adapt to adverse 
impacts (…)” (ibid.).
Obviously not everyone believes in growth. It is known that the above 
described paradigm that connects sustainable development to economic 
development (in a “means-ends” rationale, with the first as a condition to 
ensure the second) has been questioned throughout modern history. The 
Club of Rome report “The Limits to Growth” proclaimed the idea of “zero 
growth” and can be considered the first international systematic and sci-
entifically underpinned study that links economic growth with environ-
mental degradation. The more stringent vision is that of “de-growth”. De-
growth-advocates claim that the story of global wealth creation through 
economic growth is misleading and justify this by questioning the logic of 
growth as such. The argument is that one does not need meta-ethics to 
understand that in a closed system (“the finite world”), “winners need los-
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ers”. In this view, the real problem is productivist capitalism that stimulates 
overproduction and overconsumption. It is worthwhile noting that many 
de-growth rationales however reject the idea of sustainable development 
instead of appropriating it in order to link it to their own view on socio-
economic organisation. Ideas on equity and distributive justice (as such 
essential to de-growth rationales) can, in a conceptual meaning, be con-
nected to a vision on social development, but there is apparently no clear 
view on what the meaning of the adjective “sustainable” would need to 
be in that case. Up till now, the de-growth rationale has generated little 
impact on national and global policy discourses and deliberations in the 
context of sustainable development.
On a global scale in this third phase, throughout the last two decades, 
the combination of the positive vision on sustainable development (sus-
tainability as a quality of development) on the one hand and the urgent 
context of enduring poverty and unsustainable production and consump-
tion patterns on the other hand has not really generated the necessary 
political commitment. The Johannesburg Plan of Implementation3 is gen-
erally considered as containing less stringent commitments compared to 
the original Agenda 21 Document. Only in the pressing atmosphere of 
the recent climate change debates, one could observe political momentum, 
as the Stern Report (Stern 2006) restored the old pragmatic motivation 
for environmental protection with the simple statement (and calculation) 
that it would be more expensive to restore damage due to climate change 
than to prevent it. But this pragmatic stance was apparently insufficient to 
tackle the challenge of “historically shared but differentiated responsibili-
ties” between the developed and the developing world. The failure of the 
Copenhagen climate change conference in 2009 is said to be due to “too 
high expectations”, and many observers (and politicians) saw this “global 
policy crisis” as a chance to “rethink the way forward” and find solace in 
the idea of a “green economy”. 
The vision for the future (indicated as the “fourth phase” in the scheme 
above), as for instance presented by the United Nations (UN) in its prepara-
tion of the third World Summit on Sustainable Development (“Rio+20”), 
is that of a fully global socio-economic system working through a green 
3 V. http://www.un.org/esa/sustdev/documents/WSSD_POI_PD/English/POIToc.htm 
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economy and with an accelerated poverty eradication policy “to also take 
the poorest on board”. When it comes to taking care of the environment, 
the focus would be on “restoration” and especially “adaptation”. Obviously 
prevention is still a “first principle”, but it would need to be taken up under 
a new conception of restoration. Many current visions on climate change 
and biodiversity claim that “we went too far already”, and that we would 
try to keep what we have now and “adapt”. What would need to be re-
stored is thus not the original natural habitat as such, but the relationship 
between the human being and his/her natural environment. It is however 
clear that not everybody finds this an optimistic outlook.
The most important observation however is that in a green economy, 
the idea of growth seems to persist. In the context of preparing the Rio+20 
Summit, the UN stresses on “the centrality of growth”, claiming that “No 
country, howsoever rich, knows how to live without growth. The mod-
ern economic and financial system seems to require growth to maintain 
full employment and decent social services. Growth is the only sure recipe 
we have discovered for overcoming global inequality” (Banun 2010). The 
growth would however need to be different from current patterns of growth 
and could follow three strategic paths: “MDGplus (accelerate development 
and focus on the most vulnerable)”, “internalise externalities” and “invest 
in an alternative growth strategy”. The last strategy is thereby only concre-
tised as a “renewable energy revolution”.
The final question of this reflection on the basis of the scheme above 
is thus whether a combined policy of a green economy together with an 
extra effort to take the poorest on board would comply with “sustainable 
development”. There are reasons to believe that this policy would anyway 
struggle with those ethical aspects of sustainable development that would 
necessarily fall outside any reasonable market-regulating framework. This 
consideration will be taken up again further on in the text.
3. Getting straight on risk-inherent technology
Is governance of technological risk compatible with sustainable devel-
opment? In contemporary policy discourses related to energy technologies, 
food production, mobile phones and health care, the notion of “acceptable 
risk” plays a central role. One can however observe that views differ on who 
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should define and assess what would be the right “level” and character of 
acceptability of a specific technological risk, and on how this justification 
exercise should be undertaken. The picture becomes even more complex 
if one tries to relate the rationale on acceptable risk with that of sustain-
able development. To put it simply, in terms of designing assessment and 
decision making criteria related to specific risk-inherent technological ap-
plications, it is not clear how accepting a specific risk would (needs to) re-
late to “meeting our needs” and to “not compromising the ability of future 
generations to meet their needs”. Is it sufficient to democratically (“fairly, 
deliberate and effectively”) justify a technological risk (in light of expected 
benefits) to rationalise and defend the contribution of the specific techno-
logical application to sustainable development, or will long term uncertain-
ties related to potential harm ensure the concepts of risk and sustainability 
always remain part of a trade-off? Or are they simply incommensurable in 
both their conceptual meanings and practical hands-on policies? 
The issue of technological risk that dominates the actual global politi-
cal agenda is clearly that of climate change, and the most important stra-
tegic framing that undermines the quality of climate change negotiations 
today is that around the issue of nuclear energy. A simple observation of 
the history of the negotiations tells us that, since the UN climate change 
conference in Kyoto in 1997, nuclear energy has never been subject to 
official discussion in open negotiation sessions. The reason is not the 
inherent complexity of its risk assessment, but because parties don’t want 
to discuss it, as there are other state-related interests at play (being the 
economic (in search of a market position or energy-autonomy) and the 
military). Apparently, the industry and also its opponents find benefit in 
sticking to their polarised positions in the Agora’s around climate change 
negotiations (Meskens 2008). Policy documents such as those generated 
within the scope of the United Nations Framework Convention on Cli-
mate Change (UNFCCC) and the United Nations Commission on Sus-
tainable Development processes emphasise the freedom of nation states 
to consider the use of nuclear and speak of its “conditional acceptance” 
(safe operation, safe waste management, protection from malevolent 
use), without going deeper into the complexity of its (democratic) justi-
fication. At one point in time, in the UNFCCC process, the concept of 
“advanced low-carbon technologies” was introduced in the negotiating 
texts to please both advocates and opponents of nuclear, as anyone could 
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perceive and use the meaning of the concept in accordance with their 
own stance on the issue. 
The technological risks of fossil fuels and of nuclear technology are es-
sentially incomparable, and therefore the proclaimed contribution of nu-
clear to combat climate change is as such contested. Even its objective 
benefit (being a low-carbon energy technology) is subject to controversy, 
as opponents claim they are seriously underestimated. The real problem is 
that it is impossible to calculate the total CO2 emissions generated from the 
nuclear fuel cycle, which makes it in principle impossible to undertake an 
impact analysis with the aim of comparing this burden with that of alterna-
tive energy technology options. For nuclear energy, CO2 emissions result 
from different process stages over the entire fuel cycle. A life-cycle assess-
ment offers the possibility to properly calculate these emissions. However, 
it shows that estimates of the total CO2 emissions of the nuclear fuel cycle 
depend very much on the choices made by scientists when it comes to 
taking into account technical, practical, social and political factors in the 
assessment of these process stages (Beerten 2009). 
The reason nuclear energy should be openly and formally discussed at 
climate change negotiations is not to make it accepted or rejected once and 
forever, but because it exists. Today the nuclear sector benefits from a re-
naissance that is driven by economic incentives and is apparently “backed” 
up by growing public support, in spite of the latest disasters in the Japanese 
nuclear centrals. Two critical thoughts can be made here. Given the re-
maining uncertainties around the real costs of dismantling and waste man-
agement, the budgeting of provisions therefore, and consequentially the 
proclaimed economic incentives, are open for interpretation and narrow 
framing, which means that, in the end, surplus costs risk “leaking back” 
from the private to the public sector. Secondly, if public support really ex-
ists, then there are reasons to believe that this does not build on a sudden 
belief in the technology as such, but on a fear of climate change. The justi-
fication of risk-inherent technologies such as nuclear faces a cognitive and 
axiological complexity that brings about a need for specific normative con-
ditions for the working of the science-policy interface. For various reasons, 
the necessity to engage in reflections on these required conditions is not 
always acknowledged by the intellectuals and, particularly, by the scientific, 
industrial and political world. Especially in the nuclear case, deliberate re-
search and policy making is hindered by too many strategically demarcated 
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non-overlapping comfort zones. After decades of public and political de-
bate, a serious reflection on the contextual justification of nuclear technol-
ogy is still hijacked in a polarised (and polarising) discourse, characterised 
by positionism on the basis of (all but not strategically inspired) “simple” 
narrow pro/contra framing in the broad public and political sphere. In the 
concrete case of the climate change negotiations, this serious reflection is 
needed more than ever, and only the UN can organise it and call on parties 
and civil society to participate.
4. Rationalising the theme-driven governance approach
The most difficult challenge for designing policies under the banner 
of sustainable development seems to be: how to link the meaning of sus-
tainable development as a meta-working method (holism, integration) 
and a meta justice principle (equity, solidarity) to a responsible gover- 
nance approach, or thus to designing, deliberating and implementing spe-
cific multi-level thematic and sectorial policies, taking into account their 
“cross-cutting issues”. It looks as if framing sustainable development into a 
theme-driven approach (energy, water, food, health, …) (see Figure 2) is a 
way out, as it provides a conceptual method to design policy processes that 
can lead to practical outcomes. This does not mean that meta-reflections 
would be irrelevant in these cases. Only through “framing”, the connec-
tion with meta-levels (such as “the planet” or “overall well-being”) and the 
connection with other frames (through so-called cross-cutting issues) will 
become “workable”. Nevertheless, our society still struggles with defining 
“the right themes”. To give only one example: while “energy” and “bio-
diversity” have no essential practical issues in common, they both mean-
ingfully overlap with the theme of “sustainable production and consump-
tion of commodities”. In addition, of those three, biodiversity, although 
an essential concern, seems to be the most unworkable in terms of setting 
clear goals that can be translated into unambiguous policies and measures. 
A practical solution would be to drop biodiversity as a theme as such, and 
“ensure” it within the policies and measures to guide “sustainable produc-
tion and consumption”. But that, in turn, would overly emphasise the im-




For sure, it is worthwhile striving to define the right themes in order 
to negotiate clear “vertical” (top-down/bottom-up) policies that can be 
connected to socioeconomic sector responsibilities and that would unveil 
unambiguous cross-cutting issues to be connected with transversal cross-
sectorial policy responsibilities. But even then, it would look as if the social 
of sustainable development (poverty eradication, education, labour rights) 
would, as cross-cutting issues, only need to be taken care of to serve the 
other pillars of sustainable development, being economic development and 
environmental protection. Which brings us again to the essential question: 
what does it mean to pragmatically organise a theme-driven approach to 
sustainable development while ensuring an equal treatment of its three 
pillars of social development, economic development and environmental 
protection?
Figure 2 – Framing sustainable development into a theme-driven approach
5. Voluntary committing beyond (or in absence of) the law
The reality of the endless sputtering and wandering political negotia-
tions shows that, as reaching consensus on the idea of what would be the 
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right thing to do under the banner of sustainable development is already 
utterly difficult, pouring this consensus into binding global law seems to 
be almost impossible. Nations unite to tackle global problems – caused by 
specific transnational sectorial activities – to design transnational thematic 
and sectorial solutions, to be consolidated by international and multilat-
eral binding agreements that would enforce translation into national law. 
While this sounds like a logic that is “closed” to reasoning, reality is clearly 
different. Agenda 21 was still ambitious in designing and promoting the 
advancement of international law with respect to the environment, trade 
and social aspects, but the character of the Johannesburg Plan of Imple-
mentation, as with the outcome of the second World Summit, showed clear 
stagnation in the development of international law in the field of sustain-
able development (Pallemaerts 2003). The only clear progress made seems 
to be international trade law. During the negotiations in Johannesburg, an 
attempt to add to the final text a specification that the principle of “mu-
tual supportiveness” of trade and environment “should be consistent with 
WTO Principles” was foiled in the last phase. A specification of this kind 
would in principle have meant nothing less than a subordination of mul-
tilateral environmental agreements to international trade law (ibid. 210).
While early industrialisation and the expansion of economic activities 
(“the root of the problems”) happened in the absence of national protec-
tion or competition (everybody had the right to “jump on the develop-
ment train”), global governance now needs to be negotiated and organised 
by nations that try to protect their national integrity and maximise their 
competitive position. This “situational complexity” comes on top of the 
fact that, due to cognitive complexity and essential value-based pluralism, 
there exist different visions on solutions “within” specific sectorial contexts 
that are state-independent. The difficulty of designing and implementing 
international environmental law has not so much to do with issues of pro-
tection and competition in principle, but with the fact that the negotiating 
actors distinctly differ on criteria that have nothing to do with the nature 
of the problems as such. Thereby, the fact that economic development has 
been mainly a North/West story is a historic evolution that was not driven 
by a global strategic plan (although post-colonial critical theorists would 
put a relevant side note here). Therefore, shared but differentiated respon-
sibilities among developed and developing nations imply a global moral 
problem, but not a case of guilt. 
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Still today, opinions differ over whether nation states, as policy actors, 
are the solution to global problems, or rather represent an additional fun-
damental methodological problem. While this reflection may be called 
essential, the issue as such is a topic of discussion in academic and civil 
society contexts, but obviously not in political debate in the context of the 
global negotiations. Is there, in relation to the meaning of sustainable de-
velopment, and taking into account the historic evolution of the political 
world as a group of nation states, still a rationality to formulate in defence 
of having the nation states as leading actors of global governance? If not, 
what would be a realistic alternative in the long term? 
The making of citizenship for sustainable development
Today, sustainable development is seen by many policy makers as the ra-
tional “meta-criterion” to motivate or test specific policies for global prob-
lems. Others think the criterion can only inspire discussions on governance 
(and government), taking into account its vague and ambiguous meaning. 
Last but not least, there are many sceptics who consider the concept flawed 
as such, as, according to them, it provides a way for autocrats, technocrats 
and corporate powers to disguise their old habits with a sense of socio-
political responsibility. Whatever the view on the concept of sustainable 
development is, as set out in the introduction, and as hopefully under-
pinned in the previous part, I state the situational complexity of balancing 
conflicting interest is not the only reason for the staggering global negotia-
tions under the framework of sustainable development, and claim that, be-
fore a socio-political society can see how interests really conflict, it should 
be prepared to engage in an advanced politics with the aim of “clearing up 
conceptual fog at the knowledge-policy interface”. As will become clear 
in the rest of the text, the advancement would need to be found in “new 
human attitudes” in the way we deal with knowledge (referential, factual 
and discursive) in socio-political interaction, and the idea of the reflexive 
knowledge society will be sketched in this sense. However, in the inter-
est of an advanced dealing with sustainable development, two essential 
focus shifts are needed to enable this reflexive knowledge society “to get to 
work”: we should rethink the nature of our bare necessities and accept that 
we have no choice but to “think” anthropocentric.
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1. Struggling out of the anthropocentric view
The original Brundtland definition of sustainable development may be 
said to be driven by a sense of protection and justice (“Sustainable devel-
opment is development that meets the needs of the present without com-
promising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs”). Al-
though during the last decades, this definition has inspired many thoughts 
on the value of our natural habitat, in its essential meaning, the formula-
tion is purely anthropocentric. The value of nature comes in only indirect-
ly, as a mean to preserve the possibility to meet human needs. Since then, 
socio-political discourses have struggled with using the value of nature as a 
reference in reflections on human responsibility. Is this responsibility to be 
defined in the spirit of a higher meta-ethics (the value of nature, and the 
necessary humble position of humans in the order of things) or can it only 
be “among ourselves”, out of a stance of “deliberate responsible anthropo-
centrism”?
Figure 3 – Possible references in discourses on the protection of the natural 
habitat
Thinking in terms of the “acceptable occupation” of nature is reason-
able, but it is impossible to force this stance into an eco-centric perspec-
tive. Nature has a value as such, but it cannot be regarded as “absolute”, 
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as we do not know what this would mean, and therefore we cannot use 
this absolute character as point of reference. The alternative cannot be 
more than “responsible anthropocentrism” stretched into a perspective of 
engaged aesthetics beyond ethics (see Figure 3).
2. Rethinking the bare necessities
The bare necessities of early human beings were the same as those of 
animals: food (including water) and shelter. The early development of liv-
ing standards was made possible by means of socially organised settlement, 
agriculture and the use of energy (fire and mechanically generated power). 
With the progression of “organised living”, energy became the third bare 
necessity of a civilised society, joining food and shelter (the last now called 
“housing”). Today, in a society that relies on a complex system of interde-
pendent production processes of goods and services, human bare necessi-
ties are no longer food, energy and housing, but the logistics to provide food, 
energy and housing. This counts for developed as well for underdeveloped 
societies. To push the reasoning further, today “organising logistics” ap-
parently puts a burden on the ecosystem and does not ensure distributive 
justice in a straightforward way. With the specific unavoidable cognitive 
uncertainties and the high degree of complexity that characterise current 
challenges, it appears that different rational views on solutions exist, based 
on references to different value frameworks. From out of a pragmatic ethics 
(or ethical pragmatism), one could thus conclude that human bare neces-
sities are not the logistics to provide food, energy and housing, but a col-
lective interactive intelligence to organise these logistics, and an effective and fair 
decision making system to produce this intelligence and to implement its findings. 
But out of these various value frameworks, not everyone would agree with 
the last claim.
3. Finding ground in between normative ethics and pragmatic 
 architectures.
In a world wherein the proper designing of socially, economically and 
ecologically fair and effective policies is complicated by inherent cognitive 
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uncertainties and value-related pluralisms, politically negotiating the way 
forward to a large extent comes down to “negotiating meaning”; that is: 
the meaning of concepts, knowledge and values behind or “in front of” 
these uncertainties and pluralisms, and in the face of various “contexts of 
urgency”. Negotiating “meaning” instead of “direct action” can sound un-
intelligent and irresponsible, given the fact that some of these contexts of 
urgency, such as poverty and the deterioration of the natural habitat, are, 
in their harsh reality, clearly visible and for many of us directly tangible. 
Furthermore, in the case of global problems that become ever more appar-
ent (such as climate change), the needed precautionary action can in prin-
ciple be easily translated into practical policies “in the real world” (such as 
emission cuts). Despite these phenomena that require direct action rather 
than semantic and philosophical reflection, the global political world (sup-
ported by science and society) chose to tackle them “all together”, and to 
make this endeavour guided by the concept of sustainable development. 
The reason to handle all global problems together is not philosophical but 
rational, as there is the clear insight that they are all interlinked in various 
ways. The reason to put them under one guiding reference may also seem 
rationally driven by a concern with respect to the evolution of the global 
state of affairs of humanity on the globe, and inspired by a stance of inter-
generational justice. The Brundtland report said indeed that “sustainable 
development is development that meets the needs of the present without 
compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs”. 
But one does not need to be a historian or a policy analyst to observe that, 
since then, uncountable views have emerged on what that would mean in 
practice.
Since the beginning of negotiations over designing policies for sustain-
able development (such as those under the auspices of the UN Commission 
on Sustainable Development,4) deliberations have been morally grounded 
by making reference to two general ethical principles that are said to have a 
fundamental character (in the sense that “nobody can be against”). These 
principles are human equity and fair play. The general principle of human 
4 The United Nations Commission on Sustainable Development (CSD) was es-
tablished by the UN General Assembly in December 1992 to ensure effective follow-
up of United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED), also 
known as the Earth Summit. See http://www.un.org/esa/dsd/csd/csd_aboucsd.shtml. 
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equity informs in its turn the “derived principles” of (1) inclusion of the 
(potentially) affected in decision making, (2) intra-generational solidarity 
as an account towards the weak (the underdeveloped / the poor) and (3) 
intergenerational solidarity as an account towards future generations. The 
principle of fair play, on the other hand, traditionally supports a generally 
acknowledged need for transparency and accountability of authorities and 
the private sector, based on an understanding that political authorities and 
markets can (and should never try to) shape their own ethics, but that they 
have the moral right and duty to take part in the intellectual socio-political 
debate about them. 
In recent decades, numerous useful mechanisms, instruments and ar-
chitectures in the interest of sustainable development have been suggested 
by policy makers, academics and consultants, and in their pragmatic ap-
proach, most of them seem so “logical” that one could wonder why the 
global political community does not accept, instrumentalise and implement 
them right away. A way to understand why some rational-pragmatic archi-
tectures (such as a CO2 cap-and-trade system; (see, for example, Aldy and 
Stavins 2009) do apparently not inspire and stimulate political consensus 
on the way forward would be to question how these architectures ration-
ally relate to the normative-ethical framework sketched above. The answer 
would be: they do not, at least not in a direct unambiguous way. This does 
not mean that it would be useless to think in terms of ethical principles and 
frameworks in the interest of sustainable development on the one hand, 
or, pragmatically (“bottom-up”), to design workable architectures on the 
other hand. The important insight is that it would not be necessary for de-
signers and policy makers to prove that architectures rationally “connect” 
to the normative-ethical framework sketched above. The simple argument 
for this claim is that it is impossible to unambiguously “extract” these ar-
chitectures out of this fundamental ethical framework and that, vice-versa, 
it is impossible to “stretch” them in order to prove that they comply with 
that fundamental ethical framework. The reason for this impossibility is 
that in most thematic contexts (energy, biodiversity, health, sustainable 
production & consumption, among other issues) a number of issues exist 
“in between the normative ethics and the pragmatic architectures of which 
their rationalisation (in terms of role and impact) is hindered by typical 
cognitive factors (unknowables, unknowns, uncertainties and ambiguities) 
and axiological factors (“pluralism”), which makes these issues in principle 
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not subject to rational resolution within that “imperative” context. The 
problem is now that, driven by value-related or simple protective inter-
ests, these unknowables, unknowns, uncertainties and ambiguities provide 
room for mediation of these issues into “thin rationalisations” (either by 
denying them or by strategically mediating or framing them) that tend to 
“erode” the quality of the knowledge-policy interface in the context of the 
sustainable development debate. A typical example is the polarised “nu-
clear is (not) sustainable” issue. A second example is the approach to prod-
uct life cycle assessment that typically assesses aspects within the lifecycle 
of the product but forgets to assess the justification of the very existence of 
the product itself.
4. Better living, in false atmospheres of trust
What are these issues that exist “in between the normative ethics and 
the pragmatic architectures” and of which their rationalisation (in terms 
of role and impact) is hindered by typical cognitive and axiological factors, 
which makes them susceptible to mediation into “thin rationalisations”? 
They are certainly not global concerns such as poverty, aids or terrorism. 
Although solutions to these matters cannot also be rationally extracted 
out of the normative framework sketched above, there is the simple un-
derstanding that nobody would want to try to rationalise them as an una-
voidable consequence of the complexity of our contemporary society. The 
issues of which their rationalisations need to be scrutinised are concepts 
that, although unwanted in the way they manifest, have a “neutral” char-
acter, as society accepts them as inevitable consequences of current socio-
political, socio-cultural, technical and economic interaction. The concepts 
are identifiable and recognisable in the way the adjective “acceptable” can 




   “unwanted but neutral”
   organisational concept
 Ecology (natural environment): / acceptable … occupation
 Technology: / acceptable … risk
 Socio-economy: / acceptable… exclusion
 Organisational systems: / acceptable … functionality
 Politics: / acceptable … authority
 Politics: / acceptable … delegation 
 Media: / acceptable … mediation
 Consumerism (market economy): / acceptable … dependency
 Socio-cultural environment: / acceptable … formation 
 (all adding up to…)
 Welfare: / acceptable … inequity
 
Table 1 – Examples of concepts susceptible to misuse in false atmospheres of trust
What do I mean by “thin rationalisations”? At various manifestations 
of the knowledge-policy interface, these unwanted but neutral organi-
sational concepts become susceptible to misuse in strategically created 
or mediated “false atmospheres of trust”. In this view, the fact that an 
atmosphere of trust is “false” is not a problem, but the fact that it can be 
strategically created or mediated is. Living in false atmospheres of trust is 
a human thing. Since emerging as sensible creatures, through reflective 
interaction, human beings have constantly tried to make sense of them-
selves and of the world around them, facing unknowables, uncertainties 
and ambiguities of which many still persist today. The notion of “false” 
denotes an atmosphere of mutual trust built on what one “believes but 
cannot prove” and should thus initially not be understood in a nega-
tive way. The awareness for possible misuse comes with the conclusion 
that, due to the existence of specific unknowables, there is no rational 
evidence available to determine in consensus what would be an acceptable 
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occupation, risk, exclusion, functionality, authority, delegation, media-
tion, dependency, formation or inequity. 
If a socio-political society (the political arena and its Agora’s) would 
want to create “transparency” in the interest of arriving at consensus on 
the available and needed knowledge to be able to judge what would, for 
instance, be an acceptable technological risk, an acceptable environ-
mental occupation or an acceptable socio-economic exclusion, it would 
need to engage into a kind of “epistemic mediation”. Epistemic mediation 
starts from a set of questions meaningful in the context of a challenging 
societal setting (what is at stake? / what do we need to know? / what is 
possible in terms of knowledge generation and use?) in order to motivate 
a “collective stance” beyond the need for individual self-justification and 
protection of integrity. This stance can be described as a joint awareness 
for and recognition of “(in)capacities” in interactive discursive knowl-
edge generation. Therefore, “better” living in false atmospheres of trust 
requires recognition of and awareness of the consequences of the limits 
to our knowledge producing capacities, being:
 – limits to the capacity to show reasonable concern, denoting a “lay” 
perplexity 
  (“what you fear but cannot account”)
 – limits to the capacity to deliver social warranty, denoting a “dis-
cursive” perplexity 
  (“what you hope but cannot guarantee”)
 – limits to the capacity to show factual evidence, denoting a “scien-
tific” perplexity  
  (“what you believe but cannot prove”)
As a next step, the “act of epistemic mediation” would facilitate a col-
lective inquiry into the usability of a specific knowledge brought into a 
discourse setting, and into the relevance of the actor’s motivation to in-
troduce it, in order to come to a “justified critical consensus knowledge” 
with regard to a specific issue at stake. Critical consensus knowledge 
does not converge on “truths”, but integrates scientific facts and ideas, 
observations, discourse and reference with the outcome of joint reflec-
tions on the usability of those facts, ideas, observations, discourses and 
references and on the motivation of actors to bring these “knowledges” into 
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debate. Important to note is that these. In this sense, epistemic mediation 
would essentially inform a discourse deliberate acts of critical consensus 
knowledge generation are negotiating acts in themselves, as they essen-
tially aim to negotiate “meaning” and to reflect on what we can and cannot 
know and should and should not need to know with respect to a particular 
ethical issue that “better” relativises truth by way of creating a “hermeneu-
tic transparency” around the usability and motivation of a specific propo-
sition. This better relativization would enable in its turn an “advanced” 
understanding of notions of authenticity and legitimacy (connected to the 
proposition), and of their functioning in the interest of “trust building”. 
As these happenings would be conceived of as formal materialisations 
of the knowledge-policy interface in which various formal and informal 
knowledge generation processes on a particular issue would converge, this 
deliberation of knowledge essentially needs to be fully inclusive. Last but 
not least, it would require actors to move (and be stretched) beyond the 
traditional attitudes of those principal mediators of knowledge typically ac-
tive at the knowledge-policy interface, being “the politician”, “the scien-
tist”, “the stakeholder” and “the activist”. However, in a governance arena, 
before transparency can be stretched, it needs to be “unlocked” in a culture 
of reflexivity. While transparency can be “organised”, reflexivity needs to 
be “fostered” in the academy, the research institutes and in general public 
discourse about the issues at stake. This will be taken up in the next and 
last part of this text.
5. The idea of the reflexive knowledge society
However “logical” specific architectures, instruments and mechanisms 
for sustainable development policies may be perceived, the considerations 
above illustrate the argument that the soundness of their science, the ra-
tionality of their economics and the pragmatism of their politics will al-
ways have to be based on “opinions that cannot be turned into facts”. This 
means that, in the context of the issues touched upon above, but also in 
the general context of agreeing on what development should be in order for 
it to be called “sustainable”, the global political community would in prin-
ciple need to make a fundamental choice: it could continue the debate by 
“bargaining over conflicting evidences” (as is still too often the case today), 
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or engage in more deliberate approaches to knowledge generation in order 
to “better” deal with cognitive factors (uncertainty, ambiguity, complexity) 
and axiological factors (values, identities, abstract “ideological” references) 
in political decision making, as was sketched before. 
So where can these epistemic mediations and conceptual demystifica-
tions happen in reality? Although the idea of “governance” generally refers 
to concepts related to culture and politics, or more specifically to a process 
relying on laws, regulations and conventions, it cannot be seen as something 
driven and steered by an autonomous “system” that would keep on running 
in the absence of people. Governance can only be done where people come 
together and interact. It is in these places that global civil society “materi-
alises”, and where a global reflexive knowledge society can come to exist in 
reality in a concrete political setting. This reflexive knowledge society has the 
intra-generational moral responsibility of inclusion. The reflexive knowledge 
society, understood as an interaction between people, includes the categories of 
indigenous, lay-person and expert knowledge (and all variations in between). 
In this sense, it is important to see the knowledge society as an organised 
deliberate transversal knowledge exchange in the public sphere, connecting 
the citizenry, the private sector, informed civil society, the academies and 
the political world. As a general definition in this sense, participation can be 
understood as the involvement of non-mandatory concerned and (poten-
tially) affected individuals and groups in a mandatory organised knowledge 
exchange. This applies as much for the political context as for the context 
of policy-supportive (but “non-committal”) research, discourse and opin-
ion making. Taking into account the reasoning of the previous paragraphs, 
reflexivity should be understood as an individual attitude of awareness of 
an agent (involved in a discursive “knowledge exchanging” interaction) of 
(1) the (im)possibilities of “making a claim” , (2) the way his/her knowl-
edge has been shaped and formed and (3) the character of his/her knowledge 
(multiplicity, variety, integration, coherence). In this sense, reflexivity does 
not necessarily denote “knowledge about the contextual character of own 
knowledge” (which specific philosophers would call an impossibility anyway) 
but a normative responsible individual intention.
Taking all this together, the knowledge society cannot be but a discourse 
society. While this sounds like a downgrade in the concept (is that all we 
have?), its perspective is actually of a higher intelligence than the one that 
would strive for unambiguous clarity and evidence “at the science-society-
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policy interface”. The knowledge society is the “population” of a holistic, 
trans-disciplinary, inclusive and practice-oriented science-society-policy 
interface. Holism, trans-disciplinarity, inclusiveness and practicability are 
thereby no fixed unambiguous qualities of its knowledge generation, but in-
tentions that inspire the practices of knowledge generation. Last but not least, 
the knowledge society is self-reflexive in the way it maintains processes 
of generating, capturing, disseminating, assessing, applying and evaluating 
ideas. The reflexive knowledge society is an unselfish knowledge society, 
and therefore the only possible knowledge society for the sake of the gen-
eral interest. 
The conditions for this society to emerge, happen and work are twofold 
and simple in principle: they are set “in the academy” and need to be ena-
bled in the Agora around the governance negotiation arena. Today, there 
is no excuse for the academy not to organise applied research and reflec-
tion in trans-disciplinary inclusive settings for the sake of global (environ-
mental) governance. Neither is there an excuse for political delegations 
and civil society not to enable and stimulate “dialogues” in the sense of 
concrete reflexive and transparent knowledge generation settings in global 
negotiation processes. These settings by themselves would not generate 
pragmatic architectures, but at least they “liberate” actors from the pres-
sure of choosing between references to ethics on the one hand and propos-
als for pragmatic architectures on the other hand. This kind of “capacity 
building” for reflexive and transparent knowledge generation is in a way 
the most important responsibility of all actors involved, and is also the only 
one key responsibility that is shared without being differentiated.
Sustainable development is social development
For a large part of the political world, it is clear today what sustainable 
development can and needs to be: the implementation of a “green econ-
omy”. The previous reasoning has hopefully showed that the concept of 
economic growth is conceptually flawed and therefore dangerous, and also 
that a “green economy” will not ensure in itself socio-economic well-being. 
It does not ensure “by design” the fundamental ethical principles of equity 
and fair play mentioned above. While it may in some respect guarantee a 
form of pragmatic intergenerational solidarity (in accounting for the next 
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generations) by way of restoring the old idea behind environmental assess-
ment, there is no reason to assume that it would ensure the principle of inclu-
sion of the (potentially) affected in decision-making and the intra-generational 
solidarity accounting for the underdeveloped (the weak and the poor). 
A green economy may be the (future) motor of the “logistics” of the soci-
oeconomic society, from a global ethics point of view, the social capacity that 
needs to be built in the interest of sustainable development comprises much 
more. In terms of the idea of solidarity, a global ethics for sustainable devel-
opment would in essence imply the possibility of an “intellectual-discursive” 
globalisation and give a new meaning to the conception of the global citizen. 
Its foundation would be the human right to enjoy individual intellectual de-
velopment that stimulates curiosity and critical-contextual thinking and that 
would strengthen and motivate every citizen to follow transversal trajectories 
between self-maintaining cultural, social and political territories, and to enter 
or create joint interactive and solitary reflection spaces. In face of the global 
challenges envisaged, this potentiality would need to be supported bottom-
up by multilevel (sub-national and regional) social policies to rethink and 
reform education and research. But this approach would require a specific 
relativism with regard to cultural, social and national identity and integrity. 
Looking back on decades of global negotiations among cultures, nations and 
sectors, and on the way they remain hiding behind their protective curtains 
of conceptual fog, this might be the most difficult challenge to tackle.
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STRATEGIC INTELLECTUAL COMMITMENT FOR 
THE GLOBAL SYSTEM
helena gonçalves da silva
The need for consistent commitment: a question of 
coordination and a global perspective 
A more effective intellectual commitment is being demanded by the pre-
sent imperative to create a more balanced and sustainable world. In a con-
text where the intrinsic crises of the modern world-system are merging with 
the systemic effects of globalization, intellectuals should try to share more 
consistent and visible responsibility by appointing themselves, in spite of 
the difficulties, as public mediators in matters of fundamental concern. 
Should we wish to avert the likelihood of the process of globalization be-
coming primarily a hegemonic financial and neoliberal trading system and 
1989 and 1991 (the demise of the USSR) the prelude to the decline of 
democracies, we have to realize that the process of deep social change the 
world is undergoing entails a problem of cultural coordination, i.e. the need 
to deal with wide-reaching crucial matters in a concerted way and from a 
global perspective. 
Building intellectual consensus and compromises within a context of 
growing structural, axiological, social and cognitive complexity involves 
joint responsibility and systematic interaction among intellectual actors 
with different identities, functions, outlooks and meaning systems. On 
such aptitude rests the possibility of conceiving common strategies for 
creating a framework for epistemic mediation and public intervention on 
focal matters. Furthermore, given the mounting fragmentation, the value-
related pluralisms, the cross-cutting nature of all issues and, on the whole, 
the overlapping, contradictory tendencies towards increasing intercon-
nectedness, concerted intellectual activity would have to be supported by 
an inclusive, multi-perspective perception of our present world as well as 
a transdisciplinary approach. Pluralism and plasticity would then be ma-
jor prerequisites in the formation of a cosmopolitan intellectual allegiance 
that has a potential for informing political praxis by means of continuously 
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assessing requirements, conditions and possibilities. I am not, therefore, 
defending any perfectionist notion of a single philosophy (precisely what 
we have now if we consider the hegemony of financial and economic dis-
course) that is produced by a sort of ‘government’ of wise men, but rather a 
truly committed culture of permanent reflexivity and strong intervention.
In order to function as concerted intellectual voices, as advocates of 
a pluralist reflexive culture, intellectuals need greater visibility. Hence, 
they should cultivate adequate recourse to the media (in spite of the 
risks involved) as a fruitful means of critically addressing large audiences, 
especially the mainstream television networks, from where single contro-
versial intellectuals – I am thinking of Bertrand Russell, Jean-Paul Sartre 
and more recently Noam Chomsky among many others – have so often 
been excluded. The media opens up opportunities for increasing their 
agency, that is to say, for developing a more responsible transnational 
public sphere and, with it, the democratization of the rising structures of 
a new global order. 
Difficulties on the way to concerted commitment
The strategic engagement I am postulating is not impossible, given 
the fact that the majority of intellectuals are already implicitly com-
mitted, but it is difficult and problematic. For one, critical thought and 
discourse have become more of a dilemma and contrary to stabilized no-
tions, unifying visions and consensus. Essentialist and binary represen-
tations (including that of social antagonism), for example, have been 
historically eroded and rendered obsolete, mainly because the solidity 
and order they offered, mostly attached to notions of identity – ethnic 
or ideological –, are incompatible with the demands of a progressively 
unbounded, multi-centred, and culturally permeable world, i.e. simul-
taneously de-differentiated and hyper-differentiated; just as interpreta-
tions and alternatives sustained by overarching teleological narratives, 
like those that erected the foundations of previous historical theory, 
were deconstructed; what is more, critical thinking, the very essence of 
culture theory, today poses the major problem of how to operate with 
certain concepts rooted, for instance, in quantum theory, fractal phys-
ics, mathematics and biology, and transfuse them into the core of the 
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real world, where they are everywhere and simultaneously active. 
Scientific knowledge itself has been immersed into a foundational 
crisis manifest in Karl Popper’s notion of methodology (The Logic of Sci-
entific Truth1). Since neither empirical verification nor logical reasoning 
is sufficient to establish a secure foundation for knowledge, the crisis of 
scientific and philosophical knowledge has converged into an ontological 
crisis of the Real. Radical reflexivity has thus become a departure point 
for approaching all sorts of subjects, including the sweeping ongoing 
drastic transformations that are “liquefying” our “modernity” (Bauman 
2006). Furthermore, the combination of uncertainty with complexity in 
the rapidly mutating macro-cultural situation means that, whatever ma-
jor consistent conceptualizing and sustainable key-answers a concerted 
intellectual engagement might produce, they would have to be subject 
to constant evaluation and revision. Consequently, and in spite of the 
fact that the conditions in which intellectuals may function as legislators 
and ideologists have gone, the emerging historical milieu, which con-
figures the change of paradigm dramatically demands their vigorous in-
volvement, not just at individual level but in a convergent effort towards 
assisting local policy-makers, global governance, entities and civil soci-
ety confronted with a host of interlocking challenges of which the most 
important are the issues of distributive justice and (ethically) sustainable 
development. 
Consensus through cosmopolitan imagination 
A cooperative intellectual endeavour of the kind I am suggesting – 
an endeavour aiming at articulating local realities with global structures 
and flows and intervening in world matters of social and ethical concern 
– would draw legitimacy from being cosmopolitan in configuration, scale 
and vision. On the other hand, in being an indispensable quality and tool, 
a cosmopolitan imagination should never jeopardize the strategic agendas 
1 Karl Popper’s notion of methodology implies that no number of experiments can 
ever prove a theory, whereas a theory can be contradicted by a single experiment. This 
was expounded in Logik der Forschung (1934) and reformulated by the author himself 
in English as The Logic of Scientific Truth (1959).
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and the levels of action organized with the purpose of establishing a com-
mon ground on which to build consensual knowledge and take initiatives 
involving vital universal issues. However suspicious or frail the building of 
consensus may seem, even when be, even when established on a reflexive, 
democratic and pluralistic basis, we cannot ignore that compromises and 
agreements cannot be reached without first overcoming differing or even 
incompatible views on priority matters. From a pragmatic standpoint, such 
incapacity would mean a greater exposure of the new world order to un-
suitable gratuitous standards and policies that would thereby increase its 
growing potential for inequality and disaster. 
Being cosmopolitan means that a combined intellectual commitment 
could not be just ‘Western’, despite the fact that most political theory 
tends to assert that the ‘West’ is synonymous with liberal democracy as the 
only legitimate political model to ensure the universalism of human rights 
(Rowls 2005, Habermas 2008); this notion has been reinforced since 1945 
by the spread of Western democracy throughout the world, from Asia to 
Africa. The Western democratic spiral had its moment of triumph twenty 
years ago, according to Fukuyama’s essay “The End of History” (1989), 
which was published in the conservative quarterly National Interest and 
hailed from the start by leading conservative intellectuals. What brought 
the essay immediate world-wide notoriety was not Fukuyama’s reworking of 
Hegelian theory but his overconfident assertion that “something very fun-
damental has happened in world history”. By that he was not referring to 
historical finalisms but to the collapse of the last rival to liberal democracy 
– Marxism-Leninism as an international mobilizing ideology. Since then, 
and judging from the present uprisings in North Africa and the Middle 
East, the desire for Western liberal democracy has continued to grow. 
Despite such evidence, theoreticians like Chantal Mouffe and 
Boaventura de Sousa Santos question the notion that Western democracy 
is the only possible political model. The former argues in favour of a “plu-
ralist” conception that would consent to “good political regimes” (Mouffe 
2011, 103). The pluralism Chantal Mouffe has in mind would require the 
recognition of regimes other than Western democracy, as being legitimate 
forms of political association. In his view, only a shift from the universal-
istic approach, used for so long to validate the hegemony of the ‘West’, 
could safeguard the dimension of “the political” (ibid. 108-110) and the 
future of a more democratic world order. Sousa Santos (2005) proposes the 
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“universal reach” (Rorty 1999)2 of human rights as a form of globalization 
“from below” or “cosmopolitan globalization”, since only the intercultural 
conceptualising conceptualising of human rights would convert them into 
an instrument of progressive politics. In the early 1990s, Anthony Giddens’ 
theory about the reformism of late social-democracy also recognised the 
need for considering the multifarious ways in which individuals and groups 
imagine, experience and enact alternative realities within the dimensions 
of “negotiated power” and “dialogic democracy” (Giddens 1994, 100-1). 
Tackling this issue from a post-colonial viewpoint, Homi Bhabha suggests 
that it is necessary to “de-realize” democracy by de-familiarizing its his-
tory and political project (in the sense of critical distance and also in the 
surrealist sense of withdrawing an object from its normative reference) in 
order to perceive its fragility – not its failure – and cope with the trials of 
the century (Bhabha 2003). 
Whatever the different outlooks, the basic conviction in democracy pro-
vides a common ground for rethinking its functioning from a global and mul-
ticultural perspective. Such a move would represent a further step in the 
historical process of emancipatory politics that had its roots in Ancient his-
tory, later to be taken up by the Renaissance legislators and the philosophers 
of the French Enlightenment (regardless of their connivance with absolut-
ist power), and that could be continued in our time with a more interac-
tive and open-minded approach, despite some very negative interpretations 
made by contemporary thought where the most debated is, perhaps, Giorgio 
Agamben’s. In his critique of human rights – distinct from the more histori-
cal approaches of Karl Marx, Hannah Arendt and Michel Foucault – and 
his messianic appeal to a radically new form of politics, Agamben’s “state 
of exception” appears as an aporia that characterizes Western politics, since 
contemporary sovereignty produces biopolitics and the logic and rationalities 
of biopower with its inherent genocidal potential (Agamben 1998). 
Furthermore, the intellectuals involved in a cosmopolitan coalition 
should be able to rise above partisan, radical or corporative politics, in-
2 Neither Habermas nor Rorty question the superiority of liberal democracy, al-
though they argue differently: Habermas believes in the “ideal speech situation”, i.e. 
the universalization of liberal democracy through rational argumentation (Habermas 
1984), whereas Rorty makes a distinction between “universal validity” and “universal 
reach”, favouring the second mode, i.e. persuasion and economic progress.
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dependently of their individual embedding, whether in political parties, 
organizations, movements, firms or universities in the sense pointed out 
by Bauman: “(...) the intentional meaning of being an intellectual is to rise 
above the partial preoccupation of one’s own profession or artistic genre 
and engage with the global issues of truth, judgment and taste of the time” 
(Bauman 1987, 2). Only the enhancement of disinterested and pluralist 
outlooks are apt to potentiate new possibilities for agency and place them 
in an eligible position to generate a transnational synergy of brainpower 
and connivance capable of redirecting the social and the political towards a 
more inclusive and fairer democratic world culture. A fundamental aspect 
of such re-direction was discussed, for instance, by Anthony Giddens’ in 
Beyond Left and Right (1994) and The “Third Way” (1998). His approach to 
dual structures relies on the themes of reflexivity and system integration, 
and acknowledges the need to update the political concepts of “left” and 
“right” in the context of the great changes sweeping through the world. But 
neither the occlusion of thinking capitalist exploitation, nor the denial of 
politics is excluded from his discourse on the “third way” that is intrinsic to 
the “beyond left and right” paradigm.
Regaining legitimacy
Thus far, intellectual “Left” and the collapsedisunion and dispersal, as 
well as inconsistencies, ambiguity and omission prevail in matters as rel-
evant as human rights, multicultural politics, forms of control and domina-
tion, military intervention, environmental policies and questions of value. 
A feeling of disempowerment that came with the destructive impact of 
modernization, the errors and misjudgements of the intellectual left and 
the collapse of major ideological currents caused both the disintegration 
and proliferation of centres of resistance (Laclau and Mouffe 1985, Castells 
1984). Moreover, while on the one hand, the fragmentary, ambiguous and 
provisional postmodern milieu has been opening up a new space for critical 
discourse and local movements (Carl Boggs 2000, 307), on the other, one 
of the major changes in recent times has been the persistent call for univer-
sities to go beyond their traditional role and turn towards more utilitarian 
or even lucrative scientific programmes and goals. In addition, most in-
tellectual functions have been increasingly appropriated by the university, 
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mass media and governments, where they are integrated into think-tanks, 
newspapers and TV channels, institutions, and movements that have a 
localised influence for the most part. Nevertheless, even though intellec-
tual identities have become less consistent and outstanding, a divide is still 
discernible between an oppositional intelligentsia – now less influential and 
affirmative than in the past – and the technocrats who enjoy dominant 
positions in the high-tech global economy and information revolution. 
If the 20th century saw the decline of the more classical humanistic intel-
lectual, as well as the Gramscian “organic” type with strong roots in ideol-
ogy and the community, and their replacement mostly by political experts, 
opinion-makers, cultural, artistic and sociological actors, the 21st century 
may well come to represent the divorce or antagonism between critical 
consciousness and politics. The reverse was once true: from the First World 
War and going beyond the Russian Revolution, the most numerous and 
the best European intellectuals supported so-called “left”. Intellectual al-
legiances to the fascist movements during the twenties and thirties were 
also a reality. But as the century moved on, after the Second World War, a 
tendency towards accommodism became evident along with a shift in their 
ideological filiations. Without an anchor in the class struggle, the “New 
Left” of the 1960s and 70s merely sought to be a short-cut to social change 
through various movements (women’s and gay liberation, pacifism and en-
vironmentalism). It was, according to David McKnight’s analysis, “the last 
gasp of an older left” (McKnight 2010). In the last two decades of the 
century, as their stances became identical with party and economic inter-
ests, the distinction between the “left” and the “right” became less clear, 
configuring a development that has been interpreted as the “the story of a 
disappointed determinism” (Wood 1995, 9).3 
Ultimately, the decline of deep commitment evident in many intellectu-
als’ fear or avoidance of politics, and witnessed in the semantic substitution 
of the left’s analytical normative vocabulary, as well as their tendency to 
lean in the direction of theories on empathy, can also be understood as the 
outcome of a crisis in authority and legitimacy, nourished to a great extent 
3 The full quotation is: “The intellectual history of the (stunningly rapid) transition 
from the structuralist Marxism of the sixties and seventies, through the brief moment 
of ‘post-Marxism’, to the current fashions of ‘post-modernism’ has in large part been the 
story of a disappointed determinism” (Wood 1995, 9).
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by their discomfit at having to explain how the destructiveness and terror 
related to the ideals they supposedly pursued, and why they lived with and 
concealed what was intolerable.4 The embarrassment, bewilderment and 
shame, and also the objective failure of Communism played upon their 
ability to speak out against all sorts of more recent or impending terrors 
– ideological, individual, group or state terrorism.5 It also wore away their 
eligibility to be listened to. In this respect, according to the categories es-
tablished by Umberto Eco, intellectuals became “integrated” (something 
unacceptable, however, to some well-known exceptions like Chomsky or 
Edward Said6), or “apocalyptic”7 as he designates those who convey the 
vision of an irretrievable decline of culture. In their dispersal, conformism 
or scepticism (genuine or cynical), they seem to be content with merely 
commenting upon and more often, showing what is going on in the “global 
village” mostly within the framework of “the politically correct”. By so do-
ing, they chronically defuse their aptitude for exerting influence, for that 
reason bearing the main responsibility for the lack of more consistent far-
reaching engagement precisely at a moment when the need for an account-
able global public sphere and coordinated intellectual commitment seems 
most urgent. But what is even worse is that politics itself today appears to 
give signs of being indifferent to their withdrawal from public life.
4 Naturally there were many who suffered and died for their convictions. Ironically, 
many of them very often had to bear the suspicion, attacks and lies by the official “left 
intellectuals”, who for the sake of privilege and in the name of orthodoxy became 
their fiercest enemies, accusing them of being fascists, pro-Nazis or CIA agents. The 
dishonesty and betrayal extended from Stalinism and Maoism to Cuba and the military 
regimes of Latin America. It also explains, as Tony Judt tells us, the difficulties Primo 
Levi faced in Italy with the “Left”. His first testimonies about the Holocaust only be-
came the object of attention twenty years after having been written (Judt 2008).
5 The concept of terror was applied to politics during the French Revolution during 
1793-94; since then it has been regarded by many intellectuals, like Camus and Walter 
Benjamin, as correlate to history.
6 In Representations of the Intellectual: The 1993 Reith Lectures, Edward Said clearly 
states that the intellectual cannot submit to the goals of a government, a large corpora-
tion or even to an association of professionals.
7 In Apocalypse Postponed (1994), originally published in 1964 as Apocalittici e inte-
grati and revised in 1977, Eco offers a commentary on cultural life, from the mid-1960s 
to the late 1980s primarily in Italy, when intellectuals were especially alarmed by the 
emergence of a mass or pop culture. He dedicated the book to the “apocalyptic”, i.e. 
cultural elites who feared the destruction of their world by mass communication and 
popular entertainment.
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Consequently, the second difficulty the intellectuals face (together with 
the former lack of coordination), is how to re-gain authority or legitimacy. 
This could be surpassed through their willingness to engage as a collective 
in a continuous strategic effort that would offer stronger guidance to the 
problems and deadlocks of our civilizational crisis. The fact that our time is 
going through sweeping transition, where the modern references references 
and ways of interpreting the world and history have vanished or been ren-
dered unstable, political, social, ethical and aesthetic concerns of a more 
complex kind than those posed by modernity, constitute ample motivation 
for re-engagement in the global res publica. However, despite the audible 
claims that our planet requires a new comprehensive perception or world 
consciousness, as well as a different paradigm of development, codes and 
regulatory principles, there is little evidence to suggest that a committed in-
tellectual synergy of the kind I have been suggesting might be in the process 
of materializing. For the time being, amidst a multitude of conflicting views 
and interests and growing complexity and insecurity, we are experiencing a 
new world order being processed by a marriage between technology and the 
market or, more precisely, by the planetary reach of neoliberalism and the 
speed of its linkages and repercussions in real time; we are also speculating 
apprehensively about ineffectual political leaderships, the destabilization of 
democratic mechanisms, the vacuousness of public morals and all sorts of 
asymmetries, imbalances and hazards. It is inevitable that, in this scenario, 
the ineffectiveness of the intellectuals appears to be a considerable part of 
our world’s problems. 
Despite the limitations I have pointed out, by no means do I wish to 
underestimate the enormity of their present relevance. Nor do I wish to 
ignore their accomplishments individually, and across the “global sub-cul-
tures” (Beck 1996, 121), forums, social movements, inter-personal societies 
and organizations that, in acting as transversal networking mechanisms, 
bear an important responsibility for global ideologies. Precisely because I 
value them, I can also envisage their greater potential in working towards a 
concerted intellectual strategy so as to respond to matters of universal con-
cern despite all difficulties. My point, then, is that only as a consortium will 
intellectuals be able to provide the far-reaching insights, fruitful dialogical 
approaches and indispensable agreements on fundamental key-concepts, 
criteria and proposals our world requires. In other words, the enormity of 
the challenges involved in the processes of globalization calls for a type of 
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intellectual power that only a cosmopolitan convergence is able to provide. 
Ideally, this means that a good number of intellectuals need to surmount 
the “coordination problem”, the lack of a world-wide perspective and the 
deficit of authority, as well as all kinds of other limitations that affect their 
commitment to such vital issues as the sustainability of culture and life in 
general. In support of my thesis I shall now briefly focus on just a few prob-
lematic aspects of our contemporary world. 
Some instances where intellectual concerted 
commitment is needed
1. Economic and financial globalization
The process of economic and financial globalization and the spread of ne-
oliberalism, particularly after the 1990s, when the geo-economics of the 
post-Cold War asserted itself over geopolitics, brought to the foreground 
with renewed vigour, questions related with financial and business monop-
oly, deregulation, wealth redistribution and labour policies. Stock market 
capitalism, disconnected from productive economy and social responsibil-
ity, new became a source of uncertainty, inequality and displacement. It 
has torn down the fabric of many societies, threatening the very concepts 
of Western democracy, while crushing the most vulnerable strata of the 
capitalist system. Most national states see their GDP being surpassed by the 
incomes of the biggest multinational corporations, while directives from 
the top are valuing risk-taking as a better stimulus to economic growth as 
against social and economic rationality. Thus, the main contradiction is no 
longer between capital and labour but between two kinds of economies, 
the productive and the financial; just as the tension is no longer between 
the market and the state but between the social market economy and the 
global finance market. Consequently, neoliberalism and financial deregula-
tion – not politics – have become the radical force throughout the world. 
And although the industrialization of the so-called “emergent nations” (in 
some of which, like China and the former-URSS, there is still strong state 
control over finance and the economy) is accelerating, thereby diminishing 
poverty with many millions of people climbing up the food chain, it is also 
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incrementing world imbalances, anomalies and all sorts of risks. The latter 
are mostly associated with technology, climate change, and the scarcity of 
natural resources. From arable soil to water and all kinds of commodities, 
the shortage of resources, aggravated by fierce market speculation, is rap-
idly augmenting famine throughout the world, producing successive energy 
crises, and leading to violent confrontations at a time when the prolifera-
tion of weapons and terrorism are common phenomena. 
Meanwhile, in the enduring edifice of Western civilization, the fissures, 
which have long been identified with its decline, are now more conspicuous 
as the gap between affluence and poverty widens in the USA and the EU. 
After the Second World War and despite the loss of their colonies and em-
pires, most Western countries reached a situation of relative self-achieve-
ment through political stability, social welfare, extensive protection of basic 
rights and a wide-ranging popular culture. Many of these accomplishments 
are being threatened by the aggressive demands, imbalances and system-
ic effects resulting from the speeding up of the globalization process and 
the harsh neoliberal measures that most countries are adopting to try and 
meet economic competitiveness. The magnitude of the financial crisis that 
emerged in the USA at the end of 2007, mainly because of reckless banking 
and predatory urbanism, and ecological devastation, can hardly be consid-
ered just another cyclical crisis similar to those happening during the last 
few decades.8 Its devastating economic and social consequences, as many 
countries face massive unemployment, huge debts and bankruptcy which 
are also due to large-scale taxpayer-financed bailouts and unhampered in-
ternational rating agencies, seem to provide evidence of major global tur-
bulence. Its gravity is patent in the hasty attempts to build regional and 
global oversight structures in the fields of banking, insurance securities and 
fiscal plolicies to enforce measures that time and again seem inconsistent 
and counterproductive. The damage has extended to the political sphere, 
affecting the Euro Zone in particular. The European Union, which was the 
most promising project to come out of the Second World War and seemed 
even stronger after the end of the Cold War, is suffering severely from a 
8 The mid-eighties and the 1987 “Black Monday” crash, for instance, generated 
a lot of market mistrust. But despite the high-profile criminal cases involved, the Bull 
Market of the 1990s saw a return to financial investment and to a culture of credibility 
around the markets as a means of generating easy money.
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deficit of political perception and commitment. Its failure to develop as a 
federation and enforce measures that build upon integration is hampering 
its capacity to survive moments of large-scale systemic crisis.
Thus, after the “real socialism” of the East, after the turn to a flow-based 
economy operating in timeless time, nourished by the fantasy that the self-
regulatory mechanism of the market is the true guarantor of stability, we 
once again realize that questions thought to be primarily economic and 
financial cannot, after all, be dissociated from ethics, freedom of choice and 
human dignity – in a word, from politics. Precisely because the systemic 
volatility of the global market will not generate national and cross-border 
economic solidarity and social stability, strong intellectual commitment to 
political renewal, along with intense public debate have become an impera-
tive. 
2. Democracy and sovereignty
An issue I would like to focus on briefly is the democratic national state 
and the question of sovereignty. In many ways, the former is going through a 
critical stage chiefly due to the growing inconsistencies between macro and 
local politics or because “those responsible for shaping global and transna-
tional public policies are not always accountable to those affected by them” 
(Tinnevelt and De Schutter 2010, 1). With “territoriality as the organizing 
principle of the world polity (...) everywhere in retreat” (Axford 2000, 241-
2), the classic nation state, organized around a clearly demarcated territory 
and recognised by other states as having juridical-political sovereignty, is 
undergoing a process of metamorphosis characterized by de-nationalisation 
as a consequence of the internationalised and flexible production systems; 
a de-statisation of politics due to more decentralized forms of governance; 
and an internationalisation of policy regimes (Tinnevelt and De Schutter 
2010, 79-80). 
Consequently, the progression of globalization is also propelling the re-
invention of world governance. This concept has gained attention in the two 
last decades in a range of key-disciplines and in connection with certain 
issues, such as the rules for collective decision-making that transcend the 
powers of the national states. However, this field still poses a great num-
ber of problems that need to be clarified, regarding, for instance, roles and 
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responsibilities and the new mechanisms of accountability (Chhotray and 
Stoker 2009, 221-25). Some intellectuals are particularly sensitive to the 
growingly mutual interdependence of all nations: Ulrich Beck advances the 
notion that national sovereignty can only survive as post-national by means 
of “cosmopolitan political realism” (Beck 2009, 3), while Noam Chomsky 
points out that the de-nationalisation of statehood is being countered by 
an increasing role for stronger national states, or the imposition of a “single 
standard” (Chomsky 2007).9 Meanwhile, in Western and Westernized de-
mocracies there are mounting fears that social transformation and liability 
may no longer be within the reach of their common political culture, and 
chaotic situations are likely to arise. 
On a different level and differently from world governance, transnational 
civil society is also trying to cope with the shortcomings and vulnerabilities 
produced by the expanding process of globalization. An awareness of the 
disempowerment of national states, of forms of disorganization and polycen-
tric control that are replacing the centralized organization characteristic of 
modernity and of the feebleness of local or regional political leaderships, 
explains, among other issues, the phenomenon of international civic mobi-
lization in critical moments. This type of mobilization seems to favour more 
inclusive rather than merely national solidarity. Nevertheless, as Bob Jessop 
explains, civil society is a problematic notion: it remains a “contested space 
for representatives of very different types of interests, norms and values 
(…) a target for strategies to secure the dominance of the particular insti-
tutional orders (…) a reservoir of antagonistic ‘instincts’ (…) and a social 
resource for resistance” (Jessop 2011, 81). Even if it is heterogeneous and 
formless, its democratic potential nevertheless seems to be undeniable as 
Jürgen Habermas recognizes (Habermas 2008). Besides, the feasibility of a 
transnational civil society has been greatly enhanced by the technologies 
that work at the speed of light (Internet, mobile phones and other gadgets) 
in a space that is the space-world. “Time and space compression”, to use 
David Harvey’s expression (Harvey 1990), is redefining all sorts of borders, 
as well as the consciousness that is becoming increasingly cosmopolitan, 
with the result that indignation and political disappointment are fuelling 
spontaneous expressions of citizenship across the planet. 
9 This expression is used by Noam Chomsky in connection with American foreign 
policy.
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On the opposite side of mobilized civil society, there is the more com-
mon phenomenon of depoliticized citizenship. The number of people who do 
not fulfil even their most basic role as electors has been rising in Western 
democratic countries, despite the expansion of the culture and information 
societies of recent decades. One of the reasons for this attitude lies in the 
generalized scepticism about the political system itself coupled with a self-
perception of being politically insignificant. World governance may also be 
adding to this attitude, in as much as it dislodges or restricts some of the 
functions of the national state, harming the basis for the individual’s identifi-
cation with national party-politics. But there are multiple causes for citizens’ 
indifference, including: the dissolution of ideologies and traditional forms of 
class identity, the contradictory perspectives offered by our shifting and mal-
leable postmodernity, consumerism and mind formatting by the dominant 
media, notably the liberal media, including international news agencies and 
powerful networks, such as the CNN, CNBC, BBC and Aljazeera. 
In a number of essays on the culture industry in the 1940s, Adorno 
and Horkheimer argued – and did so even more controversially in their 
critique of the Enlightenment known as Dialectic of Enlightenment (1947) 
– that far from encouraging critical reflection, the culture industry had 
deteriorated into a mere commodity, impressing “the same stamp on eve-
rything” and making up a totalitarian system that was “uniform as a whole 
and in every part” (Adorno 1991, 120).10 In One Dimensional Man (1964), 
Herbert Marcuse also explained how consumerism in an advanced indus-
trial society, that is a capitalist society, became a commodity-producing so-
ciety, integrating individuals via the mass media into the existing system 
of production and consumption, or what he called the “one-dimensional” 
universe of thought, behaviour, and technology – the latter both as a con-
trivance used in the production of goods and as a social process which 
facilitates control and domination.11 Whatever the causes and explana-
tions – scepticism, an ingrained feeling of impotence, auto-reification or 
10 I am referring to the negative critique of culture that Adorno and Horkheimer 
made as regards the mid-1940s in the context of late capitalism under the impact of 
German National Socialism and American modern culture – a critique that Adorno 
reaffirmed in a radio talk in 1963.
11 For Marcuse a humanizing liberation from this system of domination could only 
come through a “Great Refusal” co-ordinated by those outside the system and within 
a loosely constituted “New Left”. 
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one-dimensionality – citizen indifference or apathy weigh negatively on the 
quality of our present-day democracies (Arteta 2010) and, consequently, 
on the political quality of the new world order that is being shaped. Today’s 
cybercitizens are “tourists” (Bauman 1997, 89) pleasurably immersed in the 
images and symbols of millions of others, yielding to the instant gratifica-
tion provided by consuming the virtual: places, communities, relationships 
and “pornotopia” (Steven Marcus) free from the traditional taboos about 
human behaviour, or distracted by Dysneyesque shopping malls and tour-
ism channelled through architectural look-alike airports or Marc Augé’s’ 
“non-places” (1995). 
Viewing citizenship from this angle leads us to the  rather pessimistic 
conclusion that advanced technology and affluence may have removed 
from society the possibility for social and political change that existed in 
early industrial societies. According to Baudrillard, this loss came with 
the shifts away from modernity, when the production of consumers rather 
than goods became central, the distinction between the “mass” and the 
“media” blurred, and rationalization dissolved (Lyon 2000, 229). Moving 
away from the political economy of the Frankfurt School theory toward a 
semiological theory of the sign, Baudrillard’s work, especially For a Critique 
of the Political Economy of the Sign (1981), clarifies the emergence of post-
modern culture from consumer societies. Political alienation or conform-
ism is thus a feature that, to a large extent, characterizes the citizens of 
our increasingly globalized world. While citizenship is distracted from its 
duties, contemporary democracies tend to become autistic, distant from 
the real social problems, more prone to uncountable direct corruption and 
irrational political decision-making. A more intelligible public sphere, i.e. 
less fragmented, contradictory and esoteric, enlightened by a cosmopolitan 
intellectual synergy might stimulate the revival of democratic engagement, 
both at individual and collective levels, along with the development of a 
more integral awareness of the world.
3. Science, technology and public surveillance
Many more issues and areas require intellectual convergence. The di-
rection of change in science and technology, for example, is of the utmost 
relevance, especially the issue of how to democratize decisions and open up 
priorities in order to found a wider public debate and thus avoid depoliti-
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cization as well as the implicit endorsement of organized non-liability. Ever 
since the work of the late T.S. Kuhn in the early 1960s, sociologists have 
been studying the ways in which processes within the scientific community 
can affect the content and direction of scientific innovation. Their analy-
sis points to the key question of how to detach research from its current 
embeddedness within the institutional nexus of capital and the state. We 
have received sufficient confirmation that it is a grave mistake to minimize 
the structures of power which have accompanied the latest scientific rev-
olution and the unprecedented monopolies that have arisen. Man-made 
risks and disasters, such as the increase in epidemics in the early 1980s 
with the new strain of Creutzfeldt–Jakob disease (bovine spongiform en-
cephalopathy, commonly known as mad-cow disease), the oil spillage in 
the Mexican Golf (2010) and the succession of accidents in the nuclear 
power stations on Three Mile Island (1979), in Chernobyl (1986) and in 
Fukushima (2011), are becoming more frequent and dangerous. Follow-
ing on from what I have said, Ulrich Beck’s advice seems to be judicious 
when he reminds us that the more cosmopolitan and interconnected our 
clarification of the problems is, the more chances we have of diminishing 
the serious risks happening in our contemporary world. In his view, the 
relatively certain capacity to predict catastrophes must be understood and 
acknowledged within a cosmopolitan realism that is capable of establish-
ing a network of alliances and mutual transnational dependencies (Beck 
2011, 23). For that to happen, science and technology must be surveyed 
by the public eye, while the chronic insufficiency of public debate and the 
culture of non-liability should be remedied. This is a complex area in need 
of reliable sound orientation. Without it, I do not see how we are able to 
restrict global ambitions in the fields of capitalist accumulation, control 
over labour processes, product innovation and state strategies in relation 
to military priorities and surveillance. 
4. Dialoguing and dissuasion against terror and violence
Another problem we face is the need to reinvent the politics of dissua-
sion, since “time and space compression” also redefines the issue of war and 
peace; technology and the acceleration of history favour accidents at a time 
when the world disposes a “third system of armaments” that may be lethal 
to mankind (Virilio 1993). With the increase of terrorism, our communica-
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tion and perception have become the new weapons of dissuasion, but there 
seems to be a quandary here: global surveillance or the whole logistics of 
the global panoptic systems is leaving us with less freedom without guaran-
teeing our safety, because dissuasion in the context of terrorist warfare and 
the proliferation of weapons seem to be an impossible task. Surveillance 
must then be complemented by the economic development of poor regions 
and continuous political negotiation at local and regional levels. That is 
why the offensive launched against Islamism following the attack of Sep-
tember 11, 2001, was a gross and dangerous misjudgement as the ongoing 
popular uprisings in Northern Africa and the Middle East spearheaded by 
ordinary people in their twenties and thirties seem now to confirm. The 
offensive unleashed a revival of monolithic thinking and xenophobia alien 
to the complexities of cultural diversity, regional alliances, tribal loyalties 
and counter-global activity, as well as endorsing the recourse to “enhanced 
interrogation techniques”, “extraordinary renditions”, prisons such as Abu 
Ghraib and a concentration camp like Guantánamo, where a multicultur-
al, multinational and multi-aged population (living a “bare life” existence) 
continues to be detained whereby its abandonment has been sanctioned by 
the law within a “state of exception”.12 
These practices have damaged international efforts to enforce a whole 
new policy for the Middle East through a culture of fair negotiation. Fur-
thermore, they have once again foregrounded the Western contradiction 
between real politics and its humanistic values or human rights – a con-
tradiction that shapes a culture of violence and terror with an established 
tradition. Within the limits of modernity, barbarity mas allways been in 
herent to the civilization, , going back not only to Robespierre, Saint-Just 
and Lenin but also to the colonial policies that prepared the twentieth 
century’s genocides and mass murders. Or it entails the paradox pointed 
out by Agambem, when he claims that “(...) in every modern state, a point 
exists which defines the moment when the decision of life is transformed 
12 For Agamben, whose concepts I have just used, the camp is “the hidden matrix 
of modernity” (Agamben 2000, 48), the concrete physical location for biopolitical ex-
ception. With its invention, “the state of exception, which was essentially a temporary 
suspension of the rule of law on the basis of a factual state of danger, is now given a 
permanent spatial arrangement which nevertheless remains outside the normal order” 
(Agamben 1998, 84).
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into the decision on death, when biopolitics is thus inverted and becomes 
thanatopolitics” (Agamben 1998, 188).
But there is another side to civilization, that is also grounded in tradition, 
and which has been solidly built by the intelligentsia over the centuries and 
needs to be reinforced in the present global context. For has not emancipa-
tory reason always had to fight for its right to exist within Western culture 
itself? Has it not most recently been locked in a life and death struggle against 
totalitarianism? And is this struggle, mostly against instrumental reason, not 
one which has to be fought anew and on a daily basis? This better tradi-
tion is the culture that still nourishes the options that involve intellectual 
commitment to inscribe human rights within the modern state, deconstruct 
prejudice and hatred, condemn exclusion, oppression and all forms of sov-
ereign violation, as well as forge a conciliatory and lawful outlook on exter-
nal political affairs instead of arbitrary decisions and actions. To this cultural 
tradition belong, among so many others, Bertrand Russell, Herbert Camus 
and Edward Said: the Russell Tribunal (also known as the International War 
Crimes Tribunal), was established following the 1966 publication of the phi-
losopher’s book War Crimes in Vietnam which investigated American foreign 
policy and its military intervention in Vietnam; Camus and Said tried to find 
key-answers to the acutest problems of their time in the domain of sociabil-
ity. Camus argued for solidarity and negotiation during the Algerian War, 
and Said urged an understanding between Palestinians and Israelis so that 
a one-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict might emerge. They 
both endured fierce criticism for their views. The repeated failure to carry on 
this better tradition explains why the silence of many American intellectu-
als or their belatedness in condemning the political offensive that followed 
September 11 was so disconcerting; it also revealed why it is imperative that 
we have a coordinated world intelligentsia, composed of democratic open-
minded intellectuals with the authority to help shape public opinion and 
exercise an influence on international politics and organisms in decisive situ-
ations such as those involving military intervention. 
Conclusion
A unique feature of the present situation is that all countries – deve-
loped and developing – are subject to the same global marketplace pres-
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sures and culture industries in varying degrees and different aspects, as well 
as to the new possibilities opened up by the communication and informa-
tion technologies. Constructing a democratic cosmopolitan culture that 
meets fundamental challenges posed by the globalization process requires 
changes in our awareness of the world we live in and the emergence of a 
political culture which captures and responds to the difficulties faced by 
societies today. Decisive world issues, such as those pointed out and includ-
ing many others (the convergence of ethics with the political, peace among 
the states, ethnic conflict and genocide, unbiased international law, mul-
ticultural policies and the sustainability of life on earth), means tackling 
them from a global and multicultural perspective and taking advantage of 
the new opportunities for agency that spring from the immense access to 
information and knowledge. Because of their scale and complexity, these is-
sues can only be met through major structured intellectual effort, strategic 
vision, and dialogic and pluralist approaches. All this implies, in my view, 
the formation of intellectual public consensuses that moves away from an 
obscure, diffuse and to a great extent, inept postmodern intellectual cul-
ture towards a more overt, consistent and vigorous commitment to the 
renewal of politics and ethics – to a more intelligent, inclusive and green 
world. Ultimately, such effort would involve a new type of cosmopolitan 
imagination that might well mean “(...) a re-enchantment of the world that 
modernity tried hard to dis-enchant (Bauman 1992: x). 
References
adorno, Theodor. 1991. Culture Industry Reconsidered. In The Cul-
ture Industry: Selected Essays on Mass Culture. London: Routledge.
agamBen, Giorgo. 1998. Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life. 
California: Stanford University Press.
2000. Means Without End: Notes on Politics. University of Minnesota Press.
augé, Marc. 1995. Non-places. Introduction to an anthropology of super-
modernity. trans. John Howe. London, N. York: Verso.
116
arteta, Aurelio. 2010. Mal consentido. Madrid: Alianza Editorial.
axFord, Barrie. 2000. Globalization. In Understanding Contemporary 
Society. Edited by Gary Browning, Abigail Halcli, Frank Webster. London. 
Thousand Oaks. N. Delhi: Sage, 238-251.
Baudrillard, Jean. 1981. For a Critique of the Political Economy of the 
Sign. St. Louis: Telos.
Bauman, Zigmunt. 1987. Legislators and Interpreters: On Modernity, Post-
Modernity and Intellectuals. Cambridge: Polity Press.
2006. Liquid Times: Living in an Age of Uncertainty. Cambridge: Polity.
BhaBha, Homi. 2003. Democracy De-realized. Diogenes 1, 27-35.
Beck, Ulrich. 1996. The Reinvention of Politics. Cambridge: Polity.
2009. La nueva “realpolitik” es cosmopolita. El País, February 3, 3.
Boggs, Carl. 2000. Intellectuals. In Understanding Contemporary Society. 
Edited by Gary Browning, Abigail Halcli, Frank Webster. London. Thou-
sand Oaks. New Delhi: Sage, 296-311.
1997. Posmodernity and its Discontents. Cambridge: Polity Press.
castells, Manuel. 1984. The City and the Grassroots. Berkeley, CA: 
University of California Press.
chhotray, Vasudha and Stoker, Gerry. 2009. Governance Theory and 
Practice. A Cross-Disciplinary Approach. London: Macmillan.
chomsky, Noam. 2007. Failed States: The Abuse of Power and the Assaukt 
on Democracy. Harmondsworth: Penguin.
eco, Umberto. 1994. Apocalypse Postponed. Edited by Robert Lumley. 
Indiana University Press and the British Film Institute.
giddens, Anthony. 1994. Beyond Left and Right: The Future of Radical 
Politics. Cambridge: Polity Press.
1998. The “Third Way”. Cambridge: Polity Press.
haBermas, Jürgen. 1984. The Theory of Communicative Interaction. 
In Reason and Rationalization of Society. Vol. 1. T. McCarthey, trans. Cam-
bridge: Polity.
Helena Gonçalves da Silva
Intellectual Topographies 117
2008. Between Naturalism and Religion: Philosophical Essays. Ciaran 
Cronin, trans. Cambridge: Polity Press.
harvey, David. 1990. The Postmodern Condition. Cambridge: Polity.
JessoP, Bob. 2011. Challenging democratic governance. The impact of 
globalization on territorial and temporal sovereignty of the state and the ca-
pacities of civil society. In Globality, Democracy and Civil Society. Edited by 
Terrell Carver and Jeans Bartelson. London and New York: Routledge, 75-94.
Judt, Tony. 2008. Reappraisals: Reflections on the Forgotten Twentieth Cen-
tury. London: Penguin Press.
laclau, Ernesto and Mouffe, Chantal. 1985. Hegemony and Socialist 
Strategy. London: Versu.
lyon, David. 2000. Postmodernity. In Understanding Contemporary So-
ciety. Edited by Gary Browning, Abigail Halcli, Frank Webster. London. 
Thousand Oaks. N. Delhi: Sage, 221-237.
marcuse, Herber. 1964. One-Dimensional Man. Boston: Beacon. 
mcknight, David. 2010. Beyond Right and Left. New Politics and the Cul-
ture Wars: Allen & Unwin.
mouFFe, Chantal. 2011. Civil Society, democratic values and human 
rights. In Globality, Democracy and Civil Society. Edited by Terrel Carver and 
Jeans Bartelson. London, New York: Routledge, 95-111. 
rorty, Richard. 1999. Philosophy and Social Hope. Harmondsworth: 
Penguin.
roWls, J. 2005. A Theory of Justice. Original Edition. Cambridge, MA: 
Belknap Press.
sousa santos, Boaventura de and Rodriguez-Gravito, C.A., editors. 
2005. Law and Globalization from Below. Towards a Cosmopolitan Legality. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
tinnevelt, Ronald and De Schutter, Helder, editors. 2010. Global De-
mocracy and Exclusion. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing.
virilio, Paul. 1993. L’insécurité du territoire. Paris: Galilée.
Wood, Ellen Meiksins. 1995. Democracy against Capitalism: Renewing 
Historical Materiallism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 

II – Intellectual Commitment, 
Identity and Citizenship

THE ORDEAL OF CITIZENSHIP IN THE ERA OF 
DIGITALIZATION
moleFi kete asante
My task is to elucidate a complex set of discourses around the post-modern 
warping of citizenship by giving special attention to immigrant and native 
narratives in various contemporary societies. Transnational boundaries and 
transgenerational communication are cornerstones of the new era of a digi-
tized world. Understanding and maintaining a common state of citizenship 
in a world where it is easy to own bank accounts, pay taxes, and live any-
where has allowed the contemporary scholar of culture and communica-
tion to explore the human being in the world as a challenge. Therefore, 
I want to pose as many questions as I answer, but certainly to answer the 
ones that are most pressing in an analysis of contemporary citizenship. 
Furthermore, I seek to explore the increasingly intrusive nature of the 
digital revolution on the question of being, not simply autonomous ontol-
ogy, but being aware of others, being-in-company, but being in company. 
I shall show, as Abdul Jan Mohammed has claimed, that the love of dif-
ference has emerged in our discourse with an undue exuberance (JanMo-
hamed 1983, 2-9). I am not suggesting that difference or differance is with-
out value, only that the suppression of identity, to the degree that it has 
been suppressed, might be unwarranted in many cases (Derrida 1978). In-
deed, the suppression of identity might lead to further oppression of certain 
groups. The valorization of difference, a sort of hetero-philia, has warped 
the way we see relationships. It is true that I am different from you and yet 
at the same time my alterity carries its own identity and it is not simple, the 
other. In either case, whether in love of difference or love of identity, we are 
bundles of affections and cognitions that are evident in our actions. 
My thesis is that most racial and ethnic discourses related to questions 
of citizenship are ultimately false and nothing more than fear reactions 
based on the idea that we will lose something that we really do not possess 
and can never possess exclusively. We cannot possess perfection in human 
relationships, even though the endeavor itself is worthy of humanity. Ra-
cial discourses are about our petty imperfections as well as the valorization 
of difference. Identity figures in this equation only to the extent that the 
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Sartrean racist seeks to take his identity for granted and for meaning while 
simultaneously denying an identity-with-substance to others (Sartre 1948). 
In other words, a hollow symbol, an empty shell, a shadow, an unsubstantial 
sign, or a stereotype laden with the potential to create fear suffices for the 
racist imagination. 
Yet in modern European and American societies it is this fear, not so 
much of difference but of identity that sits at the very entrance to our 
own freedom (Asante 2007, 23-56). We are stunted in our imagination, de-
formed by our anxieties, and hemmed in by our desire to escape from genu-
ine humanism that recognizes identity as well as difference. Nothing less 
than the upheaval of our established fears can allow for the re-awakening 
of a human society based on the duality of difference and identity. 
We have not yet abandoned the European Renaissance or the Enlight-
enment in social views and there are perhaps many aspects of those move-
ments that we should not abandon, but we must continue to advance from 
the structured cocoon created by those who sought to control every aspect 
of the world. This was a control that was not simply one concerned with 
gold, oil, rubber, diamond, silver, or uranium, but the control of people, and 
people’s thoughts and behaviors. Sometimes living in the United States of 
America through political campaigns, where the various voices of the past 
are brought to the present, I imagine a 17th century déjà vu experience. 
The 21st century is not very far from the 17th.
The United States of America was born with two serious birth defects 
that have truly challenged the citizenship idea. The first was the disposses-
sion of the Native Americans and the second was the enslavement of Afri-
cans. In the process of its growth and evolution, the American nation, with 
bravado, also managed to conquer Mexican territories. How these events 
are remembered and how they are passed on to students in American Stud-
ies are important matters of memory. Nevertheless, we are confronted by 
desires of dominance in the Althusserian sense where people are willing to 
exercise violence to maintain dominance over others. But as Fanon under-
stood, violence often creates more violence (Fanon 1965, 34-79).
Yet the manner in which our collective memories organize national 
identities and allegiances to given political platforms is of especial concern. 
If we know anything, we know that intellectual topographies, digital litera-
cies, embedded mythologies, reified symbols and new histories encourage 




present moment in human history, two intellectual traditions converge at 
the level of reading and locating (Derrida 1978; Mazama 2003, 12-14; Fer-
reira 2010). Derrida’s reading of difference and differance and the Afro-
centrist’s locating of agency and passivity, or center and margins, are deep 
constructions of thought meant to breakdown, to deconstruct, in order to 
reintegrate human thinking. I do not believe that we should dispense with 
either of these ideas. 
Drawing on a mixture of discourses rooted in my understanding of his-
torical themes, articulated human conflicts, and our debates over inter-
stitial territories, I champion an alternative set of discourses based on an 
ancient African system of maat as articulated in the writings of Maulana 
Karenga (Karenga 2006).
The ancient Africans who lived along the Nile Valley created the idea 
of holding back chaos and made that idea the central fact of their concepts 
of the ethical, physical, intellectual, and eternal life. Maat, according to 
Maulana Karenga, is normally referred to in modern European languages as 
truth, justice, propriety, harmony, balance, reciprocity, and order. But while 
Maat is common in our contemporary language it is exceedingly rare in na-
tional behaviors. In fact it is easy to understand why it is difficult to achieve 
when Karenga says that “Maat means rightness in the spiritual and moral 
sense in three realms: the Divine, the natural and the social” (Karenga 
2010). In effect, as Seba Khun-Anup says, “Speak Maat, do Maat, for Maat 
is mighty, it is great, it endures (…) Wrongdoing does not achieve its goal, 
but one who is righteous reaches dry land” (Karenga 1984 34:VIII). Our 
task, as communicators and cultural thinkers, is to pose Maat in the mak-
ing of citizens where the digital era has broken the boundaries of territories 
and place. Our dealings with each other, no longer local, but global and 
digital, must rise to the level of Maat. 
Examples
Recently, I read in the New York Times that the Israeli government was 
planning to send 400 children, born in Israel, to the original home of their 
parents because the parents were undocumented aliens when the children 
were born (Haaretz.com). Israel is not alone in this tendency to seek exter-
nal causes for economic and social turbulence. Squeezed, because jobs are 
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scarce during a recession, many Israelis blame the lack of job opportunities 
on the presence of the once much-needed foreign laborers. 
In the United States, the immigration issue has taken on some of the 
vilest expressions of racism we have seen for quite some years. The moti-
vation for anti-immigration activities in the United States is the Mexican 
immigrant, most often undocumented. There may be twelve million un-
documented aliens, principally Mexicans but also some Eastern Europeans, 
in the United States according to the authorities. Believing the Mexican 
government to be broken and that the growing migration of undocumented 
Mexicans to the United States cannot be completely stopped, the State of 
Arizona, in the American southWest, a state that borders Mexico, wrote 
a law requiring police to arrest anyone who might be considered illegal. 
The problem is that the only people they were targeting with this law were 
Mexicans. Fortunately, a federal court prevented this negative law from go-
ing into effect. There will be more debate and legal actions by the State of 
Arizona and the United States federal government. It appears from some 
news reports that there might also have been some capitalist interests in 
pushing this law since a few corporations that specialize in housing aliens 
stand to win millions of dollars worth of contracts with the State of Ari-
zona. The plan was to have law enforcement officers arrest the aliens and 
since there was not enough space in the local jails, the capitalist prison de-
velopers would meet the need by producing their own holding cells. They 
would stand to make millions of dollars on such a scheme. 
As important as these suspicions, the protections of traditional domi-
nance patterns are at the core of these irrational actions. There are fears 
here, not simply fears of Mexicans taking jobs from Anglos, but a profound 
ontological fear. Mexicans will further Mexicanize the culture, the food, 
the language, the philosophy of beauty, and the history of the region. The 
question for the whites is: “How to maintain Anglo-Saxon control and 
dominance in a region that is becoming increasingly Mexican?” People 
know certain things or they think they know certain things because this is 
the way it has been done in the past or this is what their parents told them 
about a situation. What we have known before, that is, what we knew dur-
ing the analog age, we knew viscerally with our affective as well as cogni-
tive dimensions. Sometimes we have brought past attitudes too far into the 
21st century much like children growing up in their parents’ religion and 
then in adulthood genuinely believe that they made an independent choice 
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to be a member of a certain religion. In such a case, one has no choice but 
to choose our parents’ choice. There is a wave of imposition, a tide of co-
ercion, that exists in our social interactions around what we think are our 
independent choices. 
Our language and our ability to decipher appear to succumb to no par-
ticular hegemonic system. We know now, however, that it is respect for 
others that must govern all true intellectual quests regardless of hegemony. 
This is the basis of all listening to others even when we hear others say: “I 
do not care what you say. I do not want to listen.” Actually they are listen-
ing at that very moment and they do care even though they may not act 
upon what they have heard or may be angry about it. 
I have heard some of my contemporaries say: “I am comfortable with 
the way of the world as it is, as I see it, do not disturb my world. Do not 
bring new ideas”. These are the dinosaurs of thought. Do you remember 
what happened to Leonardo Fibonnacci when he brought to Europe the 
African-Arab numerals that replaced the bulky Roman Numerals that 
had been introduced by the Roman Empire? (Bernal 1984) Many people 
ridiculed Leonardo Fibonacci, called him a witch, an evil man filled with 
mysterious ideas about how the world should or could work more effi-
ciently, and then threw him into jail. What audacity he had to bring inno-
vations in the way Europe wrote numerals? Today, six hundred years later 
the world is grateful that he insisted on the portability and practicality of 
the new numerals. 
During the early part of the last century in the American South, a place 
laced with a history of charm and cruelty, and in more recent times in 
South Africa under the white minority regime there was signage racism, per-
sonal racism emerging in the signage throughout the country. Signs pointed 
people to either “white” or “black” places to eat, sleep, or drink. We knew 
this in the United States for a hundred years after the end of the enslave-
ment in 1865. In the l9th century, there had been a brief twelve years of 
Reconstruction when it looked like the old structure of enslavement would 
give way to a world of interracial freedom and collective responsibility to-
ward government (Foner 2002). Blacks were elected to Congress, served as 
senators, and briefly as governor of one state. But by 1877 the reaction was 
so severe that the response of right wing racist political operatives caused 
an abrupt halt to what could have been a regime of good relations. The era 
degenerated into the establishment of the Ku Klux Klan, a terrorist orga-
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nization, with the purpose of bringing back the old regime in which blacks 
“knew” their places and their places were not alongside whites. 
In the present day, it is hard to imagine black and white racial signs 
separating people but it was not so long ago that there were those times in 
Africa, in America. What could possibly have gone through the minds of 
the perpetrators of these divisive structures in America and in South Afri-
ca? Who could devise such laws? What would a white person do in a toilet 
that a black woman would not or could not? How could a black man use a 
urinal differently than a white man? What contamination would I cause to 
a white person by eating my food in the same room? How is it that our so-
cieties have advanced beyond this static kill of the spirit of humanity? Who 
is responsible for the death of reason? These are telling questions because 
once we answer them we are right back at the heart of the matter. Humans 
are responsible for all conventions by which we live regardless of our societ-
ies. If I do not want for you what I want for myself then I am reducing you 
to something other than human. In effect, to be human, as I am human 
or think I am, I have certain expectations but if I am able to separate you 
from me and to define you as outside of those expectations, then I have 
reduced you, thrown you into a pile of trash, or to the human wayside. This 
is the core meaning of all forms of human discrimination. The racist says, 
“You are not me and you do not deserve the rights or expectations that I 
have.” All societies have dark corners of these antique beliefs in their clos-
ets because all societies have individuals who believe they are better than 
others. Chattel slavery in the past was the epitome of the idea of otherness, 
the enslaved were those who were really not considered human at all, but 
property, to be owned, managed, and disposed of at will. 
Portugal has its own closet of questions, so does Spain, and France, the 
United Kingdom, and the United States. There are no gods that have de-
vised racist regulations and restrictions or anti-feminist attitudes; all these 
actions belong to humans. The makers of social terror that lead to destruc-
tion of trust and deep self-rejection are all humans. They look like our 
neighbours, in fact, they look like us. However, all violence against human 
beings has the capacity to ignite the fires of hatred (Fanon 1965). 
I must add, however, that I would not ask the majority to decide on the 
rightness of these anti-human actions nor would I put these issues to some 
human majority in an effort pursue some form of Foucault’s popular justice 
because majorities can be very wrong (Foucault, 1989). If we think popular 
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in the sense of majority or mass public opinion we know that such popular 
opinions have often been responsible for killing decent people.
I do not need to remind you that a few months ago we had a horrendous 
debate in the United States over whether or not the Islamic community in 
New York should build a community center on land that they own close to 
the site where the World Trade Towers were attacked? There were many 
irrational arguments in this debate. In the United States, the Constitution, 
almost a sacred document, protects “freedom of religion” and “freedom of 
speech”. But the masses of Americans, according to pollsters at the time, 
wanted to deny those freedoms to Muslims. “They must not build their 
community center which included a mosque so close to Ground Zero,” the 
masses Saïd. Popular justice is sometimes based on mass justice and mass 
justice has its limitations when it comes to ethics. 
I am a descendant of people who have lived with a majority that has 
over the years believed in slavery, racial segregation, Ku Klux Klan vio-
lence, the lynching of Africans. The southern majorities in America con-
doned attacks on little school children because they were black, and now 
we are often confronted in many societies with violent homophobia, anti-
Jewishness, anti-Africanness, and discrimination against women. If you had 
taken a poll of the masses during the heat of many of these debates rational 
people would have wondered if we did not live in a mad society, so vitriolic 
and violent were the arguments and actions against others. Too often, free-
dom is interpreted as something that we could have but not others. This 
thinking, of course, is the beginning of terror. 
Terror, the political term of the era, has two forms, petty and grave. They 
form a merry-go-round, you see them here and then you see them there. 
They are parts of the same process of negation of self and others. Perhaps the 
petty terror is different from the grave terror in some respects, as I will show, 
but they are pretty much of the same game. They play on the same football 
pitch, though in different positions at different times. They are consistent 
in their ability to strike from any position on the field. This is our dilemma. 
Petty terror operates in our societies, as it has in previous societies, as violent 
attacks and assaults against people and institutions with which the terrorists 
have differences. Terror, in such cases, is a message sent with the most awful 
consequences to individuals, families, homes, and institutions. 
But even in the most vile assaults on property and individuals this petty 
terror is never so overwhelming or so consequential as the grave terror 
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that demonstrates its awesome power in the devastation of a people’s will 
to live, in their desire to achieve, in their ability to maintain culture, and 
in their absolute economic degradation on a daily basis. Grave terror is 
created when a society is able to produce an extensive, indeed, in some 
instances a comprehensive malaise and immobility in thinking, in action, 
and in behaviour. It reigns supreme in the avenues of our brain like massive 
trucks consuming all of the space on the road. You know the experience of 
driving around the side of a mountain and meeting a huge truck that takes 
up all of the road and you are squeezed into the smallest possible area to 
avoid a disaster. Well, this is grave terror. Like petty terror it is based on 
successfully peddling the idea of mortal fear. Of course, no where else in the 
world has terror been de-historicized as in the United States. The 9-11 at-
tack on the United States brought a new awareness of terror, but Africans, 
Native Americans had lived with terror for several hundred years. Lynch-
ing of blacks became a recreational past time in the 20th century. General 
Sherman sent soldiers to kill millions of buffalo on the American plains in 
an effort to force the Native Americans into reservation camps. 
One thing we have learned in the modern world is that fear is conta-
gious. It sends fundamentalists, of whatever religious banner, into action 
with a vengeance. The terrorists are fearful themselves and they use their 
own fear to scare the hell out of others. They blow up this and that or they 
tell this lie or that lie, but ultimately the malaise brought on by fear mul-
tiplies so that there is a headlong rush of masses of people seeking to hold 
back the collapse of structure. 
They have to be against love. They have to be against Mexicans. They 
have to be against Africans. They have to be against Christians. They have 
to be against Muslims. They have to be against Catholics. They have to 
be against Communists. They have clear prejudices against everyone and 
every culture, gender, creed, or ethnic group. They are miserably locked 
into a world of madness. It is this madness that screams at them and creates 
racism, colorism, religious prejudice, women haters, and so forth. 
And now we see that this suspected hetero-philia, love of difference, is 
somewhat a mirage, a phantom, because what matters to the hater, the 
denier, is his own identity, something he would like to prevent the other 
from ever possessing. 
There are white Americans, for example, who insist even now that 
President Barack Obama is not an American despite the fact that the au-
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thorities in his home state of Hawaii have produced copies of his birth 
certificate. We call these doubters, birthers, meaning that they question his 
nationality. “How could he be an American,” they say, “since he thinks like 
a European or an African?” In their minds they believe that his emphasis 
on social justice, religious freedom, environmental protection, health care 
for all, is an anti-American position. Some even ask, “How could Obama 
be an American since he was born in Hawaii”? Not knowing that Hawaii 
is a state of the United States of America these birthers betray reason and 
show their ignorance of their own history. Others ask: “How could he be 
an American since his step-father was an Indonesian and he was raised in 
Jakarta?” “How could he be an American since his Kansan mother married 
a Kenyan, and Kenya is in Africa?” 
What the racists among this cohort are saying is, “How can a black man 
lead the American nation? How did he gain control over the political ap-
paratus of the United States? So, one of their campaign pledges in the last 
election, held a few days ago, was “Let’s take our country back!” The double 
meaning inherent in this political declaration was probably unintentional 
but the clarity of going backwards is crystal clear. The implication for many 
conservative Americans is that Barack Obama is not an American. The 
fact that the right wing won one of the houses of Congress in 2010 attests 
to the strength of this identity politics. Although Obama’s intellectual and 
academic records are impeccable and the fact that he achieved the highest 
political office by sheer brilliance, eloquence, and the ability to sell his ideas 
to the majority of the people, those who closed their eyes to reality still see 
him as an interloper, occupying a white person’s position. I am setting a 
stage for you to see how the collapse of structure, however ancient in the 
mind, can cause more fear. 
We must never forget that the fear generated in the unconscious masses 
is dangerous because they believe that there is some threat to them because 
others are also free. It is the unconscious masses’ unfreedom that produces 
their fear. They cannot allow others to be free because their unfreedom 
would unravel. 
In many cases, the so-call birthers in the United States were born in 
Portugal, England, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Sweden, Greece, and other 
European nations. They came to a country of immigrants and sought to 
impose the strictest structures on others. One Hungarian immigrant Saïd 
that he was against the Mexicans coming to the United States to have 
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children just so they could gain American citizenship but in his case, he ex-
plained, it was different. I guess the difference was that he migrated to the 
United States because of political reasons, the oppressive Soviet Union’s 
pressure on freedom in Hungary, but the Mexicans seem to be coming for 
economic reasons. In the end, none of this matters because the Hungar-
ian American is just demonstrating his ignorance of history and prejudice 
against Mexicans, who were among the first as well as the latest group to 
arrive. One-third of the United States once belonged to Mexico and it is 
still an unsettled question in the minds of millions of Mexicans whose land 
was appropriated nearly one hundred and seventy years ago. 
So the issue is the sovereignty of nation states in some circles. Those 
who claim priority of citizenship often devalue the experiences of those 
who arrived within the jurisdiction of the state without documents. If we 
cannot discriminate on the basis of ethnicity or race, then we can claim 
that the person is undocumented. If the person is documented, then we 
claim that we cannot employ them because of their accents. This is a com-
mon situation in Western Canada, in the Vancouver area, where African 
immigrants to the area have the highest educational credentials of any im-
migrant group yet often find it difficult to secure the best jobs because of 
their English accents. Of course, Vancouver is English-speaking and there 
is no trouble with the English accent of Australian or British people in the 
area. To further complicate this problem of linguistic accents, the largest 
group of immigrants to the Vancouver region are Chinese and they are 
the ones discriminating against the Africans because the Africans do not 
speak English like the Chinese immigrants. So you understand now, it is 
not racism, they claim, but accentism that produces the need not to hire or 
promote the African person. All of this is complicated by the fact that the 
sovereign government is Canada and yet the operational realities on the 
ground are counter to the realities one would find in Toronto or Montreal. 
Sovereignty has two dimensions as a practical idea or as a popular idea. 
As a practical idea sovereignty is related to how governments control the 
domestic actions within its jurisdiction. As a popular idea, one gaining in 
use, sovereignty is earned by nations on the basis of protecting those within 
their jurisdiction. However, nothing about it is sacred and it could be trans-
ferred from one government entity to another. 
The dominance of neoliberalism, after the fall of the Soviet Union, has 
brought mistrust in governments, not that this is a new idea, but it is new 
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in the sense that we had thought that there were some governments that 
were truly untrustworthy. Now, we are faced with the uncomfortable fact 
that governments appear to be inherently untrustworthy, regardless of the 
honesty of the people in the government. The nature of the bureaucracy 
invites, as Kafka knew, dangers to the public (Kafka 1995). There is a ten-
dency to devalue the personal experiences of the citizen. We are victimized 
by our own optimism. This was the experience of many leftists during the 
first couple of years of the Barack Obama government in the United States. 
Is it ever possible for government to fulfil all of its promises and to what 
degree are we willing to admit that our favorite politicians have lied to us? 
They are neither gods nor angels, but like us, they are human. However, 
unlike us, they make their living selling us the idea that they are really 
capable of delivering us from evil. In every society, repeatedly, we believe 
them. Such is the nature of human mistrust of government. 
We soon forget the past unless we are constantly reminded and that 
is why societies create rituals of remembrances, festivals, religious obser-
vances, and shrines. Sometimes children either do not remember or do not 
know the debt they owe to their parents for their own livelihoods.
Africans must take notice that the world is no longer after Africans in 
a physical sense, but after Africa itself. It is the richest continent, the cake 
that has not yet been fully eaten; the treasure that has not yet been com-
pletely stolen; and the intellectual and philosophical well that remains too 
deep from which to drink. In the West, we assume that Africa is very differ-
ent, even the word exotic used by the French to identify Josephine Baker 
was too mild for what some would call African ideas. Terms like primitive, 
savage, jungle roll off of the lips of Westerners in reference to Africa more 
than to any other place. As an African, I am re-assured by my friends that I 
am not the African they are thinking about. But this reassurance does not 
allay my fears or calm my anxieties. There are very real reasons why I am 
not at ease with verbal exclusions. I know that I am one with the African 
world, with the African that is condemned, held in contempt, and that has 
history torn from its roots. I can be profiled as they say in the United States. 
It is one of the more onerous state crimes in America, this racial profiling, 
which allows the police to look at a person and to declare that person 
dangerous, unfit for the society, or suspicious. While it is now considered 
unethical and is increasingly prohibited, some highway police often have 
an unwritten law that certain drivers, particularly young black and Latino 
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males, should be routinely pulled over and checked for drugs, seatbelt vio-
lations, or any other transgression that could result in the person being im-
prisoned. Such deliberate targeting of those who are socially or physically 
“not like the rest of us”, has been adjudged a violation of a driver’s rights. 
It is now considered criminal in some states for police to profile individuals 
for harassment. But the passion for profiling stems from the prediction of 
dangerousness, not necessarily in physical terms, but in terms of our com-
fort with our own prejudices. 
A recent report by the CCR.Justice.org in New York is most revealing. 
Jeffrey Fagan, a Professor of Law and Public Health at Columbia Univer-
sity, has supported a class action lawsuit of the Center for Constitutional 
Rights (CCR) that challenges New York Police Department (NYPD) stops-
and-frisks because these stops were racist. Nearly 150,000 stops over the 
last six years lack any legal justification. Another 544,252 stops may be 
unconstitutional but were not sufficiently documented to analyze. Here 
are the facts: most police stops occur in Black and Latino neighborhoods, 
and even after adjustments for other factors including crime rates, social 
conditions and allocation of police resources in those neighborhoods, race 
is the main factor determining NYPD stops. Black and Latino residents are 
more likely to be stopped than Whites even in areas with low crime rates 
where populations are mixed or mostly White. Nearly half of all stops are 
justified by citing the vague category “furtive movements”, as opposed to 
only 15 percent citing “fits relevant description”. In more than half of all 
stops, the officers cite “high crime area” as an “additional circumstance” 
even in precincts with lower than average crime rates. The Supreme Court 
has specifically found that it is unconstitutional to stop and frisk a person 
simply because they are in a so-called “high-crime” neighborhood. Black 
and Latino suspects are treated more harshly in instances in which police 
officers make the determination that a crime has occurred. Black and La-
tino suspects are more likely to be arrested rather than issued a summons 
when compared to White suspects who are accused of the same crimes. 
Black and Latino suspects are more likely to have force used against them; 
and the rate of gun seizures is nearly zero – 0.15 out of a hundred stops – a 
disturbingly low return for a law enforcement tactic the NYPD claims is 
designed specifically to remove illegal guns from the streets.
The idea is that the immigrant or ethnic other in a cognitive way, that 
is, in the mind of the Native, could be punished not for what the immigrant 
Molefi Kete Asante
Intellectual Topographies 133
had done, or would do, but for what the Native believe he or she may do 
in the future. Often the Native believes that he will be harmed by the im-
migrant’s lifestyle, behaviour, food preparations or physical dangerousness. 
The Native refuses to bear any risk in regard to the immigrant and in fact 
seeks to project the dangerousness of the immigrant as a reason for violat-
ing the immigrant’s status. 
What are we to make of President Sarkozy’s rounding up of thousands 
of Roma in France and shipping them to Romania and Bulgaria? What 
can actually be the justification for South Africans assaulting Zimbabweans 
who seek work in South Africa, especially since South Africans received 
financial, military, and moral support from the Zimbabweans during the 
days of apartheid? Indeed, should there not be the quid pro quo that hu-
mans should be treated with decency simply because they treated others 
with decency? Why should any human be treated in a fashion less than 
human? The answer to this question is obvious for those of us who seek to 
foster new spaces for effective human interactions. No one should have to 
deny their identity, conceal their names, or hide their background in order 
to be a full citizen. It was widely reported on September 25, 2010 that two 
former Polish neo-Nazis who had become violent skinheads in Warsaw dur-
ing their teenage years learned in 2009 that they were actually Jewish. The 
report Saïd that their ancestors had hid their Jewish identities in order to 
protect them from the Nazis. Ola, the woman, and Pawel, the man, now in 
their thirties Saïd that they believed when they were teenagers that “it was 
all about white power (…) that Jews were the biggest plague and the worst 
evil of this world” (New York Times, February 28, 2010). Now that they 
have embraced their Jewish identity and history they are actively trying to 
overcome the regrets of the past. Of course, they no longer believed the ac-
cusations against Jews now that they have understood their own humanity 
as Jews. Literally, they have awakened to become the bodies and the minds 
they hated without reason. The claiming of identity is a form of census 
taking. It allows us to know who we are and who the other is only for the 
purpose of enriching our lives, not destroying theirs or preventing theirs, 
but seeing clearly how much, even with difference, we are to each other. 
I think we can pose another issue of complexity given the new emphasis 
on non-geographical social networks such as Internet blogs, online com-
munities, virtual classrooms, and various other non-geographical spaces. 
We can spread our identities, opinions, and ideas throughout the world in 
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near lightning speed and without an editor. An entire field of intercultural 
and international communication developed in the l970s around the no-
tion that human beings from various cultures were interacting more regu-
larly because of air travel. This meant that a business person, student, or 
professor who lived in one cultural setting could easily within a day be 
situated in another geographical area with someone of a different culture. 
Now all of this has become far more complicated because our spaces have 
become arenas of thought, multi-level discourse sites, and even interactive 
ideologies that are created through digital engagements. In effect, spaces 
of interpersonal communication and intercultural communication are dis-
covered everyday in our ordinary adventures with each other. They are the 
spaces where we meet other cultures and interact with them in the context 
of a common humanity.
Our own identities are created and re-created during these remarkable 
meetings and it is our emphasis on human relations that re-shapes our 
spaces so that they are safe. Maulana Karenga, Antonio Gramsci, Stuart 
Hall, and Ana Monteiro Ferreira, among others, have added the dimen-
sions of class, power, identity, and centeredness to intercultural spaces. I 
have tried to link Afrocentricity, that is, the idea of agency and subject 
perspective of African culture, to the best aspects of post-modernity. In 
an anti-structural sense, a core idea in post-modernity, Afrocentricity has 
sought to address immigration, diasporas, and representative identities in 
ways that align with the best thinking of Ama Mazama, bell hooks, Paul du 
Gay, Stuart Hall, Ien Ang, and even Zizek. 
They all suggest that you cannot hear your own opinion and be sane. 
You have to listen to others, integrate ideas, attach symbols, understand 
and appreciate diversity, in order to retain a semblance of humanity. But 
to listen to others is essential communication. President Amadinejad has 
some of the same issues that President Bush had, he hears his own voice, he 
sees only his perspective, and he concedes only his history. Yet as the poet 
Saïd, none of us is an island. 
Maat exists sometimes when we have exhausted the means to harm 
each other. Armies have run out of weapons, distances have proven too 
great to launch missiles, money has dried up and the people are weary of 
supporting warfare, and children have been born who have no memory 
of the reasons for hatreds, animosities, and enmities between people. We 
must have a new standard of citizenship, based on acceptance of diversity, 
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freedom, and respect for humanity and reason, then we will be able to 
declare that humanity has met and conquered the ordeal of citizenship in 
the digital age. 
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WITHSTANDING THE RIGHT-WING STORM: THE 
CURRENT AMERICAN (ANTI-) INTELLECTUAL 
LANDSCAPE AND THE INTELLECTUAL 
CONTRIBUTIONS OF NATIVE 
AMERICAN STUDIES
tom holm
It is unfortunate indeed to have to report that cultural hostilities, anti-
intellectualism, xenophobia, rage, anti-government sentiment, and racial 
polarization in the U.S. are once again on the march. What this current 
American celebration of ignorance, fear, and bigotry seems to be aimed 
at is the extinction of any and all intellectual development. It really ap-
pears as if the Arizona state legislature wants to stop knowledge dead in 
its tracks. The current appeal is to aggrandize the so-called American way 
of individualism, capitalist entrepreneurship, Christian fundamentalist 
thought, and professed American exceptionalism to the detriment of any 
critical thought, scientific method, and especially of the post-World War II 
hypotheses about human socio-political behavior. Anything that remotely 
criticizes American colonialism, racist policies, modernization theory and 
the perceived liberties of erroneous and vitriolic free speech, bearing arms, 
and the insertion of Christian fundamentalist ideologies into the making 
of national policy is seen as un-American and even criminal. This paper 
amounts to a special plea for the continuance of ethnic studies as legitimate 
academic disciplines in the face of these ideological trends. 
Arizona, the state in which I reside, has led the charge into the politics 
of fear. The newly elected president of the Arizona state senate, Russell 
Pearce, is the chief supporter of various laws that are aimed directly at 
oppressing the Mexican-American population in the state, including an 
“English-only” law, a statute that permits racial profiling to check the pa-
pers of so called “illegal immigrants,” a regulation that would allow school 
boards to fire teachers who have heavy “foreign” accents, and finally a law 
that would ban any kind of ethnic studies program in schools, colleges, 
and universities based on the unfounded supposition that these programs 
advocate the overthrow of the American government and promote ethnic 
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solidarity instead of American individualism. Pearce even wants to change 
the fourteenth amendment of the U.S. Constitution to deny citizenship to 
so-called “anchor babies”, those born on American soil to undocumented 
immigrant mothers. An ironic twist to Pearce’s stance on the fourteenth 
amendment is the fact that the young man, who staunched the blood from 
Congresswoman Gabrielle Giffords’ gunshot wound she suffered in an as-
sassination attempt and propped her up so that she did not choke on her 
own blood all the while dodging bullets, was in fact an “anchor” baby – 
exactly the person Pearce would have deported immediately and without 
even the briefest of hearings. Daniel Hernandez Jr., the twenty-year-old 
man who heroically helped save Representative Giffords’ life, was a con-
gressional intern who also sat on the city of Tucson’s Board of Gay, Lesbian, 
Bi-sexual, and Transgender Affairs. 
If Pearce and others had their way, the U.S. would be moved back to the 
mentality and socio-political structure of the 1950s. Civil rights for minor-
ity groups would be non-existent; Christian fundamentalist beliefs would 
be enshrined in school curriculums instead of scientific reasoning and criti-
cal thought; unbridled capitalism would create an even greater disparity in 
wealth between the upper and lower classes; there would be nothing left of 
the social and economic safety nets that were created under the New Deal 
of the 1930s; and new knowledge, particularly about ethnicity, race and 
colonialism, would have been filtered strictly through the models, theoreti-
cal constructs, and ideologies of Western European intellectual traditions. 
What follows is a short and basic history of the intellectual development 
generated by information gathered just within the framework of Native 
American Studies – a framework that will not exist if current American 
anti-intellectual sentiment has its way. The storm of right-wing criticism 
is rapidly gaining strength. On the other hand, many students of the dis-
cipline of American Indian studies have published the results of their re-
search. So I am hopeful that American Indian studies will survive the tem-
pest of invective launched against its content and the attempt to excise it 
completely from all levels of public education. I might mention also that 
this threat exists against all of these kinds of programs and their own inter-
nally created theories and the new knowledge they have produced. 
The notion that Native American – and for that matter, African-Amer-
ican and Mexican-American – studies is a simple by-blow of 1960s activism 
has become almost axiomatic. I have heard several of my non-Native col-
Tom Holm
Intellectual Topographies 139
leagues in various disciplines argue that ethnic studies programs in general 
were established in order to mollify minority protests on college campuses 
rather than to move any kind of academic discourse forward. These col-
leagues have more or less adhered to the proposition that Western science, 
logic, and philosophy have already developed the conceptual frameworks, 
theories, paradigms, and core assumptions that fully explain the political, 
social, and economic behaviors of minority peoples, including those living 
as colonized groups. Thus, Native American studies is considered a kind of 
tributary – a stepchild – of the mainstream disciplines like history, political 
science, sociology, and anthropology. Worse still is that American Indian 
studies has been accused of providing sinecures for Native American politi-
cal activists rather than hiring “real” (read “traditional”) scholars in order 
to place barbed thorns in the sides of university administrators. 
During this period of time, however, a number of Native American 
scholars and activists were conducting research and proposing ideas that 
moved American Indian studies beyond Western intellectual constructs. 
I will add too that scholars of African-American and Mexican-American 
studies were doing the very same. In the case of Native American studies, 
the first wave of American Indian scholars understood, in the light of post-
modern discourse, that deconstructing stereotypes of Native peoples was a 
step toward completely disavowing harmful, abusive, and even genocidal 
policies. 
In 1968, N. Scott Momaday was awarded the Pulitzer Prize for his novel 
House Made of Dawn. Most critics praised the book for its portrait of an 
Indian man, the main character Abel, caught between two worlds. Many 
academic observers have posited that Momaday was working from a post-
modernist standpoint and was thus disparaging the colonial oppression 
that had led to the decline of his culture and his own marginalization. In 
the final act of the novel, however, Abel returns to his native land and 
finds solace in his own culture. In short, Momaday was not really the cyni-
cal post-modern writer that his reviewers would have him. What he did, 
in my opinion, was introduce his readers to the spiritual healing of place. 
Abel’s culture was rooted in his home land, which was also a holy land. 
Indigenousness was actually Abel’s salvation. And since Momaday’s work, 
the meaning of place to human beings has been one of the focal points of 
Native American studies. He certainly solidified the idea of a living con-
nection between human beings and place in his book The Way to Rainy 
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Mountain (Momaday, 1976 and 1999). I was fortunate to have worked with 
Momaday and with Vine Deloria, Jr., whose readership was easily as great 
as Momaday’s. Deloria recruited Momaday to the University of Arizona, 
along with Leslie Marmon Silko, Robert K. Thomas, and my humble self. 
Looking back, I would have to argue that Deloria was perhaps the most 
significant force behind the development of American Indian studies as an 
autonomous discipline within the academy. Although often labelled as an 
activist (and polemicist), Deloria was a fierce logician who attempted to 
deconstruct false and harmful stereotypes of Native Americans. Deloria’s 
diverse academic background included study at the Colorado School of 
Mines, general science at Iowa State University, theology at the Lutheran 
School of Theology, and law at the University of Colorado. He also served 
as the Executive Director of the National Congress of American Indians. 
Perhaps in consequence of his liberal education, Deloria approached every 
topic on which he wrote from a multi-disciplinary standpoint. 
Although not one to formulate theory or construct paradigms, Deloria 
took up the critics’ role of dissecting each and every academic assumption 
about Native Americans as well as putting Western science and philosophy 
under his intense logical scrutiny. He literally put Western academia on tri-
al and generally found them all inadequate to explain the Native American 
relationship with place, the persistence of Native cultures, the pervasive-
ness of Native spirituality, and Native American behaviors. Deloria made 
several indictments in his first book, Custer Died for your Sins, but none so 
scathing as his critique of the traditional academic discipline of anthro-
pology. “Indians”, he wrote, “have been cursed above all other people in 
history. Indians have anthropologists” (Deloria 1988, 78). His overall criti-
cism against the discipline primarily rested on the fact that anthropologists 
frequently built careers on observing Indians, but, at the same time, learned 
nothing about Indians. Just as frequently, in both the pure and the applied 
research, anthropologists developed jargon and a set of definitions that not 
only perpetuated stereotypes but also fixed certain incorrect notions in the 
minds of non-Indians. In looking into the matter of anthropology and In-
dians further, I have become convinced that Deloria had it right all along. 
I will attempt, in a very Native way, to illustrate Deloria’s contention 
about anthropology by retelling one of my experiences with an anthropolo-
gist colleague and explaining my own war on certain anthropological terms 
and concepts. The experience with my anthropologist colleague occurred 
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just a few years ago. I sit on a commission for my own Native nation in 
Oklahoma. I am an enrolled citizen of the Cherokee Nation. One of my 
good friends is our tribal NAGPRA (Native American Graves Protection 
and Repatriation Act) officer. NAGPRA essentially was established to re-
turn human remains and grave goods to Native nations for proper re-in-
terment according to tribal customs. My friend asked a group of Cherokee 
elders what they would like to see returned to the Cherokee people then 
located in various museums around the country. They unanimously replied 
that they wanted to have the “giants’ arrowheads” given back. According 
to tradition, the giants’ arrowheads are very powerful, protective medicine 
that secured both the health and prosperity of the Cherokee people. 
I told my anthropologist colleague about the revelation from our tribal 
elders, to which she replied, “Oh, they must mean Clovis points!” My re-
mark to her was probably not put as well as it should have been put. I Saïd 
that it did not make much difference if they were Clovis or Mousterian or 
Saturn’s fingernails, the giants’ arrowheads were powerful objects and not 
museum pieces to be classified for public view. My colleague bristled, nar-
rowed her eyes and Saïd, “You people simply don’t understand the impor-
tance of the Clovis point!” It is exactly this kind of cross-purpose discussion 
with racial overtones that makes Indians question the supposed benefits of 
Western science. 
Anthropological classification and definition has led me into several 
more fierce discussions over terminology. I am currently doing battle with 
the term “tribe”. I use it frequently as do my Native American brothers and 
sisters. But in recent years, journalists and scholars have used the term to 
explain violence and genocide in the Middle East, Africa, and Eastern Eu-
rope. This incredible level of hatred and violence in Afghanistan, Rwanda, 
and Kosovo was the result of a kind of “us-them” mentality of kin-based, 
exclusive, tribal societies. This notion is the direct result of an undisputed 
anthropological definition. In the nineteenth century, the father of Ameri-
can anthropology Lewis Henry Morgan began to use “tribe” and “clan” 
almost interchangeably. Since then “tribe” is used for a group of people 
that bases its social structure and political system on kinship. Kinship, in 
Western political discourse, does not a state make. What that means in 
the long run is that they do not have the international status as do other 
nation-states. Some of my political science colleagues have actually argued 
that because Indian tribes do not rise to the level of the bureaucratic state, 
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the treaties they made with the United States are not necessarily valid. In 
short, this rationale could be used to lessen the importance of our treaty 
rights. 
Deloria’s scholarship went beyond his critique of anthropology (and, 
with it, the rest of the social sciences). He added an important, but often 
overlooked, evaluation of the Bering Straight theory of how Indians came 
to the New World and offered a strong rebuttal to the idea that somehow 
Indians were to blame for the extinction of American mega fauna around 
10,000 BCE. These arguments, presented in his Red Earth, White Lies, first 
published in 1995, are perhaps the most thought-provoking reassessments 
of so-called scientific theory that have added to the spurious stereotyping of 
Native Americans as immigrants to the Americas and rapacious hunters will-
ing to exterminate any and all creatures in their path (Deloria 1995, 81-127). 
But Deloria’s most significant intellectual gift was his deep understand-
ing of the Native American sense of place. Through various writings, but 
especially in his God is Red, he outlined the basic tenant that human beings 
have a regard for their place over and above that which values land for its 
resources or its worth as a piece of property. Native knowledge, according 
to Deloria, was the understanding that the human-place relationship was 
organic by nature. Deloria also pointed out that place was sacred at several 
different levels (Deloria 2003, 276-278). 
Deloria’s ideas about the Native American-territory/land/place nexus 
fit closely with those of Robert K. Thomas. Deloria recruited Thomas, a 
Cherokee anthropologist, to the University of Arizona in 1981 to serve as 
director of the newly founded American Indian studies graduate program. 
Most important in terms of theoretical development in American Indian 
studies were Thomas’ hypothesis of “internal” or “domestic” colonialism 
and his concept of “peoplehood” (Thomas 1966-1967a & b; Thomas 1981; 
Thomas 1986; Fink 1998). Thomas was convinced that Native American 
peoples had a sense of group identity focused on their individual tribes’ 
own language, territory, religion, and sacred history. Without those four el-
ements the “people” would not constitute an identifiable human group—in 
short “peoplehood.” Thomas built this theoretical base for Native societies 
on Edward Spicer’s and George Castile’s and Gilbert Kushner’s models of 
“enduring” or “persistent” peoples. Spicer, Castile, and Kushner, however, 
did not include a very important aspect, that of “sacred history” in their 
respective models (Spicer 1962; Castile and Kushner 1981).
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Several years after Thomas’ death, Diane Pearson, Ben Chavis, and I 
took up the notion of peoplehood and saw its potential as a defining model 
for American Indian studies. Let me illustrate with a Native American 
symbol what we have come to call the “People Matrix” (Holm 2000; Holm, 
Pearson, and Chavis 2003; Holm 2005, xiv-xv). 
This figure was carved on a rock surface and was an artifact of the Missis-
sippian mound builder culture. It cannot be dated with pinpoint accuracy. 
In any case, it depicts the intertwined bodies of four horned snakes – called 
in Cherokee uktena. The four bodies are intertwined so as to be inseparable 
and they cannot be distinguished as being attached to a particular head. I 
am convinced that they were depicted in this manner to demonstrate the 
idea that they are all related one to another. It is, therefore, a representa-
tion of the complexity of culture – a metaphor if you like – that combines 
place, spirituality, and history in a holistic milieu. It is then the gist of both 
Deloria’s and Thomas’ understanding of Native knowledge: that the world 
is a living being that does not function mechanically. 
As Pearson, Chavis and I modified the matrix, each snake represents 
the four basic elements of peoplehood: language, sacred history, ceremonial 
cycle (a change from Thomas’ “religion”), and place. As Keith Basso has 
argued in his Wisdoms Sits in Places, language and storytelling essentially 
relate to landscape and demonstrates a kind of living kinship between en-
vironment and identity (Basso 1996). I know of numerous elders who can 
simply walk across a meadow in Northeastern Oklahoma and tell you not 
only place names but also the stories about how and why they were given 
those names. But the connection between all four elements of peoplehood 
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exists in the same way. Sacred history (origin and creation stories as well 
as trickster and hero stories) tells not only of the requirements for ceremo-
nies but how, when and why they are to be performed. Ceremonies always 
relate to place in that they are usually conducted according to seasonal, 
faunal, floral, stellar, solar, or lunar change. Healing ceremonies are done 
to cure the body, mind, and spirit of the individual. They seek to heal the 
surrounding environment as well so that the physical and spiritual worlds 
commingle and establish balance and harmony. Priests and shamans always 
utilize sacred objects from the environment, whether gourd rattles, particu-
lar stones, animal hides, bird feathers, and/or plant parts. Sage, sweet grass, 
and cedar are but three types of plants burned to cleanse the environment 
in which ceremonies take place. Finally, language is used both colloquially 
and in a liturgical sense to tell the stories, sing the healing and ceremonial 
songs, relate to others, establish kinship, and ultimately to seek political 
consensus through persuasion. There are three very important derivatives 
of peoplehood: political sovereignty, personal identity or nationality, and 
individual well-being in terms of mental and physical health. 
Momaday, Deloria, and Thomas set American Indian studies on a course 
that should lead to its being recognized as a free-standing academic disci-
pline. American Indian studies has theory, definitions, and even methodolo-
gies that set it apart. It has students, refereed journals, and academic confer-
ences where the latest in research is presented every year. It can no longer be 
considered a tributary of one or more of the traditional Western disciplines. It 
has, along with African-American and Mexican-American studies programs, 
become a legitimate, autonomous area of inquiry and research. 
But given today’s political climate, these great strides in the evolution 
of this particular area of study can be wiped out with a single law or a steep 
decrease in funding. Already we have seen in our universities an increase in 
hiring adjunct instructors and a decline in appointing professors on tenure 
tracks. Additionally, new instructors are hired with degrees in the tradi-
tional disciplines to teach American Indian studies. Even though there are 
ethnic studies programs in the United States that grant doctoral degrees, 
universities nevertheless hire instructors whose first loyalty must be in a 
“home” department. The home department, of course, is in a traditional 
discipline. It all seems apparent that the trend in American education is 
to throw out programs and focus on the “traditional” for two reasons, both 
implemented to mollify the current right-wing cries for budgetary austerity 
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(while giving away vast sums to corporations) and base education on so-
called traditional American values. 
This ostensible return to American values in education is shorthand for 
teaching the old doctrine of American exceptionalism. The “exceptionalist” 
notion is a political tool used to stir up patriotism among voters, especially 
those of European decent. In essence, American exceptionalism asserts 
that Americans, because of the Constitution and the frontier experience, 
are freer, more productive, more democratic, more diligent, more innova-
tive, more plainspoken, and more assertive than their European ancestors 
and contemporaries. It is, in fact, a clear expression of a supposedly new 
identity based on the rejection of its European roots. It also rests on the 
false assumption that the founding of the republic, subsequent turmoil of 
civil war, and the expansion of the United States from ocean to ocean was 
a great blood sacrifice. Exceptionalism, then, is a kind of religious experi-
ence. The upshot of this form of American piety is an illogical assault on all 
things deemed “un-American”. Interestingly, the two-word phrase “special 
interest” has come to be used among certain groups as a synonym for the 
terminology. “Ethnics” are considered special interests within this ideological 
framework. The Arizona law calling for a ban on ethnic studies programs 
essentially encapsulates this trend in American right-wing philosophy. An-
other point about this American creed is that its true believers do not believe 
it carries racist overtones. Anyone of any color, so they say, can accept the 
creed and become a “true” American. The trouble is that there is no room for 
critical thought or diversity. The logical trend is to de-legitimize ethnic stud-
ies, whether American Indian, African-American, and Mexican-American, 
except when these programs emphasize the assimilation of these groups into 
mainstream American society. If that is truly the case, then the collective 
works of scholars like Momaday, Deloria, and Thomas will be, once again, 
shelved and treated as aberrations in the American academy. 
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Tom Holm
PUBLIC INTELLECTUALS FOR A MORE HUMAN 
HUMANITY: THE AFROCENTRIC IDEA
ana monteiro-Ferreira
Introduction
This essay reflects my concern with the annihilating effects of the con-
temporary globalization and technologization of science and society and 
draws on Jean-François Lyotard’s (2007) double concept of inhuman1 and 
Molefi Kete Asante’s (2009) fundamental critique of the Western discourse.2 It 
is a critical reading of the Western constructions of knowledge both in its 
origins and dehumanizing consequences. 
Many thinkers who understand the Western rationalistic project as well 
as the collapse of modern capitalist societies have long predicted the fail-
ure of an unending faith in the progress of humanity during the twentieth 
century. Anchored in the hegemonic and totalizing views of the Western 
individual as superior and of the Western thought as universal, new theo-
ries have surfaced, one after the other, as Western intellectuals and think-
ers have tried to answer the anxieties of the Western individual mind and 
close the breach on the Western paradigm caused by the atomization and 
itemization of people in society.
The possibility that African cultures and values bring renewed ethical 
and social significance to a sustained project of human agency, liberation, 
and equality is explored here as a critique of the Western discourse and 
construction of knowledge understood and discussed in the context of 
Afrocentricity, a revolutionary philosophical paradigm and an epistemo-
logical theory of social change.
1 Published in France in 1988 L’inhuman: Causeries sur le temps discusses the need to 
question the ideological mechanisms through which humans become individuals, i.e., 
acquire a ‘second’ nature which makes them fit into the established social and cultural 
institutions. 
2 In "Resisting Westernity and Refusing Development" published in 2009 Asante 
declares that “(T)here can be no privileged discourses that protect the status quo 
where the status quo is anti-human”. 
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Concepts like individualism, domination, colonialism, race and ethnic-
ity, universalism, progress and supremacy that Molefi Kete Asante, the cre-
ator of the Afrocentric theory, calls the infrastructures of dominance and 
privilege are reviewed against the backdrop of agency, community, com-
monality, cultural centeredness, and maat to highlight the inadequacy of 
Westernity in overcoming the various forms of oppression. 
The discussion that will follow between Westernity and Afrocentric-
ity can be summarized as a dialogue between, respectively, the primacy of 
rational individualistic values and the holistic values towards life and the 
world, community and nature. 
Conceptualization
Like every other theory, Afrocentricity has a history. The publication 
of Asante’s Afrocentricity: The Theory of Social Change (1980) is the philo-
sophical and methodological corollary of five hundred years of works and 
struggles of many of this author’s African and African-American predeces-
sors, scholars, writers, scholar-activists, poets, preachers – public intellec-
tuals – like W.E.B. Du Bois, Marcus Garvey, Cheikh Anta Diop, Langston 
Hughes, Harold Cruse, Malcolm X, Ida B. Wells Barnett, George James, 
Paul Lawrence Dunbar, Carter G. Woodson, Anna Julia Cooper, John Hen-
rik Clarke and many more, in the best tradition of the modern American 
public intellectual. Unlike the modern American “think tanks” popular in 
media and in television appearances, whose goal is to shape general public 
opinion on important political and ideological matters that keep the Amer-
ican status quo intact, the Black Public Intellectual, active in the communi-
ty, in an academic or preaching format, writing magazine articles or books, 
less frequently on television, has worked in a distinct direction: to improve 
the social conditions inherited from the American dehumanizing system of 
white-on-black oppression. In the American cultural, social, and intellec-
tual panorama, in fact the epitome of racial oppression and historical falsi-
fications, the work of African centered scholars like the great Pan-African 
Marcus Garvey and W.E.B. Dubois as well as John Henrik Clarke´s, Yosef 
Ben-Jochannan’s, Ivan Van Sertima’s, and especially Cheikh Anta Diop’s 
seminal works, irrefutably detail African contributions to society in a way 
that demises the Eurocentric myth that white people are the fathers and 
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mothers of civilization, technology, religion, philosophy and education, to 
the detriment of peoples of African descent labeled as uncivilized, barbaric, 
with neither history nor contribution to the civilized world. 
African American preachers, on the other hand, also have a strong tradi-
tion of keeping active roles in politics, running for office or sustaining their 
congregation to support and serve its best interests, struggling for social up-
lift and the human dignity of the African community: Absalom Jones, M.L. 
King, Jr., Jessie Jackson Sr., Richard Allen, Al Sharpton, Jeremiah Wright, 
Malcolm X, Elijah Muhammad, to name the most charismatic. 
In the academy, or in the community, their work has been systematically 
suppressed pretty much by and in every mainstream white dominated in-
stitution in America. Some of these intellectuals, predecessors of Asante’s 
theory and forced into an artificial or recent memory, have become trapped 
in a kind of cul-de-sac resulting from an appreciation of oppression through 
the ideological lens with which the oppressor determines his rule. They 
have almost invariably choked in the obfuscating nets of Westernity, which 
shifts responsibility away from the oppressor and the institution of official-
ized race discrimination by providing a selective cultural amnesia to hide 
the facts and support the motives of geo-political-socio-economic domina-
tion and white supremacy. When trying to elevate the status of Africans 
and attain the common goals of cultural reconstruction and liberation of 
African people these scholars, activists, and public intellectuals face the 
paramount challenge of confronting the cultural and religious hegemony 
that “makes sense” of the pivotal doorway into the relevance of human-
kind’s past painted white; one such clear example being eventually Martin 
Luther King, Jr.’s Christian framework. 
With Afrocentricity, Asante brings to the fore the parameters of the 
African sense of the world, and reclaims this culturally rooted African 
worldview and the power of rememory (Morrison 1987) to confront and 
resist white racism, to regain African cultural and historical centeredness, 
to critically build a metatheory based on the study of the three fundamen-
tal themes in the African and by extension African American discourse 
(1) human relations; (2) human’s relations to the supernatural; and (3) 
humans’ relationship to their own being (ibid. 168), in an African rhetoric 
condition. 
While it poses a severe criticism of the preponderant Eurocentric myths 
of universalism and challenges the colonizing concepts and racist theo-
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ries that preside over the triumph of the Western thought, Afrocentric-
ity also offers the possibility of a non-hegemonic alternative perspective 
in the understanding of human expressions in our diverse multicultural 
society. Afrocentricity materialized as a theory of knowledge in 1980 under 
Molefi Kete Asante´s philosophical thinking whilst a systematic challenge 
to Western epistemology. It emerged in the African-American cultural 
panorama as a set of premises that would account for the understanding 
of an African sense of totality and wholeness in a network of multiple and 
particular manifestations of different fields of knowledge to address the life 
and experience of people of African descent in America, in the African 
continent, and in other diasporas.
Theoretically rooted in the pursuit of human knowledge from a cul-
turally and historically located perspective of the subject, it questions 
moral, political, and intellectual justifications of taken-for-universal values 
in clear epistemological rupture against what in this work is addressed as 
Westernity. By agencing the African subject in the voicing of his/her own 
history and culture contrary to being the object of study or the mere subject 
matter in the framework of Eurocentric disciplines (Asante 1988), Afro-
centric theory informs a clear epistemological rupture with the Eurocentric 
paradigm.
This epistemological rupture with Westernity may be better understood 
if we reverse our present day status of ideological subjects to find out the 
epistemological moment where our Western perception of the world, as we 
conceive it today, has gained its shape – Modernity.
Modern Western philosophy and cultural paradigms are based on indi-
vidualism and on the autonomous individual as center of the universe. They 
have been shaped by the systematic attempt to control the natural order in 
a quasi supra-natural understanding, and ultimately, as the replication of an 
almost divine power, as the secular human being became the locus and center 
of rationality with the reasonable doubt of René Descartes (1596-1650) and 
the power of the reasoning mind of Immanuel Kant (1724-1804), maybe the 
two most influential philosophers of the Modern epoch.
However, over five hundred years of building a project that presumed 
to revolve around human rationality and for that matter emancipation, 
progress, and civilization the credibility of modern ideals of social wellbe-
ing and equanimity is being profoundly questioned au fur et à mesure that 
individualism and collective greed, secular and religious powers alike, have 
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plunged Europe and the world into consecutive humanitarian disasters 
since European modernity has emerged. 
Afrocentricity questions the European project of Modernity both in its 
universalistic and hegemonic stances. Afrocentric perspective on knowl-
edge requires “location”: African “location” as the methodological ap-
proach to African traditions and cultures while refusing the subaltern place 
that has always been conferred to black expressions, artistic and cultural, 
by Eurocentric scholars. As a theory of location and agency, Afrocentricity 
is committed to the reconstruction of ancient African classical civilizations 
as the place for interpreting and understanding the history of African peo-
ples, narratives, myths, spirituality and cosmogonies. 
Similar to the notion that can be found in Cultural Studies that “every-
thing is culture” (Pires 2004, 35) in an Afrocentric sense culture is also ho-
listic, systemic, symbolic, and relativist. It is the lifelong process of individual 
and collective apprehension of the meaning of the world, of human relation-
ships, of the relationship of humanity with the world and its manifestations. 
In the Afrocentric paradigm, culture entails the historical experience of 
a people, their systems of knowledge, spiritual dimensions, ethical and so-
cial values organized in some aesthetic support that reflects their particular 
cosmological standpoint. Culture is therefore history in its broadest sense.
Major Findings 
The consciousness of difference, the ontological problem of self-defini-
tion, the dramatic reversal of meaning and purpose of life entered African 
cosmogony with Portuguese and Spanish colonization, the European Slave 
Trade, and the “civilizational” mission supported by the Catholic Church. 
Concerns with the meaning of existence and identity have been, for the 
past 500 plus years, at the core of every African person’s existential quest 
impaired by colonial theft of self-definition and sense of humanity. In fact, 
the foundational ideas of the Western European concept of the world and 
its civilizational expansion have led instead to the objectification of human 
beings, reducing them to the role of commodifiables of powerful Western 
international corporations.
As a result of the analysis conducted on both paradigms three major 
propositions must be highlighted in order to critically discuss the founda-
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tional ideas of the Western European concept of the world and its oppres-
sive nature on the one hand, and the liberating nature of the Afrocentric 
theory of knowledge on the other.
The first proposition is the idea that the project of European Moder-
nity, purportedly aiming at propelling liberation and the development of 
humanity through progress and civilization, has paradoxically become one 
of the most oppressive, annihilating, and destructive ventures for human 
beings. The second proposition is the fact that there are two grounding 
philosophies of political, economic, and social organization as well as two 
modes of perceiving human relationships: one is an ethics of sustainability 
the other an ethics of deprecation (Galeano 1971). They represent respec-
tively (1) the respect for the good of the community organized in systems 
of freedom and equality, a simple reflection of one’s respectful orientation 
towards human beings and nature, and (2) the individualistic profit mo-
tive organized under oppression and exploitation that has been crystallized 
by the Western dichotomic organization of thought in political concepts 
of right and left, capitalism and socialism. The third proposition regards 
the fact that Afrocentricity represents a philosophical paradigmatic rupture 
with the extreme case of hegemonic Western ideological framework, which 
is Eurocentrism, offering a philosophical structure and a liberating theory 
of knowledge with the potential to bring a renewed ethics for a more hu-
man humanity.
Discussion of the central propositions
Three pillars sustain Westernity. The first is Christianity and Enlighten-
ment that became the building blocks of European Modernity. They con-
stitute, in Lyotard’s sense, the two grand narratives of the Western thought, 
myths of freedom and progress validated by anthropocentric philosophical 
theories hand in hand with political and religious powers, which are what 
we can call the birth of a Eurocentric ideology: one that became simulta-
neously the place of material and symbolic exploitation, oppression, and 
exclusion of the rest of the world, exactly as Chinweizu called his 1975 
work The West and the Rest of Us. The second is the Western philosophical 
architecture of European Modernity which heir to Greek and Roman clas-
sical philosophy and law, produced a comprehensive superstructure around 
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the following foundational and distinctive traces: (1) the modern man, 
separated from the Divine by his inherent ability to reason, became the 
center of the material and immaterial world that he would subdue, trans-
form, and use for the betterment of his living conditions, and technological 
and economic development; (2) this journey from a theocentric into an 
anthropocentric orientation of the world could only be achieved by the 
separation of the material from the immaterial, the body from the soul, that 
crystallized into the perception of a dichotomous world created by relation-
ships of inclusion and exclusion: I versus the other, center versus periphery/
margin; (3) in a world defined by binary oppositions, progress / civilization 
can only be achieved by means of conflict; (4) progress is evolutionary – a 
journey to the future in a linear conceptualization of time: past is discon-
nected from future; (5) individualism, i.e. the prerogative of the individual 
person to overlook an ethics of common and shared responsibility with the 
community and the world, has been conferred to the modern European 
man by Christianity as the belief in a Supreme omnipotent entity ultimately 
the only one endowed with the power to punish, reward or redeem human 
actions. 
The third pillar of Westernity evolved out of the European Modernity’s 
thrust for material/economic and ideological/religious expansionism that 
produced a new Global Order: Western or Modern Capitalism at the ex-
pense of the human degradation of the rest of the world by colonial and im-
perial oppression and the exploitation of the human and natural resources 
of Africa, Asia, and the Americas, sustained by a new conceptual tool of 
oppression and domination: racism.
Afrocentricity also has three, yet absolutely distinct foundational main-
stays. One is the fact that the first major human civilization whose origins 
date back to at least the 4th millennium B.C.E.3 is African. The second is 
what in Afrocentric terms we call communalities, i.e. the fact that Classi-
cal African or Kemetic cosmological orientation can be found all over the 
African continent as part of an African conceptualization of the world that 
Islamic and European colonization could not destroy. The third is the exis-
tence of an African comprehensive superstructure, characterized by a Maa-
tian or Ancient Kemetic sense of the world, organized around the following 
values: (1) the Kemetic sense of the world or the African superstructure 
3 In Afrocentric theory B.C.E. stands for Before the Common Era.
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is holistic. It does not conceive the world in separate but in contiguous 
and integrated forms where the spirit world and the material world, life 
and death, nature and human beings, ancestors, living and those yet to be 
born, are all part of the cosmological order; (2) harmony, not conflict, is 
the generating force in the world. Indeed one first moment of balance and 
harmony of the cosmological forces created the world. A first occasion / 
Tep Sepi / or the Big Bang if we want to translate it into modern scientific 
language / or a First Creator in a spiritual sense /or the old, old, old ancestor 
created the world and passed it on to the human beings to take care of it; 
(3) in the African spiritual sense a supreme being is not an all-governing, 
all-presiding entity over the destiny of the world. On the contrary, it is the 
human being’s responsibility to actively and permanently seek the sacred 
in life and heal the world serujta, and restore the supreme moments of bal-
ance and harmony; (4) endowed with the ability to reason it is human be-
ings’ responsibility to keep balance and harmony in the world: searching for 
MAAT is the ultimate condition and meaning of existence for the African; 
(5) the rhythms of life are cyclical and the notion of time is circular: past 
is contiguous to future and past actions determine the path to harmony or 
chaos. Therefore it is the world, and the future that render human beings 
accountable for their moral conduct. Human responsibility is not deferred 
to the Creator /the first ancestor; (6) ancestors, not an almighty omnipres-
ent God, are venerated as the symbols and keepers of wisdom and ethical 
teachings. 
Conclusion 
The critical analysis on both paradigms revealed that with colonial and 
imperial practices of racism, oppression, and exploitation, the individu-
alistically – and hegemonically – oriented performance of the European 
man of reason erected a rotten edifice of dehumanization that reclaimed 
liberation from economic exploitation (Marxism) and physical and psycho-
logical survival (Existentialism), eventually the complete overturn of the 
European Grand-narratives (Post-Modernism). All of them grounded in 
the basic tenets of the Western Weltanschauung, they could barely provide 
partial shifts in the perception and functional orientation of the Western 
superstructure (ideology), post-modernism included.
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Only a paradigmatic rupture – a philosophical framework structured 
around a totally different cosmological orientation – would provide the lib-
eration of thought towards an epistemological and functional liberation of 
humanity from inhumanity. This is the role of the Afrocentric philosophi-
cal paradigm constructed over Maat , Hisia ya Dunia , (African sense of the 
world in Kiswahili), Ubuntu, Muntu and other African philosophies based 
on the cultural and historical centeredness of Africa and African agency, 
within an ethics of respect and equality, shared values of community and 
environmental sustainability. 
While the Western thought, condensed in the Eurocentric paradigm, has 
failed in solving the crucial stances of humanity in a modern world, where 
the male white individual had to confront the collapse of his civilizational 
project and was left adrift in the void created by his impossible transcen-
dence, the Afrocentric paradigm seized the floor of Western hermeneutics 
and transcending any parochial or essentialist assumption becomes a new 
place of human consciousness, a non-hegemonic and non-hierarchical loca-
tion from where to assess the world, and the possibility of a perspective on 
data that definitely demises European hegemony (Asante 2007a).
Afrocentricity provides a critique to Western distortions of history and 
to its diffusionist proclivities (Blaut 1993). It stands as a revolutionary the-
ory of knowledge, a philosophical paradigm that answers many of the sub-
ject’s anxieties that contemporary Western discourses have been unable to 
overcome when we want to understand, and overturn, the deep structure 
of oppressive power relations that have almost erased colonized peoples’ 
agency out of the world landscape. 
Unlike the universal character reclaimed by Eurocentric ideologies, 
Afrocentricity unapologetically honors historical and cultural contingency. 
This sense of contingency and respect is precisely that which generates the 
whole encompassing scope of the theory that can be appropriated by any-
one anywhere because the parameters of the theory remain equally valid if 
applied to locate any people as agents in the center of their own culture and 
history, which testifies to the fact that Afrocentricity is not a reversed Eu-
rocentrism. The theory stands as an orientation to knowledge that rejects 
essentialism. It is a liberating theory and a paradigm that provides the epis-
temological tools to scientifically address issues of oppression, distortion 
and dislocation, in order to restore human beings to their self-identities 
and dignity. 
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VARGAS LLOSA. TWO CULTURES, TWO 
DISCOURSES: DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE 
WESTERN INTELLECTUAL AND EL HABLADOR 
(The Storyteller) IN MACHIGUENGA SOCIETY
klemens detering
Mario Vargas Llosa was born in Arequipa, Peru in 1936. He was a mem-
ber of an important group of Latin American intellectuals beginning in the 
1950’s and rising in influence throughout the 1960’s. Vargas is well-known, 
not only for his notable novels including Los jefes [The Time of the Hero] 
(1959 /1963), La ciudad y los perros [The City and the Dogs] (1962/1966), 
La Casa Verde [The Green House] (1966), and Conversaciónes en la Ca-tedral 
[Conversation in the Cathedral] (1969) but also for his civic acti-vism, de-
bating again and again themes like the relationship between diverse cultural 
identities, their coexistence or cultural hybridism. Peruvian, a naturalized 
Spanish citizen and citizen of the world residing in London, he was elected 
President of PEN Club International in 1977. His most high profile politi-
cal activities include running, in 1990, for the presidency of Peru, when he 
lost to the agricultural engineer Alberto Fujimori. During the 1950’s, Vargas 
Llosa openly sympathized with communism. Later, he moved closer to Lib-
eralism and Neo-liberalism, making his support for these tendencies publicly 
known. He has recently offered a strong critique of the populist regime of 
Hugo Chaves for the increasing limitations he has placed on the freedom of 
speech of the press. During the recent Chilean elections, Vargas Llosa sup-
ported the current President Sebastián Piñera, appearing with him at several 
campaign events. Then, in October 2010, the career of this great freethinker 
reached a peak on winning the Nobel Prize for Literature.
Almost anyone who grows up in Peru lives in a world marked by mis-
cegenation and encounters with people of varied cultures. Vargas Llosa 
proves no exception. As a young man he ‘drank in’ different cultural cli-
mates not only within Peru but in other countries, such as those of Bolivia 
and Spain. In Madrid, he was a frequent visitor to the National Library as 
he prepared his doctoral dissertation on Rubén Darío. He continued his 
studies in Paris where he wrote his famous essay on Madame Bovary.
158 Klemens Detering
He soon turned his attention to the Andean world through the works 
of indigenistas such as Ciro Alegria or José Maria Arguedas. The latter 
portrayed the Andean world in Los Ríos Profundos, whilst his unfinished 
short novel, El zorro de arriba y el zorro de abajo, argued that the Indians’ 
world would one day be crucified by the “zorro de abajo” (“the fox down 
below”), white society and Westernization. In The Storyteller, Vargas Llosa 
depicts the world of the indigenous peoples of the Peruvian jungle, namely 
the Machiguenga tribes that inhabit the region called “ceja de selva” and 
“selva” in Cuzco and Madre de Diós, between the rivers Misahua, Manú 
and Madre de Diós to the east and the rivers Koribeni and Yanatile to the 
South and those of Tambo, Perené and Ene, and, to the West, the River 
Urubamba. 
This short novel portrays the confrontation of the intellectual narra-
tor, in this case Vargas Llosa himself, with his country at the very moment 
in which he is distancing himself from home by travelling to Italy. It is 
exactly as he finds himself far from home, upon arriving in Florence at an 
exhibition of an Italian photographer (deceased in the meantime), that 
he is faced with images of Peru, specifically photographs of Machiguenga, 
an Amazonian Indian tribe. He feels particularly drawn to the picture of a 
storyteller, a storyteller who appears in the middle of a group of Indians. The 
photo reminds him of his student days at the Universidad Nacional de San 
Marcos de Lima and a trip that he had taken to Eastern Peru. On this voy-
age, he had met an old missionary who had spoken about a storyteller. Now 
this well-known and cosmopolitan intellectual, Vargas Llosa – the apparent 
opposite of a “primitive” Machiguenga Indian – is prompted to discover 
more about these people and to write a short novel about them. With the 
help of the Schneils family, linguists with the American Summer Institute 
for Linguistics, he manages to enter into contact with the tribe, but they, 
unlike the Schneil couple, deny the existence of any storyteller.
As the writer searches out the storyteller, the reader witnesses the pro-
cess of literary creation and the previous attempt of the writer to approach 
a world foreign to his own. It reminds him of his days as a law student in 
Lima, when he used to discuss the Amazonian Indian question with his 
colleague Saúl Zurata, the son of a Jewish immigrant and a Creole woman 
who, due to an enormous birthmark on his face, was called “Mascarita” 
(“The Masked One”). This made Saúl an outsider, although he took on 
that role of his own free will, since he felt no sense of identity with his law 
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studies or with Lima society. Instead, he sought to know more about the 
way of life of the people and he moved closer towards ethnological stud-
ies. This interest is revealed when Vargas Llosa is involved in an incident 
with some drunken men and Saúl gives him a talisman so that he might 
overcome the anger that this provokes in him. The men insult Saúl and 
Llosa defends him vehemently. Thus, Saúl reveals the deeply Indian cul-
tural attitude with which he identifies. This same identification leads him 
to turn down a postgraduate scholarship to study ethnology at a European 
university, the dream of many Latin American academics. Saúl justifies his 
decision by invoking the need to take care of his father. In fact, however, he 
shares the concerns of the great Swedish ethnologist Nils Erland Herbert 
Nordenskiöld (1908/1909) who, as is well-known, regretted bringing the 
existence of a previously unknown Indian tribe on the border of Brazil and 
Bolivia to the attention of the Western world. The tribe ended up disap-
pearing due to the massive intervention of white society. Saúl recognised 
that the Indian tribes had no chance of survival unless the paradigm of 
white society changed. The white man should learn to nurture nature, a 
fact which has recently been accepted by the President of the European 
Parliament Jerzy Buzek (15/06/2010). In his disillusionment with Western 
society, Mascaritas turns his back on Lima and disappears into the jungle 
without a trace, where he learns the Machiguenga language by living with 
its people. He then becomes a nomadic storyteller, a storyteller. One day his 
picture is taken by an Italian photographer.
It is not known whether Saúl Zuratás is a real person or a literary crea-
tion. However, he functions as a mirror, allowing the author to challenge 
the weaknesses of his own preconceptions about the Indians and serving, 
equally, to introduce Western readers to the Machiguenga world, or a world 
which is represented as such in Vargas Llosa’s writing. 
Upon returning to Peru, Vargas Llosa once again enters into contact 
with the Schneils and finds out that the current storyteller is an albino who 
travels amongst the villages in the Machiguenga territories always accom-
panied by a parrot, just as his schoolmate Mascarita had done in Lima. 
When the writer hears that the storyteller tells stories to the Tasurinchi-
Gregorio and to the Tasurinchi-Jéhova Indians, he has no doubt that the 
storyteller is his old classmate from San Marcos. Saúl had always enjoyed 
commenting about Die Verwandlung, in other words Kafka’s Metamorphosis, 
as well as the permanently nomadic destiny of “his” Jewish people. 
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This story coincides only tangentially with the Machiguenga lifestyle 
as the tribe is not considered nomadic, despite the fact that their groups 
displace themselves, moving within the same region every three years so 
as not to damage the environment, but to protect and preserve it. Vargas 
Llosa, however, finds a link between the move of the Machiguenga and 
mythology. There is a myth according to which the world used to live in 
perfect harmony until one day when the God of Evil, Kientibakori, tried to 
bring down the sun, although unsuccessfully since Tasurinchi, the God of 
Good, left his place to support the sun, constantly moving from one place to 
another. In his wanderings, Tasurinchi is accompanied by the Machiguenga 
people who thereby protect themselves from places threatened by chaos, 
illness and wars that the God of Evil Kientibakori tries to cast over them. 
Following Tasurinchi, the Machiguenga people find other Tasurinchi in all 
places, rivers, plants and animals, which allow the people to live anywhere, 
supported by the Tasurinchi. The myth is constantly retold and reinvented 
by the storyteller with new words but always with the same truth. Thus, 
the storyteller ensures the continued existence of the people because the 
myth of Tasurinchi expresses the deep philosophy, knowledge and customs 
of the Machiguenga, so that all the stories told by the storyteller appear 
as stories told by Machiguenga to other Machiguena, interconnected by 
Tasurinchí(es). 
Thus, the storyteller ensures the continued existence of the Machiguen-
ga because he constantly narrates the myth between the communities and 
the Machiguenga villages, sustaining and strengthening their identity. This 
role of the storyteller is different to that of the Western writer Vargas Llosa, 
whose influence upon our society is much more tenuous. However, the 
narrator allows a doubt to linger about the storyteller when he comments 
“Eso es, al menos, lo que yo he sabido” (“This is, at least, what I have 
learnt”) (Llosa 1987, 242). This phrase reveals the vast difference between 
the Western intellectual Vargas Llosa and our way of looking at the other, 
about whom we try to obtain the maximum information possible, with-
out ever managing to completely understand the animist culture of the 
Machiguenga, which is centered on itself. While observing the culture of 
other peoples, Vargas Llosa has to recognize that his role as a writer and 
intellectual in our culture is much more limited than that of the storyteller 
in the Machiguenga culture. His reflections about himself, as well as those 
about the world of the other, do not engender greater respect on our part 
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for the Machiguenga, nor have they found a way to ensure the preservation 
of that culture. 
Meanwhile, Marcaritas, with his archaic vision, failed to preserve the 
myth of the Tasurinchi. Nevertheless, he did preserve the cyclical, spiraled 
history of this Amazonian people. On final analysis, neither Mascaritas nor 
Vargas Llosa’s “The Storyteller” were able to contribute to the protection 
of this people, since our civilisation did not accord them sufficient impor-
tance. 
However, Vargas Llosa highlights a conflict which has existed in multi-
ethnic and multi-cultural Peru since the arrival of the Spanish. In the past, 
more specifically, the pre-Incan past, the Machiguenga people managed to 
live peacefully with their neighbours on the high plains and even offered 
sacrifices to Pachacamác, the Oracle, on the Peruvian coast, near Lima. 
These offerings were explained by the fact that the tribe had successfully 
defended itself against the “new diseases” of the Incas, who had caught 
them with the Spanish colonisation and with the arrival of the first mis-
sionaries. The threats that once began to decimate the Machiguenga and 
other jungle peoples continue today. Their universe is disappearing day by 
day, whether because of the gold miners who poison their rivers and sur-
rounding life with mercury, the danger of the white indigenous peoples 
from the Peruvian coast, or even because of the Western and Eastern in-
digenous peoples who are willing to kill Indians in search of natural gas or 
oil, declaring them to be “second-class citizens” (see Youtube), as did the 
President “of all Peruvians”, Alán García, in June 2009. His words followed 
the massacre of Ashuainca Indians by a police force in Bágua after native 
lands were illegally invaded by a company prospecting for gas. 
Current events such as those in Bágua, in the Ashuaninca territory and 
in the district of Madre de Dios (see Glüsing 2010) must stop! It would be 
wonderful if our society afforded to the Nobel Prize winner Vargas Llosa the 
same importance that Machiguenga society gives the storyteller. I doubt this 
will happen, amongst other reasons, because of the events in Bágua and the 
gold mining in a region that once contained 86% of the world’s biodiversity 
and which is now in danger of disappearing. 
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CAREY MCWILLIAMS, THE PUBLIC 
INTELLECTUAL: REFLECTIONS ON CITIZENSHIP 
AND CULTURE
maria José canelo
In a lecture to college students delivered at Cooper Union, in New York, 
in 1976, Carey McWilliams elaborated on what he called “the power of 
ideas” in terms that I find fitting to identify the brand of intellectual and 
political activity he espoused throughout his career as a lawyer and a social 
and cultural critic. They highlight the strains of dialogism and activism 
that inform his whole criticism. McWilliams was more than a traditional 
intellectual and more than a traditional lawyer as well; more than an intel-
lectual because he became fairly active in the public sphere, whereas he 
was more than a lawyer because his reinvention of legal concepts and legal 
practices derived from his insightful research on cultural matters. In effect, 
the most original aspect of his work lies in his combination of a critique of 
culture with a critique of the law and how this anticipated current debates, 
namely on legal activism. While presenting a broad overview of his criti-
cism of culture, I shall attempt a closer look into his engagement with the 
law and the development of his ‘legal imagination’ as a crucial component 
of McWilliams’s activity as a public intellectual. 
Ideas have an inherent interest. (. . .) There is a symmetry about them 
that opinions lack. And they are creative in the sense that they can com-
bine with other ideas, or modify them, or lead to still more novel ideas. 
Ideas keep an intellectual tradition alive, viable, and relevant; they are the 
yeast of a culture (. . .). The intellectual awakening of an individual usually 
dates from the moment he or she discovers that ideas are more than words 
on a page but are real and that the life-of-ideas is a timeless reality in hu-
man experience.1 
1 “The Importance of Ideas”, lecture given at Cooper Union, New York, Feb. 2, 
1976, p.2. Carey McWilliams Papers (Collection 1319), Department of Special Col-
lections, University Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles. Box 67, 
Folder ‘The Importance of Ideas’ Mss. Notes.
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Although the words of McWilliams to the students first appear as a call 
to their imagination and creativity, they were also an appeal to their politi-
cal awareness. They imply that idealism per se does not contribute so much 
to the individual’s intellectual development as the application of ideas to 
practice. Ideas are intended to create and recreate the world.
McWilliams’s own coming into politics had happened quite early in his 
life; after a privileged childhood and adolescence, he was somehow forced 
into the real world when the family’s fortune suddenly vanished. Born in 
Colorado, in 1905, in a conservative family of Scotch-Irish and German-
French descent, his father a powerful man in the cattle industry and a state 
senator, McWilliams could not locate in his family history, nor in the pasto-
ral education he received until moving to California, the roots of the social 
concerns that were to inform his adult life. Shortly after the First World 
War, the crash of the cattle market on which the family business relied 
caused the loss of his family’s fortune, and forced them to leave the ranch. 
Moving to Los Angeles, they became migrants of a sort, but the urban mi-
lieu was to provide McWilliams with a very different life experience than 
his earlier pastoral education.
Soon after his graduation in Law and a short period of practice at a law-
yer’s firm, McWilliams started practicing labor law, which was determinant 
to his future involvement in social issues. With the Great Depression and 
the Popular Front as background, McWilliams, as many intellectuals of the 
time, was soon engulfed by politics. Once the Wagner Act was passed in 
1934, the practice of labor law was allowed and McWilliams was frequently 
asked to give advice on worker rights and how to exercise those rights un-
der the new law. In time, his interests moved on from labor to civil rights, 
an essential turn whose reach in U.S. ethnic history and its struggles for 
freedom were hard to foresee at the time.
Also of great importance to understanding McWilliams’s activism was 
the particular historical context of the Great Depression and the New Deal. 
Indeed, the New Deal provided intellectuals and artists with the chance to 
be what Antonio Gramsci has termed “organic intellectuals”, mediators 
for the people before state institutions or the apparatuses of power. Even 
though McWilliams was to refuse the connection of the intellectual with 
power for need of a critical distance, he became engaged with the state 
apparatus during this period, being appointed Chief of the Commission for 
Immigration and Housing in California, a post he carried out between 1938 
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and 1942, under Popular Front Governor Culbert Olson. In line with his 
previous work on labor law, this post allowed him a greater proximity with 
farm labor and a way of resolving the workers’ problems, as McWilliams 
became the official responsible for the welfare of migrants. It also deepened 
his interest in problems of migrant and immigrant integration, of which 
an extensive critical and cultural work gives evidence, much of which was 
certainly ahead of its time. In connection with this position, McWilliams 
was also chosen as a member of the Senate LaFollette Committee, in 1939 
and the House Tolan Committee, in 1941, which held public hearings in 
California on labor conditions in state farms, interstate migration and the 
Japanese evacuation from the West coast. For McWilliams, his position 
as Commissioner was the experience that took him beyond liberalism and 
toward the path he defined as his own brand of activism: native American 
radicalism (McWilliams 1978, 85). 
This position gave him the chance to design and carry out policies 
aimed at solving questions of social justice and reducing social conflict, 
although it is difficult to see him as a politician proper. McWilliams used 
the position also as a tribune: to denounce the oligarchies of California, 
namely what he termed the feudalistic land-barons who exploited migrant 
work. His outspokenness regarding the suppression of labor and civil rights, 
voiced in the numerous public hearings he convened and the reports he 
subscribed to and publicized, threatened the profits of the most powerful 
agricultural lobbies, such as the Associated Farmers of California. Pressures 
from this organization led to McWilliams’s discharge by the next Governor, 
Republican Earl Warren, in 1942. His dismissal was actually the ‘popular’ 
order with which Warren boasted of having inaugurated his term of of-
fice, after the Farmer’s Union had elected McWilliams “Agricultural Pest 
No.1 worse than pear blight and boll weevil” (ibid., 77). In the meanwhile, 
McWilliams authored some of the still most referenced pieces of histori-
cal, social and cultural analysis of California and the West on the ethnic 
history of the region. As an active member of the Sleepy Lagoon Defense 
Committee, he drafted the Appeal that eventually won the release of the 
Mexican American youngsters arrested in the Sleepy Lagoon case and gave 
testimony to the Los Angeles County Grand Jury on discrimination mat-
ters in California, warning against what came to be known as “the Zoot 
Suit Riots”. He was one of the first personalities to publicly denounce the 
internment of the Japanese-American community, after the Pearl Harbor 
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attack and, as a lawyer; he was also involved in the defense of the “Hol-
lywood Ten”, later in the 1950s.
Arenas of intervention – the Law 
McWilliams understood writing as a way of pushing aside the official his-
tories and examining facts anew, a continuous rereading and supplementa-
tion of history (1939, 9). Thus, writing and the law combined in his work 
throughout his life, developing a legal imagination that was particularly fruit-
ful in terms of envisioning legal tools to empower subaltern groups such as 
immigrants and ethnic communities experiencing discrimination. McWil-
liams sought a new understanding of both the law and its practice and it is in 
this combination that I find one of the most solid and also most productive 
features of his activism in terms of criticism of the role of the intellectual. 
At the time McWilliams was writing, many legal cases brought to the 
fore the issue of discrimination against ethnic groups, namely Mexican 
Americans, which evinced how the law formulated, justified and corrob-
orated racial inequality and its institutionalized practices of segregation. 
One of McWilliams’s early and most vocal engagements in public terms 
was his drafting of the Appeal to release the Mexican American youngsters 
arrested in the Sleepy Lagoon case, after the first mass trial in California 
and what became one of the most infamously racist manoeuvres of the 
legal system. McWilliams spoke out against the involvement of the law in 
segregation, stressing how race was a social construct serving particular 
interests, a critique that clearly forestalls claims resumed by critical race 
theorists, from the 1960s onwards. 
McWilliams became interested in legislative reform, or how to make of 
the law an ally against institutional racism and the vehicle for his most out-
standing theoretical and political project: how to make of U.S. society what 
he called an “ethnic democracy”. In a seminal article published in 1945 
and titled “Race Discrimination and the Law”, McWilliams unearthed the 
roots of racial discrimination in U.S. society and their articulation with leg-
islation. To his mind, instead of a solution, segregation was actually a social 
danger that threatened the public interest, for it subtly promoted prejudice 
and conflicting difference, especially when it continuously generated un-
equal competitive power (1945, 21-22). He saw discrimination as “a policy 
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of systematic exclusion” that involved adherence and resulted in concrete 
forms of policy (“segregation” proper) and was materially applied to various 
areas of social life, before dividing it into two different types: passive seg-
regation (based on custom and tradition), and “active” segregation, which 
had the legal sanction of the law. The legal signature made the inferiority 
of the segregated group official, allowing for it to be approached elsewhere 
as an essence. Deliberation based on precedence in turn reproduced the 
erroneous representations he noted being upheld by legal discourse and 
fostered what McWilliams called the “legal myths” governing the law. This 
aspect was aggravated by the generalist and abstract character of the law, 
which tended to overlook the historical contexts witnessing and assisting 
the productions of identities – and exclusions.
This evidence that the law effectively gave tacit consent to the perpetu-
ation of a particular social order and hierarchy showed that it sustained, 
or was ineffective against, inequality. Therefore, if the law could discrimi-
nate negatively, McWilliams reasoned, so should it be able to discriminate 
positively as well and this was one of his most important and prescient 
contributions to the legal debates of both his times and those to come. 
He envisioned new legal mechanisms for the accommodation of difference 
(e.g., ethnicity and culture) into the law, aiming at an idea of equality that 
could acknowledge and incorporate difference.
McWilliams found in citizenship the terrain where the fight for equality 
had to take place. By defending the concept of what he termed “functional 
equality”, he fought for the need to accept differentiated rights to answer 
differentiated needs, in the cases of communities with histories of institu-
tional dispossession and discrimination of sorts. What he found missing in 
the new legislation (considering that the 1940s were indeed a decade of 
profuse legislation on equal opportunities and equal rights laws) were the 
effective substantial differences still pending in terms of access to opportu-
nities. His concept of equality was not, in this particular scheme, a levelling 
of sameness, that is, the application of the same rule or benefit to every-
one, but a concept to be adapted to the conditions and needs of each of 
its objects instead. He defended that social justice could only be achieved 
if equality, as also a fundamental pillar of the law itself, was conceived as 
differential – what he termed “functional”; hence equality as a function im-
plied assuming equality to be also a practical, utilitarian value, and thus 
specifically applicable to co-respond to particular needs. 
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In line with this, he developed the idea of “special” or “group” rights 
for ethnic communities, a project quite close to what we now call cultural 
citizenship. And showing that his approach to the issue was not just a social 
but also a political matter, he backed political action regarding race that 
was not traditionally sanctioned by the law (McWilliams 1947). This was 
the case of what he termed the “positive obligation” of the federal govern-
ment to intervene in the enforcement of civil rights, which I suggest can 
also be situated within any genealogy of “affirmative action”. 
Even as a law expert, McWilliams did not however remain an abstract 
thinker. His activism concerning legal reform and the strategies he defend-
ed correspond in many ways to what is currently identified as legal activ-
ism and alternative or subaltern legalities (Santos and Rodríguez-Garavito 
2005, 4-6; Santos 2007). As a lawyer, he defended more causes than cases; 
his concern for social justice was very much informed by his perception 
that the dispossessed were also deprived of the legal means to improve their 
situation or accordingly make demands on the instruments of access to 
justice that were totally improper to them and so continuously reproduced 
their subalternization (Santos 2008, 55). In that sense, he promoted the 
creation of grassroots associations and the formation of groups according to 
ethnic constitutions, especially in the case of Mexican Americans. His ac-
tivism in this field certainly calls to mind that of “popular lawyers”, in their 
upholding of values and principles, an ethics of the oppressed, as it were, as 
the basis for their practice of the law. Like popular lawyers do, McWilliams 
went to the workplace to meet his defendants and to hear their stories, 
which he defended as valuable testimony, in the sense of alternative forms 
of knowledge that had to be taken into account in the construction of the 
legal case, as the workers’ perspective of the workplace as well as the activi-
ties taking place there constituted an essential part of the context. These 
narratives would work as ‘counterstories’, as critical race theorists would 
also have them, personal testimonies that supplemented the understand-
ing of a situation by providing the viewpoint of the victims. McWilliams 
defended these practices as emancipatory for these groups, for in the long 
run they would allow them to defend themselves better and so break their 
dependency on the state legal instruments that had not ultimately been 
shaped according to their particular interests and needs. In other words, it 
was not only a question of attaining visibility but of finding their own voices 
in order to attain self-representation as one more faithful to their needs. 
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Arenas of intervention – public dissemination
Public discussion and advocacy regarding specific situations and experi-
ences were strategies that McWilliams often used as he prepared numerous 
official public reports and participated in public hearings. For instance, he 
was in charge of the first hearings to be held in California for salary rises 
for workers in the cotton fields, at Madera, early in 1939. He believed that 
public hearings were a powerful pedagogical tool to develop an informed 
public opinion, their powerfulness resting in their dramatization of events 
thereby bringing events to the attention of a wider audience. As such, 
dramatization informed both the people and the state, and an informed 
public was well on its way to dismissing prejudice (McWilliams 1942, 636, 
648). McWilliams believed that “[i]f people can be made conscious of so-
cial processes, if they can be made aware of the weight and influence of the 
past on the present, this creates, although it may not seem so, a lasting im-
pression or influence on their outlook and experience” (Navarro 1971, 15).
The press was therefore a follow-up to what he started in the courts and 
in the hearings. I believe he used it as if a platform to publicize and extend 
debates, since he also believed that an informed public would demand the 
necessary legislative action required for changing what was wrong. Besides 
his book-length studies, McWilliams published widely in newspapers and 
magazines, a career that culminated in his editorship of the New York left-
ist magazine The Nation, a position he held for about twenty years (1952-
1975). Besides the abundant contribution to newspapers, brochures and 
magazines, he wrote several books that remain works of reference today, 
such as Factories in the Field, A Story of Migratory Farm Labor in California 
(1939) and Ill Fares the Land (1942), which were largely based on the dra-
matic farm-labor strikes he witnessed during the 1930s. His closer contact 
with the people who led the events he depicted in his studies in turn led 
to his books on ethnic matters and race relations: Brothers Under the Skin 
(1943), Prejudice: Japanese-Americans: Symbol of Racial Intolerance (1944), 
North from Mexico: The Spanish-Speaking People of the United States (1949), 
and A Mask for Privilege: Anti-Semitism in America (1948). Some of these 
studies were precursors in ethnic studies, most notably North from Mexico, 
which for many years prevailed as the only general history of the Mexican 
people in the U.S. (Navarro 1971, 2). These books, McWilliams explained, 
should be seen as part of his activism; they were part of the racial revolu-
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tion of the 1940s, or, as he put it, “[they] have been part of the action. 
They’ve grown out of what was actually happening at the time” (McWil-
liams 1982, 185). Several of these studies were republished after 1951 by 
the Civil Rights Movement (ibid, 6). 
I take his intervention in the press as a distinguishing mark to his activi-
ties as a public intellectual. The magazines and newspapers were spring-
boards for his ideas and forae for debate, especially as they introduced ideas 
that were more often than not innovative and disruptive of the status quo. 
Indeed, the main goal of the magazines, McWilliams argued, was to break 
taboos and introduce new subjects: “to provide a home for new ideas and 
young writers. To prepare, so to speak, an agenda of items requiring na-
tional attention and discussion. To flush out new points of view. To sup-
port unpopular causes and issues. To focus a consistent and intelligent 
criticism on prevailing attitudes, policies, and dogmas.”2 And so he himself 
used them profusely, having written for Antioch Review, The New Republic, 
Common Ground and Survey Graphic, besides The Nation, and to mention 
but a few. His editorship of The Nation, while not preventing him from 
publishing, provided him with a different stage of action; he would pick 
subjects (McCarthyism was one of his favorite targets; the construction 
of the military-industrial complex another; the fabrication of fear the um-
brella for all of them, a keen topic for him since the war period) and giv-
ing clues to young journalists or contributors to the magazine, such as the 
young historian Howard Zinn, and encouraging them to pursue the story 
(Richardson 2005, 211). It is interesting to see that McWilliams ‘forged’ a 
genealogy for his activism that included some of the most outstanding crit-
ics of U.S. culture – most of whom wrote for newspapers. Pressed to explain 
his activism, he placed himself amongst figures such as Edgar Allan Poe, 
Ambrose Bierce, Mark Twain, H. L. Mencken, and Louis Adamic; they 
were for him an ancestry rather of choice and affinity. These figures were 
also all part of a tradition of dissent in American letters, what he called an 
“indigenous American rebel democratic tradition” with which he identi-
fied his own quests and concerns (McWilliams 1978, 51). In the context 
of the Depression, as later during the Cold War – a period in which he was 
2 “The Small Magazines” 4. Carey McWilliams Papers (Collection 1319), Depart-
ment of Special Collections, University Research Library, University of California, Los 
Angeles. Box 17, Folder “Small Magazines.”
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particularly active in denouncing the culture of fear and protesting against 
the military-industrial complex –, H. L. Mencken’s irony and wit, combined 
with Bierce’s bitterness, appeared to McWilliams as more helpful and more 
fitting critical modes to approach the times, while also protecting him from 
adhering to the consensual reading of the “American experience” that was 
the vogue then. Moreover, Bierce’s example as an unattached intellectual 
may have provided McWilliams with the freedom he needed to make origi-
nal and relevant new contributions in the theoretical and practical fields 
of social activism (ibid, 232). He singled out not just Bierce’s rejection of 
the society of his times, but how he created an idiom, as a critique, to speak 
that rejection.
This need to invent his own critical genealogy gives evidence of an in-
teresting aspect of McWilliams’s criticism, one that still puzzles many crit-
ics: the motivation for his activism, even though there are no reasons to 
doubt that he was a public intellectual. Especially in the context of identity 
politics in the U.S., McWilliams’s commitment to the causes of communi-
ties to which he did not ‘belong’ or with which he did not share a per-
sonal affinity is challenging. Why write on Jews and prejudice, if he was 
not of Jewish ancestry? Whence his interest in Mexican Americans (he 
is acknowledged as one of the founders of the Chicano movement for the 
publication of his studies Brothers Under the Skin and North From Mexico), 
if, again, he was not of Mexican ancestry? Why defend workers if he was 
middle-class? Whence his inflamed denunciation of the Japanese intern-
ment program, and so on and so forth. What mostly troubles scholars who 
come across his experience as a public intellectual is the fact that he never 
explained his activism as a predetermined path, a calculated mission, or 
even a personal vengeance. And it sometimes looks like, by that omission, 
he somehow failed to convey his commitment as a comprehensive, hence 
more powerful, example to the American people. 
Indeed, if we turn to a much referenced study taking the intellectual as 
its object, Edward Saïd’s Representations of the Intellectual, and follow Saïd’s 
remarks that “[t]here is always the personal inflection and the private sen-
sibility, and those give meaning to what is being said or written”, locating 
the personal motivation for activism in the intellectual’s own experience 
(1996, 12), we understand the struggle to explain McWilliams’s interven-
tion. Reading McWilliams’s autobiography, written in the late 1970s, one 
perceives how he was challenged to explain his motivations as a public in-
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tellectual and how he always resisted in making particularistic or personal 
claims: he very much felt like a cultural ‘maverick’ or an outsider, also in 
social and political terms, in relation to his ancestors. McWilliams was the 
first to point out how his education could hardly have foreseen his interest 
in social reform: “Anyone with a background as mixed as mine”, he writes, 
“might be expected to feel a bit of an outcast in today’s America, in which 
ethnic backgrounds and ‘roots’ have acquired a new significance. But I (. . 
.) can not see that tribal loyalties or immediate family influences had any-
thing to do with shaping my political convictions” (McWilliams 1978, 26). 
He considered his childhood on a Colorado ranch a much more important 
experience, for it had taught him the values that would lead his life: “For 
quite logically it is on frontiers (. . .) where the tags and identifications have 
been discarded or never recognized, that a sense of justice and equality 
often emerges”, he reflects, quoting Lionel Trilling (id. ibid.). 
To the disappointment of many, I suppose, he did not claim any ethnic 
battle in particular to justify his interest in social matters, but advanced 
arguments that may be taken as very candid in the context of identity poli-
tics: his path to activism, he said, was boredom and curiosity (ibid, 66). 
More than that, and regarding his motivations, McWilliam stresses a re-
sponsibility for justice and equality that is timeless and universal, which 
brings us close to the ethical ideal of the traditional intellectual definition. 
He always stated that experience had taught him that radicalism resided 
first and foremost in a concern with values, not with doctrines, traditions 
or specific man-made and historically bound ideologies: “If they [radicals] 
could achieve substantial agreement on the kinds of values society should 
encourage, it might then be possible to proceed experimentally, tentatively, 
to invent new forms and institutional arrangements which would best safe-
guard and extend those values. Values, in a word, should take precedence 
over programs” (McWilliams 1979, n.p.) Yet, he realized that reinventing 
a whole system and its institutions was a task for a Goliath; he argued that 
for the critic it would be enough to go on commenting on reality, fulfilling 
his or her rebellious and destabilizing role as a critic of established ideas and 
of power; in a word, a dissenter.
McWilliams’s endeavors to remain a rebel without a doctrine were a 
constant in his life. Political affiliation and activism were different takes on 
reality, but only the latter could make a difference. He denied association 
both with liberalism, which he saw as too feeble to unleash his interest, as 
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mentioned in a letter of 1931 to Mary Austin (Pearce 1979, 247) and also 
because he considered his native American radicalism to be well beyond 
liberalism; as for Marxism, he admired it but only as part of the ferment 
of his times (McWilliams 1982, 84-85). He justified his activism in ac-
cordance with certain ideologies in pragmatic and contingent terms: he 
admired the Left (e.g., the trade union movement) because it brought 
to the fore issues that deserved attention and concern, but he declined 
commitment to a particular doctrine. McWilliams even considered him-
self a socialist, but noted that he could not reconcile his sentiment with 
a party or a movement; yet he admitted being a socialist in his critique 
of capitalism, because socialism provided him with an analytical scheme 
and a language fit to identify and explain the dangers of corporate power 
to democracy: its exclusive concerns for profit and expansion (McWil-
liams 1979, n.p.). 
Marginality was therefore a condition of the radical rebel; he had to stay 
outside the domain of power in order to constantly check the exercise of 
power. McWilliams agreed with Hannah Arendt that “[t]he radical is the 
perpetual outsider, the odd man (or woman) out, constantly critical of the 
power structure and of things as they are” (id., ibid.) He could not criticize 
from within, for the proximity of power was, as he put it, “a terrible tempta-
tion” (McWilliams 1982, 18). So, “‘radical’”, as he further argues, “suggests 
critical thought operating outside the consensus or by way of challenging 
the consensus.”3 Another fundamental aspect in this tradition of dissent 
that McWilliams also identified with radicalism was its pragmatism and its 
preoccupation with social justice and equality: “the American radical tra-
dition has been pragmatic (. . .) The tradition has always been concerned 
with justice, with equal opportunity, suspicious of large aggregates of power 
and antagonistic to them.”4
The option for being politically active without the constraints of dogma 
may in the end explain the peculiar and productive dynamism of McWil-
3 Letter to Joseph P. Navarro, Dec. 19th, 1972. Carey McWilliams Papers (Collection 
1319), Department of Special Collections, University Research Library, University of 
California, Los Angeles. Box 7, Folder “1920’s.”
4 Letter to Joseph P. Navarro, Dec. 19th, 1972 (underlined in original). Carey 
McWilliams Papers (Collection 1319), Department of Special Collections, University 
Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles. Box 7, Folder “1920’s.” 
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liams’s thought and criticism, not altogether common in times of politi-
cal ferment (and political persecution) such as his. The Popular Front 
was a very wide umbrella of the Left; its ranks included many independ-
ent leftists who refused identification with the Communist Party. Of 
course this ambition of McWilliams’s to be truly objective, pure and 
universalist could be challenged; as editor of The Nation magazine he 
faced serious criticism in the 1950s for insufficient criticism of the rise 
of totalitarianism in the Soviet Union (Richardson 2005, 181); McWil-
liams argued that the troubles at home, namely McCarthyism, were 
more urgent to address because they were closer, the same argument he 
used when publicly denouncing the deportation of U.S. citizens of Mex-
ican and Filipino origin, or the internment of U.S. citizens of Japanese 
descent, in the 1940s, while the nation was so busy combating Nazism 
abroad. His activism was therefore moved by both universalist and par-
ticularistic causes and it involved negotiations with politics and power 
that leave the ideological question open, certainly. Whatever the case, 
however, McWilliams’s contribution to debates on citizenship rights de-
serves deeper research, all the more since he was not an idealist – to 
return to my first quotation on the power of ideas –, for he did struggle 
to turn his ideas into reality, or else planted the seeds for them to bloom 
just a couple of decades later.
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PATHWAYS OF RUSSIAN INTELLECTUALS: 
RUSSIA AND THE WEST 
vanda amaro dias
The Russian Revolution turned out to be a distortion of the intelligentsia’s 
goals.1 The new regime brought massive oppression to the country. Besides 
executions and prisons, repression involved cold, hunger, hard labour and 
disdainful abuses (apud Kochetkova 2010, 21). Despite the intelligentsia’s 
structure continuing to survive during the 1920’s, under Stalin’s rule the 
cut with the revolutionary intelligentsia reached its climax,2 with censorship 
and the Purge of the 1930’s almost physically destroying it (Bergman 1992, 
17; Davies 1989, 11-27; Walker 2000, 346).
As the old intelligentsia vanished, crushed by the state apparatus, a new 
class of “engineers of the human soul” was born, with a very distinct notion 
of what should be their social function. They were created by the state that 
desired a new intellectual class, which could break with the oppositional 
character of the nineteenth century intelligentsia and put national interests 
above everything else3 (Boobyear 2009, 113-114). Therefore, a modern So-
viet intellectual class was born, a privileged social stratum organized into 
1 After the Russian Revolution in 1905, two distinct camps emerged within the 
intelligentsia. One was an atheist group oriented toward the West, following a West-
ernizing tradition. The other was a mighty circle of influential religious philosophers, 
like Berdyaev and Bulgakov that accused the Russian intelligentsia of atheism, nihil-
ism and sectarianism, which led to the defeat of the 1905 revolution. They advocated 
philosophical atheism to be the most reliable foundation for all future reforms. They 
published the anthology Vekhi in 1909 reflecting their opinions of the failure of Russian 
Revolution, which would be disliked by Soviet leaders like Lenin (Gessen 1997, 7-8; 
Volkov 2009, 38-39).
2 Before him, Lenin had already restricted the intelligentsia’s freedom and initiated 
the expulsion abroad of the greatest cultural figures of Russian society, including the 
crème de la crème of Russian philosophy, revealing the anti-intellectual position of So-
viet power (Volkov 2009, 73-74).
3 Among them were some members of the Russian avant-garde, who decided to 
collaborate openly with the regime, since it gave them the opportunity to be in charge. 
Bolsheviks accepted this arrangement out of purely pragmatic considerations, thereby 
starting a convenient alliance (Volkov 2009, 58).
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professional syndicates. The Soviet Writers Union, founded in 1932, is the 
oldest of them. Expulsion from this institution composed of successful writ-
ers meant the impossibility of publication and, thus, the loss of public vis-
ibility. Nevertheless, its congresses were not only opportunities for declar-
ing dedication to the regime but also for authors to lobby for improvements 
or changes. In fact, it was an important instrument through which it was 
possible to exert political influence, even if it was also used to materialize 
the regime’s revenge on some writers – those who did not follow the rules 
could face with severe consequences, from loss of social standing to prison 
and death (Churchward 1973, 75-76; Gessen 1997, 10).
Assuming itself as an alternative model of modernity, the USSR (Un-
ion of Soviet Socialist Republics) wished to replace the critical intellectu-
al by the intellectual who unreservedly supports the regime (Sakwa 2006; 
Reis 2005, 8). As the Party strictly controlled intellectual activity, there 
were few opportunities to exert individual criticism (Churchward 1973, 
97). Their function was to organize and develop productive processes, 
culture and social experiences, as well as systems of maintenance and 
adaptation. Intellectuals were to be the architects of a homo sovieticus, 
while they were expected to give away their autonomy and criticism and 
prove their loyalty to the regime (Leymarie and Sirinelli 2003, 366-367; 
Volkov 2009, 89).
Nevertheless, the limited influence of conformist intellectuals allowed 
them to remake Marxism by developing a theoretical analysis of national 
and international politics beyond the limits of official ideology. Also, they 
were successful in their defence of liberal opposition and resistance to 
conservative pressures through joint or individual letters sent to superior 
Party organizations and statements of faith published by recognized intel-
lectuals. Political divisions inside the Party allowed them to find allies 
to defend their causes without danger of being persecuted (Churchward 
1973, 127). 
However, the line between being considered a “friendly” intellectual 
or a threat was very thin. In fact, some intellectuals with anti-Soviet ideas 
were not only not arrested but given some of the highest Soviet awards 
simply because the leaders liked their speeches or texts. This was the case 
of Tikhonov who, despite his anti-regime activities, enjoyed a good shield 
of protection because Stalin had once heard a speech in which he spoke 
of and greatly praised Pushkin (Volkov 2009, 85-86). But those who were 
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definitely perceived as a threat to the power were severely punished. This 
resulted not only from anti-Soviet intellectual activities, but also from all 
contacts with the West. The Iron Curtain had fallen not only upon political 
Europe, but also on its culture (ibid, 120-121).
At some point, the regime took a keen interest in the Eurasianist move-
ment that first emerged in the nineteenth century and was revisited in the 
1920’s. Accordingly, Russia, as the great state on the border of Europe and 
Asia, shaped its own role in global geopolitics. This group was divided in 
the early 1930’s into right and left wings: the right tending towards Chris-
tian Orthodoxy and the left drifting to the side of the Soviet Union, which 
the Eurasianists considered the true heir of the Russian Empire. Therefore, 
the Kremlin gradually brought in leftwing Eurasianists under the control 
of the secret services, turning them into conformist intellectuals that sup-
ported the regime (ibid, 144). Conformist intellectuals believed they only 
had one life and were not willing to throw it away. Hence, they believed 
their mission was to achieve as much as possible within the limits of the 
system given them. These were Party members who did not rebel, openly 
protest, get involved in underground activities, sign protest letters or take 
part in demonstrations (Kochetkova 2010, 135-172).
After Stalin’s death, the dissident movement was born, formed by in-
tellectual critics of the regime which fought against violations of human 
rights and individual freedoms. The emergence of this generation, during 
Khrushchev’s rule, proved that the various attempts to erase the critical 
spirit of Russian intellectuals had failed (Tolstaya 1996, 317-318). By that 
time, many young intellectuals occupied the place that once belonged 
to the intelligentsia. As a consequence, they embraced the mission to re-
construct their predecessors’ intellectual and spiritual exaltation (Walker 
2000, 347). In fact, there are some similarities between them. Both criti-
cized the political order from a moral perspective, recognized the value of 
individuality and the absolute inviolability of individual conscience. They 
seemed to emerge from similar circumstances as both were the offspring 
of a paternalistic state that limited the autonomy of the Russian educated 
elite (Bergman 1992, 16).
In the 1960’s, those young intellectuals remained silent because they 
believed that only silence could translate an independent conscience. Nev-
ertheless, that attitude became unbearable and it was replaced by a major 
mobilization of intellectual circles, which was made possible by the relative 
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opening of the USSR under Khrushchev One main feature of this era was 
the mobilization of intellectuals in order to defend their rights, especially 
freedom of speech. They wanted to preserve some kind of detachment 
to prevent them from turning into technocrats or experts. Ultimately, 
to be free was to be independent from power holders (Kochetkova 2010, 
13). 
The intellectuals accepted Khrushchev’s ideas with enthusiasm as 
they were ready for change and eager for active participation. They be-
lieved they had an opportunity to become involved in Russian politics 
and, thus, they gave him their support and energy. But it did not take 
long for Khrushchev to take several steps backward, which came as a 
blow to their hopes for a better and freer future. Khrushchev’s main goal 
was the USSR’s de-Stalinization and not the opening up of the regime. 
Only that can explain why authors like Pasternak and Alexander Gins-
burg were constantly attacked while the publication of Solzhenitsyn’s first 
novel, One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovitch, was personally approved 
by Khrushchev The Soviet leader appraised the book for being written 
in the spirit of the XXII Party Congress, meaning that it would upset his 
enemies. At first, it seemed that Khrushchev had sympathy for the intel-
lectuals because he needed allies and legitimacy in his tightrope walk of 
de-Stalinization but, once the process could no longer be stopped, he 
turned suddenly violent on them (Applebaum 2009, 582; Kochetkova 
2010, 53-57; Volkov 2009, 185-204). 
Later, with Brezhnev and the regression in the relative openness expe-
rienced under his precursor, many intellectuals were charged with being 
anti-Soviet and sentenced to the work camps and prisons of the gulag sys-
tem.4 The reactions were almost immediate. Letters and protest petitions 
spread and, while some intellectuals involved in these events turned out 
to be integrated non conformists, others affirmed their dissident charac-
4 Brezhnev, unlike Khrushchev’s lack of interest in culture, was an intelligent and 
interested leader who sympathized with the idea of expanding cultural freedom in 
USSR. He was particularly shocked by the ruthless treatment writers experienced un-
der his predecessor. However, despite his personal benevolence, culture came under 
increasing pressure during his rule as cultural issues fell mostly under the supervision of 




ter, defending with serenity their right to free expression and individual 
dignity, as well as the fulfilment of human rights. From 1968 onwards, af-
ter the invasion of Czechoslovakia by the USSR,5 the dissident movement 
definitively assumed fighting the regime openly and fearlessly as its mission 
(Kochetkova 2010, 95). 
Another significant event in the formation of the Russian dissident 
movement was the trial of Andrei Sinyavsky and Yuli Daniel. This was 
a decision made by the apparatchiks6 who felt that the intellectuals were 
getting out of hand and needed to be brought to heel. It was a strategic 
move and therefore planned with extra caution that attained initial suc-
cess. However, within this framework, they decided the trial was to be 
open, thus enabling the establishment of closer contacts between Soviet 
dissidents and the Western media. Furthermore, it unleashed sentiments of 
anger and disappointment in relation to the Russian political and cultural 
system in the West, representing a historical breakthrough (Volkov 2009, 
217). Massive trials and arrests followed, signalling the end of the Thaw – a 
magical era that ended as quickly as it had begun but not without having 
shaped the dissident movement, giving birth to samizdat7 and bolstering the 
free word (Gessen 1997, 12).
In fact, dissidents were the tip of the iceberg, with the large mass of in-
tellectuals opting for more reserved non-conformist attitudes that ensured 
they could stay within the system and preserve their careers. They were 
foremost technological and scientific experts that sought refuge in non-
5 The demonstration in Red Square in protest at the invasion of Czechoslovakia 
was one of the most dramatic milestones of the dissident movement. On 25th August 
1968, eight people met in Red Square to criticize the Soviet invasion four days earlier. 
As a result, they were beaten up by KGB agents and transferred to a police station. 
Then, they went on trial and were sentenced to prisons and labour camps, with the 
effects felt for many years after in terms of ostracism, marginalization and even exile 
(Gessen 1997, 3).
6 Apparatchiks were professional bureaucrats of the Communist Party or the Soviet 
government. 
7 At the end of the 1950’s, this instrument is developed to diffuse censored works, 
allowing ideas and critical opinions to circulate. This practice consisted of typewriting 
a work distributed among some persons close to the author, contributing to the emer-
gence and development of a space for reflection and debate independent of political 
power. Samizdat allowed repressed authors to perform a broader social function and to 
assume themselves as committed intellectuals (Leymarie and Sirinelli 2003, 372).
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political activities. Furthermore, dissidents, whose undisputed leaders were 
Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn and Andrei Sakharov,8 wrote texts, signed petitions, 
organized demonstrations and created samizdat magazines, which worked as 
forums of information and debate, with the aim of undermining the state’s 
authority (Kochetkova 2010, 25; Leymarie and Sirinelli 2003, 373-377).
In practice, there was no proper movement of which one can speak 
about. For instance, Shafarevich, a mathematician and political philoso-
pher, saw the dissident group not as a movement but as something born of 
a desperate scream against the clamping down on thought that followed 
the Thaw. This non-movement had no unifying ideology, program nor any 
particular goal beyond struggling against the ongoing violation of human 
rights. Even if later on these shortcomings will be seen as the root of post-
Soviet Russia’s political and ideological problems, at that point they were 
the key to the dissidents’ existence: there were too few people willing to 
risk their social status and freedom to draw ideological distinctions among 
them (Gessen 1997, 40). Kovaliov, a human rights activist and dissident, 
perceived dissidence as a loose concept as there were no profound diver-
gences from the regime – it was more impulsive than that. It was not a 
conscious resistance but rather a moral incompatibility with what was go-
ing on (ibid, 154).
Often dissidents had more than the average person’s familiarity with 
the regime. Many Soviet intellectuals, including dissidents at some point 
in their lives, established contacts with Party structures, allowing them to 
develop a particular understanding of its nature and functioning. They had 
to know it in order to criticize it; besides membership of the Soviet elite 
or state institutions added unparalleled moral authority to their critique 
(Churchward 1973, 127-133; Gessen 1997, 154-155).
Even though it is easier to identify Soviet dissidents with the commit-
ted intellectual model,9 paradoxically Western intellectuals acknowledged 
8 Both were exact scientists – Solzhenitsyn was a mathematician and Sakharov a 
physicist. In fact, it has been claimed that exact scientists played a major role in the 
dissident movement. According to Andrei Amalrik in 1968, 45 percent of those who 
signed protest letters by then were exact scientists (apud Gessen 1997, 38).
9 The term “commitment” was related to intellectuals for the first time in the 1930’s 
to indicate their political involvement (Mackinnon 2009, 515). Sartre represents the 
intellectual totale because he has an opinion about everything in society. The commit-
ted intellectual should be actively involved in political and social events, acting as a 
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Russian intellectual commitment in those (the conformists) closest to 
them. This idea results from the fact that these Russian intellectuals wrote 
and published papers, took up public positions and shared some of their 
so called progressive stances on foreign policy – anti-Americanism, cam-
paigning for peace, denouncing the Korean and Vietnam wars, supporting 
the Palestinians against Israel and backing national liberation movements 
(Leymarie and Sirinelli 2003, 367). But what was free choice for Western 
intellectuals was a constraint for conformist authors, as they were strongly 
limited by socialist realism and the psychological pressure that came from 
the threat of expulsion from the Soviet Writers Union – conditions that 
led many of them to embrace the official ideology. Those who really used 
their intellectual abilities to report political flaws were sent to work camps 
and prisons. They could neither speak nor publish publicly, they wrote in 
secrecy and hid their works to protect themselves from harassment and, 
therefore, had less visibility in the West (ibid, 368-371). And yet these were 
the opposition to the regime, bearers of truth and defenders of the weak, 
inheritors of the intelligentsia and those actually closest to the committed 
Western intellectual. In fact, they were what Bon and Burnier (1995) de-
fined as intellectuals: individuals making a critical judgement of society, 
a permanent contestation, in order to achieve social and political change 
and improvement. But, exposed to the regime’s censorship, they often end-
ed up in exile, where they developed their ideas without ever denying their 
bonds to Mother Russia. 
But the link between Russian and Western intellectuals cannot be limit-
ed to a fixed classification. There was a game at play between them as Rus-
sian intellectuals ‘used’ Western intellectuals to exert influence and claim 
visibility for their causes. Recurrently, dissidents would identify a problem, 
find a way to communicate it to the West and often see their demands in-
troduced in high-level negotiations (Gessen 1997, 31).
By the 1980’s, the dissident movement was in disarray and weakened 
by the arrest, imprisonment, emigration, exile and psychiatric incarcera-
tion of many of its members. Under Gorbachev, the regime attempted to 
change its relationship with dissidents in such a way that it would make the 
movement obsolete. Glasnost brought their works into the media, albeit 
with certain limitations. The only condition was that the dissidents stop 
counter-power (Leymarie and Sirinelli 2003, 247; Winock 2000, 410-415).
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being dissidents. In 1987 and 1988, when the majority of political prisoners 
were released, the state sought to pre-empt their future activities, con-
straining them to sign a statement promising not to engage in “anti-State 
activities”. This controversy was the beginning of a set of debates through 
which dissidents attempted to define a new relationship with the govern-
ment. Sakharov was the leader in shaping the cautious new cooperation. 
By 1989, as the Soviet Union prepared its first democratic elections, he was 
straddling the dividing line between dissidents and the ruling elite (Gessen 
1997, 155-156; Volkov 2009, 72).
Embodying the intelligentsia’s classical tradition, they defended socialism 
“with a human face”, authored Perestroika, and were demonized when the 
reforms failed. Worse, when the Soviet regime fell, arts and culture were 
left without funding. Many artists and writers moved to the West hoping to 
find better conditions. After the fall of communism, many anticipated the 
flowering of culture. However, almost the opposite occurred (Kochetkova 
2010; Volkov 2009, 278).
Post-Soviet intellectuals: the ultimate convergence 
with the West
After communism collapsed, intellectuals were ideally placed to act as 
mediators and encourage dialogue between civil society and political power 
(Kochetkova 2010, 38). Confronted with the mirage of freedom they had 
wished for all their lives, intellectuals believed and supported the prom-
ises of politicians. Gorbachev’s reforms had taken hold and the free press 
and elections were flourishing in Russia. But all of a sudden, Gorbachev 
was backtracking while democrats kept pushing for more. The Democrat-
ic movement, a popular front that could draw hundreds of thousands of 
people to the streets, was backing Yeltsin as a candidate in the first Rus-
sian presidential elections. Frightened by the loosening of his grip on the 
country, Gorbachev banned public demonstrations in Moscow having the 
counter-effect of causing possibly the largest independent demonstration 
in Russian history just a few days later (Gessen 1997, 115).
The sympathies of intellectuals were divided between those who wanted 
the reforms to continue and the reactionaries that inspired the conserva-
tive Parliament. Both sides thought their opponents to be driving Russia 
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into an abyss and both needed an ideological cover that could only be sup-
plied by intellectuals (Volkov 2008, 278-279).
Many dissidents were getting inside power institutions. After years of 
opposition, they were led to believe they were playing a key role in toppling 
the post-Soviet regime. Most supported Yeltsin in October 1993 when his 
troops shelled the Russian Supreme Soviet building with rebellious mem-
bers inside. This reflected the belief that the regime was so bad that it must 
be destroyed by every means
But disillusionment soon afflicted the intellectuals. The military attack 
on Grozny, the Chechen capital, in January 1995 represented the failure 
of the intellectuals’ quest for a free Russia. Instead, they helped raise a 
regime responsible for Russia’s economic collapse and unjust military in-
terventions. People lost hope in the regime and intellectuals not only felt 
responsible for Russia’s economic, political and identity crisis but found 
themselves alone, tormented between the corrupt and inefficient govern-
ment and the indifferent people. They lost oppositional power and their 
word was now meaningless to the people. Simultaneously, they missed the 
sense of homogeneity that opposition to the established power endowed 
them with (Gessen 1997, 17-18). The changes were not as transformative 
as predicted by the somewhat naïve intellectuals.
Facing a new reality, intellectuals spread through all social stratums and 
professions. Now they are philosophers, political scientists, economists, 
lawyers and all sorts of professionals, but that does not mean their death or 
silence (ibid, 28).
They were experiencing the transformation Western intellectuals suf-
fered with the passage from modernity to post-modernity and their evo-
lution from legislators to interpreters. This represents a final phase of 
convergence between Russian and Western intellectuals. Now they found 
themselves on the same stage, facing the same problems and dilemmas. 
Even if in some domains they defend different positions, these cannot be 
seen as a structural difference but rather as intellectual heterogeneity – one 
of the consensual features in today’s intellectuals, whether in Russia or the 
West (ibid, 31).
Nevertheless, some dissidents were able to maintain their intellectual 
role, despite post-Soviet transformations. For example, Shafarevich, who 
was not optimistic about the future, believed Russia to be at a divide – be-
tween good and evil. For him, Lenin and Gorbachev were expressions of 
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Russia’s destruction. If the Revolution had isolated Russia from the world 
and weakened it, Perestroika exposed Russia to the outside and weakened 
it. A rejection of modernity spread through intellectuals who thought and 
believed, like Shafarevich, that the Western world was suffering from a 
mental crisis with roots in modern evolution (ibid, 46-81).
Furthermore, there was a transformation in the intellectual-media rela-
tions with intellectuals integrated into television program formats (by the 
mid 1990’s, the feminist Arbatova and Solzhenitsyn had their own shows). 
But having a place to set out their thoughts was not the problem. The wor-
rying question is: who listens to them? An economic crisis, social Westerni-
zation, evolution in the media, information overload and new technologies 
ended up deviating people’s interest from the quest for truth (ibid, 87-94).
Apart from resistant dissidents, the new intellectuals are “techies”, tech-
nological experts that produce a steady stream of trends and fashions that 
dominate intellectual thinking and behaviour. If they were the centre of 
non-conformist movements in the 1960’s, 1970’s and 1980’s, representing 
many of the intellectuals who sought refuge in non-political activities, in the 
1990’s they turned to business. Former scientists, physicists and mathemati-
cians controlled banks, investments, firms and television channels. The edu-
cated people of society are now businessmen (in the same way they were in 
the nineteenth century intelligentsia), but they inherited the dissident quest. 
The difference is that instead of fighting the regime’s repression, they com-
bat corruption, nepotism and political inertia. Simultaneously, money gives 
them the power to influence the government. “Techies” have also had major 
importance in the Westernization of the country, importing its culture and 
liberal thinking while assuming a vigilant posture towards the State. In this 
respect, whether out of old habits or new exigencies, they embraced the role 
of the nineteenth century intelligentsia and Soviet dissidents for the new times 
(ibid, 104-110). The intellectuals who chose political life hoped to enlighten 
the government and play a significant role in Russian development. How-
ever, while they perceived enlightenment as a changing process, the State 
simply regarded them as an informative source. Furthermore, they soon real-
ized that government was not meant for intellectuals, as it left no time for 
thinking. Other intellectuals found refuge in research institutes thereby try-
ing to contribute towards a better society (ibid, 125-128). 
But intellectual apathy and consent did not last as long as the govern-
ment might have expected. Reactionary performances emerged through 
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former dissidents like Kovaliov, whose appeals caused avalanches of de-
nunciations from the Parliament, the government and the media. By de-
nouncing, for instance, the Russian troop invasion of Chechnya, he tried 
to define a proper relationship between intellectuals and the State, but he 
soon realised the difficulty of that task. Not only did his confrontation not 
influence political decisions, as the State made clear that neither law nor 
speech would check its intent, as it seemed that in post-Soviet Russia eve-
rything had changed but the State. Nevertheless, Kovaliov represents those 
who still believe the intellectual to be an individualist who must always be 
in opposition to the regime – if only because in the absence of opposition 
any regime becomes inhumane (ibid, 153-163).
This new situation led, as one saw before, to the emergence of several 
anti-modernity positions among intellectuals. But it was also responsible 
for the revival of Eurasianism that projects the idea of Russia as a unique 
and anti-Western civilization. Many intellectuals affiliated with this under-
standing, some exerting its influence in the Kremlin (Delanty 2006, 46). It 
implies rejection of the West and criticism as to its decline and barbarian-
ism. Nevertheless, Eurasianism represents only a part of Russian society 
that condemns the West, particularly the USA, for its fake, mechanical, in-
dividual and material nature.10 Even if Glasnost opened a door for Russian-
Western relations, the legacy of the Soviet Union resulted in relatively few 
Russians having contact with the West. Therefore, there was no room for 
a major transformation in the country’s narrative and the West remained 
the other, the stranger that helps the nation to define its identity. This 
ambiguity facing the West also expresses Russia’s multiple colliding and 
complementary identities – imperial, byzantine, European and Eurasian – 
or its belonging to a broader European civilization (Feklyunina 2008, 608; 
Rose and Munro 2008, 54; Sakwa 2006, 215).
Perestroika was intended to maintain the Soviet system’s distinctive-
ness, while improving its effectiveness. But this goal was somehow lost in 
the middle of the treble transformation of Russia’s political regime, econo-
my and State. Gorbachev’s and Yeltsin’s policies had been inspired by West-
ern political and economic theories. However, in Russia’s imagined history, 
10 As the enquiry realized by Rose and Muro (2008, 53) shows, by a majority of 
almost two to one, Russians see the country’s future linked with other states of the 
post-soviet space, rather than with Western Europe.
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the West was a constant opponent and the antithesis of imagined Russia. 
It represented technological progress, unlimited consumerism and spiritual 
barbarism. Nevertheless, aspects of this imagined West have been realized 
in post-Soviet Russia. Additionally, as the country lacked the mitigating 
factors that have allowed Western liberal democracies to work, these have 
since become the ‘nightmare vision’ of the West that has inspired conserva-
tive Russian thinkers since the eighteen century: an atomized and nakedly 
aggressive society marked by individualism, corruption, consumption and 
cruelty (Slater 1998, 79-81). This fed Eurasian rhetoric and allowed it to 
gain strength among Russian intellectuals and politicians.
With Putin, the quest for preserving Russia’s uniqueness was again on 
the table yet the President never truly embraced rejection of the West as he 
was aware of its importance to achieving Russian national interests (Rose 
and Muro 2008, 51-52). His goal was to make Russia an independent and 
strong international actor, by strengthening the State and maintaining a 
realistic world order (Mankoff 2007, 127).
Most post-Soviet intellectuals have been very negative, as they have lost 
critical power and visibility, which affected their ability to change events. 
Today, Russian thought ranges from national democracy to Eurasianism and 
imperialism;11 most still believe that Russia is simultaneously a unique civili-
zation and a major power in international relations. Russia has a mission in 
the world that collides with her ambition of independence from the West, a 
problem whose solution has yet to be found. Analysis of discussions among 
intellectuals finds that the set of ideas underlying Russian foreign policy has 
remained fairly constant since the early 1990’s (Mankoff 2007, 126).
When in 1991 Russia initiated its political approach towards the West, 
their differences became clear as the two sides were at different evolution-
11 Despite some liberal politicians and scholars believing that Russia should aban-
don any imperial hopes, there has been a striking combination of liberal and impe-
rial views presented within the concept of liberal empire. Anatoly Chubais suggests 
that Russia should build a liberal empire in the post-Soviet era. The core elements of 
the country’s relationship with the near abroad should be: promoting Russian culture; 
defending the rights of Russian speakers; expanding Russian business and supporting 
democratic rights and freedoms. At the same time, Russia should respect the sover-
eignty of those countries and its actions should always comply with international law. 
Therefore, Russia would become an empire not through political coercion, but through 
its increasing economic attractiveness (Feklyunina 2008, 619).
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ary stages. While the West, particularly the European Union, has been 
evolving towards a new cosmopolitan identity,12 Russian narratives remain 
linear. Instead of embracing the cosmopolitan features of its identity that 
would allow for developing relations with Europe and Asia, intellectuals 
tend to suppress them and right at the moment when cosmopolitanism is 
emerging in international relations as a new phase in post-Western devel-
opment (Rose and Muro 2008; Sakwa 2006, 220-226). 
The place of Russia in the world remains a political issue but its validity 
lies in Russian narratives and it is up to intellectuals to change them and to 
embrace their critical role in post-Soviet society. They should at least act as 
interpreters, identifying what links Russia to the major European constel-
lation and devaluing rejections of the West. Interpretation and mediation 
could indeed promote a more fruitful relationship between Russia and the 
West, while validating the inherent cosmopolitan features of Russian herit-
age. Intellectuals should move beyond political constraints and try to recover 
their mission as power-people mediators. In post-Soviet Russia, individuals 
often found themselves lost. With the complex transformations of the 1990’s, 
people lost their identity and security in the name of democracy and freedom 
that to their eyes brought only social dysfunctionality (Ohan 2008, 64-65). 
Therefore, now more than ever, there must be a sense of accountability that 
creates a bridge between political power and civil society. However, this is not 
merely a quest for Russian intellectuals but for all post-modern intellectuals 
that have to rethink their role in the conception of a better and fairer world.
Solzhenitsyn: beyond the East/West dichotomy
Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn is perhaps the most emblematic Russian intel-
lectual of the twentieth century. The story of his divergence from the So-
viet regime was pretty uncommon. After attending an officer’s school in 
1941, he fought on the Western front in 1943. Criticism of Stalin in a letter 
sent to a friend cost his imprisonment in 1945. While thus far he had been 
a convinced communist, the cruelty of the events turned him into a critic 
of the political status quo (Applebaum 2009, 580; Rappaport 1999).
12 On European cosmopolitanism, see Grande and Beck, 2008.
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He had a central role in the defeat of communism by exposing its ideo-
logical lies. The Gulag Archipelago, one of the century’s masterpieces, un-
dermined its moral legitimacy and showed Solzhenitsyn’s remarkable cour-
age in de-legitimizing the regime.
Solzhenitsyn’s legend was created simultaneously by various sides: the 
author; the authorities; the growing circle of his supporters and admirers; 
and the Western media. His reputation led the KGB to bring up the idea 
of expelling him from the Soviet Union. In a letter to the Soviet leaders in 
1973, he proposed an ambitious program to save the country from what 
he saw as looming catastrophes: war with China and a global economic 
crisis due to a depletion of natural resources and overproduction. To avoid 
this scenario, Solzhenitsyn recommended discarding Marxist ideology and 
the policy of excessive industrialization and returning to traditional values. 
But while the letter was ignored by Soviet leaders, it caused plenty of criti-
cism from Western intellectuals who accused him of promoting the USSR’s 
isolationism (Solzhenitsyn 1980, 66-67). The persecution by the KGB be-
came hysterical and Solzhenitsyn ended up arrested in 1974. Surprisingly, 
he was released the next day, stripped of his Soviet citizenship and placed 
on a charter flight to Frankfurt. From there, he went to Zurich and then 
onto the United States, starting a twenty-year exile abroad. After him, the 
authorities got rid of a plethora of intellectual figures that “disturbed the 
peace” (Volkov 2009, 220-228). The real reason for his expulsion from the 
USSR was the publication of The Gulag Archipelago in the West. Its effect 
among Western intellectuals was huge. It was not only a literary master-
piece as it was the real testimony of a victim of the Soviet system and, 
at the same time, an analysis of its corrupt nature. The debate that fol-
lowed its publication in the West divided intellectuals: there were those 
who thought of Solzhenitsyn as a traitor and those who saw his book as the 
ultimate denunciation of what was really going on – the prisons and work 
camps, the machinery of oppression and the mechanisms of extermination 
(Bergman 1992, 31; Winock 2000, 618-624).
Actually, Solzhenitsyn did not say anything new. Criticism of the Soviet 
regime started early in the West and, after World War II, the French-based 
radical libertarian socialist group “Socialisme ou Barbarie” had already 
made a rigorous systemic analysis of the subject. Nevertheless, the USSR 
achieved a status after the defeat of the Nazis that was, in part, responsible 
for the devaluation of what was happening inside the USSR by internation-
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al leaders and even some Western intellectuals. However, what Solzhenit-
syn did, with the help of many others dissident works that became known 
all over Europe, was to revive the debate on the subject. Henceforth, no 
one could ignore repression or human rights violations; the results reached 
further as they transformed European Leftists into anti-Soviet intellectu-
als. He was helped by felicitous timing since, in the 1970’s, the Western 
intellectual community was becoming disillusioned with the Communist 
experiment that rendered it hard to distinguish cause from effect (Apple-
baum 2009, 18; Volkov 2009, 229; Winock 2000, 627-630). While high 
culture declined and the influence of intellectuals decreased, Solzhenitsyn 
was the only writer still named regularly as a moral authority and cultural 
leader, even though the number of his followers shrank drastically (Volkov 
2008, 296). Solzhenitsyn is the example of a Russian intellectual inspired 
by Western ideas, while being sufficiently independent from them to criti-
cize what he thought wrong in the West. This ambiguity proves the inad-
equacy of the East/West division of intellectuals and the closed categories 
into which intellectual activism is very often confined. 
Solzhenitsyn knew that “moral impulses among statesman had always 
been weaker than political ones” (Solzhenitsyn 1993, 688) – something 
that, in his view, explained Western decrepitude. He also believed that 
Russia held immunity to this decline because Christian Orthodoxy retained 
moral and political activity tightly linked. However, with the advent of the 
Soviet Union and the Russian federation, the moral axes had fallen into 
greater disuse than in the West (ibid, 698-699). He had the perception that 
progress was the main factor responsible for the decline in morality both 
in the West and in Russia. Progress based on economic development led 
to the optimistic idea that history will bring justice without God’s help. 
Whereas, in fact, progress proved to have too many flaws: it was a limited 
process dependent on scarce natural resources; it made men forget about 
their soul and integrity; it allowed the spread of consumerism and oppres-
sion; it impoverished culture and humanity through superficial, massive 
and easy flows of information; it institutionalized a new form of slavery that 
led to human’s loss of purpose – “what are we living for?” (ibid, 690-691). 
Despite the collapse of Soviet communism, Solzhenitsyn recognized that 
modern life problems had not vanished, but were aggravated. Post-Cold 
War complexity intensified the former spiritual and cultural crisis, leaving 
mankind’s major question unsolved: “what is our destination?” (ibid, 694).
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As a political moderate and strong opponent of conservative constitu-
tionalism, he consistently advocated the rule of law and economic devel-
opment fuelled by human scale technology. He was usually dismissed as 
a romantic, monarchist, theocrat and even anti-Semite. Solzhenitsyn was 
what Donald Treadgold called a “syncretistic thinker”, combining West-
ern and indigenous ideas (apud Mahoney 2003, 67). He was inspired by 
Russian Christian liberal thinkers of the late nineteenth and early twenti-
eth century, such as Solokiev and Bulgakov, from whom he inherited the 
intellectual resources of the wider Western tradition and the rejection of 
scientism and atheism. Nevertheless, he was victim of widespread hostility 
in the West because many of the so called Left refused to forgive him for 
his pivotal role in the defeat of communism and for being a conservative-
minded thinker who brought together a measured critique of philosophical 
modernity (Mahoney 2003, 67-68). 
Solzhenitsyn’s speech at Harvard University in June 1975 is a fine ex-
ample of his Western influences and critiques but also of how an intellec-
tual causes similar reactions both in the East and the West, proving that 
the intellectuals’ quest knows no boundaries. He assumed that the West 
had become materialistic and had forgotten the ideas that first generated 
its growth and excellence. Freedom has become indifference, democracy 
cannot control the media’s abuses and intellectuals have a confused func-
tion in such a scenario. Furthermore, he argued that communism and de-
mocracy came from the same roots: secular enlightenment. Assuming a 
critical and controversial role, Solzhenitsyn announced that the World was 
at a crossroads faced with the urgent choice between sinking into material-
ism and pursuing freedom grounded in spiritual values (Berman 1980, x). 
According to his perspective, Western thinking had become conservative, 
defending the perpetration of the established order and fighting all even-
tual changes. For him, this was the clearest symptom of a society that had 
ceased to develop (Solzhenitsyn 1980, 8-16). To transcend that situation, 
he underlined the need to return to Christian moral patterns. Solzhenit-
syn’s references to Christianity and his Manichean vision of the world were 
not as much about religion as about a higher sense of morality. As with al-
most everything in Solzhenitsyn, his speech was massively criticized. Many 
people accused him of believing himself to ‘own’ the truth and criticizing 
those who had welcomed him. But more than criticizing the West he was 
criticizing modernity both in Russia and in the West.
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Due to his criticism, in Russia he was seen as a Westernizer while in 
the West his critiques cost him the label of being an anti-modern Rus-
sian. However, Solzhenitsyn’s thinking about the nature of man and politics 
are broadly congruent with the ideas of Cicero, Plato, Aristotle, as well as 
with those of Aquinas, Augustine, Richard Hooker, Pascal, Thomas More, 
Burke, Hegel, among others (Berman 1980, 34). He was an anti-modern 
in the sense that he had fundamental and comprehensive doubts about 
the modern enterprise, of which communism and liberalism were products, 
and he wanted to explore the possibility of a way out of modernity. For that 
purpose, he proposed, for instance, voluntary self-restraint and the revival 
of European classical thought. Consequently, he was not an opponent of 
the West. On the contrary, he was one of the twentieth century’s greatest 
representatives of the West, an “avatar” of the most ancient and honorable 
Western principles that defended a return to the almost forgotten alterna-
tive to modernity: classical and early Christian political philosophy (Kesler 
1980, 49-57). Furthermore, Solzhenitsyn’s attitude towards the West can-
not be regarded as being exclusively Russian as it embraced concerns from 
all writers aware that modern societies entail severe flaws that are too risky 
for mankind.
Certainly, Solzhenitsyn had many links to Russian Slavophiles. In fact, 
the central postulate of his thesis regarding human nature and politics is 
axiomatic for all Russian conservatives. But to identify Solzhenitsyn only 
with this current is to dismiss his participating in the Western tradition, 
since he is critical of the West and also apologist of those values that have 
made Western civilization what it is (Berman 1980, 75-84). He did not call 
for the West’s collapse or a no-democratic system but rather for a better 
democratic West. Ultimately, he proposed the rise to a new stage of devel-
opment that transcended the mistakes of modernity.
Following his return to Russia in 1994, Solzhenitsyn hosted a weekly 
television show for about a year where he spoke of the end of Russia. How-
ever, he sounded like a stranger to Russians (Gessen 1997, 25). However, 
he did become the first to call post-communist Russia an oligarchy (in his 
speech to the Duma in 1994). Even if liberals, both in Russia and the West, 
gave him little credit, today, it is all too common to adopt his analysis of 
the oligarchic character of the Russian Federation. Contrary to common 
opinion, he understood himself to be first and foremost an optimist. Even 
in Russia in Collapse (published in Russia in 1998) his undeniably bleak 
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description of contemporary Russia acknowledges those souls who refuse 
to accommodate themselves to post-communism corruption or to succumb 
to a pernicious nostalgia for the communist past. It was his belief that Rus-
sia still has its fair share of patriotic citizens, public-spirited entrepreneurs 
and morally upright people of faith. Solzhenitsyn refused to despair because 
he knew that the future is open and evil can never triumph once and for 
all (Mahoney 2003, 70-71). This explains why Solzhenitsyn, in opposition 
to the idea that post-modern intellectuals vanished after communism’s 
collapse, produced a variegated body of work that included poems, short 
stories, memoirs and political writings. All display the same moral and in-
tellectual seriousness that informs his best known anti-totalitarian writings 
(Mahoney 2003, 69). His death in 2008 meant a major loss to Russian 
society and the entire intellectual world that perceived him as a symbol of 
20th century intellectual dissidence. 
Conclusion
Despite the Great Schism of 1054, Russia shares a common civiliza-
tion and evolutionary path with the West. The European theoretical back-
ground that inspired the nineteenth century intelligentsia, as well as the 
character of Soviet intellectuals, whether conformists, non-conformists or 
dissidents, and the contacts they established with Western intellectuals, 
seem to prove exactly that. Therefore, Russian and Western intellectuals 
cannot be truly distinguished from each other. Both assume the role of 
speaking the truth to power and to act as the moral conscience of their na-
tions. They share beliefs, theoretical grounds and political positions. Like 
some in the West, Russian intellectuals express harsh critiques of hege-
monic Western modernity. In that sense, the East/West division of intel-
lectuals seems to be rather artificial and makes no real sense in the current 
world order. If this division was at some point useful because it indicated 
the actions and behaviors of intellectuals on either side of the Iron Curtain, 
the collapse of the Soviet Union made its utility irrelevant. Not only are 
there no physical barriers separating intellectuals but also their function 
and position in the world show no significant divergences. In this respect, 
my conclusion confirms the notion that contemporary intellectuals can be 
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THE MAKING OF CITIZENSHIP, THE DIGITAL AGE, 
AND THE INFORMATION HIGHWAY
antónio simões
Introduction
My thesis is simple, but yet, complex. It has three assumptions. They are:
 1. The idea of citizenship and intellectual topography has various social 
and political components. Each notion has its own deep culture that 
does not rapidly change. It is an evolutionary process that may take 
generations to transform into different value orientations (Kluck-
hohn and Strodbeck 1961). 
 2. The new technological age has a significant impact on information 
sharing and responsibilities that are beyond our control. This im-
pact may have changed some of our views on collective intellectual 
responsibilities where the idea of citizenship may have political or 
cultural borders (Mirza 2010).
 3. Each generation may have a different focus on citizenship and the 
self in relationship to society-at-large (Underwood 2008).
There are no simple answers or even simple questions that one can put 
some closure to the idea of citizenship, intellectual topography and cultural 
interaction. The old and still valid question is: “Who am I and how do I 
belong in society?” The way I participate in my social and political environ-
ment, individually and collectively, still brings some validity to our passage 
of life and one’s relationship to the self, to society, to the nation and now, 
to the globe. In other words, is Martin Buber’s original definition of I-Thou 
or I-It now changed to an It-It relationship in this new world of technology 
and information age (Buber 1970)? In the I-Thou relationship, human be-
ings do not perceive each other as consisting of specific isolated quantities. 
They engage in a dialogue involving each other as a whole being. In the 
I-It relationship, human beings are perceived as separate beings and consist 
of things (Angelfire 2010; Buber 1970). My addition to Buber”s original 
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writings, an It-It relationship, brings us a step further to a disengagement of 
human interaction. On both sides of this relationship, going in two equal 
directions, there is disrespect for each other. Each other side is treated as 
an object that can be disregarded at ease. 
The idea of the I-Thou is also flexible depending on where one lives, 
what cultural orientations one has, one’s age, gender, geographical loca-
tion, and skin color (Kluckhohn & Strodbeck 1961; Paul 1997).
Due to these and other important variables, I will have to limit my focus 
to postmodern Europe and North America. My analysis will use a macro ap-
proach. It is assumed that those who participate in my paradigm of inquiry 
are those who are the "informed" in the day-to-day participation of the post-
modern and technological era. Excluded are those who still live in environ-
ments where electricity is minimal, farming is the way of life or those who 
still live in cultural communities that have not changed in the last century.
The Years from 1946 to the Present – What are some of the Variables 
that Affected Citizenship and Intellectual Topography?
I will begin with the boomer years, or those born from 1946 to 1963. 
Underwood (2008) developed a model to attempt to understand genera-
tions born in the 20th century. I will use this model to look at some of the 
issues on citizenship and intellectual topography. 
It is important to note, that Underwood suggests that each generation 
has similar developmental stages. The first stage is called the formative 
years. This stage is critical because one moulds the core values of one’s 
parents. Hence, we can assume that each generation presented new prob-
lems and issues. But did these ‘new' issues really change into a new social 
paradigm? The next stages are extremely important. In these stages, the 
Boomers, Generation X, people born from 1964 to 1981, and the Millen-
niums, people born from 1982 to the present, have more of a 30-year life 
expectancy than that of past generations. Due to this reality, they can ex-
perience the values of five generations. Hence, each generation may have 
a different view of citizenship. 
Under Underwood’s definition of generational values, I could be clas-
sified as part of the “silent generation”. This is because I was born in 1940. 
This generation is perceived as hard working. The great depression and 
the Second World War also brought a trauma and a consciousness to the 
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political arena. I was taught to obey the rule of law. Citizenship was as a vir-
tue, a responsibility to my nation and to God. My duty was to follow what 
was ‘right’ and ‘correct’. At this time, Europe was going through a critical 
transformation. 
It is interesting to note that many film makers and writers that influ-
enced the boomers were born during the silent generation. In the movie 
industry, films such a Rebel without a Cause, Blackboard Jungle, La Dolce 
Vita, La Chat, among many others, are but a few that ring testimony that 
something was in the air. What to obey was now put in question. In the 
music industry, most of the rock n’roll artists were also of the silent genera-
tion. In the art world we had post modernism that was mostly followed by 
the intellectual elite. 
Writers such as Kuhn (1970) were writing about paradigm shifts. Dali 
and Picasso were the fad of the day. In the field of education, writers such as 
Freire (1970) or Illich (1971) were read to discuss how oppressive schooling 
was, especially in the United States and in capitalist societies. The appear-
ance of change was going on in North America, Europe and some other 
parts of the globe. The past was seen as the “old world” which represented 
oppression, colonialism, fascism and so on. Citizenship, for some, was now 
transformed into a critical phase of one’s relationship to the State. In my 
field of education, it was called critical thinking (Hooks 2009). 
Let us begin to look at some of the possible changes in our digital world 
to understand if the idea of citizenship has changed within the concept of 
intellectual topography. For our discussion, intellectual topography is not 
land surface but a collection of individuals without borders.
The Boomer Years
The boomer years are when the postmodern era became influential in 
our beliefs and politics. The boomer generation questioned the past, re-
jected some of the fundamental beliefs of racism, sexism, national origin, 
monolingual societies and sexual orientation. This generation began a new 
conversation on the I-Thou relationship from the citizen to the State and 
from the State to the citizen. However, the means of communication and 
dialogue were still from the past. People relied on radio, limited television 
coverage, writing letters, and the use of the outdated telegraph, now re-
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placed by e-mail. 
According to Underwood, the next generation after the boomers was 
called Generation X. It is a generation that is very individualistic. Career 
building was its primary objective. It was the first generation that had no 
moral ties to a particular company. Looking back at my own experiences 
as a teenager, and since coming from a traditionally European home, I did 
not experience a psychological and sociological split from one generation 
to another. Until I entered higher education, the silent and the boomer 
phenomena were one continuing life experience 
The next generation, the millennial generation, is interesting. They 
have more support from parents than from the previous generation and 
have affection towards the silents and the boomers. It is a generation, how-
ever, that is totally different from other generations. Now, the millennials 
fully participate in the electronic age. They text message, use Facebook as a 
social network, have blogs, Google for information and use Twitter to share 
information on a daily basis.
The Idea of Citizenship – Topography – Language 
and Culture
I have one basic question: is citizenship in one place in time and space or 
does it depend on economic and socio-political shifts during one’s lifetime? 
My own drastic shift in a place and time was in my intellectual training in the 
late 1960’s and early 1970’s. I encountered a new time warp and a contra-
diction of my past. I began to view citizenship from the so-called “new left”. 
But even at that time, one issue remained unresolved. That was, I also had 
the fortunate experience to know another language and understand another 
culture. I was embedded with traditional values and understood two cultures 
(Simões 1983). Part of my early childhood was in Lisboa, Portugal. Both my 
parents were Portuguese. My father was dominant in the Portuguese lan-
guage and culture. My mother was dominant in the English language and the 
American culture. In other words, I grew up in a balanced bilingual home 
where both cultures had a deep effect of my state-of-being and my deep cul-
ture (Freeman and Freeman 2001; Simões 2001). Still, I was a product of the 
past. My roots from the silent generation did not fundamentally change. On 
some levels I was a “citizen” of two States. As a young adult and living in New 
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York City and being part of a movement of political reconstruction of society, 
I noted that my views of the world, or my social construction of reality, had 
two different perspectives (Berger and Luckmann 1967). 
Although my general view of citizenship was to see an end to fascism and to 
develop a new path to personal freedom, I understood that the political issues 
in the United States were somewhat different than Portugal. It is true that I 
had a general feeling that both countries and cultures had a past in colonial-
ism, oppression and the loss of personal freedom. Yet, my I-Thou relationship to 
both cultures had a very different perspective on ethical and moral responses to 
what I thought was morally correct (Simões 1991). This may have been due to 
my bilingual and bicultural view of the world. By possessing bilingual interper-
sonal communicative skills (BICS) and cognitive academic level proficiency 
(CALP), (Cummins 1979, 1982; Simões 1992; Simões and Correia 1992), I 
had the luxury to “view”, “see”, “feel”, “know”, and “understand” the world 
from two different perspectives (Whorf 1956). That is, my linguistic relativ-
ity was coded or encoded into different categories. Hence, to be embedded 
in a special social construction of knowledge, was to perceive and react to my 
specific linguistic and cultural codes to citizenship (Fishman 1973, 1989). Due 
to this reality, I possessed two semantic systems that identified my ideas of citi-
zenship from various perspectives. Depending on my cultural response, did my 
place and time affect my response to my social and personal environment?
In short, my "persona" and the view of the world had different perspec-
tives depending on several and complex social factors. Space and time were 
critical to the formation of my view(s) on citizenship. 
This line of logic is highly important to my main thesis that the idea of 
citizenship and intellectual topography is simple to define, but highly com-
plex to analyze. That is, each individual responds to particular environments 
which are loaded with social cues that form one’s state of being. These 
social cues reflect the social construction of one’s reality.1
1 The literature in bilingualism and biculturalism usually defines the individual of 
having experiences in two cultures. Due to intellectual topography, it is true that in 
many instances one culture may become more dominant than the other. For example, 
in a master’s thesis written on my book Moments in Culture (1996), the author Ms Du-
arte defended the idea that I was "truly" bicultural. She proposed that I was Portuguese 
and American and not Portuguese-American.
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The ideas of cultural hegemony and citizenship also come into play 
(Gramsci 1992, 2010; Giroux 1981, 1992). That is, I could also use a dif-
ferent line of thought that “what is real” is “real”. I will leave this type of 
analysis to my colleagues in sociology and philosophy.
Now let’s us review some of the literature of the postmodern era so I can 
create a working paradigm for further reflection and discussion. 
 
The Postmodern Era and how it Has Evolved
To attempt to capture some images of what was then and what is now, I 
will begin with a time frame of post World War II. It is assumed that those 
who participated or are included in my paradigm are those who are the 
“informed” in the day-to-day participation of the post-modern era. Still, as 
Giroux suggests (1992), to invoke the term “modernism” is to immediately 
place oneself in the precarious position of suggesting a definition that in 
itself opens an Enormous debate and little agreement.
Also, some will argue that the post-modern era is dead (Kirby 2010). I 
will not dwell on these concerns. Any intellectual, social, cultural move-
ment does not ‘die’ in a year or two. It takes time to eventually transform 
cultural environments across the globe. I do accept the label of “postmod-
ernism”, but I accept this label as a limited category where only the intel-
lectual elite participated in its doing. I have not seen any data that identify 
the working class as a full participant in this domain. For example, the 
invention of the information highway took place over several years. At the 
beginning of this technological era, the intellectual elite used it as an infor-
mation tool. Now in the year 2010, it is used by most who are technologi-
cally literate, which include children to senior citizens of all social classes.
I can suggest, however, that political or social paradigm shifts can rapidly 
take place (Kuhn 1996). With the invasion of Poland by Germany in 1939 
or the attack of the World Trade Center in New York City, on September 
11, 2001, the world changed on how we view specific ideologies, Still is this 
“paradigm shift” drastic enough to change a how we view specific ideolo-
gies, still is this “paradigm shift” drastic enough to change a total worldview 
on citizenship and intellectual topography? I do not think so.
Taking some specific events in our history that may have affected our 
political responses, I still ask: Has there been a drastic paradigm shift in 
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cultural 2010 is different than let’s say, 1939 or 2001? This depends on how 
one interprets a paradigm shift in the I-Thou, I-It and the It-It relation-
ships. In other words, are "face to face" encounters (Burger and Luckmann 
1967) present in all domains? I will use these categories to continue our 
conversation on intellectual topography and citizenship. They are useful to 
capture some images when we share information on these matters. But it 
must again be emphasized that these categories are not fixed notions frozen 
in time where one era is abruptly changed into another way of thinking. 
My assumption is that the postmodern era did not stand alone from 
1945 to the present. I believe there was a parallel movement or shall we 
say knowledge input from another source that affected our daily lives. It 
was called technology. My knowledge source toward citizenship gradually 
changed in 50 years from print knowledge to media knowledge and now to 
Internet and global knowledge. 
What is knowledge today in the year 2010? Are we in a different “space 
and time” where technology now controls our knowledge system and pos-
sibly our citizenship that crosses over political borders?
Twitter, Space Book, Google, Blogs the Millenniums and Social Net-
works: Is this a New Form of Intellectual Topography and Citizenship?
It seems logic that all generations have one common thread. It is that 
citizenship is still bound by geographical and cultural borders. Is technology 
and literacy the "new" form for social and economic benefits? Is this new 
form of communication going to create a new class of “have and have nots" 
(Simões 1984)?
May I suggest that we may now have a new phenomenon regarding this 
inquiry? Citizenship and intellectual topography may have two existing no-
tions. I will call them the local and the global notion.
On the local side and positive side, it is the notion of citizenship to 
one’s country, flag, language, music, sports, food and other encumbrances 
that defines who is “French, German, Portuguese, Australian, or Brazilian”. 
There are very emotional ties to one’s inner core values. One may cite the 
soccer world cup matches and understand that “beingness” and the I-Thou 
relationship is still strong when it comes to nations and sports. When one 
sees a grown man such as a Japanese soccer player cry after defeat, it relays 
the message that the homeland has still a very deep emotional bond to the 
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flag, to country, and maybe to God. Also, when one celebrates the 4th of 
July in the United States or the Day of Portugal, it brings some notion that 
citizenship and nation is still alive and well. Even on immigration issues, 
I am always fascinated to go to some of the local ethnic festivities in the 
United States. St Anthony’s feast for the Italians and the Puerto Rican 
Day for the Puerto Rican are always events that are full of ethnic pride 
celebrating a specific culture of the globe. These events testify that there 
are still strong emotional bonds to the homeland. These examples, among 
many others, show that local citizenship is still a strong expression of one’s 
individual roots. 
On the negative side, in the Bosnian silver-mining town of Srebrenica 
in July 1995, one of the most modern acts of genocide took place. Many 
dictatorships exist across the globe where the free press and the freedom of 
speech are banned. In the year 2010, in some countries one can go to jail 
for life and even be executed for speaking one’s beliefs. 
In short, I believe that local citizenship is still strong and is embedded 
in its own cultural traditions. Still, there seems to be a change coming 
in the future. It is possibly a global view of citizenship. We now have the 
information highway, twitter, chat rooms, face book that bring us to one 
another as “citizens” of the world. It is called social networking. I have met 
teenagers in Portugal who knew more about basketball in the United States 
than most of the population of that country. What is amazing is that they 
never left Portugal. When there is a social or political crisis several thou-
sand miles away, I can see the events unfold in real time. Using the World 
Cup again as an example, most of the football fans participated together as 
“one” cohort. My last example is the recent event in the San Jose mines in 
Chile. With access to the media and after 69 days buried in a mine under-
ground, most of the world watched while the miners were rescued. It was 
a live event that in many ways brought us a global connection that did not 
have any borders. 
Hence, may I suggest that citizenship and cultural topography may be 
slowly changing from a local view to a global view? On some levels the 




I believe that our mission in this chapter is to identify some common 
threads across disciplines to collect data and examine current ideas. May I 
suggest some ways to examine these exciting and very important issues? On 
a scientific level, one way to collect data is to create a survey model that 
looks at citizenship across the globe. As we know, research gives us a “win-
dow” to look at social constructions and to develop paradigms for further 
discussion and analysis. 
One way is to borrow Underwood’s model of generations. I would be-
gin with the silent generation and develop a series of questions that could 
cross the academic disciplines. A survey questionnaire could be developed 
to collect data that speaks to a generational time line. We could look at 4 
generations. Here are some preliminary questions for survey research: 
IP = Intellectual Topography 
C = Citizenship
DD = Demographic Data
1. What is your sex, male or female? (DD)
2. How old are you? (DD)
3. What is you yearly income? (DD)
4. Where do you live? (DD, IP)
5. How many times have you moved in your lifetime? (DD)
6. Do you trust your politicians? (C)
7. Do you support your present political system? C)
8. How many countries do you possess citizenship? (C)
9. Are you a user of technology such as the Internet? (IP)
10. When applying technology, what language do you use? (C, IP)
These data points are but a few possible questions that could be used in 
survey research. I am sure that with a team of experts from cross disciplines, 
at least 100 questions could be developed to understand differences on a 
cross generational basis that looks at intellectual topography and citizen-
ship. It is true that such a survey will be expensive and time consuming. In 
the long run it could give the research community some data to understand 
the ‘new’ world we now live in.
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The second suggestion would be research in the humanities. Here, par-
ticularly in the arts, theology and philosophy, we could look at issues in eth-
ics, social attitudes in the arts, philosophical themes of the past and present 
that are now in play in the year 2010. 
What are my conclusions to this very exciting topic? I believe it is a chal-
lenge for the academic, business and intellectual communities to continue a 
discussion that deals specifically with the issues on citizenship and intellectual 
topography. At the university level, we could develop cross disciplines in aca-
demic departments. Academic disciplines could evaluate not only social and 
cultural trends across the globe, but it could also assist the business community 
to make sound judgments based on the data that is related to citizenship and 
cultural topography. In short, I believe that we can create a new way to look at 
our world of today and of the future. We can begin a new intellectual discourse 
of our global participation in the economic and the intellectual spheres.
Do we really now have local and global citizens? Is citizenship and in-
tellectual topography now a legitimate academic field that deserves an 
academic department at institutions of higher education? Would such an 
academic department be multidisciplinary?
I believe these ideas and challenges are exciting. 
We cannot afford to pass them by.
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António Simões
MATTHEW JAMES BELLAMY: 
AN EXAMPLE OF A NEW INTELLECTUAL?
nelson nunes
When examining the critical bibliography on the post-Sartrian intellec-
tual landscape, it becomes clear that frustration and pessimism (Posner 
2004; Furedi 2004; Jacoby 1987; Small 2002, 110-128, 207) are the 
predominant notes sounded for the public intellectual. Stefan Collini, 
Frank Furedi and Russell Jacoby, among others, clearly admit that the 
intellectual has disappeared or is at least in decline. However, there are 
also authors, such as Steve Fuller and Richard Posner, who claim that 
the intellectual has not actually vanished (Fuller 2005; Posner 2004) 
but rather being dispersed throughout different fields such as science, 
politics, literature and art. 
However, should we also consider the list of one hundred intellectuals 
put forward by Richard Posner (2004), and that is most commonly cited by 
the media, we realize that the majority of public intellectuals appearing in 
the public sphere between 1995 and 2000 remained academics (41) and 
writers (34). In addition, the list includes ten journalists, eight political 
pundits, seven law experts before then being completed by a sprinkling of 
philosophers, activists, politicians and the poet Ezra Pound for his partici-
pation in different musical projects. 
According to most scholars, an intellectual is someone who thinks 
about current affairs (Small 2002, 114), strictly and independently, while 
remaining committed to truth, social responsibility and innovative ideas 
(Furedi 2004, 36). As such, he/she influences public opinion and poli-
cies in a direct way (Small 2002, 5). Beginning with the idea that the 
traditional intellectual (mainly the writer and academic) is in decline, I 
shall proceed with a proposal that may seem, to some, rather unorthodox. 
Hence, I would like to ask, at this early point, for some open-mindedness 
about what I am going to say on the well-known young musician Mat-
thew James Bellamy. 
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Who is Matthew James Bellamy?
Mark Beaumont, journalist and Bellamy’s biographer, gives one of the 
most accurate and elucidative ideas of Bellamy’s persona: 
What Matt constantly strives to do is thrust forth an alternative view-
point on politics and humanity, to make his listeners question the informa-
tion they’re being spoon fed daily and to research and reason out their own 
form of The Truth. Matt Bellamy humanises the frustration, paranoia and 
anger of the ordinary man who refuses to be a pawn in a global game with 
no rules. If marching about Iraq and rioting about banking crisis make no 
difference, at least Muse are voicing our concerns, as brightly and loudly as 
they humanly can.1
Matthew James Bellamy was born in 1978 in Cambridge, England. From 
an early age, he revealed a sui generis passion for music. Aged three, he 
started playing the piano and, when he became twelve, he was already play-
ing long classical music pieces at school events.2 Later, he also became a 
member of his school’s theatre group.3 Nevertheless, nothing could predict, 
at that early stage in his life, the future idealistic, profound and erudite 
artist. Today, still a young man, he is the lead singer, guitarist, pianist and 
composer of the British rock band Muse and has produced some signifi-
cant pieces of work that, in my view, qualify him as an intellectual, i.e. as 
someone who is capable of thinking in depth about current affairs and, per-
haps more importantly, creating his own cultural material through complex 
and informed analysis. No wonder, in the last decade, Bellamy has created 
five pieces that have received unanimous critical acclaim: Showbiz (1999), 
Origin of Symmetry (2001), Absolution (2003), Black Holes and Revelations 
(2006) and The Resistance (2009). Throughout these years of inspired crea-
tion, a significant literary culture stimulated Bellamy’s artistic vision of the 
world, his interpretations of current events, as well as his socio-political 
critique and alternative views, and which we find in Confessions of an Eco-
1 NME Icons, May 2010: 8-9
2 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_99w1GYza1c, <accessed November 26, 
2010>.
3 NME Icons, May 2010: 42
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nomic Hitman,4 Limits to Growth,5 Crossing the Rubicon,6 Nineteen Eighty-
Four,7 The Grand Chessboard,8 among others. The vast majority of this bi-
bliography is about politics or think-tank style thinking.
From a very early age music was definitely a decisive facet in the for-
mation of this curious artistic character, as mentioned above. Matthew 
Bellamy has revealed that several musicians were important sources in 
his musical development, influencing him throughout the years. Artists 
such as Tom Morello (guitarist of Rage Against the Machine), Sergei 
Rachmaninov, Tom Waits, Hector Berlioz (Beaumont 2008, 14), Jimi 
Hendrix, Nirvana, Smashing Pumpkins (ibid. 15), Andres Segovia or 
Villa-Lobos (ibid. 14) are constant inspirational presences in his work. 
Bellamy himself was awarded an Honoris Causa Doctorate by the Uni-
versity of Plymouth in recognition of all the artistic advances he has 
given music.9
His interest in political issues also began long before he became the 
composer and exclusive lyrics writer for Muse at the early age of 15. Ap-
parently, the soon-to-be musician finished college with grades that were 
somewhat a “mix of A’s B’s and C’s” (Myers 2007, 42). What is interesting 
is that he soon grasped the great potential of the media for a successful 
socio-political commitment. As he explained: “(...) I got an ‘A’ in Media 
Studies and I believe that it made me feel interested by the amount of 
power that the media have”.10 
Can musicians be deemed intellectuals?
How can a rock musician and composer be deemed an intellectual? 
Careful analysis of Bellamy’s complex artistic output is required before gi-
4 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=42mesIUG3kI, <accessed November 26, 
2010>.
5 NME Icons, May 2010: 24
6 NME Icons, May 2010: 25
7 Q, October 2009
8 Ibid.
9 http://www.nme.com/photos/50-supermassive-muse-facts/173103/1/1, <accessed 
November 26, 2010>.
10 State, March 4, 2008
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ving a credible answer to this question as, while not new, approaching a 
mainstream artist as a possible intellectual is not very common. 
There is no such thing as an accurate definition of what is an intellectu-
al. There are, however, characteristics that may help us define one. Taking 
an unbiased look at some of the specific attributes with which critics tend 
to assess the intellectual’s functions, I have no doubt about the feasibility 
of a musician like Bellamy being considered an intellectual not just because 
of his ability to sing or play a musical instrument but also because of the 
relevance and reach of the message he conveys. According to McKee, for 
instance, the intellectual is someone who takes as his or hers “subject mat-
ters of public concern and has the public’s attention” (Mckee 2002, 221). 
Bellamy focuses upon the abuses of power and political oppression inciting 
his audience to combat them: in the song Uprising11 – an excellent example 
of such concerns – the musician tells us that “they will not force us, they will 
stop degrading us, they will not control us, we will be victorious”.
Relevant to any classification as an intellectual is the central position 
of the media in contemporary society. In fact, it seems that “the traditional 
Western image of an intellectual as a cloistered ivory-tower academic or a 
member of the clergy is no longer valid for the bulk of intellectual roles” 
(Louw 2001, 13). Furthermore, there are theoreticians who “insist that per-
formance artists, novelists and filmmakers should also be public intellectu-
als”, since “the attention of a wider public is vital to the definition [of an 
intellectual]” (Mckee 2002, 221. Correspondingly, a successful musician 
like Matthew Bellamy, who is capable of deploying the media as a com-
munication vehicle (especially to reach younger generations), has a great 
impact on his audience and, by this criterion, may also be considered a 
public intellectual. 
The intellectual in Bellamy
Jeremy Jennings defines the intellectual as someone “who thinks about 
current affairs”,12 adding that he also possesses the ability to analyze, criti-
11 “Uprising”, The Resistance 2009
12 SMALL, 2002: 114
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cize and explain the reality to his public, decoding procedures and situa-
tions with critical independence and without the interference of personal 
and professional interests that might influence his view on the issues.13 On 
September 2009, Muse put out a song named United States of Eurasia,14 
in which Bellamy uses the ideas Zbigniew Brzezinski (state advisor to the 
former American President Jimmy Carter) expounded in The Grand Chess-
board; it also incorporates elements of Nineteen Eighty-Four by George Or-
well15 and a piece of Nocturna in E Flat Major, Op. 9, No. 2 by Fréderic 
Chopin. Bellamy advances the idea, developed and explained by Orwell, 
that the State fostered the feeling that Eurasia was constantly at war with 
other continents, based on the ruling party’s idea that “War is Peace, Free-
dom is Slavery, Ignorance is Strength” (Orwell 1984, 30). Bellamy’s song 
states that “these wars they can’t be won”, asking his listeners: “Do you want 
them [the wars] to go on and on and on? (…) Does anyone know or care 
how they begun?”
The bibliographic references are present throughout the song. As re-
ferred, another source that inspired him was Brzezinski’s The Grand Chess-
board. This work expands on an international scheme for North American 
foreign policies based on the idea that the United States needs to control 
Eurasia both since that area holds a great amount of cultural, military and 
economic potential given its gross national product is 420% greater than 
the American, and because that continent is a “cauldron of ethnic conflicts 
and great-power rivalry” (Brzezinski 1997, 33 and 195). The author puts 
across the idea that the United States as a superpower, based on military 
strength, technology and cultural and political influence (ibid. 24), must 
control Eurasia in order to avoid future threats to its political system. 
What Bellamy seeks to convey is essentially what someone, commonly 
known as “intellectual”, does when he/she paraphrases and recycles the 
ideas of several authors in order to advance a personal point of view or a 
particular thesis: for instance, why not unite the whole of Eurasia in order to 
have enough power to respond against the dominance of the United States 
of America? The initial statement “you and me are the same” – which 
13 SMALL, 2002: 117
14 “United States of Eurasia”, The Resistance 2009.
15 Nineteen Eighty-Four has been referenced by Muse as an inspiration for the whole 
album The Resistance. 
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seeks to approach Eastern and Western cultures and dissolve the West/East 
dichotomy –, the glorifying shouts of continental union “Eurasia!” and the 
fusion of oriental melodies with Chopin are clear indicators of the elucida-
tive inter-textual intricacy of Bellamy’s composition. Along with profound 
thoughts about current affairs and proposals for viewing the world’s geo-
politics differently, Bellamy is also exempt from bias in his statements as he 
has no contractual obligations that might restrict him from saying whatever 
he wants– except, of course, his record label contract. Certainly, this might 
pose an obstacle to a musician’s independence, however, when he is in a 
band that already has a large fan base, the problem dissipates. 
As a musician, he has no other professional obligations than playing or 
signing sessions; therefore, he has a lot of free time for examining reality 
and elaborating on what he considers to be relevant issues. Bellamy himself 
acknowledges that he “possibly” thinks too much, since “you’ve got a lot of 
time on your hands when you are in a band travelling all the time”.16 This 
bohemian side was also common to the lifestyles of many 19th century 
intellectuals. Additionally, Bellamy also believes that a great amount of 
critical thought about what the media broadcasts is needed in spite of ad-
mitting to being afraid of eventual retaliations. Fear does not prevent him 
from intervening publically: “[If] I feel strongly about it (...) I’ve got to say 
it”, he says. And when asked whether he is afraid of being identified by the 
FBI as a dangerous threat to the system, he simply retorts that “with the 
world we live in, I think the books I’ve ordered on Amazon I’ll already be 
on [their] lists”.17 
Frank Furedi states that the intellectual is the “defender of cultural 
standards” and “the conscience of society” (Furedi 2004, 35), committed 
to the chase of new ideas and the ‘truth’ (ibid. 36). As I have pointed out, 
these are also characteristics of Bellamy’s activism, who says explicitly that 
he is interested in “alternative ways of thinking”.18 Besides defending cul-
tural standards (as we shall see further ahead in this paper), Bellamy also 
aspires to be society’s conscience, even on matters of a quasi-philosophical 
16 Kerrang, November 10, 2006.
17 Ibid.




nature. In “Thoughts of a Dying Atheist”,19 for example, he exposes the am-
biguity of thought that can assail the mind of an atheist on his deathbed. The 
search for ‘truth’ is also present in Bellamy’s body of work as is evident in “Un-
natural Selection”,20 in which the musician gives voice to “I want the truth”. 
And as Steve Fuller explains, ‘truth’ can be transformed by the intellectual 
himself so that he can present it to the public in a more appealing fashion, 
for instance, by simplifying it (Fuller 2005, 61-67). In fact, Bellamy recog-
nizes that simplification is required should he wish to be understood by the 
public in general. 
Fuller also sets out the metaphor of “the eternal irritant” to give expres-
sion to the intellectual’s function (ibid. 163). Bellamy may not (yet) be 
considered a serious menace to the establishment but there are some indi-
viduals who have already felt uncomfortable with his presence in the public 
sphere. On November 18, 2006, the music magazine NME stated that the 
“powers-that-be” had referred to Bellamy as a “crackpot little fella”.21 
Edward Saïd, in turn, defines three grand goals that should guide the 
intellectual: to protect culture and tradition from the sweeping transforma-
tion societies are undergoing; fight against the excessive simplification of 
history by endowing historical narratives with different and detailed con-
textual perspectives, as well as avoiding manipulating facts and fostering 
ideological “battlefields”. Finally, the intellectual should protect his work 
from being minimized by the elites residing in small academic industries 
(Small 2002, 37). The latter is also what Bellamy does. 
David Wallace enhances humanism as an important characteristic of 
the intellectual (ibid. 62-79). Bellamy once again complies with this re-
quirement, judging, for example, from the 12-minute symphonic composi-
tion “Exogenesis”.22 Here, he exhorts politicians to assume that, for sur-
vival reasons, we may have to leave this planet in the future for another 
point of the galaxy, restarting life in society in a more responsible way. 
This may sound like naive science fiction to some but the idea has already 
been proposed by well-known and respected scientists such as Paul C. W. 
19 “Thoughts of a Dying Atheist”, Absolution 2003.
20 “Unnatural Selection”, The Resistance 2009.
21 NME, November 18, 2006
22 “Exogenesis”: Part 1” (Overture), “Exogenesis”: Part 2 (Cross-Polination) and 
“Exogenesis”: Part 3 (Redemption), The Resistance 2009.
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Davies (Brockman 2009, 188-190), Rodney Brooks (ibid.192-95), Carl Sa-
gan (2003) and even Stephen Hawking (2008). Furthermore, there is the 
message of “Map of the Problematique”23 – a protest held against what the 
“Club of Rome” think tank has defended in Limits to Growth (Meadows et 
al. 2004) – advocating the need for a population control policy in the face 
of the scarcity of the planet’s resources. 
Nevertheless, the strongest statements of the musician derive from his 
ability to legitimate (or discredit) certain conspiracy theories. For those 
considering whether or not an intellectual should believe in conspiracy 
theories, the answer would seem to be yes according to some authors. Cor-
respondingly, Steve Fuller states that the intellectual should be somehow 
paranoid about all the issues he is concerned with. He even states that 
conspiracy theoreticians are paranoid intellectuals who end up building 
social-scientific theories (Fuller 2005, 19). Bellamy has always been known 
for believing in some conspiracy theories although he has publicly admit-
ted that some of them are just “sheer madness”.24 Inspiration triggered by 
this theme is undeniable in his work: the entire Black Holes and Revelations 
album of 2006, for instance, is filled with conspiracy theories rooted in the 
book Crossing the Rubicon (Ruppert 2004), which was his main source of 
information during the writing process. In the album booklet, we also find 
references to “High Frequency Active Auroral Research”– the project that 
studies basic natural processes that occur in the ionosphere,25 documents 
unravelling the time when the CIA investigated mind control, a project 
named “MK Ultra” and several pictures of the Auroral project, which de-
veloped secret airplanes that reached 20,000 kilometres per hour. But there 
is more: the song “Ruled by Secrecy”26 is based on the similarly entitled 
book (Marrs 2001), and “MK Ultra”27 is a song that recalls a conspiracy 
theory that ended up being confirmed (Boese 2007, 75-80; Klein 2009, 37-
51). These are just a few of many more examples.
23 Black Holes and Revelations 2006.
24 Q, July 2010: 57.
25 The Project was used to name the 2007 Muse live album, H.A.A.R.P.
26 Absolution 2003.
27 The Resistance 2009.
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The Intellectual-Musician – acting in a new situation
The present intellectual context – referred to by Stefan Collini as the 
3D Reality: Dead, Deceased and Disappeared (apud Small 2002, 207) – 
leads us to consider that intellectuals are probably no longer only academ-
ics, writers and philosophers as was once the case. Granted this possibility, 
we should then open our horizons and search for them in new emerging 
areas that possess public relevance. It is certain, as stated by Frank Furedi 
(Furedi 2004) and Russell Jacoby (Jacoby 1987), that the intellectual has 
been absorbed by academic institutions and has, therefore, lost the neu-
trality and independence of the ideas exposed in the public sphere. The 
public sphere itself has been profoundly changed. In the prodigal period 
of intellectual activity, between the mid-19th century and the end of the 
Second World War, the public debate spaces were mostly cafés or salons, as 
explained by Habermas (1992), where papers – the most common media at 
the time – were read. Today, electronic media are the mediator. 
There are, in fact, several indicators that suggest a musician actually 
can function as an intellectual, not only because of his ease in reaching 
wide audiences through the media, but also because he possesses certain 
non-verbal codes and symbols that facilitate the understanding of the mes-
sage in a musical text. Jane Fulcher wrote a book in which she specifies 
the way French composers, between 1914 and 1940, engaged in intellec-
tual debate through such codes: “The choice for musicians, unlike artists 
and writers, therefore, was not that of clear conformity or dissent through 
words or images; rather, through style they could equivocate more subtly. 
Words were subject to censorship, but symbols and style could be manipu-
lated with latitude, providing a mode of criticism or indirect resistance to 
complete absorption by the nationalist myth” (Fulcher 2005, 47). Along 
with words, Bellamy uses these codes in very different ways, from martial 
rhythms28 to the simulation of sirens whether with guitars29 or with his own 
voice.30 One of the most interesting and original examples of this type of 
intellectual communication is Megalomania in which Bellamy criticizes the 
way the Church deals with some issues and denounces the perverted form 
28 “Uprising”, The Resistance 2009; “Invincible”, Black Holes and Revelations 2006.
29 “Plug in Baby”, H.A.A.R.P. 2007.
30 “Apocalypse Please”, Absolution 2003.
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that belief in a God can assume. The artist got permission from a priest to 
use a Church organ to illustrate his critique. This attitude could certainly 
be mistaken by childish mockery of religious power or belief, but religion as 
an oppressive organization has long been a target for intellectual critique. 
Zygmunt Bauman, for instance, recalls that intellectuals emerged during 
their war against Church power (Bauman 1987, 34-35). Isaiah Berlin refers 
to the Russian intellectual Belinsky, for whom “religion was (...) a detesta-
ble insult to reason; theologians were charlatans, the Church a conspiracy” 
(Berlin 2001, 83).
Reaching the public’s awareness 
There are some issues that are central to the public’s reception of the 
intellectual’s ideas. According to Furedi, the contemporary public is philis-
tine meaning that it has no kind of cultural taste and its interests are purely 
common sense and materialistic (Furedi 2004, 1). This author shows that 
most people are not proactive in the search for knowledge but take it for 
granted and comprehend only that which comes through the media – re-
gardless of the sources (ibid. 50-72). Philistines also believe that they have 
“proper knowledge” that comes from their own experience and relevant 
knowledge than that conveyed by specialized, educational institutions. 
The omnipresent philistinism of contemporary Western societies is respon-
sible for the increasing scepticism and disinterest in public matters and for 
turning individuals into possessors of an “inverted snobbery” (Furedi 2004, 
145). Bellamy criticizes such attitude in “Futurism”,31 saying that: “Ignorance 
pulls, apostasy and apathy still rules”.
There is also the question of adult authority over children and adolescents. 
Furedi also writes about this matter when referring to the decadence of education 
and to the prevailing ideas for coping with this problem: either it is the parents’ 
or the teachers’ fault with the latter accusation favoured by parents. At the same 
time, schools strive to satisfy student needs, levelling down education (Furedi 
2009, 4). The problem, according to Furedi, resides in the general lack of adult 
authority when dealing with young people. Without it, they have little influence 
31 “Futurism”, b-side of Origin of Symmetry 2001.
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and intellectual ascendency over them (ibid. 87). In such a situation, it is in-
evitable that young people transfer their attention to those they admire – 
people like Bellamy and others who, as musicians, attract greater attention 
than academics or writers. Thus, musicians, in their roles of new intellectu-
als, are closer to younger generations. What this means is that intellectual-
artists enjoy favourable conditions for being makers of citizenship. This is 
precisely what Bellamy has been concerned about – creating a feeling of 
social responsibility in his audiences whether by means of statements in the 
media or the songs he creates. “Assassin”,32 for example, is based on melodies 
(heard on Islamic radio stations) with the purpose of alerting people to cultural 
differences and by transposing Middle Eastern realities onto the Western context. 
In this song, Bellamy states that “the time has come for you to shoot your leaders 
down, join forces underground”. This may actually be a perfect metaphor for 
the turnout in elections and the symbolic “death” of the current governing 
class. The name given to the song – but not chosen for its final version – 
represented what Bellamy struggles against: demonocracy. 
The Intellectual as the gatekeeper of cultural 
standards
I now arrive at another unavoidable dimension to my analysis: cultur-
al standardization. Linda Kauffman (Small 2002, 131-57) states that the 
intellectual functions as a certain gatekeeper, that is, he/she informs the 
public about which are (or are not) good pieces of culture. Accordingly, 
artists and intellectuals have the “vital function” of studying and explain-
ing the origins and evolutions of aesthetic movements and canons (and the 
devaluing of popular culture), in order to foster new creative processes and 
new cultural products. 
Bellamy does this in a perfect and delightful way. It takes only a slight 
glimpse of his influences and we understand that popular and elite cul-
tural references are in constant fusion: while simultaneously turning popu-
lar culture more sophisticated, he also delivers elite culture to the masses, 
rendering it less difficult. There are many examples of this artistic (and 
32 “Assassin”, Black Holes and Revelations 2006.
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inter-textual) process in Bellamy’s work from which I point out just a few: 
“The Small Print”33 is based on Goethe’s myth of Faust, “Micro Cuts”34 
was inspired on the style of Johann Sebastian Bach; in “Butterflies and 
Hurricanes”35 there is a part belonging to a Rachmaninov piece; “Space 
Dementia”36 is also based on Rachmaninov’s work; “Hoodoo”37 contains 
some Tchaikovsky; “I Belong to You”38 has an opera aria from Samson and 
Delilah by Camille Saint-Saëns, sung in French by Bellamy himself; “Citizen 
Erased”39 is based on Orwell’s Nineteen Eighty-Four. Such merging of popu-
lar and erudite music reveals Bellamy’s great artistry and also insight into 
the public’s taste. 
In 2003, the artist composed a song named “Sing for Absolution”,40 in 
which he conveys the belief that music had taken on a new function in people’s 
lives, substituting religion. Seven years later, the researcher Clive Marsh pub-
lished a paper in which he reached the same conclusion by saying that music is 
attracting the public’s devotion and therefore substituting religion,41 while trans-
ferring the musician’s way of thinking to the audiences. And Bellamy admits: “I 
care about communicating with the younger generation”.42
Muse fans: a large public
Let me just point out that Muse reaches a very large diversity of pub-
lics. As Bellamy refers, the kids attending the gigs are so diverse, from 
metal to pop-indie fans.43 Besides, on every long tour of the band, the 
33 “The Small Print”, Absolution 2003.
34 “Micro Cuts”, Origin of Symmetry 2001.
35 “Butterflies and Hurricanes”, Absolution 2003.
36 “Space Dementia”, Origin of Symmetry 2001.
37 “Hoodoo”, Black Holes and Revelations 2006.
38 “I Belong to You” (Mon Coeur S’Ouvre à Ta Voix), The Resistance 2009.
39 “Citizen Erased”, Origin of Symmetry 2001.
40 “Sing for Absolution”, Absolution 2003.
41 http://www.telegraph.co.uk/culture/music/music-news/7511834/Music-is-replac-
ing-religion-says-academic.html, <accessed November 26, 2010>.
42 National Post. June 10, 2009: http://network.nationalpost.com/np/blogs/theamper-
sand/archive/2009/10/06/q-amp-a-matt-bellamy-from-muse-talks-politics-arena-rock-
and-the-resistance.aspx, <accessed November 26, 2010>.
43 NME. March 9, 2009.
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vast majority of shows are sold out. The last Muse concert in Portugal, 
which took place in Pavilhão Atlântico in November 29, 2009, had al-
ready sold out before the end of August. This has been happening over 
the five continents and throughout the ten years Muse has been playing 
together. But besides the shows themselves, the band also counts on 
huge record sales successes, especially in North America, Europe and 
East Asia. Speaking again about the Portuguese case, it is important 
to mention that one of the group’s songs remained high on the playlist 
of a national radio station (Rádio Comercial) between October 2009 
and July 2010. It is also important to mention that several Muse songs 
receive frequent airplay.44 
In the light of what I said, I believe I can assume that a musician like 
Bellamy can be considered a new type of “intellectual” – one that has a 
huge impact on the generations he reaches out to and who will probably 
play a significant role in the future of societies. The features that Pierre 
Bordieu ascribes to the intellectual – capacity for people’s mobilization, 
“freedom with respect to those in power, the critique of received ideas, 
the demolition of simplistic either-ors and respect for the complexity of 
problems” (Bourdieu 1998, 65 and 92) – can be found in Bellamy’s per-
sona. The great resistance to the emerging of this new type of intellectual 
may lie in the fact that he/she is broadly considered a mere figure of en-
tertainment. However, once the media and the establishment discard the 
prejudice by assuming the existence of intellectuals like Bellamy, these 
will become a presence in the public space, where they will discuss public 
matters in ways that prove easier and more palatable to public under-
standing and thereby influencing public policies. The time is ripening for 
this to happen, particularly because the media is now more permissive 
and there is questioning over intellectuals having to follow traditional 
and moral values (Johnson 1988, 1). 
44 “Time is Running Out”, “Starlight”, “Supermassive Black Hole”, “Uprising”, “I 
Belong to You”, “Resistance”, “Neutron Star Collision” (Love is Forever).
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III – Intellectual Topographies in the
Iberian Context

PUBLIC INTELLECTUALISM AND THE DEMISE OF 
THE PORTUGUESE MONARCHY:  
THE IDEOLOGICAL ROOTS OF THE
REPUBLICAN VICTORY OF 1910
José miguel sardica
In the nineteenth century, even the most conservative section of the intel-
ligentsia was critical of the prevailing cultural climate, and every brand of the 
intellectuals sought to alter, improve, transform and even overthrow the world 
that confronted them. The contrast between this tradition of intellectual fer-
ment and the complacent attitudes displayed today highlights the distant fea-
tures of intellectual life in the early twenty first century.
(Furedi 2006, 48)
The demolishers of liberalism […] encountered an anaemic and decrepit 
society, succumbed to a certain senile dementia, mouthing various deliria of 
liberty as if recalling a passion of youth and in fact abandoned to the disgrace of 
a great fall and much ineptitude within which one atrophies and is dishonoured. 
It had become urgent to reanimate society, raise it up through a new baptism, 
purify it and begin there new kingdoms, free of its multiple vices, recasting it 
with new politics, new art, new hygiene, new religion, new customs, new hap-
piness and new standards of dignity.
(Lima 1916, 1103)
The lost power: writers and intellectuals in liberal 
Modernity
It remains today difficult to locate in time the exact historical moment 
when intellectuals lost their central role in cultural, social and political life. 
It was only a posteriori that this loss was noted, eliciting embittered nostal-
gias regretting the decadence and the end of the public intellectual and his/
her relevance within what is termed post-Modernity. As Frank Furedi re-
cently pointed out with irony: “the very fact that today many monographs 
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ask “what is a public intellectual?” suggests that what they are describ-
ing corresponds to an endangered species” (Furedi 2006, 31).1 In con-
trast, and historically as from the Enlightenment through to our post-
ideological era, the centrality and relevance of intellectuals was taken 
for granted along with their unquestionable social and political recogni-
tion. At a time when ideas displayed real power in creating and chang-
ing “worlds” (in the expectation that this was for the better), their pro-
ducers, interpreters and promoters enjoyed an almost oracle-like status 
in public life. As Michel Winock summarised, intellectuals stood out for 
their strong spirit of civic mission, for their ambition to “conceive and 
represent the universal” and for their inherently critical vocation that 
consisted in “recording the universal values” to their co-citizens (Win-
ock 2000, 634, 645). As a class, modernity period intellectuals were a 
learned and liberal intelligentsia that not only spoke out on behalf of 
all citizens but also ideally to all citizens, thereby creating, interpreting 
and motivating wills, leading public spheres of debate, integrating civic 
society and advising on the construction and improvement of structures 
of power and political systems. Hence, intellectuals lived from and for 
ideas – not ephemeral slogans or party convictions but broad questions 
relating to civic awareness, public morality and global progress (Furedi 
2006, 32)2 – self-appointing themselves as holders of a social responsi-
bility that drove them to take public and political positions. 
Over the course of the temporal span of contemporary times, the final 
decades of the 19th century and the early decades of the 20th century rep-
resented a high water mark in the history of intellectuals and their profile 
and authority (Charles 1996).3 The figure of the intellectual clearly pre-
1  See also Posner 2002, and Pires 2009.
2 Isaiah Berlin draws attention to this, highlighting how “sheer protest, whether 
justified or unjustified, does not qualify one to be a member of the intelligentsia as such. 
What does so is a combination of belief in reason and progress with a profound moral 
concern for society” (Berlin 2001, 108).
3 In this book, Christophe Charles portrays “the birth of the intellectuals” in the 
short two decade period from 1880-1900. Like Michel Winock in the first part of his 
work, Charles’ object of study is the France of the 3rd Republic while the same chro-
nology is equally applicable to other countries – Portugal included. Isaiah Berlin also 
places the emergence of the intelligentsia in Tsarist Russia (the word intelligentsia is 
indeed of Russian origin) between the years 1860-1870 (Berlin 2001, 103).
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dates this period and stretches back, at least in more industrialised societies, to 
the Enlightenment and the moment when for the first time the most symbolic 
cultural work of the “Lights” took form – the French Encyclopédie. The liberal 
revolutions politicised intellectuals while the post-revolutionary Romanticism 
of the first half of the 19th century consecrated their status in glorifying the 
génie litteraire and the poète-penseur and assisting in establishing an important 
inter-linkage between literature, art, journalism, oratory and politics.4 It was 
particularly towards the end of the 19th century, when a realist aesthetic and 
scientific positivism endowed literature and other fields of learning with a 
heightened level of concern and socio-political incidence, that the word “intel-
lectual” replaced the previously existing notions of a “man of letters”, “learned” 
or “public writer”, taking on a new meaning as a noun and not merely as an 
adjective (Ramos 2004, 108-109, and Andrade 1999, 28).5 
The “golden age” of the Portuguese intelligentsia
The late 19th and early years of the 20th century, with the transition 
from a Monarchy to a Republic, represented a “golden age” for intellectuals 
in Portugal. The word was perhaps not as commonly attributed as in France 
but it was the same search for ethical-political points of reference, the same 
discursive energy in their defence and the same commitment towards the 
civic awareness that motivated writers, journalists and intellectual leaders. 
It was this image as the “voice of the collective conscience, speaking out 
to all and perceiving a correction and improvement in the shortcomings of 
the community” (Ramos 2001, 47-48) that these men of thought – reform-
ist supporters of power and iconoclastic voices of the opposition – attrib-
uted themselves as a specific social and cultural category. 
4  On the history of the French intellectual between Enlightenment and Orleanism 
(c. 1750-1850), see Sirinelli 1996. On the Portuguese situation in the first half of the 
19th century, see Santos 1988.
5 This qualitative evolution resulted above all from the echoes issuing out of France 
to all of Europe by the notorious “affaire Dreyfus”. It was on this subject that Georges 
Clemenceau wrote his Manifeste des Intellectuels in 1898, deemed one of the founding 
texts on the new role and image of the intellectual in the public space.
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The importance gained by all those contemplating national problems 
and intervening in public debate in defence of their position is inseparable 
from the set of transformations that Portuguese society underwent in the last 
quarter of the 19th century and the first decades of the 20th century. The 
Fontist period (c. 1851-1890) saw literacy spread more widely, the breaking 
with ancestral isolation and the creation of larger cities where new middle 
class social strata boosted civil society and led to the emergence of a radi-
cal and noisy masspolitik, whose dynamism contributed towards eroding the 
old institutional and cultural conventions of the oligarchic based monarchy 
(Bonifácio 2010, 81-82 and 113-114). In a country aware of social protest, 
political radicalism and the latest trends in thinking and in the arts, the opin-
ion making centres expanded beyond the restricted environs of the Palace, 
the Parliament, the parties of the notables, members only clubs, elite acad-
emies and the university to enter into the main mass channels of communi-
cation – the fin de siècle style newspapers (cheap, generalist, written in simple 
language and dotted with political-ideological slogans), books, pamphlets, 
essays, mass market cultural collections, rallies, conferences, exhibitions 
and the activism of commemorations and civic processions (Sardica 2010, 
109-110, and Matos 2002, 108). It was within such an environment and the 
sociologically and geographically expanded public opinion domain that the 
“new” men of letters, the “new” writers took up their stance as militant intel-
lectuals able to bring together the wisdom and perception of the old thinkers 
and rhetoricians and the sharpness of insight of opinion makers capable of 
stirring up the urban masses. We were arriving a period when the intellec-
tuals would represent “the critical conscience of a nation”, and where “the 
arts in general were no longer the pretext for the frivolous pleasure of the 
bourgeois but became transformed into a source of the national conscience” 
(Bonifácio 2010, 92), as well as serving as a means for social and political 
climbing, establishing their mark on the collective imaginary. 
The greatest Portuguese writer of the late 19th century – Eça de Quei-
rós – encapsulates the promotion of the intellectual in general and the 
way in which these intellectuals revolutionised the self-perception of their 
endeavours and their mission. Since his journalistic debut in 1866-1867, 
through to the last of his novels in 1900, Eça de Queirós always maintained 
that the arts were of public utility and that writers of his generation had an 
enormous influence and recognition among an ever growing public. Writ-
ing in 1886, he set out a crucial difference between eras: 
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The writer, a century ago, particularly addressed a person of 
knowledge and good taste, who would occupy his leisure time read-
ing and who would be called ‘the Reader’; today, he addresses a bus-
tling and crudely educated crowd that he names the ‘public’. (Quei-
rós undated [1886], 96) 
He then went on: “the idea of reading, today, suggests only an accelerat-
ed turning of the pages under pressure, in the rumour of the public square”. 
The changes derived from “democracy”, “gas lighting”, “instruction” and 
the “Marinoni machines”, with the “individual” disappearing and intel-
lectuals now facing before them “the crowds, governed by an instinct, by 
an interest or by an enthusiasm” (Queirós undated [1886], 96-97). Thus, 
influencing and leading the crowds was the very purpose of these writers.
What Eça de Queirós and so many other men of letters and journalists 
of this time conveyed was a dual militancy, ethical and aesthetic, in defence 
of a new, more self-aware society, a new system of mass education, and a 
new political and democratic civil order. These were the active intellectu-
als of the new generations that dominated the Portuguese cultural pano-
rama between the “Coimbrã Question” and the advent of the Republic – 
and not the simple romantic literati or the stodgy academic of earlier times 
– and due to serve in the vanguard of the evolution of public life and in the 
construction of a new and broadened “culture”, which required daily “con-
quest” and “conversion” of the spirits (Ramos 2004, 114, 129). Contrary 
to what takes place today, nobody then talked about the irrelevance or the 
decadence of intellectuals, because ideas, their formulation and promo-
tion really did matter and really did influence the thinking members of the 
nation who set the tone for the period. Furthermore, as new ideas spread 
easily from intellectuals to the streets, through the masspolitik channels of 
communication, iconoclastic and radical intellectual positions reflect core 
realities needing to be taken into consideration in any understanding of the 
process that led to the political crisis in the constitutional monarchy and 
the eventual triumph of the republican alternative.
In October 1910, Portugal underwent one of the most important politi-
cal changes in its contemporary history in turning its back on the monar-
chical system, ongoing since the founding of the nation in the 12th century, 
and declaring itself a Republic. Any historiographic inquiry into the causes 
of this change would have to take into account the political, institutional, 
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social and economic factors, all of which predate the “beginning of the 
end” normally established for this narrative, i.e., the British Ultimatum of 
1890. Such factors certainly do all hold importance. However, the scope of 
analysis perhaps should be broadened so as to incorporate the large front 
of public intellectuals – both the critical reformists within the monarchy 
and the radical republicans beyond it – which opened up a cultural war 
against the throne in the final decades of its constitutional existence (and 
not merely as from 1890). In this way, the short history of the republican 
victory in Portugal proves inseparable – and in reality a product of – from 
the far longer history of criticism and cultural and intellectual dissidence. 
Through books, pamphlets and newspapers, this current of thinking con-
demned the monarchical system to ideological bankruptcy and undermined 
its capacity to govern a problematic country or to resist the military coup 
of 1910.
The ideological erosion of the Constitutional 
Monarchy
In a period of such accelerated change as that of the end of the monar-
chy, in which the uncertainties and difficulties of progress simultaneously 
engendered feelings of decadence and future utopias, the general objective 
of national intellectual output was the “reform of Portugal by means of 
critical public discourse” (Leone 2005, 37). This was the minimum com-
mon denominator of all those who, in accordance with their written con-
tent, wished to “awake” the country “with screams”,6 yanking away the 
constitutional routines of the 19th century and launching it on course for 
the modernity of democracy, urbanisation, industrialisation, massification 
and for conscious civic participation. 
Indeed, in the transition from the 19th century to the 20th century, 
this all seemed impossible within the framework of the old guard of the 
constitutional monarchy. The criticism made of it from various quarters – 
6 “Wake up all that with screams” was the way chosen by Eça de Queirós and Ra-
malho Ortigão to justify the publication of their O Mistério da Estrada de Sintra as a 
novel-pamphlet in Diário de Notícias, in 1870. “That” was the Portugal of Regeneration, 
and the sentence authored by the two writers became a program for their generation.
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ever since the 1870s Generation to the “vanquished in life”, moving onto 
a “new monarchical life” and the propagandists of the idea of republican 
revolution – put forward a dark legend according to which monarchic con-
stitutionalism ran against the grain of political-philosophical good sense 
and was reduced to a time of ideological foreignness, corruptive material-
ism and fraudulent nepotistic inbreeding. It was at the intellectual level, 
therefore, that the sea of repudiation first built up by ideologically demol-
ishing the charter based constitutional monarchy. Furthermore, it was this 
“betrayal by intellectuals” of the political and cultural system in which they 
had been educated that drove the ideological victory of republicanism in 
1910. 
Many began to see the future triumph of the Republic as a demiurgic 
moment in which, with the advent of true liberalism and democracy, the 
country would burst out of its apathy and decadence and spring towards 
progress and citizenship. Without ever playing down the economic crisis, 
the social tensions, institutional stalemates and the rivalries that wrought 
the political system apart, which in the long run helped bury the monar-
chy and open the way to a republic, it was the intelligentsia’s production 
of a mental and cultural climate capable of eroding and undermining the 
monarchy through an accusatory public process that served to fuel the con-
frontation and protest that the republicans were the main beneficiaries of. 
Hence, we need to begin by looking at what the constitutional monarchy 
was and just what it was accused of by late 19th century intellectuals.
The first historical and political evaluation of 19th century liberalism 
took place among the generation founding the constitutional monarchy, 
interested in justifying the righteousness of their cause and the importance 
of the break made with the preceding regime.7 In 1830, for example, writ-
ing against King D. Miguel (absolutist), Almeida Garrett made an intran-
sigent defence of constitutional liberalism as the banner to struggle for and 
praised the “law of 1826” (the Constitutional Charter). “Proposed by the 
king and accepted by the people”, Garrett believed it to be the wisest and 
most “legitimate” of all the constitutions that the kingdom had ever had, 
“due to its loyal conservation of absolute principles of natural and social 
law, to its prudent restoration of longstanding bases of Portuguese public 
7 See Pina 2003, 151.
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law and finally by the appropriate combination of these principles” (Garrett 
undated [1830], 209-210).
In the years subsequent to the liberal victory in the Civil War (1834), 
Alexandre Herculano would step up to the mark as the great advocate of 
the purity and perfection of constitutional charterism. According to Her-
culano, beyond the justification of “good reason” and of “profound affec-
tions” (having been the “polar star” of all the liberal struggles against the 
absolutists), the Charter and constitutionalism would prove able to simul-
taneously free Portugal “from the despotism of an individual and the still 
more tremendous despotism of the mob”. This provided its “immense mor-
al strength”, guaranteeing the “victory of sensible progress”, the hallmark 
of respect for historical legitimacy and the sovereignty of law and reason 
without which the country would lose its liberty and be plunged into the 
“slavery” of absolutism or the “slavery” of the “adventurers” of “anarchy”.8
The Herculano elegy to constitutional monarchism as the best of all 
political and social worlds for governing the Portuguese rested upon the 
idea of the “middle-ground” – the juste milieu of French Orleanism political 
doctrine. Repudiating absolutism, that had been defeated through revolu-
tion and of which only Catholicism and the monarchic form of the state 
had been saved, classic liberalism also did not wish to be tarnished with 
the heritage of proto-republican Jacobinism. Loyal to a principle of equi-
distance between the two extremes on the political spectrum, charterists 
did not believe that the denial of divine royal sovereignty would inevita-
bly entail handing it over to the revolutionary sovereignty of the masses. 
Its justification was evolution within continuity. The separation of powers 
was an imperative, alongside the consecration of rights and guarantees of 
citizens, laws set down in writing, parliamentary representation and meri-
tocracy; but all of these factors did not mean that the natural progress of 
society required revolution or that civil equality represented a synonym for 
political equality or that all the indicators inevitably pointed to a “demo-
cratic” and “republican” future. Herculano was openly pro-oligarchy and 
elitist. He distinguished between the “legal country” and the “real coun-
try”, perceiving the former as a set of adult, educated and independent 
citizens, who came into politics so as to serve the common good. The cul-
tural and economic progress of the “legal country” that he claimed to be 
8 Herculano 1983, 38-42, 121-122, 165 and 119 (texts from 1838, 1851 and 1867).
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working towards consisted of broadening the scope of citizenship to an ever 
increasing number of co-citizens within a democratisation process under-
taken through top-down reformist measures, without any concessions be-
ing granted to the revolutionary fervour of the masses (Bonifácio 2010, 
15-17). At the heart of this understanding, as its most fundamental law, 
was the Constitutional Charter and at the pinnacle of the regime, as the 
arbiter who reigned without governing, was the king wielding the “power 
of moderation”. The secret to the success of the Constitutional Monarchy 
lay exactly in guaranteeing this tiresome balance between progress and or-
der – a state of liberties immune to any destabilising threat, in the sway of a 
throne on which an enlightened and progressive monarch-citizen sat. 
Ironically, it would prove to be the same Alexandre Herculano, the ro-
mantic theoretician of charterism, who authored one of the first accusa-
tory pieces against Portuguese liberalism. It was his 1856 booklet, written 
originally in French and entitled Mouzinho da Silveira ou la Révolution Por-
tugaise. Within it, Herculano did not attack the foundations of monarchic 
liberalism. What he stated was that Mouzinho da Silveira (the great liberal 
legislator of the Civil War) had been the last (and perhaps the only) giant 
figure of the regime. In his wake, and especially since the Regeneration, 
inaugurated in 1851, when materialist utilitarianism became the prevailing 
philosophy for governance, there had only been “liliputiens politiques” (Pires 
1992, 197-198). This was not the first time the regime had been criticised, 
and far less so the royalty: Vintistas and Setembristas had already made such 
attacks within their leftwing discourse. However, the criticism coming from 
Herculano, deriving from within the system, carried more authority and 
opened the way to a succession of waves of oppositional intellectual dis-
course that would end up bringing down the entire ideological construct of 
monarchic liberalism.
Just a few years after Herculano had set out these ideas, this strand of 
thought began to mature and reach out to a new generation of public read-
ers. Their distance in relation to the “founding fathers” of liberalism did 
not only reflect an age gap; it actually amounted to a profound ideological 
and cultural rupture, heralding the triumph of realism over romanticism 
in aesthetics and of socialism and republicanism over liberalism in politics 
(Pires 1992, 35). This was the generation of the “Coimbrã Question”, the 
Cenáculo and the Casino Conferences – the generation of the 1870s. This 
was the age group that embarked on a fashion for denigrating the Charter 
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monarchy and all the institutional, cultural and social conventions resting 
upon it, thus inscribing onto the Portuguese intellectual agenda a slogan 
of struggle and militancy that may be summarised as “the myth of the un-
finished revolution” (Ramos 2004, 127). The first liberalism conceived of 
the liberal state as a type of super-structure, hierarchical and vote-limited, 
which ruled over a depoliticised society (Ramos 2004, 128).9 To this young-
er generation, in contrast, there was a need to break with this sleeping state 
and advance the civic domain as foreseen in 1820 by broadening the public 
sphere, triply understood as debate, participation and citizenship aware-
ness. Suddenly, what the liberal monarchists had always seen as the virtuous 
nature of the Charter system – that Herculano had always insisted was a 
philosophy, or at least a theory (political and social), and not only a form 
of government10 – began to seem, from the perspective of many, as a defect. 
As from the moment when the constitutional monarchy was judged to be 
flawed, its credibility and public acceptability were breached. Henceforth, a 
discourse took shape that would be, with nuances in political colours, that 
of all intellectual demolishers. In sum, what the 1870s Generation did was 
to establish the role of the professional iconoclast, the intellectual ‘in oppo-
sition’ – not because he/she was subject to political persecution, silenced by 
censorship (which was non-existent), or marginalised by any excessive tra-
ditionalism (which also did not exist) by the parties or the Catholic church, 
but out of a desire for another liberty, different to that given or promised by 
the utilitarian windfall of “material improvements” (Ramos 2004, 126).11 
The writings of Joaquim Pedro Oliveira Martins, in particular Portugal 
Contemporâneo (1881), built up the most complete “historical process of 
Portuguese liberalism” (Valente 1990, 70) and still today remain the main 
9 In another formulation by this author, “radicals stressed the ‘unfinished’ character 
of the liberal state. Liberals had destroyed the old society while neglecting to build a 
new one in its place” (Ramos 2000, 66). This explains the reason the ideas of the 1870s 
Generation could appear as “the culmination, the pinnacle of liberalism”, as a means of 
“mobilising the people for a new life”, breaking with the prevailing anomie and rehears-
ing a regime more able to “organise the life of individuals in a total manner” (Ramos 
2004, 128).
10  See Saraiva 1977, 97-114.
11  Alternatively expressed, as from the 1870s, intellectuals “dreamed of writing 
books to provide liberty with the ideas and strong beliefs without which it would be 
mere permissiveness and egoism” (Ramos 2000, 54).
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source for the critical image on the 19th century.12 It was Oliveira Mar-
tins, within the scope of the 1870s Generation, who did most to systemati-
cally dismantle the structure of chartist liberalism, beginning to expose the 
constitutional monarchy to public exhaustion steadily until 1910. Oliveira 
Martins believed that the Charter monarchy had emerged out of an im-
position on the nation due to war and dictatorship, and was an exotic and 
foreign ideological product.13 Victorious as from 1834, over the course of 
time it had created only “emptiness” and a “grand illusion” in pretending 
to represent a point of equilibrium between the “historical patriotism” of 
an old Catholic Portugal, even if genuinely Portuguese, and the “Jacobin 
democracy” of a possible republic.14 Mixing tradition with revolution, seek-
ing to modernise in some instances and procrastinate in others, the mon-
archy ended up being little more than “a tyranny of abstract formulas”, a 
“doctrinal chimera” seeking to “reconcile the irreconcilable” (Martins 1986 
[1881], I, 26, 76, 343). Hence, in the shadow of the Charter and the liberal 
throne, enlightened citizenship and sustained progress had never been able 
to thrive and prosper. On the contrary, what there had been most of was 
“anarchic debate among all the individualities”, within a general ambience 
of “sentences” and “shots” through to 1851 and, since then, a “clammy” 
and “soft” peace of “practical materialism” and “idolatry of utility” (Mar-
tins 1986 [1881], I, 18, 372, and II, 233-234). “Paying off”, “buying” and 
12 For a summary of the critique of constitutional monarchy by Martins, see Ramos 
2000, and Pina 2003, 37-44. For his biography and works (historical, literary and politi-
cal), see Martins 1999.
13 In 1879, Teófilo Braga had already publishing Soluções Positivas da Política Portu-
guesa, a work inspired by Comte’s positivism and by the Hegelian concept of revolution 
as the dialectic march of History. In the vision of this republican thinker, the consti-
tutional monarchy in effect was a lesser state of cultural obscurantism and political 
impotency, which one day Science and Humanity would be capable of eliminating (see 
Braga 1879).
14 Martins 1986 [1881], I, 12, 80, 366-367, and 1957 [1870], 91, 95-96. As Rui Ra-
mos detailed, Martins came to conceive the constitutional monarchy in the same way 
that Pierre Proudhon viewed the July Monarchy in France – as “a stopgap between the 
ancien régime and democracy” (Ramos 2000, 56). Martins would himself better express 
this in affirming that the liberalism of the Charter elaborated “a new Portugal with 
the former completely and utterly destroyed. Tradition was broken with and the new 
building, standing on revolutions throughout years, did not find its axis apart from in 
political scepticism and economic industrialism” (Martins 1957 [1892], II, 312).
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“corrupting”, the constitutional monarchy would forever stumble through an 
unstable life, digging the “financial ruin of the country” and the “moral ruin 
of society” by seeking to linger on when the regime could no longer be any-
thing more than a fragile “smooth transition” en route to a different future 
– a future of greater socio-political equality, with mass education and civic 
awareness (Martins 1986 [1881], II, 233, and 1957 [1870], 97-98, 101-103). 
Such an extreme criticism was designed as much to demolish as to build. 
Oliveira Martins believed that constitutionalism, given its failure to pro-
duce a new national energy or synthesis, was only worsening the separation 
between the government and the people “to the discredit of the former 
and to the impoverishment of the latter” (Martins 1986 [1881], II, 322). 
Indeed, genuine reform would only prove possible if and when this gap was 
filled by a new civic culture, a new collective ideal, which would drag the 
most inward parts of the country out of their inveterate torpor and resigna-
tion. This would lead to, for example, a stand being taken against Sebastian-
ism, which he approached as a collective form of alienation, incompatible 
with civic participation, entirely against the image of a dynamic and self-
aware organism that he, despite his final sceptical cloak of “defeatedness”, 
never gave up aspiring to (Ramos 2000, 68, 78).
It was also Oliveira Martins, closely followed by José de Arriaga (an 
openly declared republican), who triggered the insulting tone used in refer-
ences to the intellectual capacities of the Braganças, the royal family. If the 
system was in itself inherently corrupt, the sitting monarchs leading and 
reflecting it could only also be subject to severe accusation. In his 1879 
História de Portugal, he portrayed all the 19th century monarchs “as degen-
erate representatives of a decadent society cast adrift” (Matos 2002, 103). 
And rereading Portugal Contemporâneo, or Oitenta Anos de Constituciona-
lismo Outorgado (a radical pamphlet by Arriaga published in 1905), it is 
hard not to be shocked by the abundance of negative adjectives deployed. 
Among many other such terms, and in keeping with the chronological or-
der of the century’s monarchs, D. João VI was “grotesque” and “imbecile”, 
D. Pedro IV “adventurer” and “vain”, D. Miguel “hallucinating” and “fa-
natical”, D. Maria “despotic” and “viperous”, D. Pedro V “misanthropic” 
and “naive”, D. Luís “extravagant” and “frivolous”, and D. Carlos “uncon-
scious” and “licentious”.15
15 See Sardica 2009, 273.
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Between Oliveira Martins, the first in a line of major critics of the mon-
archy, with his complex profile of a “disappointed radical” (Ramos 2000, 
82), and Alexandre Herculano, the last of its defenders, not many years 
stood distant. However, they were separated by a highly significant ide-
ological break: “Herculano recognised that the country was distant and 
had strayed far from its natural course, but while he perceived the liberal 
project as a response to the problem, Martins perceived it as another step 
forward into collective decadence.” (Pina 2003, 38)16
This rupture proved lasting and became a distinctive factor identifying 
all men of ideas, letters and cultures participating in the Portuguese public 
sphere in the last quarter of the 19th century. And while Martins accused 
the Charter monarchy of being an impossibility, given its roots led to the 
false assumptions of classical liberalism, the republicans would later declare 
that liberalism was, in effect and within the scope of the royal throne, both 
incomplete and imperfect and only susceptible to improvement on the day 
there were no more kings, with Portugal then undergoing transformation 
with a new aurora of genuine democracy. In this way, even with their dif-
ferent purposes and positioning, the destructive effects of criticism of the 
monarchy attained the same ends.17 
The analysis by Oliveira Martins of monarchic liberalism became ortho-
doxy for the left by the end of the century and its popularisation was the 
glue bonding all campaigns against the royalty. In 1899, Augusto Fuschini 
referred to the intrinsic equivocation of the system itself, “considering the 
different and antonymous sovereignty of the two sovereigns whose har-
mony it was sought to establish by contract [in the Charter]” (Fuschini 
1899, 133). Given it was a “transaction formula”, the Fuschini prognosis 
was that the existing monarchy, liberal in form but undemocratic in con-
16 As the author explains, “Oliveira Martins completely destroyed the liberal vision 
of which Herculano had been the main exponent (…) The liberalism that, for the 
generation of Herculano, provided the victory of good against evil, to Martins proved 
negative from the national point of view” (Pina 2003, 37-38).
17 See Pina 2003, 152: “Martins, on the one hand, and the republicans, on the other, 
performed the role of true iconoclasts, overturning, without any reservations, Hercu-
lano’s vision. The liberal regime consisted, to Martins, of a political and economic 
system to be overcome. To the republicans, the monarchy should be abolished and the 
parliamentary regime and all of society broadly democratised. As from this moment, 
the debate took on a completely new dynamism”.
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tent, could only ever lose for the simple reason that “when the majority of 
citizens preferred a Republic, the rights of the monarchy would disappear due 
to this fact”, causing the inevitable dilution of the half-way monarchy in the 
face of full popular sovereignty (Fuschini 1899, 134, 421-422). This was also 
the position taken by José de Arriaga in 1905 amidst a varied range of insults 
about the evils of the Braganças, whose reign symbolised “a continued and 
uninterrupted acquiescence before the enemies of liberty”, and inflammatory 
demands that the natural future could not remain “inside the monarchy” 
(Arriaga 1905, 7, 11, 34). In 1906, it would be the turn of Alfredo Pimenta to 
declare that in the time of “positive science”, to which progress had opened 
the door, only due to “mental impotence” could the people “tolerate kings”. 
The simple existence of the liberal monarchy rested upon a “contradiction-
ability” (sic): the kings could only be absolutist figures; to be liberal they had to 
“come from the people” and out of the people could never come a monarchy 
(Pimenta 1906, 7, 38, 58, 62). In 1911, already after 5th October 1910 (the 
date of the declaration of the Republic in Portugal), Arriaga would return to 
the cause in reaching his conclusion on the 19th century: “The proclamation 
of the Republic was the last word in the persistent struggle throughout almost 
a century of monarchy, or government by the kings, against democracy, or 
government of the nation by the nation. This struggle encapsulates[ed] the 
entire history of Portuguese constitutionalism.” For Arriaga, the conflict be-
tween the two principles, and above all the undermining of the throne in its 
later years before a nation that “was advancing to the future, desiring a new 
life”, was that which explained the “democratic revolution” of October 5, 
“fatally” carried out “under the republican flag” (Arriaga 1911, 11-12, 238).
In its longest extent, amassing decades, it was this dismantling of the con-
stitutional monarchy, embarked on as from the 1870s (if not before), which 
nurtured the mental foundations of the Portuguese intelligentsia, hindering 
and stifling the capacity of the regime to defend itself in the daily agitation, 
crisis and political struggle that afflicted the years running up to 1910.
“Vanquished in Life”: pessimism, apocalypse and 
neurosis
Against this background of intellectual dissidence, the final years of the 
monarchy were confused and difficult times. From the relative prosperity of 
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the Regeneration era, the country entered into a period of economic crisis, 
social instability and political fragmentation. In an increasingly competitive 
world, with radical and accelerated international change, with the arrival of 
the second industrial revolution and the phenomena of urbanisation, ter-
tiarisation and the massification of societies that heralded the 20th century, 
it became clear that the 19th century level of Portuguese development and 
progress would not overcome the extent of backwardness and poverty. At 
the turn of the century, Portugal remained overwhelmingly poor, rural and 
illiterate, with this latter condition experienced by 74.5% of the Portuguese 
population in 1900.18 Due to the vicious circle that bounded cultural and 
educational backwardness to social backwardness in turn driving a poor 
economic performance, it had not proven easy to counter the country’s 
peripheral location and underdevelopment that led to its lowly position (al-
ready by this stage) in the European hierarchical rankings. Governing the 
country proved a similarly difficult task. Even on a smaller scale than the 
European average, the rural exodus, urban growth, industrialisation and 
the proletarianization of commerce and services generated new dynamics 
that was reflected in a general climate of agitation and instability. Pressure 
from below, wielded audibly by labour and the petty bourgeoisie making 
up the urban plebe, combined with pressure from above, with the political 
and social elites also talking of crisis and renewal to the extent that they 
experienced the decline in the aristocratic and bourgeois status quo forged 
in the shadow of Fontism and the peaceful years during the reign of D. Luís.
All the macroeconomic indicators identifying Portuguese backwardness 
in relation to a Europe experiencing significant progress in conjunction 
with all the social restrictions that impacted on the daily life of the era had 
an important relationship with the prevailing mentality and intellectual 
ambience. In just a few years after the biennial combining both the British 
Ultimatum and national bankruptcy, 1890-1892, the country slumped into 
one huge community of “vanquished in life”, cultivating decadence as a 
type of cultural spleen and doubting the possibility of finding identities and 
directions able to supply the energy needed for the challenges to be faced. 
Hence, the era was replete with theories of crisis and decadence across 
18 As the intellectuals would regret, the country had “four million of illiterate citi-
zens out of five million inhabitants”, or “in the cities 75, and in the villages 90 per cent 
of illiterate people” (Ortigão 1916, 20, and Almeida 1912, 12).
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both material and moral dimensions. Cursing the nation and “bemoaning” 
the Portuguese became common threads in intellectual discourse, eliciting 
and strengthening feelings of scepticism and doubt that crowded across the 
pages of literature, essays, pamphlets and journalism. As a consequence 
of these crises, these diagnoses took a generalised hold of public opinion 
perceptions, creating a mental framework highly favourable to the 5th Oc-
tober 1910 declaration of a republic.
As an expression of fin de siècle Portuguese decadency, the term “van-
quished” was very much a symptom of the awareness intellectuals held of 
the difficult world around them. Social Darwinism, industrial competition, 
the struggle for empires in Africa – everything convinced them, and made 
them declare publicly, that Portugal was surrounded by threats and was 
shorn of resources, solutions or the collective will that might be able to 
serve as a suitable antidote. More specifically, “vanquished” was the aes-
thetic and cultural expression of the 1890s Generation,19 which joined 
people from two intellectual backgrounds. Firstly, there was a new wave of 
young persons stemming from an “intellectual proletariat” (Ramos 2001, 
263) produced by the expansion in the numbers attending university that 
first emerged out of the anger expressed at the patriotic public meetings 
called in the wake of the British Ultimatum. Humiliation by Britain stirred 
their ideas in the same way that twenty years earlier the 1870s Genera-
tion had awoken to the sounds of revolution in Spain or the Commune in 
Paris. Hence, the 1890s Generation was also the continuation and the fruit 
of its predecessor.20 At a distance of two decades, those who had begun 
by believing that a cultural and mental revolution was possible were now 
cursing their failure, strengthening the conviction that the problems fac-
19 On the 1890s Generation, see Real 2001.
20 The Portuguese “vanquished in life” took their inspiration from a Parisian social 
movement out of which they indeed drew their name: “battus de la vie”. Throughout 
a year between the summer of 1888 and May 1889, they were a “dining” group with 
its official members: Eça de Queirós, Oliveira Martins, Ramalho Ortigão, Guerra Jun-
queiro, António Cândido, the Count of Sabugosa, Bernardo Arnoso, Carlos Mayer, 
Luís de Soveral and Carlos Lobo d’Ávila. At the beginning, they were far from giving 
over to defeatism and aspired to political careers with a great deal of hope placed on the 
ascension of D. Carlos to the throne (in 1889). However, they ended up not achieving 
their aims and dispersed in disillusionment, thereby spreading the expression – “van-
quished in life” – that took root as a means of designating the general pessimism that 
swept Portugal in the following years (see Mónica 2010, 175-190). 
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ing the country were profound and that the constitutional system – with 
all the plans in the 1880s for a “new monarchical life” having failed – was 
definitively obsolete and unable to provide solutions.
The “vanquished” had by self-definition to be pessimistic, prone to per-
ceiving catastrophe and suffering. Indeed, pessimism, apocalypse and neu-
rosis were the mental coordinates for the intelligentsia from 1890 to 1910. 
Just a few weeks before committing suicide,21 Antero de Quental confided 
to Alberto Osório de Castro: “Portugal is a eunuch country, which only 
lives an inferior life out of the vileness of material interests and out of the 
coward intrigue that serves to process these interests” (Viçoso 2002, 126). 
This was in 1890, at the beginning of the reign of D. Carlos, in the hang-
over of shame following the British Ultimatum and shortly before the first 
attempted republican revolution that would break out in Oporto in Janu-
ary 1891. This was the year of Finis Patriae, by Guerra Junqueiro, a doleful 
satire on the “mediocrity” of the monarchy – “without soul, with mud in its 
stead: an inversion of two letters, a slight lapse” that the Republic would 
one day amend (Pires 1992, 20).22 1891 was also the year when Oliveira 
Martins praised the virtues of pessimism: 
With this label one mocks those who dare analyse, judge and state 
with clarity the inevitable dangers of the future. One terms them bitter 
persons, with bad livers, bothersome creatures, that come to interrupt 
the cycle of society. One day, one hears of a doubling of the deceased 
and it was always the pessimists who had the courage and notably 
knew how to deal with the crisis (Martins 1957 [1891], II, 237). 
21 The “vanquished” and the turn of the century displayed a peak in suicides among 
members of high society which appear to be extreme expressions of boredom and list-
lessness, of quitting and radical rupture with a society deemed beyond saving. Such 
cases include Soares dos Reis (1889), Camilo Castelo Branco, Júlio César Machado 
(1890), Silva Porto (1890), Antero de Quental (1891), Mouzinho de Albuquerque 
(1902), Trindade Coelho (1908) and, already during the Republic, Manuel Laranjeira 
(1912), not to mention Mário de Sá-Carneiro and Florbela Espanca of the Orpheu 
Generation. The morbidity of the Portuguese intellectual led the Spaniard Miguel de 
Unamuno to declare Portugal was “a country of suicides” (see Ramos 2001, 275, and 
Viçoso 2002, 131).
22 “Soul” is the English translation of the Portuguese Word “alma”, as “mud” is the 
translation of “lama”. The “inversion of two letters” Guerra Junqueiro called for was 
thus destined to replace “lama” by “alma” (“mud” for “soul”).
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Pessimism appeared to intellectuals as a type of reserve of lucidity in a 
world that was falling apart, as a symptom of intelligence and wisdom even 
if not endowed with the power to save the monarchy. In 1892, Oliveira 
Martins posited that were republicanism to win in Spain “it would be a fact 
in Portugal on the following day”, with the consequent “political unifica-
tion of the Peninsula” and the dilution of nationality in an Iberian repub-
lican federalism (Martins 1957 [1892], II, 318). In 1894 (the year of his 
death), in the introduction to the 3rd edition of Portugal Contemporâneo, 
the tone became still harsher. The “financial crisis”, “political disorder” and 
“social anarchy” were the results of a people “abnormally educated for con-
temporary life” and without “the strength and guile to amend themselves”. 
Furthermore, without the intellectual, moral and economic resources to 
foster labour and civic pride and reducing imports and indebtedness, it was 
doubtful whether Portugal could survive “as autonomous people within 
strictly Portuguese borders” (Martins 1986 [1894], 9-16).
In the same year, 1894, another author, Teixeira Bastos, became the 
spokesperson for a catastrophic atmosphere of pessimism and degenera-
tion. “The further we advance towards the 20th century” – he stated – 
the further “the dark clouds gather over us and threaten to break into 
a formidable storm bringing fear, disquiet and terror” (Bastos 1894, IX). 
Outside the country, the world was dealing with the challenges of swift 
progress, of a new globalised imperialism, of heightened and bellicose com-
petition between the great powers alongside the emergence of mass de-
mocracy. Peripheral due to its geographic location and weak given its scale 
and resources, Portugal witnessed this “era of transition, of effervescence, 
of social ferment” with concern, presenting in lamentable contrast the “dis-
appointing spectacle” of a nation and a state “convulsing in ruins” (Bastos 
1894, XXIV, 472). In 1896, it would be J. A. da Silva Cordeiro, in a long 
study on “the crisis in its moral aspects”, observing the “stagnation of col-
lective life”, which had plunged the country into a pure “pool of Epicurean-
ism”, with “an inherent dose of apathetic egoism, cold or malevolent” that 
was “perhaps the gravest symptom of our status” (Cordeiro 1896, 59-60, 
142). Portugal had only the “indifferent”, “life-stoppers” and “charlatans” 
and of this mass one would not be able to extract a future (Cordeiro 1896, 
138). In 1899, Augusto Fuschini listed as “our current afflictions” “the in-
tellectual slaughter in science, art and literature, the flagging of labour and 
production, the lack of confidence in the honest and intelligent action of 
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the State”, to desperately conclude: “rather we tend to open up onto us an 
immense abysm into which may disappear the autonomy of a people and, 
perhaps, the liberty of its citizens” (Fuschini 1899, VIII, 159). 
Beyond being deep and quantifiable in economic and social terms, the 
crisis fundamentally resulted from the destruction of “moral certainties” and 
the lack of the energy and civil education that might be able to regenerate 
it (Ramos 2001, 275). Nothing would be resolved without the Portuguese 
reinventing themselves. However, for such a reinvention to happen, this re-
quired new political leaders and a new national identity that the constitu-
tional monarchy had not proven able to supply. In September 1910, just days 
before the fall of the crown, Raul Brandão summarised the existential drama 
of his generation: “The old life had roots, perhaps the future will again restore 
them. Our epoch is horrible – because we no longer believe and we still do 
not believe. The past has disappeared, of the future not even guidelines exist. 
And here we are, roofless, among the ruins, awaiting…” (Viçoso 2002, 124).
In the gallery of critics oscillating between the most neurotically dispir-
ited tones and the most sarcastic irony, we may line up many of the intellec-
tual names of the time – from Manuel Laranjeira to António Nobre, from 
Eça de Queirós to Ramalho Ortigão, from Eugénio de Castro to Fialho de 
Almeida. In different registers, the entire fin de siècle literature contributed 
towards deepening the shadows that the intellectual cast over the national 
destiny. Eça de Queirós is one particular example of the decadent satiri-
cal literature, revealing sharp political criticism of the vices of the monar-
chy and 19th century society in many of his romances. The Constitutional 
Charter is one of the favoured targets of As Farpas, and O Conde de Abra-
nhos a terrible libel on the “scholastic” education (the notebooks) and the 
political corruption (the cliques) underlying the machine of constitutional-
ism.23 As regards his masterpiece, Os Maias, written in 1888, the book can 
be read as if from Caetano da Maia to Afonso da Maia and from Afonso da 
Maia to Carlos da Maia, the decadence of a family represented the deca-
dence of the nation under the 1826 Constitutional Charter.24 
The 1890s Generation had its very own aesthetics based upon which 
the poetry and prose produced were “political”,25 in the sense of being mili-
23 See Pires 1992, 198-199.
24 See Pires 1992, 203-205.
25 On the “political novels” of the late 19th century, see Pires 1992, 217-236.
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tantly anti-monarchical and apologetic of new organisational ideas for the 
national community. These aesthetics, in reality a vision upon the world, 
incorporated both symbolism and naturalism, two literary fashions imported 
from Paris that involved the expression of tedium, nihilism, degeneracy and 
scepticism. Symbolists and naturalists jointly expressed their “disenchant-
ment with the bourgeois world” and the “belief that European society was 
decadent” (Viçoso 2002, 118, and Ramos 2001, 263), seeking, without ever 
attaining, “new roots” to overcome “the conscience of national self-flagel-
lation” (Matos 2002, 113).26 It is certainly also true that the “vanquished” 
and their decadence was not purely nihilistic, since they continued to take 
as their reference the idea of the 1870s Generation of completing liberalism 
through extending voting rights to Portuguese citizens and boosting civic 
awareness, building a society governed by new certainties and where equal-
ity, justice, democracy and enlightenment prevailed. Consequently, the 
1890s Generation wanted to serve as “re-Portuguesefiers”, hoping that the 
national investment in patriotic roots would nurture the collective resur-
rection that they longed for (Viçoso 2002, 127). 27 The demands of writers 
and intellectuals made them enter a love-hate relationship with Portugal 
that induced a radical rupture with the status quo of constitutional monar-
chy. The Portugal that they had did not serve the task and they would only 
gain another Portugal by changing – through reform or revolution – the 
system that governed them. 
From the impossible monarchy to the inevitable 
Republic
The entire iconoclastic and catastrophic tone of those who shaped in-
tellectual opinions in Portugal necessarily impacted and contaminated the 
policies and achievements of the period. As from the 1870s Generation, 
when irreverence and radicalism began penetrating Portuguese cultural 
26 Decadentism gained an enormous boost with the success of António Nobre and 
his book of poems Só, in 1892, which expressed the “existential miserability” of the 
author, imbibed with a certain “nationalist sense of yearning” (see Viçoso 2002, 128).
27 For continuity between the end of the monarchy and the First Republic in the 
reinvention of the Portuguese nation, see Ramos 2001, 499 and after.
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discourse and especially after the two-year period of crisis in 1890-1892, 
making politics and leading the Portuguese state and nation became an 
increasingly difficult and uncertain task. The government simply was not 
in charge of a calm country set in its routines. The rotational balance that 
turned into a closed circuit among the elites had to confront the critics and 
opponents that generated noise with the books they published, the news-
papers they wrote, the opposition thrown up against the system, whether 
from within or, and on a steadily rising basis, beyond, in guilds, associations, 
Masonic lodges and street rallies. Buffeted by the economic downturn, by 
social instability and by the iconoclastic stance taken by intellectuals, the 
mechanisms on which the constitutional viability of the Charter rested 
came to be perceived as restrictive and out of alignment with the demands 
for reforms, the socioeconomic challenges and the dynamics driving the 
democratisation and massification of politics coming from many sectors of 
society. 
Hence, over the medium term, the more radical republican alternative 
was first contemplated and then attributed credibility. In the field, the pes-
simism that permeated many monarchic sectors of society could not con-
trast more sharply with the enthusiasm shining out of republican propagan-
da. The republicans always saw crisis as more of an opportunity for action 
rather than a cause for paralysing neuroses. Between 1890 and 1910, while 
some monarchist supporters strove towards finding a “new life” restoring 
the country to the status quo prior to the body blows of the British Ultima-
tum and bankruptcy between 1890 and 1892, the republicans termed this 
effort to be lacking and in vain, capitalising on the image that only they 
would be able to, as could already be read in the lyrics of A Portuguesa writ-
ten in 1890 (the future republican anthem by Henrique Lopes de Mendon-
ça and Alfredo Keil), “again raise the splendour of Portugal”. Consequently, 
the republicans proved able, from amongst the vast and diversified wave of 
criticism targeting the monarchy, to most effectively instrumentalize deca-
dentism and crisis and turn events to their own advantage. 
The intellectual strand that regretted the decline of Portugal and 
harked to a new culture that would raise the awareness and the patriotic 
spirit of the entire nation found in republicanism the ideal response. More 
than just a simple proposal for regime change, republicanism was a “global 
view”, a “demopedia”, a broad reaching cultural movement that would re-
verse the national backwardness that afflicted Portugal and the Portuguese 
250
(Catroga 1991, 107, 191, 377, 451). Within the prevailing mental frame-
work of the “vanquished”, republicanism stood out as an optimistic and 
energetic counterbalance – and this made all the difference in endowing it 
with a power of attraction that no monarchic discourse, however reformist 
it might prove, could ever aspire to have. The term “republicanisation” is 
erroneously but commonly reduced to the new members joining the Por-
tuguese Republican Party (PRP) without any previous political allegiances. 
In truth, republicanisation was very often a simple sentimental signing up 
to the optimism that emanated around the republican “idea”. The PRP 
had few political militants even while republicanism, as an organic way of 
protesting and hoping, attracted ever larger numbers of sympathisers in 
broader terms. That is the reason Oliveira Martins once summarised Por-
tuguese republicanism as “completely negative, as the total lack of hope in 
any better future with the monarchy” (Martins 1957 [1892], II, 314).
For the moderate theoreticians supporting the cause, replacing a heredi-
tary head of state by an elected leader would prove meaningless were the 
substance of this new regime not extended to include an awoken, educated 
and mobilised nation. The question for the radical republicans, who ended 
up in charge of the party in the final years of the monarchy, was that only 
political victory and the declaration of a new regime would open the doors to 
re-founding Portugal and re-educating the Portuguese as called for in intel-
lectual thinking. A new culture required political power to be seized, as only 
in this way could “the state apparatus serve as an instrument and the political 
community as a framework” (Ramos 2001, 287), with the objective of order-
ing and rehearsing the global transformations that would see off the crisis and 
the pessimism and lead Portugal into the 20th century. The 5th October 1910 
declaration was simply the materialisation of this rationale.
The date of the republican political victory still lay far in the distance 
when republicanism began gaining in credibility and attracting loyal sup-
port to the “cause”. This was achieved through taking advantage of the fact 
that general public opinion and the media climate around kings D. Carlos 
and D. Manuel II were, always marked by an atmosphere and a rhetoric 
characterised by mistrust and criticism when not outright hostility and in-
sults. As Basílio Teles noted in 1905, “all the microcosm of constitutional-
ism, artificial, ignorant, verbose, ridiculous” was “exposed to the merciless 
analysis of all who, in the public space, formed opinions” (Teles 1905, 47). 
Against the last two kings of Portugal, there was always “a firm intention 
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of attack”, “a general assault of low prose”, and a tone of “terrible criticism 
for a people who neither knew how to read nor to discern”, made up of 
“ironies, sarcasms and bloody charges” (Martins 1926, preface, 47-48). This 
lament by Rocha Martins is corroborated by another monarchist, Eduardo 
Schwalbach, who would record the end of the regime as a time when the 
mental fashion was “loaded with demolition, out of line with the idea of 
reconstruction”, “an irresponsible lack of discipline” and “the vilification of 
reputation” (Schwalbach 1944, 213-214). What must be noted is that such 
insulting iconoclastic and rhetorical discourse came not only from repub-
licans but also from monarchists. In the wake of 1890, due to the British 
Ultimatum crisis, growing divisions between parties and the undermining 
of institutional credibility meant D. Carlos and D. Manuel II were never 
afforded shelter. Both lived exposed to constant political criticism. When 
revolutionary cries took the streets against D. Manuel, in October 1910, 
the Monarchy simply had no possible means of defence. Whoever was not 
actually taking a stand against royalty was not prepared to lift a finger in 
support of it; hence the republican triumph – althronghalmost accidental 
and highly improvised – was, given the circumstances, inevitable. 
In 1909, Tomás de Mello Breyner (Count of Mafra), a confident of the 
Palace, reproduced a known regret of D. Carlos in noting how “in Portugal, 
there were no monarchists” (Breyner 2004, 302). What he meant by this 
was that the country no longer had monarchists experiencing any real pas-
sion for the dynasty. After years and years and page after page of literature, 
essay and journalistic output attacking the throne and the institutional 
and cultural conventions surrounding the monarchy, deference towards 
the throne had disappeared and there were now only a handful prepared 
and actually able to defend the old system of the Charter in intellectual 
terms. Therefore, it was at this level that the need and the hopes for change 
took effect, providing the grounds for the implementation of republicanism 
within the scope of the political regime inaugurated on 5th October 1910.
The “demolishers of liberalism” and the nostalgia 
for the power of ideas
In 1916, in an article written for a small artistic, literary and social 
monthly – the magazine Atlântica – Jaime de Magalhães Lima recalled with 
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nostalgia and admiration a gallery of heroes from the arts and letters, from 
around the turn of the century, whom he termed the “demolishers of liber-
alism”. As a group, they had been the 
Primordial members of the court that came and judged us and 
dissolved bourgeois liberalism and its numerous and splendid cor-
tege, generated and formed in the revolutions that we began at the 
beginning of the second quarter of the 19th century (Lima 1916, 
1092). 
With “tenacity, method, knowledge of the cause, adding ability and 
warm public applause” they had overseen “the demolition of the liberal 
building in which we had taken shelter and which our grandparents had 
found solid and noble, built for the eternity of times and the happiness of 
men” (Lima 1916, 1092). 
Their labours were to be admired: 
It was they who, whether laughing, assaulting or simply analysing 
and commenting, reduced to dust the ostentatiousness of that archi-
tecture of compromises, acquiescence, principled means, excellent 
intentions, little courage and scarce logic (Lima 1916, 1092). 
However, the “demolishers of liberalism”, continued Magalhães Lima, 
did not see their “irons” and “reactives” only as instruments of dissolution. 
All such destruction was educational towards the “reconstruction” – a pro-
cess imagined by them as 
A radical purification, the sweeping away of uselessness, break-
ing free of all the parasitism, amputating or correcting deformity, 
purging all rottenness (…) [since] whoever destroys does so because 
they seek something better or different to that which they see (Lima 
1916, 1096-1097).
The homage of Jaime de Magalhães Lima to the “demolishers of liber-
alism” represents the best summary of the originality and importance of 
the combative agenda that the intelligentsia had self-imposed upon their 
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discourse. The decades subsequent to the first demonstrations of the 1870s 
Generation and the political triumph of the republican “idea” make up one 
of the most fertile eras in Portuguese literary, artistic and cultural life. At its 
core and leading the way were the intellectuals, then perceived as enlight-
ened citizens, engaged in reading, reflection, discussion, controversy and 
debate and with a particular vocation for promoting ideas and enlivening 
the consumption of culture (books, pamphlets, newspapers, performances). 
They considered they were engaged in a mission of transformative political 
action but which neither began nor ended in this field. Their world was 
one of culture, broadly understood as the public sphere, sociable networks 
and community of discourse. From the lofty position of their mental and 
rational capacities, the baggage of their learning and their capacity for di-
agnosing what was wrong in the lives of their fellow citizens, they addressed 
a large public, writing and debating issues of common interest. This was a 
cohesive group in the professional sense of the term as it held a strong iden-
tity. While gathering a large sweep of ideological diversity within its extent, 
frequently plunging into redundant and bitter disputes, they were sincerely 
convinced that they had something to say and were urged to speak out due 
to Portugal’s lack of direction and the period of crisis. They did not only 
want to reflect society but to lead and guide its transformation. To this end, 
they set about systematically dismantling the foundations of constitutional 
monarchy, opening the way – many remaining unaware, some consciously 
and directly – to the political changeover that took place in October 1910. 
Thus, more than discussing the forms of regime, intellectuals conceived of 
contents; but it was indeed this discussion as to content that so greatly eased 
the way to the alteration in form in 1910.
The Portuguese intellectual circle of this period was a group made up 
of various schools in their main deriving from within the monarchical 
political-social system against which they would turn. Certainly, it was 
massification that enabled men of learning and thinking to emerge from 
beyond the scope of the monarchy. Nevertheless, the latter, republican 
(and anarchist) intellectuals, did not represent the entire intellectual 
scope nor did they begin alone the iconoclastic and radical discourse on 
ways of living and thinking. The history of republican ideological dis-
course is therefore not one of a philosophical invention but rather more 
of a political appropriation of a feeling of dissidence, criticism of an im-
perfect liberty and the incomplete citizenship that was born within the 
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monarchy and which was the heritage of many beyond the actual members 
of the Portuguese Republican Party. 
Despite the republican victory in 1910 – or perhaps because of it, if we 
take into consideration that the political practices of the republican regime 
were very commonly limited when compared to the reformist generosity of 
the republican “idea” – they did fail. They neither yanked the country out 
of its backwardness nor did they radically re-educate national citizens, pro-
viding solutions for the civic anomie or firmly establishing full democracy. 
When the “golden age” of Portuguese intellectuals ended, towards the end 
of the 1920s, with the censorship of the Salazarist regime already on the ho-
rizon, António Sérgio, among others, continued to maintain that the Por-
tuguese problem was primarily civic and cultural, and only afterwards, and 
as a result, social, political and economic.28 After decades spent attempting 
to bring about a modernising process, the intellectuals continued to face 
the perspective of a postponed Portugal, “extemporaneous to its history” 
and marginalised of its European reality (Leone 2005, 486). 
This diagnosis should not however be allowed to obscure one reality. 
Even if they did not change the country, the intellectuals of the late 19th 
and early 20th centuries constituted the most active, richest and fertile 
community of reflection in the entire history of contemporary Portuguese 
culture and thinking. Inaugurated with the 1870s Generation, this flame 
was not snuffed out in 1910 but only after 1926. The entire First Republic 
(1910-1926) was highly rich in putting forward new philosophies, aesthet-
ics, literatures and ideas, as is visible in Renascença Portuguesa (Portuguese 
Renaissance), Integralismo Lusitano (Lusitanian Integralism), Orpheu, mo-
dermism, futurism or the Seara Nova magazine. In radical contrast, after 
1926 and throughout almost half a century, intellectual life did not disap-
pear but the imposition of censorship bore down with the resulting senti-
ment – fear, which kills all mental vitality and discourages all debate of 
ideas (Leone 2005, 16). 
What is interesting to note, as a final comment on the continuity be-
tween the prevailing mental climate before and after 1910, is that the anti-
monarchy iconoclasts represent only the first manifestation of the tense, 
critical and dissident cultural relationship that public intellectuals (philo-
sophers, academics, writers, journalists, artists, etcetera) have held with the 
28 See Leone 2005, 70-71.
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political forms and regimes of contemporary Portugal. Whether 19th cen-
tury liberalism, through to 1910, or republicanism between 1910 and 1926, 
as well as, for a plethora of reasons, the Salazarist authoritarianism of the 
Estado Novo, all have been perceived as imperfect and insufficient political 
frameworks and deemed lacking by all intellectual outputs demanding new 
ways of reorganising the collective existence of the Portuguese, based upon 
a self-aware and broadened citizenship. Perhaps for exactly this reason, we 
can and should conclude public intellectuals are still necessary in Portugal.
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José Miguel Sardica
INTELLECTUALS AND THE SALAZAR ERA
WERE THERE INTELLECTUALS UNDER THE 
ESTADO NOVO?
ana Paula rias
In a country as destitute as ours, we have no right to lose
a single artist worthy of the name. Therefore, it is our duty 
to protect men of talent, even if they are enemies of the regime!
(Salazar)
I will begin by sharing some of the doubts and dilemmas that have arisen 
since I decided to write about intellectuals in the Salazar era. My first step 
was to research what had already been published on the subject, only to be 
met with silence, which, paradoxically, turned out to be quite enlightening. 
To clarify the point, I could not find one single entry, chapter or study on 
Portuguese intellectuals during the long Estado Novo dictatorship in the ex-
tant bibliography on the period. Studies that do exist refer us to the field of 
culture and to the figures of the writer, the playwright and the philosopher, 
who are not so distant from the intellectual in view of their traditionally 
interventionist role via their deployment of words. 
Franco Nogueira, Salazar’s minister and biographer, drew up the fol-
lowing list of those who “are of great importance in Portuguese political 
and cultural life”: Ramada Curto, Júlio Dantas, Augusto de Castro, Al-
fredo Cortês, Vasco de Mendonça Alves, Hernâni Cidade, Jaime Cortesão, 
Armando Cortesão, Virgínia Rau and Alfredo Pimenta. He then went 
on to refer to the rupture in literary circles led by the group Presença and 
linked the Presencistas to a defence of “art for art’s sake”.1 He then defined 
the Second World War as the point in time when a new art movement 
1 Among the presencistas of particular importance were Branquinho da Fonseca, 
João Gaspar Simões, José Régio, António de Navarro, Edmundo de Bettencourt, Al-
berto de Serpa, Miguel Torga and Adolfo Casais Monteiro. (See História de Portugal 
1981, 438)
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appeared which he termed social realism or neo-realism2 and, by way of a 
summary, labelled the work of both the Presencistas and the neo-realists as 
“committed literature”. Franco Nogueira alluded to the importance of the 
numerous magazines published in the 1950s and, regarding this decade, 
he focused particularly on works by well-known figures such as Vitorino 
Nemésio, Cardoso Pires, Eugénio de Andrade, António Gedeão, António 
Couto Viana, Jorge de Sena and Pedro Homem de Melo. Amongst the 
philosophers he listed Santana Dionísio, António José Saraiva and Delfim 
Santos. Concluding this brief account, he furthermore referred to the in-
tervention of Ester de Lemos, Maria Lamas, Natália Correia, Agustina and 
Sofia de Melo Breyner Andresen. Additionally, Urbano Tavares Rodrigues 
was mentioned as an example of socially-engaged literature. 
Noticeably, Franco Nogueira listed a range of figures that, for the most 
part, were deemed opponents of the regime even while never using the 
term “intellectual”. 
And hence the question remains: how are we to define “intellectual” 
within the Estado Novo context?3 When attempting to answer this ques-
tion, I ran into two types of methodological obstacles. The following ques-
tions arose: What definition should be used and how might one assess the 
kind and degree of influence that allows one to classify this or that in-
dividual as deserving the name of intellectual? How should one measure 
the relevance of intervention in public life and the level of dissemination 
of ideas when censorship and repression were ubiquitous? What was the 
target audience of Portuguese intellectuals? How many people were con-
quered by the power of the word, image or music?
On the other hand, we have to keep in mind that it must have been 
very difficult to encourage the debate of ideas in a country with extremely 
high illiteracy rates. This seems to lead to only one conclusion: debate took 
place preferably in a closed circuit, with every actor and recipient belong-
ing to rather small national elites. Moreover, these elites were, in turn, 
2 Most representative of this neo-realist group were Fernando Namora, Carlos de 
Oliveira, Alves Redol, Manuel da Fonseca, Soeiro Pereira Gomes and Carlos Sorome-
nho (ibid. 445-447).
3 Throughout this text the expression Estado Novo coincides strictly with the Sala-
zar dictatorship and does not cover the later phase of the regime, that is, this analysis 
does not cover the period when Marcello Caetano headed the regime. 
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severed from the major international circuits at least until the 1950s.4 This 
also holds true for the full range of other intellectual activities. We may also 
assess the influence of certain individuals via an analysis of critical texts. 
We must bear in mind, however, that in a provincial country, which was 
intentionally closed to the outside world, there are very few opportunities 
for the existence of qualified critical voices.
The range and number of newspapers and magazines5 as well as holding 
conferences and gallery openings6 are other kinds of indicators for assessing 
levels of cultural dynamism, and these are evidence of the stunted develop-
ment then prevalent in Portugal. This may be perceived even as early as 
the regime’s first decade, when a clear intention to mobilize people, form 
groups, gain support and captivate audiences is palpable. 
In some ways, I felt as if I were facing a paradox. The intellectual is, by 
definition, somebody who goes against the grain, someone who instructs 
against authority, who breaks the rules and whose intervention is a result of 
the rhythm of the reflections in which s/he is engaged and of the stimulus 
received from beyond. The intellectual is neither dependent on a plan nor 
does s/he have to promote an ideology. 
Meanwhile, the Salazar regime was, by definition, authoritarian, anti-
liberal and anti-democratic. It denied the existence of the citizen and re-
placed him/her with the concept of the organic subject, who was an inte-
gral part of a society structured around family, as a fundamental cell and 
the cornerstone of an edifice that extended into the political arena and was 
completed by the parish and the municipality. Therefore, this new society 
4 Consider, for example, Nuno Teotónio Pereira’s speech in 1948, during the I Con-
gress of Portuguese Architects, on the much proclaimed influence of Mallet Stevens 
and Corbusier whose work was, in fact, totally unknown, insofar as not even the jour-
nals approaching such trends reached Portugal. 
5 Decree 28 589, of 14.5.1936, drastically limited the appearance of new titles, 
which were dependent on a test. Authorization was not given “To found newspapers 
unless heading them” were “people of recognized intellectual and moral standing, and 
unless the respective company” demonstrated that “it possessed the financial means 
required”. In addition to this interference, another important obstacle was also created 
by the State as it forbade financing by advertising in publications that the General Di-
rectorate of Censorship Services considered of “oppositional ideology”.
6 With regard to this, we may quote the case of António Pedro who attempted to 
open a gallery in 1933 and was confronted with insurmountable difficulties and thus 
only tried again in 1952. 
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required an element able to bind it together and serve both as its armour 
and as moral cohesion. “We shall not discuss God and virtue; we shall not 
discuss the Fatherland and its History; we shall not discuss authority and its 
importance; we shall not discuss family and its morals; we shall not discuss 
the glory of work and its imperative.”7 Such a strict framework, so clearly 
defined by unquestionable values, where, let us face it, nothing escaped 
State vigilantism, was hardly conducive to dissonant voices. 
The idea of unity was highly cherished by the dictator and everything 
that affected it or called it into question was promptly rejected. “Dissolvent 
ideas” – an expression used by the dictator when alluding to “degenerate 
art” – had no place in the praxis that Oliveira Salazar envisioned. The 
regime was firmly anchored in and stoutly defended the essential, the per-
manent, the unchangeable and the past, and deeply feared the future and 
divergence. 
And yet the role of intellectuals necessarily involves “revealing” futures 
and muddying the waters so that choice is possible. 
Meanwhile, as a result of the regime’s nature, emphasis was placed on 
the creation of the “New Man”. This required the creation of a grid of aes-
thetic values dependent upon the political model, and in order for this to 
emerge, to spread and to lay foundations, it was essential to put forward a 
new type of standardized “intellectual”, both a supporter of and a vehicle 
for the official doctrine. One staff member who performed this function, 
despite all the controversy surrounding him, was António Ferro. He was 
the head of the State Propaganda Office (SPN) and was the first to recog-
nize that his role was that of a metteur-en-scène, charged with the mission 
of instilling the Leader’s message. He did not regard himself as a creator, 
innovator or agent provocateur; on the contrary, the lesson was written and 
his duty was merely to “go over the syllabus taught”.
Thus, if we assume an intellectual is someone who points out alterna-
tive routes, who livens up debate and contributes with ideas which shape 
the worldview of an era, where was this person in the Salazar period? Or 
rather, where could this intellectual be?
The intellectual had no place in this society. 
7 Speech by Oliveira Salazar, given in Braga, from the balcony of the barracks of 
Infantry no. 8, on 26th May 1936, on the occasion of the great parade and festivities 
held to commemorate the tenth anniversary of the 28th May movement. 
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Even at the dawn of the regime, when it was essential to seduce the 
masses and immediately afterwards, during the troubled period of the Span-
ish Civil War, the official ideologues limited themselves to instilling values 
rather than to promoting any discussion of them. The leader’s speeches 
were quoted by his fellows in the Crusade, in official ceremonies, but only 
as simplified slogans, rules of life and behaviours that anyone would be able 
to understand, even if illiterate designed to be handed down to the people. 
As we learn from Fernando Rosas, Oliveira Salazar’s speeches carried far 
greater weight in terms of their disciplinary function than their actual con-
tent. Extremely well-known expressions such as “Order in the streets and 
peace in the spirit”; “Orders given by those who can, obeyed by those who 
must”, or the trilogy “God, Fatherland, Family”8 are easily internalized and 
operate as guiding rules in the life of the society. 
Interestingly, Franco Nogueira, in another work, questions the role of 
elites in the history of Portugal, defining intellectuals as those “who influ-
ence the thinking of others and are the source of ideas” (Nogueira 1992, 
86).9 This view may very well coincide with the interests of the Estado 
Novo, and certainly applies to a figure such as António Ferro. 
Were we to draw up a list of the names of those we associate with the 
intellectual during the Salazar era, I believe we would quite easily reach a 
consensus: individuals like António Quadros, Adolfo Casal Monteiro, An-
tónio Sérgio, Bento de Jesus Caraça, António José Saraiva, José Régio, Ál-
varo Cunhal, Jaime Cortesão, Aquilino and Torga, amongst others. These 
come to mind because we have an archetype for the intellectual, a person 
who highlights non-conformism, who provokes division, who shakes up the 
status quo and who manifests ontological and political concerns. And one 
fact is all too evident: all these men were opponents to Salazar. This con-
8 It should be noted that the regime’s motto was actually composed of five facets: 
“God, Fatherland, Family, Hierarchy and Authority”, but, as the last two are not very 
appealing, they were swiftly overlooked. 
9 In the same chapter, Franco Nogueira refers to the “lack of personality of the Por-
tuguese elites”, which, in the words of Artur Duarte Ribeiro, “constituted a permanent 
national danger”. He reinforces his argument with the following words from António 
José Saraiva: “It is heartbreaking to see the lack of confidence that Portuguese intel-
lectuals have in their own roots, and the complex that makes them humble themselves 
before any insignificant exuberance coming from outside.” (Quoted by Nogueira 1987, 
94)
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clusion is all the more striking if we note that the regime did not produce 
an intelligentsia. We are unable to list cultural figures that arose out of the 
dictatorship, and this phenomenon is particularly acute from the time of 
the Portuguese World Exhibition and the end of the Second World War.
At this point, it is important to clarify the concept that has guided this 
reflection. An intellectual is someone who livens up and stimulates debate, 
contributing with ideas that shape the worldview of a generation and of an 
era. This is a current definition, shared by most contemporary historians. 
We may take Tony Judt as an example:
The 20th century was the century of the intellectual (…) and described 
men and women in the world of education, literature and the arts, who en-
gaged in debate and in influencing public opinion.” He goes on to state that 
“the intellectual was, by definition, dedicated – ‘committed’: generally to 
an ideal, a dogma or a plan.”10 (Judt, 2010, 23) And he adds, regarding the 
matter at hand: “In States where public opposition and criticism was (or is) 
repressed, the intellectual took on, de facto, the role of spokesperson of the 
public interest and of the people, against authority and the State. (Ibid 24) 
Should we accept this definition, António Ferro, Augusto de Castro or 
the previously mentioned Franco Nogueira would be excluded from the 
category of “intellectual”. Therefore this question remains up for discus-
sion.
“Other examples provide us with ample evidence that turning artists 
and writers into civil servants practically means preventing them from cre-
ating. Art is not a book of records. If it becomes an obligation or a duty, 
it ceases to exist or exists in pretence, that is, cheats.” (Salazar quoted by 
Garnier 1952, 189) The author of this statement was the person respon-
sible for the creation of the State Propaganda Office (SPN), later renamed 
the State Information Office (SNI).11
10 He locates the birth of the “first” intellectuals in France with the Dreyfus affair 
and tells us that they acted in the name of “universal abstractions: ‘truth’, ‘justice’ and 
‘rights’ and by opposing the intellectuals who invoked abstractions “of a less universal 
nature: ‘honor’, ‘nation’, ‘patrie’, France.” He goes on to characterize this group em-
phasizing their role as animators of public discussion when these ethical or political 
abstractions were dominant in the debate. (See Judt 2010, 23-24).
11 Salazar would have meditated on the deep meaning of his words which can only 




Salazar had a negative image of the Portuguese people. They were il-
literate, uncritical, apathetic, selfish, not too fond of work, unhealthily 
sentimental and easily dragged down by the fatalistic and immobilizing 
rhythm of the national song.12 In order to counteract this tendency and 
promote the National Revolution the regime worked hard on initiatives 
which sought to exalt and enliven a discourse which was divulged widely: 
from the classroom and workplace to free time occupations, including both 
employers and employees, as well as the youth, and even such organizations 
as the organization of mothers for national education (OMEN). 
SPN was attributed the task of defining a policy for culture and on the 
day of its inauguration, 26 October 1933, Salazar pondered on its mission 
and, in a fascistic discursive manner, began by highlighting what the State 
Propaganda Office was not. Hence, it was not “a department of praise for 
the government” or much less “an instrument of the government”, but was 
rather a government instrument. Despite recognizing similarities with for-
eign entities, he declared that “ours” was “a more mundane affair” in an 
obvious attempt to diminish its impact.
To justify the creation of this organ he took advantage of an image de-
ployed throughout his career: “politically nothing exists beyond what the peo-
ple know exists,” and the people did not know that the government was on a 
mission. It was necessary to fight disbelief, distrust, discontent, indifference of 
the soul and the lack of pride in the Fatherland, since national cohesion and 
vitality would depend on the capacity to overcome this “state of mind”. It was, 
after all, “a fact of political import”. And Salazar explains his view by expound-
ing on what he calls “the character of the Portuguese people”. One person sees 
a street badly in need of repair, another catches a delayed train, yet another 
learns of a child that has been found dead. Soon the average spirit begins to 
generalize: the roads are impassable, the trains are never on time and there is 
no assistance for children in the country. In other words, “It is very difficult to 
look out on the world from the window of our bedroom”. 
For the Estado Novo ideologue, it was therefore necessary to contrast 
the individual circumstance with the universal state of affairs and local and 
12 “Salazar does not like these songs [fado] which he considers depressing. He often 
says that fados weaken the Portuguese character, draining the soul of its energy and 
encouraging inactivity. He prefers the lively songs of the North, “viras” from Minho or 
“chulas” from Beira.” (Garnier 1952, 204) 
266
personal occurrences with the national situation. Men, groups and classes, 
philosophizing on their doorsteps, assess matters according to their own in-
terests, and therefore, only an “entity has, by duty, to see things in the light 
of the common interests” (Salazar 1961, 115). Raising the morale of the Por-
tuguese people, showing them what they are worth as an ethnic group, as a 
means of culture, as a productive and civilizing force, as an independent unit 
in the concert of nations, shouting out what is, as opposed to what is said to 
be, represented the challenge and perceived as a genuine crusade. 
The State Propaganda Office was charged with the task of immersing 
the people “within the moral thinking that should direct the Nation” and 
its activities focused upon two different directions, internally and exter-
nally. As António Ferro stated on taking office: “Art, literature and sci-
ence constitute the grandiose façade of nationality, that which is seen from 
abroad.” As a corollary to this, the dominant culture had to be defined by 
the SPN and by those who would be the privileged “instruments” of politi-
cal action, the artists and the writers who thus become civil servants in the 
service of a cause: that of the national interest. 
It should be remembered that “the national interest” was always defined 
by Salazar and always according to the circumstances. Used and abused, 
the concept gained remarkable elasticity. The same applied to the regime’s 
slogan: All within the (Salazar) State, nothing against the (Salazar) State. 
This meant that the State rewarded those who served the national cause 
and those who contributed to creating the ties cementing the Nation 
around a shared ideal while persecuting those who might call into question 
the indisputable principle of unity. Viewing the situation as a dichotomy, 
as was so popular within the ideology of the time, the regime distinguishes 
between the good, those who unite, i.e. the nationalists, from those who 
divide, the anti-nationalists. 
Salazar’s words were the beacon and the guiding compass and it was 
quickly made clear that dissonant ideas had no place in the poetics designed 
by the “great leader of souls”. Cultural actors had to take this dogma on 
board and, consequently, were coerced into following a code and acting in 
line with the higher interests of the State.
António Ferro was charged with designing cultural policy. This cosmo-
politan writer, who had been editor of the Orpheu magazine, published a 
series of articles in Diário de Notícias in 1932 in which he speaks of the rele-
vance of intellectuals within the framework of the masses. He was aware of 
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the need to overcome the absence of a “poet in service” as the Leader “was 
averse to contacts” and the “serious, sober dictatorship” could not draw 
in the masses that need to be assembled and to hear the truths insistently 
repeated and presented in an attractive and engaging packaging. The solu-
tion was to find a “metteur-en-scène” who would carry out his function via 
“theatre, painting and books”, instruments for achieving a “healthy life”. 
The people needed festivities and rituals: “Parades, festivities, symbols and 
rituals,” wrote António Ferro, “are necessary so that ideas do not fall into 
emptiness and do not fall into tedium.” (Ferro 1932) They were a privileged 
strategy for socializing, within the rules of the Estado Novo, and indoctri-
nating the people. 
Ferro, the author of Viagem à Volta das Ditaduras (Voyage around Dicta-
torships), added another advantage. These seductive movements contrib-
uted to mitigating the ever so disagreeable censorship, which so often led 
up to resentment.
Thus was born the so called “politics of the spirit”, nourished by the 
work of state propaganda, which sought to strengthen the Portuguese peo-
ple in a way that the spirit would clearly triumph over “crass, animalistic 
materialism…,” as Ferro put it in 1935, when announcing his plan for “a 
series of cultural conferences”.
Not long before, on the occasion of the first presentation of literary 
awards at the headquarters of the State Propaganda Office, Salazar had 
delivered an important speech in which he argued that “great works” are 
those that adhere to “truth”, “justice”, “beauty” and “good”. Most impor-
tantly, he categorically declared that the regime would reject any “morbid 
manifestations” of “nostalgic dreamers on decline and decay”. He seized the 
opportunity to condemn art for art’s sake, in what might be interpreted as 
a kind of warning against divergence, particularly to the young modernists 
who had come together under the wing of the SPN and who might harbour 
illusions to freely express their poetics. This behaviour was unacceptable, 
since the regime was firmly opposed to those who “sought to make litera-
ture and art separate, self-sufficient worlds, containing within themselves 
their own end and reason for existing”, promoting in this way “amorality 
and art for art’s sake”13. The association should be noted.
13 Speech given by Salazar, at the headquarters of the State Propaganda Office, on 
21 February 1935, at the first literary awards ceremony. (See Ferro 1950, 9-13) 
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In the same ceremony, in his highly mobilizing tone, António Ferro calls 
for the formation of a “common front” built on “the moral and spiritual 
principles” bequeathed by Christianity. Furthermore, Ferro outlined an ar-
gument, which is particularly relevant to our research, as to who the intel-
lectuals were and their respective sphere of influence. Besides evoking and 
invoking the “supreme, sacred words” of the “leader of the Nation”, the 
new head of propaganda reflected on the impossibility of a truly secularized 
intellectual before and expanding on the politics of the spirit, the institu-
tional support for the Salazar doctrine, deploying a particularly expressive 
and, in my opinion, intentionally aggressive language. The guidelines for 
“healthy art” resulted from balance and order as opposed to “dissolvent 
diabolism”, “amorality and morbidity” which “sully art” by lust or Satanism, 
thereby producing “ugliness”, “bestiality” and “evil”.
He continued his attack linking the authors of “vicious paintings of 
vice”, “sadistic literature” and novels “of Freudian excavations” with “un-
tiring and sick pursuers of contradictions” whom he saw as in opposition to 
the regime. As a corollary to this, the SPN could only “publicly declare war 
on the despots of free thinking, on the ‘free’. intellectuals (…), on defend-
ers of the Gidean man, of the earthquake-man. Narcisusses of democracy, 
poisoners of the World!” (Ferro 1950, 18-36)
Ferro was to go further with this line of argument comparing shapeless 
works to a disease for which their creators ought to be subject to “sanitary 
measures” (idem 44).
António Ferro was the unquestionable protagonist of a work of signif-
icant relevance and won several cultural actors for the cause, including 
painters, writers, filmmakers, musicians, actors, sculptors and journalists. 
He took pride in selecting and rewarding these according to quality, “with 
the greatest generosity of spirit”, as he professed to paying no attention to 
the “political tendencies of the competitors”. Only one criterion was used 
to reject a given work: that it was “anti-national” or proved to be “combat-
ive against the ethics of the regime” (ibid. 143). 
Without dwelling greatly on the reasons that may explain this adher-
ence, the attractiveness of a scintillating and mobilizing figure such as 
António Ferro should be mentioned. Furthermore, the cultural brew out 
of which the Fascist and authoritarian regimes emerged and the cleverly 
staged “bread-and-circus” policy, which enabled the intervention of a se-
ries of artists who would otherwise have been inactive or ostracized, are 
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also among the aspects to be considered. It should also be remembered that 
modernism was underdeveloped and embryonic, having failed to create an 
audience or practitioners in significant numbers. Just by way of an example, 
it should be recalled that in Nazi Germany there were around 1,000 of 
Kirchner’s paintings in various museums.
The Portuguese World Exhibition of 1940, the 
“Golden Year” 
To shape daily life in accordance with the model conceived by the new 
regime was a priority issue. For this purpose, the maestro in service wrote a 
piece of music – the music “of living as usual” –, whose score contained all 
the expected leitmotifs – God, Fatherland, Family, Hierarchy and Authority 
– and had all the movements – national education, censorship, repression 
– referring back to national unity. Unity was further enhanced by reference 
to a heroic past of a land of sailors, saints and knights. In order to reinforce 
the portugalidade (Portugueseness), culture and the arts were to act as an 
enlivening force and the aesthetic and ideological values of the new order 
fed by shows which were political and propagandistic in character. The 
Portuguese World Exhibition was the single most symbolic example of this. 
However, at the same time as “the great documentary of Christian civili-
zation” was being planned for what was heralded as the first “great historical 
exhibition” of the West (França 1980, 23), to be held in the splendid “impe-
rial space” next to the Jerónimos monastery, António Pedro and Dacosta 
broke with the “Politics of the Spirit” and paved the way for a new phase in 
Portuguese art. This was the first shadow to be cast over the “Golden Year”, 
announcing what would become reality after 1945. The end of the war 
became a watershed for architects, a group who had assumed great impor-
tance to the regime given its ongoing policy of public works and renovation 
of historical buildings necessarily requiring their cooperation.14 
14  lready in 1938, at the time of the preparations for the Portuguese World Exhibi-
tion, Salazar had stressed the importance of architects to forthcoming projects. 
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The I Congress of Architects15 constitutes clear evidence of the times to 
come in which so many of the former collaborators of the Estado Novo would 
distance themselves ostensibly from the regime breaking off their side to the 
agreement. These professionals took care to stress that the agreement had 
only existed as a project – of the minister of Public Works – with two men, 
Duarte Pacheco16 and António Ferro, and never with the regime.
Keil do Amaral lended his voice to the most fervent criticism and would 
later go on to lead an organic political, and thereafter unremitting, opposi-
tion to Salazarism. A new phenomenon emerged, a kind of “generational 
camaraderie” which brought together architects, artists and writers who 
expressed their opinions in magazines such as Vértice, Seara Nova, Mundo 
Literário, Horizonte and Jornal de Artes, among others. These publications 
were subject to heavily scrutiny and greatly reducing their discursive and 
interventionist role. 
Indeed, from the 1940s onwards, the struggle against the regime was 
transferred to the field of culture and its actors became the active opposi-
tion to Estado Novo.
The end of the Second World War gave rise to a climate of great ex-
pectation and it was believed that the regime was on the brink of collapse. 
Salazar himself fuelled the possibility of Portugal keeping pace with the Al-
lied victory and promised “elections as free as in free England”. The opposi-
tion organized itself and the list of leaders of the Movement of Democratic 
Unity (MUD) in 1946 was as follows (A Sessão de Trinta de Novembro de 
1946 do Movimento de Unidade Democrática 1946, 3): teachers of different 
levels of education, particularly university level = 9; writers = 6 ; publicists 
= 4; lawyers = 3; members of the military = 3; doctors = 2; students = 1; 
workers = 1; graphic artists = 1; accountants = 1.
Of 31 leaders, 19 (approximately 61%) were employed in the fields of 
education, literature and journalism, and were associated with intellectual 
15 Keil do Amaral proves most vocal and the architect who was most vehemently 
demonstrating his opposition to the regime. While Pardal Monteiro shared some of his 
opinions, Cristino, who was present, did not take any position.
16 About whom Salazar provided a brief description, highlighting that “he was a 
man of great value and would be a great minister of any department. A problem studied 
and solved by Duarte Pacheco was solved in full and for many years. Rather leftist, but 
as he had a great thirst for power, he easily adapted”. (Nogueira 1987, 179)
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intervention. This numbers help us find the definition of “intellectual” in 
the sense of those who fought against the regime and aspired to a demo-
cratic society.
Aquilino, Torga, José Régio, Alves Redol, António Sérgio and Ferreira 
de Castro were just a few of the writers, thinkers and poets who expressed 
their civic and political disagreement, in the (at least approximately so) 
public arena.17 
The author of Selva, Ferreira de Castro, soon after dared, as a member 
of the MUD committee of writers, journalists and artists, to confront the 
regime, accusing it of restricting the activity of writers and, consequently, 
of being responsible for the fragility of the cultural panorama at the time. 
Freedom was an overriding value for those engaged in writing and, while 
representing a minority, they were those who “embodied the progress of 
majorities”. Ferreira de Castro’s testimony on this issue is of interest:
The fact that freedom is of greater, and apparently exclusive, in-
terest to a small minority of Humanity, such as those who, by means 
of the written or spoken world, have devoted their lives to culture, 
to literature, to journalism or to the propagation or illumination of 
social, political and religious beliefs, in no way diminishes its im-
mense and irreplaceable value”, [for] “this small minority embodies 
the progress of the majority, their concerns, their aspirations, their 
creations, their discoveries, and all that represents Man’s progress 
through collective living. 
Thus, he expresses his understanding of what it is to be an intellectual 
before adding furthering on:
“What indicates the civilization of a people is a range of factors 
among which the intellectual naturally stands out as the loftiest, most 
long-lasting and prestigious” so that there could be “no doubt that 
the country” was “being cheated out of what” could “have been its 
best: its spirit”. He regrets not having been able to produce the work 
17 The regime was not successful in gaining the adherence of writers, and Marcello 
Caetano himself admitted this in 1956, at the time of commemorations of “Thirty Years 
of Portuguese Culture” (See Notícias de Portugal 1956).
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that he had dreamed of and extends that regret to the “progressive 
writers of Portugal, i.e., to almost all Portuguese writers.”(Message of 
the writer Ferreira de Castro 1946, 33-35)
This opposition – and this regret – could be extended to vast sections 
of national life and was particularly relevant in electoral periods when the 
freedoms of expression and thought were at the top of the list of political 
demands.
In 1949, the plot thickened and the end of the collusion that had existed 
between the Estado Novo and those linked to culture and the arts became 
more than obvious. The 1949 campaign for the Presidency of the Republic 
would be the pretext for many of those who had to an extent under An-
tónio Ferro’s protection to switch their support to Norton de Matos. Sala-
zar would refuse to forgive this decision. The leading figure in the “Politics 
of the Spirit” was soon removed. Furthermore, he had now become dis-
pensable. The period of seduction had come to an end and repression was 
now the order of day. The regime was positioned to go hardcore on dissent 
having gained the support of Britain and the United States and become a 
member of NATO. The policy of diversion – and diversion had undoubt-
edly been the main goal of supporting culture18 – was no longer necessary.
The head of the SPN resigned his position, regretting the lack of un-
derstanding shown by the “opposition” artists and the more conservative 
groups within the heart of Salazarism, which, from the very outset, had crit-
icized the protection given to modernism. The most paradigmatic action of 
the SPN, the cycle of “Modern Art Exhibitions”, ended, and represents the 
clearest indication of change.19 
18 It is my belief that Salazar not only agreed with but also worked with António 
Ferro and understood the importance of including the lively youth, but he also viewed 
it with a great degree of mistrust. From his perspective, the education of the Portuguese 
should be undertaken jointly by the Church and School, which he saw as the “holy 
workshop of souls”. The school, even when the school was rather provisional, could 
reach the most out-of-the-way locations that propaganda could hardly or would never 
otherwise reach – this despite Ferro’s attempts to create a prize for the most Portuguese 
village, for example.  
19 António Ferro was replaced by J. M. da Costa, “a person without cultural merit”. 
In their field, the annual exhibitions were the most obvious demonstration of Ferro’s 
Politics of the Spirit. “Exposições de Arte Moderna do SPN/SNI”, A Arte Portuguesa 
nos Anos Quarenta, 1, 69. 
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In that same year, 22 professors were dismissed and a new form of op-
position began to take shape, distinct from the old Republican guard, an 
opposition which left its mark through surrealism, neo-realism and even 
abstractionism. This was also the generation of the architects who were at 
odds with the regime and which finds momentum in neo-realism, a move-
ment based on the theories of Marx and Jdanov.20 Art and literature went 
hand in hand, resulting from the “new humanism” theorized by Álvaro 
Cunhal in a series of articles published by the newspaper Diabo. In these 
articles, the leader of the Communist Party defended the new art move-
ment, which he saw as the realization of a progressive historic trend, while 
condemning relentlessly the art for art’s sake. On this point, he was in total 
agreement with the Salazarist ideology. 
It was, therefore, in the agitated environment of the post-war trans-
formations that the National Society of Fine Arts (SNBA) promoted the 
I Exhibition of Arts21 which displayed works by 93 artists, among which 
were draftsmen, painters, sculptors, architects and graphic artists. The list 
of participants in the 1946 exhibition is a clear indication of the level of 
heterogeneity and, by extension, of the distance from and dissatisfaction 
with the regime.22 Amazingly, the official reaction was positive, and the 
exhibition was well received, even from the press linked to the regime. The 
year after (1947), the atmosphere was very different, and Diário da Manhã, 
of 9th May, set the tone for the scandal that was to follow. In a headline on 
the front page, the newspaper denounced the “Art’s Popular Front or the 
20 “Socialist realism” had adopted Gorky’s theoretical positions, as presented by 
Jdanov in 1943 and disseminated in France by J. Fréville and L. Casanova. The desig-
nation began to gain currency and became a household name in Portugal via Italian 
cinema. In artistic and literary terms, the Brazilian production (Portinari, Jorge Amado 
and Graciliano Ramos), the Mexican (Rivera, Orozco and Siqueiras), and the Ameri-
can output of Dos Passos and Steinbeck constitute the most significant influences on 
Portuguese intellectuals. The Marxist influence is widely acknowledged, and the young 
neo-realists assumed an attitude of denunciation and simultaneously of struggle against 
society, which they perceived as bourgeois and exploitative. 
21 The exhibition was (anonymously) organized by the Sub-Committee of Artists 
of the Committee of Journalists, Writers and Artists of the Movement of Democratic 
Unity.
22 A. Manta, A. Salazar, A. Pedro, Conceição Silva, Arlindo Vicente, Cândido Cos-
ta Pinto, Falcão Trigoso were some of the participant artists. José Augusto França, Os 
Anos Quarenta na Arte Portuguesa, vol. I, p. 83.
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Unity around pessimism and disorder”. Six paintings were confiscated23 in 
an operation presumably ordered by the Minister of the Interior himself.24 
The exhibition of the following year – 1948 – will be subject to prelimi-
nary censorship, an unprecedented situation in Portugal. The “Gerais”, as 
the exhibitions became known, had no jury and gave out no awards. They 
took, however, an important place in the imagination of the left-wing and 
stressed the opposition to the regime, as actions by the Portuguese Secret 
Police (PIDE) well document.
Within the same spectrum of opposition, although stemming from a dif-
ferent ideology and poetics, we may also mention the role of the surrealists 
and of the notorious, and scandalous, exhibition in 1949.25 Right at the 
outset, the catalogue cover was an obvious sign of rebellion: “The Sur-
realist Group of Lisbon asks: after 22 years of fear are we still capable of an 
act of Freedom? It is absolutely necessary to vote against fascism.”26 This is 
clear testimony to the alliance between artists, intellectuals and opponents 
of Salazar, this time led by the surrealists who followed on from what the 
neo-realists had been doing.
Further in 1949, and once again on the occasion of a political event 
– the Norton de Matos campaign –, the writer José Régio denounced the 
regime and its repressive practices. Régio chose to refer to a paralyzing feel-
23 The confiscated paintings were: Júlio Pomar’s “Resistência”, Rui Pimentel-Arco’s 
“Pintura”; Avelino Cunhal’s “O Menino da Bandeira Branca”; Maria Keil’s “Regresso 
à Terra”; Manuel Ribeiro Pavia’s “Ansiedade” and “Filho Morto” as well as drawings. 
Both the theme of the exhibition and the reaction of the regime were discussed at 
length in the magazine Horizonte – Jornal das Artes, 11 and 12 (first fortnight in June). 
24 The Interior Minister was Augusto Cancela de Abreu. He was appointed on 4th 
February 1947 and dismissed on 2th August 1950. 
25 The Surrealist Group was founded in 1947 and brought together António Pedro, 
Vespeira, Fernando de Azevedo, Moniz Pereira, António Domingues, José Augusto 
França, Cesariny and António Dacosta, artists whose intervention would change the 
course of both painting and poetry. To put themselves on the map, they organized a 
Surrealist Exhibition in January 1949. However, the surrealist movement itself had 
older roots, dating back to the 1930s with the incursions of António Pedro. In the 
1940s, Cândido Costa Pinto was responsible for the contact with André Breton (1947) 
at a time in which the movement had gained new momentum as a result of the major 
Surrealist Exhibition held in Paris. 
26 This cover was to be a poster for the Norton de Matos campaign and its fate could 
easily have been anticipated: it was crossed out with the blue pencil of censorship.
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ing – fear –, which he describes as “wavering, fluctuating, hesitating, vague, 
weak, permanent (…), supremely demoralizing” (AAVV 1949, 60), which 
constitutes a powerful impediment to creation. 
The regime sought to play down these attacks and accused the artists 
and intellectuals of using “intellectual action” as a strategy to bring down 
the established power out of a lack of other more effective means. More-
over, the enemy had been clearly defined, according to a basic dichoto-
mous, and yet very effective, logic: communists were the chosen target, 
and this label was applied indiscriminately to anyone who opposed the dic-
tatorship, even though many opponents, it might be added, were actually 
anti-communist.27 
Representing a kind of Portuguese-style McCarthyism, Pinheiro Torres 
was one of the architects of this strategy. It is therefore worth quoting extracts 
from his speeches to the National Assembly. In the mythical year of 1949, this 
Member of Parliament described the activities of the Portuguese secret politi-
cal police, PIDE, in the hunt for “subversives”, i.e., communists, who, under 
cover of the “dark”, set “revolutionary movements” in motion. Yet even more 
serious and more dangerous for Estado Novo was their proliferation “in broad 
daylight” “in State departments”, in “the teaching profession”, in the “official 
bodies”, “in the order of physicians”, among “lawyers, engineers”, for from 
such positions they could contaminate society as a whole. The influence of 
the communists in “books”, “conferences”, “magazines” and “newspapers”, 
where they spread “the venom of their doctrines” (Diário das Sessões April 23, 
1949: 544-545), was an absolute anathema for this defender of the regime. 
This was not an isolated outburst. His theses were supported, for in-
stance, by Silva Dias, who, in 1951, compared these subversive agents to 
“bacteria”, thriving in philosophical circles, and taking political advantage 
of the “notoriety they achieved in the scientific world” to “taint all areas 
of human knowledge according to the methods of dialectic materialism”. 
He continued his passionate speech by referring to the “essayists of the ut-
terly human” and “above all the novelists of the social”, whose works had 
outrageously “received awards from some academies” (Diário das Sessões 
April 28, 1951: 956).
27 Interestingly, we have found fewer negative terms referring to the far-right, which 
also had highly combative members whose attacks on the dictatorship were not soft 
and, on the contrary, were extremely aggressive. 
276
The regime’s perception helps us, therefore, to establish the concept of 
“intellectual”, and coincides with what we have been suggesting: they were 
philosophers, writers, essayists, journalists, architects, painters and all those 
who expressed their “dissolvent” ideas by means of the word.
In the 1950s, the estrangement of the artistic and intellectual world 
from the regime became final and would never heal. “Art interests me 
because I love beauty, the indispensable nourishment of the spirit. Ev-
erything that is beautiful and intelligent pleases me, and I regret that 
Portugal is currently so poor in the field of the arts” (Garnier 1952, 191). 
A great summary, indeed, coming from the man most responsible for that 
status quo.
Some years later, in 1966, in conversation with Franco Nogueira, his 
favourite confidante, Salazar recognized that “he always had great difficulty 
in finding collaborators, and that the intellectuals had always escaped him.”
Final remarks
While unquestionably authoritarian, repressive and controlling, the 
Salazar regime was never as strict as the fascist Italian and Nazi or Stalinist 
regimes. Thus, the intellectual performance in the public space may very 
well reflect the regime’s “half-hearted” action. From the first decade of the 
regime through to the end of the Second World War, there was even a 
certain degree of proximity, promoted by the influence of two characters 
who served the regime in this ambiguous game: António Ferro and Duarte 
Pacheco. Salazar fully understood that it was advantageous to use them 
to strengthen the national spirit, gather support and project an image of 
modernity. 
1945 was a borderline year, as it symbolically announced the end of the 
regime, which would never again achieve the favour and prestige that had 
made the “golden era” possible, the very period ending with the war. The 
close ties established between aesthetic and political discourses began to 
slacken and eventually led to the estrangement of the intellectuals who, 
obviously, took up a position of opposition. To speak of intellectuals was to 
speak of opponents, and this dialectics caused the failure of the regime, as 
it never managed to produce its own intelligentsia or spokespeople for its 
ideology and its praxis. 
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Answering my provocative question as to whether or not there were 
intellectuals in the Estado Novo, I have to conclude that they did exist, with 
many peculiarities, to be sure. These resulted from historical constraints, 
which, to a great extent, help us explain the routes taken. Indeed, these 
were confused times, of ephemeral and contradictory ideological loyalties 
even if considered only from the doctrinal point of view. António Pedro 
is but one example. An unquestionable opponent of the regime and the 
voice of the BBC during the Second World War, this artist, who presented 
his famous exhibition in Rua da Trindade in 1948, came from the national 
trade union movement, a right-wing movement that became close to the 
regime. Alternatively, to conclude, we shall briefly look into an extract 
from a conversation between Franco Nogueira, Hernâni Cidade and Ar-
mando Cortezão. During this conversation, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, 
Franco Nogueira, asks Hernâni Cidade to set up a Society for the Friends of 
Rhodesia and asks Armando Cortezão if he will agree to preside over the 
aforementioned Society. He asks these two well-known opponents of Sala-
zar to take the initiative as “it would not be a good idea if this appeared to 
be inspired by the government”. He goes on to say that it would be much 
more effective if the members were “men of opposition, respected for their 
intellectual prowess and for their integrity” (Nogueira 1987, 165). The re-
gime was not, we can therefore conclude, able to produce “men respected 
for their intellectual prowess and for their integrity.”
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THE INTELLECTUAL IN EXILE. JORGE DE DE 
SENA IN PORTUGAL DEMOCRÁTICO
Jorge vaz de carvalho
We might immediately be tempted to encounter affinities between the con-
ception of intellectual expressed by Jean-Paul Sartre, in the first edition of Les 
Temps Modernes (October 1945), and that of Jorge de Sena. Both conceptions 
do include theoretical studies and teaching, critical-reflective thinking on re-
ality and its dissemination, the production of knowledge and creative acts 
that do not exempt the intellectual from engagement in action vital within 
the historical context, but rather merge with public debate, civic intervention 
and political commitment on behalf of ethical values, which are non-relative 
and instead universalising. And, since the quality of academic thinking and 
authority endows the intellectual with the resonance of prestige (the atten-
tion paid to his words) that, in turn, explains the great demand placed on 
him for influencing ethically responsible action in the essential questions of 
life, i.e. his availability and dedication towards assuming a position within the 
set of human relationships, especially, in power relationships. If, in Sartrean 
expression, the human being is condemned to being free, privileged awareness 
of autonomy of will imposes, particularly on the writer and the intellectual, 
the Atlas condition of taking the weight of the world onto one’s shoulders. 
Sartre, who reflected extensively on the function and purpose of the 
writer and the intellectual during the occupation of France by German 
armies, launched the manifesto Les Temps Modernes immediately after the 
end of World War II and the restoration of democratic liberties in his 
country. However, in Portugal and Spain, the hope that the defeat of 
European Nazi-fascism would consequently topple the Iberian dictators 
proved in vain. Oliveira Salazar worked around his admiration for Hitler 
and Mussolini and proved sufficiently wise to take advantage of the stra-
tegic position of Portugal and the strongly anti-communist character of 
its regime, in order to survive as an ally of the Western powers, stand-
ing against the East, as the Cold War unfurled, playing in both the mili-
tary and economic fields. The democratic oppositions, isolated between 
Franco’s Spain and the ocean, were shorn of any international support 
and proved unable to summon the concerted body of action necessary to 
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overthrow the repressive structures of the Estado Novo and thereby bring 
about its end.
Indeed, it was fear of persecution and the imminence of imprisonment 
following his involvement in a failed coup against Salazar on March 12, 1959 
that led Jorge de Sena, on the verge of turning forty, to leave Portugal. Vol-
untary exile derived jointly from dissatisfaction over his professional career 
as a civil engineer, which he felt was impacting on his literary vocation as an 
essayist and writer, and the circumstances of a visit to Brazil as a speaker at 
the 4th International Colloquium on Luso-Brazilian Studies, in August 1959. 
He subsequently accepted an invitation to teach literature theory in Assis, in 
the state of São Paulo, before transferring to the University of Araraquara, 
in 1961, where he completed his doctoral thesis. With the rise to power of a 
military dictatorship in Brazil and the worsening political and intellectual situ-
ation (after March 1964), Jorge de Sena moved to the United States of Amer-
ica in October 1965. There, he lectured and gained tenure at the University 
of Wisconsin, Madison, before moving on to the University of California, in 
Santa Barbara, in 1970, where he remained through to his death in 1978. 
While Jorge de Sena arguably experienced his most creative period during 
his years in Brazil, this was not a liberating exile. The loss of and yearning for 
his homeland and the dream of the much hoped for representative democ-
racy were never to leave him.1 Not even in the safe surroundings of Brazil, 
where he finally attained a position as literature researcher and university 
lecturer, did the sense of ethical responsibility as a writer and intellectual 
allow him to lapse into distraction and inertia. On the other side of the At-
lantic, he began sharing with other intellectuals the patriotic imperative of 
engaging in forms of struggle against the Salazar regime and in defence of the 
liberty and dignity of the Portuguese. In the light of such commitment do we 
thus justify our initial reference to his affinity to Sartre’s intellectual attitude: 
both for Sena and for Sartre the conscience of liberty never alleviated nor 
quietened the sense of responsibility. Correspondingly, it was logical that he 
would participate in publications such as Portugal Democrático,2 which gave a 
1 In the “Preface to the Second Edition” of Poesia I, Sena declared: “politically, I am 
against any type of dictatorship (whether by majorities or minorities) and in favour of 
representative democracy” (Sena, 1977, 20). 
2 Portugal Democrático was first published on 7 July 1956 by Vítor de Almeida Ra-
mos and Manuel Ferreira de Moura. It was suspended one year later due to the scant 
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voice to the tasks and objectives of the expatriate political opposition work-
ing out of the Portuguese Republican Centre of São Paulo. His main objec-
tive, in his rearguard position in the struggle for freedom in Portugal, was to 
foster actions that might contribute towards undermining the dictatorship, 
freeing his homeland and launching the process of democratisation, especial-
ly by motivating anti-Salazar opinion and pressure movements within both 
groups of expatriate Portuguese and on the international front. 
The first time the name Jorge de Sena emerged in Portugal Democrático 
was in issue no. 29 (October 1959), which carried a transcription of his 
poem “This shame of living listening” from the book Evidências (Evidenc-
es) (1955), seized by PIDE (the Portuguese secret police). The poem was 
subsequently included in a collection by seven authors,3 “A Battle Front 
Called Poetry”, against the “dehumanization of Portuguese society caused 
by the effects of the Salazar regime”. His regular contributions began with 
the following issues, after which, in January 1960, he became a member 
of the Editorial Council. His first text for Portugal Democrático was an un-
signed editorial, “A ‘5th October’ of Unity”, in issue no. 30 (November 
1959), which referred to the commemorative banquet celebrating the dec-
laration of the Portuguese Republic, a pretext for a meeting of both Portu-
guese and Brazilian democratic figures in São Paulo, and which resulted in 
the dispatch of a telegram to Salazar calling for his resignation. The author 
expressed pride in the stir caused by the message 
that through dedicated, persistent and tenacious action, has con-
tributed towards unmasking, in the eyes of the world, and the Portu-
guese that are either at a distance or poorly understand the interests 
hiding that symbolic monster that is Salazar, that perfidious, hypo-
critical and cowardly dictatorship that is his government. 
interest shown by the immigrant Portuguese community and the lack of financial and 
human resources before resuming publication in July 1958 after having established the 
conditions to setup its first editorial council and board of directors with offices in the 
headquarters of the Portuguese Republican Centre of São Paulo. 
3 They are, in addition to Sena: Afonso Duarte, Alexandre O’Neill, Armindo Ro-
drigues, Carlos Maria de Araújo, Carlos de Oliveira and José Gomes Ferreira. 
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The text represents a good summary of the newspaper’s mission: contra-
dicting Salazarist diplomacy, internationally denouncing the dictatorial re-
gime so as to isolate it and demystify its propaganda, raising the awareness 
of deceived Portuguese citizens so that they withdraw their support, even 
that resulting from neutrality and inertia. As regards the actions under-
taken by Portugal Democrático, we may first set out the following declaration 
of its principles and methods:
The principles are very simple: no equivocation in relations with 
these people who at every moment betray the dignity of their nation 
whose destinies they expropriate, total loyalty to democratic ideals, 
those uniquely aligned with the present and the future of the world, 
uniquely capable of saving Portugal from the fearful abyss into which 
it is being dragged by Salazarist paralysis, absolute dedication to the 
cause of liberty and justice and those norms of social interaction and 
human respect stipulated by the Charter of the United Nations and 
which the group pretending to govern Portugal so grossly flout.
The methods, from which principles derive, are also simple: un-
shakeable unity, without discrimination against political orientations 
in the struggle against Salazarism, absolute loyalty and democratic 
tolerance in mutual relationships taking into consideration the com-
mon enemy, and totally shunning any manoeuvres designed to divert 
the democrats of Portugal (which have their eyes set on those who 
live beyond the prison that the Nation is) of courage, decision and 
the spirit of sacrifice with which they have struggled and shall con-
tinue to struggle through to final victory.
The responsibilities of intellectuals abroad, within which the newspa-
per’s own mission fell, derived from awareness as to the deprivations of 
their homeland and which demanded active commitment with the objec-
tive of attaining liberty.4
4 In the same edition of Portugal Democrático, Sena also published another unsigned 
note entitled “Hit the road, Rat!”, an invective of great violence and insult against 
Salazar, “symbol of the illegality, arbitrariness, injustice, oppression”, that culminated 
with the challenging libel: “Don’t you resign, hit the road!”. The text is accompanied 
by a cartoon by Fernando Lemos, in which the Dictator, depicted with the body of a rat, 
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Through to October 1962, between editorials, notes and articles, Sena 
wrote over three dozen pieces with the shared highly pitched tone of 
j’accuse the Dictatorship. They are texts with depth, length and diverse 
levels of importance. Let us take some examples.
In the article “Elections in Portugal”, still published under the pseud-
onym of Cândido Alves, in issue no. 31 (December 1959), Sena poured 
ridicule on the electoral farces designed to pretend democratic openness 
and which served only for Salazar to appoint his lackeys. Again in the text 
“The rat and the little flags”, published in issue no. 46 (March 1961), he 
mocked the demonstrations organised by the regime, and staged, for ex-
ample, after the embarrassing hijacking carried out by Henrique Galvão, 
to honour and salute Salazar, when he “went to Lisbon docks to welcome 
‘his’ Santa Maria”. 
In the first text published under his real name, in issue no. 35 (April 
1960), with the headline “A dictatorship of jurists”, he slammed the “gigan-
tesque legalistic ‘Make-Believe’” produced to control “the people, through 
censorship and the political police” and arbitrary “security laws” that allow 
for the “imprisonment, for an undetermined period of time, of any person, 
despite the lack of any evidence”. He also provided a historical overview, 
with notable pedagogical precision, of the dictatorship in Portugal, begin-
ning with the military coup by Gomes da Costa, the means of take over and 
Salazar’s actions when in power, through to the fraudulent elections ‘lost’ 
by Humberto Delgado, in 1958. Lastly, Sena attacked the “policy of share-
cropping”, in the interests of the economic-financial oligarchy “that serves 
Salazar and is, in turn, led by him”. 
Occasional events, such as the commemorations of the 5th October5 
and 31st January,6 are capitalised upon to highlight the unity of the demo-
crats, with the 50th anniversary of the declaration of the Republic7 serving 
as the occasion for writing a historical memory in which, by replacing the 
concept of the “republic” type regime by the set of democratic values that 
having taken off elastic boots is on the rim of a toilet and set to dive in while the bird 
of freedom is poised to pull the chain.
5 Text: “Um 5 de Outubro”, published in issue no. 30 (November 1959).
6 Text: “O General Humberto Delgado presidiu às Comemorações do 1º de Janeiro”, 
published in issue no. 33 (February 1960).
7 Text: “Os cinquenta anos da República”, published in issue no. 41 (October 1960). 
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were then proclaimed, he reduces its true duration down to fifteen and a 
half years, between 5th October 1910 and 28th May 1926. The commemo-
rations of the 500th anniversary of the death of Prince Henry the Naviga-
tor were the pretext for another historical memory demystifying the usage 
made of this illustrious national figure by the ideology of the regime.8 Sena, 
unable to directly attack the president of Brazil, where he was living, does 
so intelligently and subtly within the scope of an attack on Salazar, accusing 
him of inviting Juscelino Kubitschek to participate in the aforementioned 
commemorations in Lisbon in the capacity of co-host and co-head of the 
Portuguese state, which thus tainted Brazilian democracy with the Portu-
guese dictatorship.9 He lamented the same legitimising of the dictatorship 
by General Eisenhower, president of the United States of America, in visit-
ing the Portuguese government in Lisbon.10 
Sena condemns the terror and the arbitrariness of repressive and judi-
cial processes and the “poisoning of consciences” and appeals for amnes-
ties to be granted to exiles and political prisoners, while heaping praise on 
successful escapes (prisoners from Peniche,11 including Álvaro Cunhal and 
Agostinho Neto who made it to Britain). He also called for the end of cen-
sorship and freedom of expression and expressed solidarity with attacked 
writers, while also highlighting any international actions or speeches by 
leading figures or state representatives against the Estado Novo or critical 
of Portuguese colonialism, in addition to stressing any agitation or rebellion 
in the colonies that would collectively amount to the outbreak of the Colo-
nial War in 1961. Sena was consistent in affirming the rights of the African 
liberation movements and the right of such countries to self-determination 
and independence. Above all, Sena strove to demystify the regime’s pro-
paganda. 
Having co-signed the homage to Jaime Cortesão, made by the Com-
mittee of Portuguese Intellectuals and Artists Pro-Freedom of Expression, 
8 Text: “Valores Portugueses – o Infante D. Henrique” [313], published in issue no. 
39 (August 1960).
9 Text: “O infante D. Henrique, Salazar e o Brasil”, published in issue no. 39 (Au-
gust 1960).
10 Editorial “Uma visita presidencial”, published in issue no. 38 (July 1960).
11 Respectively, notes “Fugas de Portugal”, published in issue no. 33 (February 1960) 
and “Agostinho Neto”, published in issue no. 63 (August 1962).
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on the 50th anniversary of his literary career,12 Sena published a moving 
funereal elegy of this writer, historian and high profile democratic, terming 
him “an example of unity between intellectual labours, moral dignity and 
civic refinement”.13
In no. 33 (February 1960), Sena was behind the unattributed editorial 
“A Victory for Democracy” on the holding of the first ever South Ameri-
can Pro-Amnesty of Political Prisoners in Spain and Portugal Conference. 
Participating, in addition to the Portuguese and Spanish delegates, were 
Brazilian figures alongside delegates from Argentina, Chile, Paraguay, Uru-
guay and Venezuela. This initiative not only condemned Franco and Sala-
zar but also gave full expression to the sense of indignation built by decades 
of regimes of “ignominious characteristics, for the free conscience of the 
world” and demanded an amnesty for the political prisoners and for the two 
Iberian countries, “transformed into huge open prisons”. The communiqué 
concluded: “It is purely an imperative for the human conscience: amnesty 
for Spain and for Portugal!”. The second conference, held in Montevideo, 
Uruguay, on 27th, 28th and 29th January 1961, and reported in no. 45 
(February 1961), gained the explicit support of Jean-Paul Sartre. The first 
conference was presided over by Álvaro Lins, the former ambassador of 
Brazil to Portugal, who, in January 1959, accepted the request for political 
asylum by General Humberto Delgado, confirmed by Itamarati (Brazilian 
Minister of Foreign Affairs). However, Salazarist diplomacy proved effec-
tive, firstly weakening and then isolating the ambassador, who then lost the 
support of his president, who deemed the Brazilian representative to have 
acted erroneously.14 Driven by his conscience, Lins was angered, protested 
vehemently and ended up being stripped of his diplomatic post in Lisbon. 
He broke off with Kubitschek politically and personally on the grounds of 
what he deemed the latter’s complicity with dictators. Sena was a speaker 
at the “Homage to Álvaro Lins”, celebrated with a banquet, on 5th May, 
12 Published in issue no. 36 (May 1960). 
13 Text “Jaime Cortesão, o Historiador”, published in issue no. 41 (October 1960 
[331]).
14 With the headline “Revelações de Álvaro Lins sobre sua missão em Lisboa”, Por-
tugal Democrático issue no. 36 (May 1960), this included a transcription of an impor-
tant document revealed by the magazine “Mundo Ilustrado”, based on a book in a diary 
format written by Álvaro Lins, and published under the title “Mission to Portugal”.
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in S. Paulo. This event received widespread coverage throughout Portugal 
Democrático, issue no. 37 (June 1960). Column space was also given to 
reporting how Álvaro Lins had returned the Grã-Cruz da Ordem de Cristo 
award he had received three years earlier.
As from 1961, with rebellion in Angola and the generalised outbreak 
of colonial war, this would become a recurrent theme in the texts by Sena 
in Portugal Democrático that defended the right of African peoples to self-
determination and independence. International decisions condemning co-
lonialism made at the United Nations General Assembly and at the NATO 
Council are applauded alongside the minimising of Salazarist diplomatic ef-
forts, with the latter’s positions effectively dismissed.15 Aware of the grow-
ing and humiliating international isolation of Portugal, which would never 
be able to bear the long-term military and financial costs of war on many 
fronts in the colonies, and indignant about the disaster that colonialism 
was bringing upon the country, including the danger of annexation projects 
by Franco’s Spain, in an article entitled “Portuguese Foreign Policy”, pub-
lished in no. 48 (May 1961), Sena ordered and developed a series of ideas 
as to the need to “mobilise a core of Portuguese citizens dispersed around 
the world” to help in “a Portuguese political reconversion”, the urgency of 
a democratic solution alongside the diplomatic and trade strategies to be 
implemented and the restoration of public finances. 
The most important articles written by the intellectual Jorge de Sena 
are two complementary works published firstly in issues no. 39 (August 
1960) and no. 47 (April 1961), entitled respectively “The Community of 
Portuguese States” and “The Organisation of Portuguese Democracy”. In 
the former, he sketches and proposes “for the consideration and discussion 
of the Portuguese people” an intelligent program, meticulously and rigor-
ously planned throughout each one of its 27 principles. He did this out 
of the duty he felt to conceive and present “concrete proposals about the 
political, economic, social, etcetera, future of Portugal and the territories 
which depend on our nation”, because it was not lawful for democrats “to 
excuse themselves, in the name of tactical unity, from the strategic formu-
lation of concrete proposals”, in order to establish “a solid constitutional 
structure” that would ensure the electorate 
15 Respectively to articles “ Um novo ano” in issue no. 44 (January 1961) and “A 
Reforma inicial” in issue no. 49 (1961).
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the exercise of their liberties and within which all opinions, races 
and creeds are gentlemen in their dignity and civic representativeness 
and which, creating a free community, organised so as to maximise 
liberty, whatever the scale, imposes the maximum responsibility. 
In full awareness of his intellectual responsibility for thinking through 
the salvation of Portugal, Sena structured the extraordinary plan for a 
democratic organisation of free political exchange, integrating the various 
Portuguese language speaking nations that would emerge out of the colo-
nial empire. He also recalled the need for “the political reform of Portugal” 
not just to be a “liberalizing reconversion” that might open up the doors 
to other forms “of violence and authoritarianism” (seeming to forecast the 
period known as the “Marcelist Spring”), but rather a reform “from the bot-
tom up”, and covering “the entire socio-political structure of the country, 
the entire political organisation of the state and its administrative struc-
ture”. He put forward the notion of elections “done gradually”, at the grass-
roots level, beginning with the consolidation of democracy at the parish 
council level before moving up to the municipal level and culminating in 
the Founding Assembly, which would rewrite the Constitution. He wrote: 
“Democracy is not, and cannot be conferred. Democracy is the creation 
of democrats and a conquest of a people”. Immediately, we are told it is a 
process that could never be deemed definitively acquired and consolidated 
but has to be permanently implemented and justified in its historical duty. 
At a certain point, the unity of the democratic oppositional forces, with 
their different opinions but the shared anti-dictatorial cause, began to 
crack with the rise to prominence and eventual preponderance and con-
trol of Portugal Democrático by Portuguese Communist Party activists and 
intellectuals. Their concept of unity meant it proved impossible to define a 
program for the colonial question, for the range of the desired social trans-
formation, and for the forms of resistance both in exile and back in Portugal 
(as expressed in the lucidity of the article “The Lefts”, published in issue 
no. 49 (June 1961). Sena wrote his final article for issue no. 65 (October 
1962), precisely entitled “Unity”, in which he is disillusioned with the “sus-
picions” between the opposition groups that proved unable to attain “real 
unity around political objectives”, an agreement resulting from respect for 
the diverse currents and the coordination of efforts that the dictator always 
exploited to his own gain. Sena stated: “There is nothing more than unity. 
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However, there is nothing more important than this unity not being ab-
surd in form and overtaken by some controlling and immobilising others.” 
Out of the same feelings, and in a declaration published in issue no. 70 
(April 1963), the whole group of intellectuals that had sat on the Editorial 
Council resigned. They were Adolfo Casais Monteiro, Fernando Correia da 
Silva, Fernando Lemos, Jorge de Sena and Paulo de Castro. Thus did Sena 
bring to a close his period of cooperation with Portugal Democrático.
*
Sena mistrusted the entire systematic discourse in the determination of 
what reality is and in prescriptions as to what it should be. As he wrote: “I 
am not among those who believe in critical systems (…). From my perspec-
tive, the idea of system is incompatible with the idea of critical, given that 
the system begins where the criticism ends” (Sena 1977, 109). He also did 
not believe in unequivocal and absolute truths and was not prepared to 
submit, whether scientifically or politically, to any absolute doctrine of a 
normative character. He stressed the critical-reflective method in contrast 
to categorical and non-comparable discourses as each only ever recognised 
a partial, sectarian capacity to understand and express the human condi-
tion in its plenitude of being. Faced by the relativity (but not moral relativ-
ism) of the entire system, questioning and constantly re-evaluating criti-
cism is, to Sena, inherent to intellectual creativity and the human desire 
for freedom. 
According to Sena, the future of humanity is the development of a 
“conscience of freedom”. Therefore, being free is not, as Sartre would have 
it, a “condemnation” to which man is sentenced from the outset: the au-
tonomy of will and its privileged awareness are a process of personal con-
quest. Sena’s intellectual performance in knowledge and the (literary and 
political) transformation of the real does not encounter any incompatibility 
between the practice of civic commitment and theoretical reflection and 
the production of knowledge as they are dialectically inseparable activities: 
there is no conscience of freedom without active responsibility for it and 
vice-versa. Thinking is acting, knowing is already transforming.
While the actions of the intellectual perform an educational and moral 
role, given the implied lucidity of being ethically attentive to what the world 
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is, the intellectual’s discourse, rather than normalising the audience within 
standardised schemas (teaching them what they should think), should help 
them to freely gain autonomy of thought, stimulate the exercise of critical 
discussion against every type of dogma and determinism about a reality 
which, once acquired, interpreted, set in perspective, understood, and even 
anticipated, may aid transformation.
The thinking and the example of Jorge de Sena suggest a final reflec-
tion. The faster the processes of communication and the very information 
itself become, the greater the need for pausing for critical reflection. The 
greater the differentiation in the ways ideas circulate, the greater the rel-
evance of lucidly thinking about them. The greater the extent of democ-
ratisation of education, the greater the demand to level it off at higher and 
more challenging standards. 
The role of the intellectual has essentially not changed, since techno-
logical sophistication and scientific evolution, contrary to the dreams of 
the nineteenth century utopians which the social tragedies of the twentieth 
century disavowed, do not eliminate the problems of the convivial exist-
ence among human beings. Due to the censure and repression of totalitar-
ian regimes or to the futility and sloth of democracy, there has long been a 
temptation to lower the statute of the intellectual, or, out of the same hos-
tility to culture, adulterate it by inventing flawed substitutes and conferring 
the statute upon analysts, political commentators, scriptwriters, publicists, 
journalists and other types of public entertainers. It is down to the intel-
lectuals (and nobody shall do it for them) to take a stand against the social 
forces that undermine them. This would seem to imply (I do not have the 
affront to affirm this) the demonstration of a haughty position of power. 
However, such supposition is hard to defend when we envisage intellec-
tual commitment sustained by a humanist and renaissance culture (against 
the inward funnelling of current trends towards de-cultured specialisation) 
and by the authority of one dedicated to an honest life producing not merely 
information and opinions (with these, as with good intentions, our hell is 
brimming over), but studied understanding and profound knowledge. 
Intellectual respectability and prestige shall also be sustained by the 
strength of reception of this discourse, by recognition that one does know 
what one is talking about, even when calling for criticism and discordance, 
and by the capacity, in the face of established ideas and the powers-that-
be, to drive attention and mobilise consciences. Ultimately, for the intel-
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lectual, liberty still implies and shall always imply the responsibility of the 
citizen and the creative practice of a poetic citizenship.
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PORTUGUESE WOMEN AS PUBLIC INTELLECTUALS*
maria laura Bettencourt Pires
I am less interested in whether a woman is a feminist or not but rather wheth-
er she could be considered a public intellectual.
Elizabeth Fox-Genovese
My purpose in this essay is to focus on the role some Portuguese women 
played as public intellectuals in the twentieth century and on their achieve-
ments as “Disquieting Muses” in their country and abroad. In order to ad-
dress this topic, I will briefly refer to evolution concepts of the intellectual 
and of woman before considering how the ten public intellectuals I selected 
acted across five different cultural areas: the plasticarts, music, science, 
landscape gardening and cultural management. 
Inspired by the emblematic painting Le Muse Inquietanti by Giorgio De 
Chirico, one of the most representative painters of the twentieth century, I 
have designated these public intellectuals as “Disquieting Muses” also due 
to the reference to the muses of Greek mythology,1 the goddesses of all the 
arts and sciences who bestowed creativity on both artists and scientists. In-
deed, the Muses (aƒ mousai in Greek), besides incorporating the arts, also 
inspired creative processes with their graces, through songs and theatri-
cal representations, texts, traditional music and dance and werealso drawn 
upon to help in developing one’s abilities. 
This represents one of aspects that would seem to coincide with my 
thesis about the importance of the role and the agency of the aforemen-
tioned public intellectuals as I consider that, through their achievements 
in the different areas in which they have so successfully acted, they con-
* This is an abridged English version of my volume Intelectuais Públicas Portuguesas 
– As Musas Inquietantes (Pires 2010).
1 The Muses, daughters of Mnemosyne and Zeus, were nine: Calliope (Epic Poetry), 
Clio (History), Erato (Love Poetry), Euterpe (Music), Melpomene (Tragedy), Polyhym-
nia (Hymns), Terpsichore (Dance), Thaleia (Comedy) and Urania (Astronomy). Over 
the course of time, they have been invoked at the beginning of poems and the terms 
“Museum”, the temple of the muses, and “Music”, the art of the muses, that included 
poetry, the art of sounds and wisdom, derive from their name.
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tribute to give hope and courage to all other women, thus amply justifying 
the designation of “Muses” I attributed them. Furthermore, I think they 
are “disquieting” because, in their respective acting spaces, besides having 
reached prominent positions, in spite of being women, they also left inno-
vative marks on the different fields in which they were involved and that 
must certainly have “disquieted” many of their more conservative male 
counterparts.2 
Their privileged status suggests that they attained a rank that requires 
permanent and diligent inquiry and authenticity and, having travelled to 
less familiar locations in order to succeed professionally in the context of 
contemporary cultural life, they all have a mark of intellectual affiliation 
that is frequently designated as “insider-outsider intellectuals”, whose val-
ue consists in the simultaneous distance and intimacy, thus being due to 
their cosmopolitism both familiar and strangers, well-known and exotic. 
Additionally, their different intellectual affiliations led me to consider their 
articulation with Portuguese cultural life embarking from the assumption 
that they would, simultaneously, be the transmitters of culture and the 
models that would inspire other Portuguese women. They reached their 
intellectual maturity in the twentieth century and have either resisted or 
acted according to institutional imperatives and developed polarized skills 
of agreement and resistance in accordance with the different pressures they 
felt for they are isolated figures forced to circulate in highly traditional in-
tellectual milieux. 
In my opinion, their works and ways of acting were simultaneously mar-
ginal and crucial to the development of the cultural life of their country, 
althongh they are not interested in reaching positions of power and influ-
ence and there have been, occasionally, some tensions in the first moments 
of public acknowledgement. For all these reasons, they have certainly con-
tributed to the fact that women are no longer perceived as the other, and 
as a source of fanciful inspiration and begun to be considered as innovative 
agents. My intention choosing ten names of well-known female intellectu-
als in Portugal was to demonstrate how women can stop being seen through 
the eyes of the male privileged elite, still retaining power, and conceive 
2 The De Chirico painting also inspired Sylvia Plath’s poem entitled The Disquieting 
Muses (1957) but, according to her pessimistic perspective, Plath sees the feminine 
figures as threatening representations of the negative forces of life (Plath 1981).
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themselves as equal subjects with intellectual commitment, thus contribut-
ing towards creating a world in which identical achievements are not only 
possible but also encouraged by social institutions.
Considering the “Disquieting Muses” i have selected, and whose names 
are Emília Nadal, Joana Vasconcelos (plastic Arts); Maria João Pires, Joana 
Carneiro (Music); Hanna Damásio, Leonor Parreira (Science); Cristina 
Castel-Branco, Teresa Andresen (Landscape Gardening) and Simonetta 
Luz Afonso, Yvette Centeno (Cultural Management), the idea, mentioned 
by Giorgio Agamben,3 that we should make a work of art of our life imme-
diately comes to mind. This notion had already been previously referred to 
by Michel Foucault, who was concerned with the relation of subjectivity to 
power structures, and spoke about the construction of life as “se déprendre 
de soi-même”.4
As regards the movement generally designated as feminism, besides 
briefly referring to the definition of its key concepts and to its evolution 
over time, my objective is to draw attention to the importance of intellec-
tual clarification for the political project and to make a critical reflection 
on the state of the art of our knowledge and on its institutional relationship 
with patriarchal power in contemporary societies. Mention is also made to 
what I consider attempts to motivate a social change without ever forget-
ting that we must include a historical analysis of the basic intellectual issues 
that the feminist attack on the status quo automatically raises.
Regarding the area of music and the achievements of the pianist Maria 
João Pires and of the maestrina Joana Carneiro, I believe we must remem-
ber that music does not dwell in any external form – like the score, the 
tones or even the sensation of the sounds – it is in the universe of cognitive 
constructions, in a mental world of thoughts related to the tones and their 
relationships. Music is thus seen as an audio-cognitive activity, that is, as a 
thought related to the sounds which excludes every reasoning that does not 
involve them. In the field of the plastic arts and the activities of painters 
and sculptors, like Emília Nadal and Joana Vasconcelos, I believe that for 
3 V. Agamben’s message about a world with hope (Ulrich Raulff 2004, 437).
4 The expression means actively trying to free oneself of the only “true” or “essen-
tial” identity, thus submitting subjectivity to a permanent form of self-bricolage (Rabi-
now 1997, xi-xliii). Roland Barthes also spoke about this topic in his lecture entitled 
“Vivre ensemble”.
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the feminist perspectives of aesthetics there have been contributions not 
only by philosophers but also by art historians, musicologists and theorists 
of literature, cinema and performing arts, whose researches have practical 
implications for the analyses of the historical conceptual frameworks that 
guide aesthetics and the philosophy of art. The philosophical theories of 
the feminists have also been very influential in the critical interpretation 
of art and of popular culture and, occasionally, in the development of con-
temporary artistic practices.
Concerning science, consider the research work of scientists like Hanna 
Damásio and Leonor Parreira good examples of how feminists have been 
developing a science project that they designate as “successor” and which 
proposes a description of the world that is more adequate to a better life 
and is in a critical and more reflexive relationship with the practices of 
dominance by the others and with the dissimilar divisions of privileges. 
In the area of landscape gardening, when we consider the work of Cris-
tina Castel-Branco and Teresa Andresen we see that the garden, when duly 
treated, can be transformed into a “text”, a meaningful space and a location 
of sociability to which a landscape gardener adds her own artistic contribu-
tion. It is a unique space in which both the evolution and the signs of time 
become fundamental for its understanding. In our times, due to the new 
ways of big city living, we want to have a nature which is converted into 
humanized landscapes resulting from the action of landscape gardeners and 
from their collective work which is an essential element of contemporary 
urbanism.
From the field of cultural management, I have selected Simonetta Luz 
Afonso and Yvette Centeno, whose exceptional activities in this area pro-
vide fine examples of the ideas I defend about the importance of the ac-
tion of highly qualified intellectuals in the promotion culture and in the 
diffusion of interest in art. This is achieved through the management of 
museums, art galleries and other institutions types involved in the produc-
tion, dissemination and acquisition of art for, as is well-known, every type 
of exhibition of works of art also represents an historical phenomenon for 
it, inevitably, implies some of the selection, planning, elaboration of reports 
and appreciations that correspond to the theoretical texts of art historians. 
In my research, I am especially interested in analyzing the status and the 
role these women played in the formation of the cultural milieu as well as 
the relationship between the intellectual and the artist, or the producer of 
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knowledge and the creator of cultural products or, more generically, in the 
connection between intellectuals and aesthetics. In order to carry this out, 
we have to evaluate their capabilities in the formation or restructuration of 
national identity and to look into the social conditions of their existence, 
including in this study, whose chronological background is the twentieth 
century, references to the management of their symbolic power and to the 
trajectories and life structures of these producers of culture. We willthus 
see how the ten selectedPortuguese public intellectuals selected contrib-
ute – although in different ways and with distinctive intensities – to the 
production and the development of cultural goods through music, science, 
painting or sculpture, among others, thus transmitting frameworks for the 
understanding and enrichment of culture in general and having an impact 
on the contemporary cultural life of their country. 
When we consider this topic, we inevitably think of the emblematic 
case of Virginia Woolf5 – also both a woman and an intellectual – who was 
really interested in, rather than communicating her opinions and persua-
sions, actually educating the public so that people could read with greater 
discernment, developing ideas and judgments of their own accord. This 
idea makes all the more sense in Portugal where the education of public 
opinion is essential to the cultural structure. One can, therefore, conclude 
that although ‘high’ culture includes different skills and forms of knowl-
edge, it can also be defined, synthetically, as the talent to reflect, analyze, 
criticize and express and refute ideas. And, as Michael Oakeshott so well 
taught us in his essay “The Role of Poetry in the Conversation of Mankind” 
(Oakeshott 1996), one requires knowledge of intellectual discourses with 
their comprehensive vocabularies to implement them well enough to be 
able to intervene in the cultural world as public intellectuals should strive 
to do.
As is common knowledge, intellectualls are often perceived as those 
who deploy their mental skills to work, study, ponder or raise and answer 
questions. They frequently belong to the professional classes of academics 
and scientists but there are also the so-called “cultural intellectuals” who 
work in the fields of culture and art, thus acquiring some authority which 
5 Woolf debated her ideas about this issue in several essays she published in The 
Times Literary Supplement and, much later, in the volume entitled The Common Reader 
(see Cuddy-Keane 2003).
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is evident when they speak from public platforms. Although the designa-
tion “intellectual” as a specific category only came into view in modern 
times, the scholar or learned man and the producers of knowledge have 
been historical agents and important social actors since the first Greek phi-
losophers and the production of knowledge, whether religious, scientific or 
philosophical, has been relevant for social, political, economic and cultural 
evolution. Consequently, both the intellectuals and the knowledge they 
produce have been represented in multiple forms that range from a “chosen 
one”, producing knowledgefor the love of wisdom, to the different forms of 
“king-philosopher”, civil servant or activist, who participates in dissident 
intellectual movements that are politically connected to change in the so-
cial world. Nevertheless, the intellectual has mainly been perceived as a 
scholar more closely involved in literary activities than in public actions 
and was therefore frequently designated as “belletrist”6 in France. At the 
end of the eighteenth century, when literacy became more generalized, the 
designation “man of letters”7 started to take on a wider meaning, such as 
a “specialist” or a person earning a living writing “as an intellectual” about 
literature, although not actually a creator before encountering designations 
such as essayist, journalist and critic, among others. According to tradi-
tion, it was George Clemenceau who used the term for the first time, in 
1898, although the topic had been mentioned since the Enlightenment.8 
Henceforth, the class of intellectuals has proven its social importance due 
to its participation in art, politics, media and education, and the universi-
ties have been seen as centers of intellectuality in spite of the fact that some 
intellectuals may be anti-academic. After these references to the concept 
6 This term was applied in France in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries to 
citizens of the so-called République des Lettres, which later evolved into the salons that 
were generally organised by women as also happened in Portugal with the salon of the 
famous Marquesa de Alorna.
7 According to Michel Winock (2001), the idea that men of letters belonged to an 
elite and had duties towards society is fundamentally aristocratic and has been inher-
ited from philosophers of the Enlightenment.
8 Julien Benda, in his well-known La Trahison des Clercs (1928), used the term 
“clercs”, which he defined as “those who speak of the world in a transcendental way”, 
but in the English translation of 1969 the title was The Treason of the Intellectuals, thus 
indicating how there seemed to have occurred an evolution in the word chosen to 
designate the intelligentsia, which passed from the medieval copyists to the designation 
adopted nowadays.
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of intellectual, I now proceed by briefly defining the expression “public in-
tellectual”, which forms part of the title of this essay. We can even, as Toril 
Moi did in her famous text entitled “What’s a Woman?” (Moi 1999), also try 
to define the concept of woman about which Simone de Beauvoir (deemed 
one of the first female public intellectuals), among others, so reflected exten-
sively, mainly in her classic work Le Deuxième Sexe. Concerning this topic, as 
is also well-known, it takes a long time to really change a society and, con-
sidering the situation of women, we have only to recall that they were only 
granted the right to vote in the twentieth century. One has to understand 
that there is a difference between intellectually believing in something and 
to feel it in one’s conscience and, consequently, to actually change women’s 
living conditions would require several generations living in equality. The 
changes nowadays taking place are related to the fact that there is a great 
workforce of feminine professionals constituted by brilliant women who are 
bankers, lawyers, etc. On the other hand, there is still a lack of women in the 
leading places at the top of political and academic hierarchies. Furthermore, 
it also still remains difficult for women to be highly qualified cultural com-
mentators unless they are specialists on feminist issues.
The expression “public intellectual” has been added rather recently to the 
vocabulary of cultural debate and, as both Edward Saïd and Stefan Collini 
claim, respectively in their works Representations of the Intellectual (1994) and 
Absent Minds: Intellectuals in Britain (2007), it is a problematic expression. 
As a matter of fact, we might consider all intellectuals should be classified 
as “public” at least because their works have been published or because they 
speak for major audiences, which, in practice, is not always the case. Jeffrey 
C. Alexander, in his work The Civil Sphere (2006), claims intellectuals play a 
fundamental role in modern societies. He argues that the first public sphere 
appeared in Athens with the iconic figure of Socrates. Later, the Jewish-
Christian concept of prophetic judgment was added to these secular origins.9 
According to Alexander, public intellectuals criticize society in the name of 
solidarity, which is implied in the public sphere, and they must be understood 
in the accomplishment of their declarations about the power of truth. The 
political traditions of the revolutionary, the reformer, the conservative and 
9 According to Max Weber (1993), prophets are the religious equivalent to intel-
lectuals for he describes them as charismatic figures who speak personally and with 
divine authority.
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the counter-revolutionary have all contributed to this expressive figure 
as well as the ‘personage’ of the public psycho-therapist launched by 
Freud.10
In contemporary times, the designation “public intellectual” started be-
ing used in the United States even though it entered everyday language in 
Europe only recently, and is, for instance, not greatly mentioned in France. 
When we refer to public intellectuals, it would seem that we are declaring 
not only the usefulness of the word “intellectual” but that it applies to those 
playing a role in public life. Although this debate is more frequent in the 
United States, it is also discussed in Europe and among the multiple dec-
larations made on the subject there are two which persistently stand out: 
one holding that public intellectuals are either in decline or even extinct; 
and the other that, divergently, considers we have reached a stage in which 
their reappearance is particularly necessary. These two modes of thinking 
are related to the changes which occurred in the twentieth century and 
which have affected the way in which we consider the public sphere and, 
consequently, the type of influence a “public intellectual” can have. These 
alterations are connected to the growth in media power, the development 
of new information technologies, the reduction in state financial support 
for universities and, simultaneously, their being under the influence of busi-
ness and corporate interests resulting in the fact that there is less legitimacy 
and reliability on the ever smaller number of writers and academics that 
wish to be designated “intellectuals”. On the other hand, there are also 
tensions between the terms “intellectual”, “writer” and “academic”, which 
are more evident now due to the number of journalists that have recently 
taking to acting like “public intellectuals”. On the other hand, it is worth 
mentioning that Dan Drezner argues that those who cry for the death of 
the public intellectual are wrong for, in his opinion, the intellectual is as 
important nowadays as the giants of the past , for, with the blogs, an ever 
larger audience opened up to them.11
10 According to this tradition, which goes back to Freud and Jung and now runs to 
Erik Erikson and Jacques Lacan, these therapists/prophets, acting as public therapists, 
tried to save our civilization. 
11 Dan Drezner (2008) declares that blogs have provided a larger public, that the 
explosion of think tanks in the last thirty years, a sinecure for intellectuals, and that the 
Internet has been a boon for the divulgement of their opinions.
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Regarding female public intellectuals, it is worth mentioning that, in the 
twentieth century, when explicit discrimination blocked not only the en-
trance of many women to university but also their applying for financially 
attractive student scholarships and for educational and editorial functions 
which were highly considered and would open up the doors of the artis-
tic and literary world to them, there appeared, all over the world, many 
brilliant female writers and women who participated in the public sphere 
and – and following the example of Simone de Beauvoir – combined an 
unbending spirit with the will to get involved in debates about the great po-
litical, social and cultural issues, thus reaching out to a public that was not 
exclusively constituted by academics. We still nowadays read their books 
and recall their names, as is the case with Virginia Woolf, Gertrude Stein, 
Simone Weil, Mary McCarthy, Iris Murdoch, Hannah Arendt and Susan 
Sontag. These public intellectuals presented their ideas to everyone in gen-
eral and their texts were published in popular journals, magazines and easy 
reading books and not only in scientific academic periodicals and written 
in hermetic jargon as is so often the case nowadays. 
Feminists have overthrown most of the old patriarchal premises and 
motivated the search for new formulations about the way gender rela-
tionships are approached and they have also altered our perception and 
duties towards the environment. However, as public intellectuals, they 
also have relevant social functions, in spite of the fact that what they 
can do in a society depends on the form that society welcomes their ideas 
and on their access to governmental elites and that is also evident in the 
way the public12 often criticizes them. Female intellectuals have always 
had to fight to be considered real intellectuals. In England, in the eight-
eenth century, they were called bluestockings13 and compared to dogs 
that walked on their back paws. In the nineteenth century, they were told 
12 The topic of what the public actually is has been debated since John Dewey 
published The Public and its Problems (1927), in which he tried to answer to Walter 
Lippman’s The Phantom Public (1925), where the author questioned if there was a 
public of democratic citizens or if the public was “a ghost”. Dewey took the optimistic 
point of view that the public had potential and that it would become a coherent group 
while attacking technology as it constituted a motif for distraction from more impor-
tant issues. 
13 The designation was due to the fact that, at the time, blue stockings were worn 
informally while elegantly attired women should wear black silk stockings.
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their ovaries would atrophy if they continued to direct their precious vital 
energies to the brain. 
In terms of the relevance of feminine voices in the public sphere, we 
should mention that while men of letters have traditionally acquired in-
fluential positions as public intellectuals, some women started to play that 
role in the twentieth century, as mentioned above. We may wonder about 
what induced them to speak out and also about the way they “developed” 
their voices as well as why they are still less numerous than male intel-
lectuals. One of the justifying theories for the lack of female public in-
tellectuals argues that they approach their work from an openly feminist 
standpoint and they focus only on matters which concern women, such 
as their rights or interests. This characteristic removes them even further 
from the public in general because debating different topics is considered 
to be the symbol of a public intellectual. The restructuration of the public 
sphere in order to include feminine voices has become necessary because 
public life only considers intellectual discourse and attributes status to civic 
and state matters, thus denying the relevance of concerns with everyday 
issues and ignoring their connection to activities performed in the private 
domain. Consequently, the domestic sphere, the world of family, of nature, 
of love and emotion are considered inferior to the public sphere, where 
only reason, objectivity and power count. The word “public” used to qualify 
“intellectual” implies this emphasis on social and civic matters and denies 
the relevance of the private area in life, thus defining the theme and the 
topography of its discourse. As a consequence, women have been absent as 
contributors to public thought and their narratives, knowledge and experi-
ence have been marginalized in the leading and prestigious media.
This social role of public intellectuals implies they have the skill to con-
vey ideas to an audience which has been enlarged through the media, the 
press and the movies and is mainly constituted of an educated elite. This 
convergence with the public sphere separates academics from public intel-
lectuals and, according to Pierre Bourdieu, it is the general public divulge-
ment of information outside their immediate area of expertise that allows 
an academic to become one of them. Although Frank Furedi (2004) argues 
that intellectuals are not defined by their works but by the way they act, by 
how they see themselves and by the values they defend, they are, however, 
often defined by the fact that they bring controversial topics into the public 
debate.
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As regards specifically female public intellectuals, an issue that has 
already been raised by Virginia Woolf in Three Guineas (1938), it is 
related to the way women can keep themselves independent from the 
institutions responsible for perpetuating male domination and for the 
group dynamics which is marked by gender in intellectual life. It is ir-
refutable that, when compared to their male mates, it has been much 
more difficult for women to be considered public intellectuals and, rath-
er than only saying they are few in number, we should perceive that, for 
multiple reasons, they are ignored while their masculine counterparts 
instead obtain the coveted title. Women were absent from this area 
due to structural issues and it was only recently that they were able to 
distinguish themselves at universities in order to become recognized 
as “experts”, which was apparently a pre-requisite for them to become 
public intellectuals. 
In this essay, I refer to the history of a group that emerges from the 
community and is constituted by contemporary Portuguese female in-
tellectuals, whose lives and activities in the above mentioned cultural 
areas are a real and inspiring legacy to every woman in their country. 
Their acting as “Disquieting Muses” who, with a vibrant energy, try 
to improve the world through their examples and also to “disquiet” it 
– thus contributing to a generalized awareness about what should be 
done to change it – constitutes a link in a living and relevant chain. 
Descriptions of their activities are expected to motivate, inspire, chal-
lenge and encourage other women to follow their examples – for each of 
their narratives contains a specific message – and to live their lives in a 
positive, committed and stimulating mode and to abandon the allegedly 
“feminine” topographies of self-criticism, lack of confidence and doubt 
about their own capacities. 
Aware that the concept of culture has changed and that it is no longer 
studied as an object or as a coherent and restricted field of meaning and 
that, instead of analyzing an object in the world, we should clearly investi-
gate the mediation processes through which meanings are selected and or-
ganized, thus using culture as a mediator for every aspect of human behav-
ior. Consequently, my analysis necessarily had to be cultural and I deploy 
analytical concepts derived from social feminist movements all the more 
so because in every representative case that I refer to there are concerns 
with social justice and with liberation both in the intellectual production 
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and in the human aspect of scientific or artistic activity, which leads all the 
“Disquieting Muses” seeking to improve and perfect the world.14
Concerning the methodology I followed in my research, due to the fact 
that both the subject and the objects of study are women and also to my in-
terest in “multidimensional” investigations, I selected the theory of intersec-
tionality that reveals and examines the different categories of discrimination 
that are culturally constructed and interact at several levels, thus contribut-
ing to systematic social inequality. According to this theory, classic models of 
oppression in society, such as those based on race/ethnicity, gender, religion, 
nationality, sexual orientation, class or disability, do not act independently of 
each other and are, instead, interrelated, thus creating a system of oppression 
that reflects the “intersection” of several forms of discrimination. Although 
this is a relevant paradigm for sociological and cultural studies, it has been 
difficult to apply its full capacity. The difficulties encountered stem from the 
multiple complexities involved in generating the “multidimensional concep-
tualizations” able to explain the way the differentiated categories interact to 
create a social hierarchy. Intersectionality claims, for instance, that knowing 
a woman lives in a sexist society is not enough information to describe her 
way of living and we must also be aware of her race, sexual orientation and 
class as well as her society’s attitude in view of those distinctive and char-
acterizing traits. This theory also suggests that the forms and expressions of 
oppression do not determine themselves mutually and, therefore, in order to 
understand the “racialization”15 processes of oppressed groups, we have to 
investigate how that structure, its systems and social representations are also 
formed by gender, class and sexuality. This theory started as an analysis of the 
oppression of women in society but, nowadays, sociologists are trying to apply 
it to everyone and to the many different intersections of group membership. 
In terms of the historical context of the theory of intersectionality, a 
thorough study of its development has yet to be carried out but based on 
14 This attitude reminds us of the Hebrew expression tikkun olam – meaning to help 
“to perfect the world”, creating a model society in which we are all responsible for the 
others – which is used by contemporary activists whether they are Jews or not.
15 The term “racialization” refers to the processes of discursive production of racial 
identities. It implies the extension of dehumanizing and racist meanings to a relation-
ship, social practice or group that previously was not racially classified. Summing up, a 
group of individuals is seen as a “race” that previously was not thus considered. 
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the limited documentation available, we know the concept was impor-
tant in sociological circles in 1970s together with the multi-racial feminist 
movement. It emerged as part of the criticism of radical feminism known 
as “feminist revisionist theory” and challenging the notion that gender was 
the main factor that determined the fate of a woman. It was defended by 
women of color who contested the idea that “woman” was a homogeneous 
category sharing essentially the same life experiences because they thought 
that white middle class women did not correspond to a correct represen-
tation of the whole feminist movement and that the form of oppression 
they suffered was different from that experienced by black, poor or disabled 
women. Therefore, they tried to understand how gender, race and class, 
when intermixed, “shaped the destiny of women”. Leslie McCall, an impor-
tant intersectionality theorist,16 claims the introduction of this theory was 
of vital importance for sociology and declares that, before its launch, there 
was almost no research specifically devoted to the experiences of people 
who are submitted to multiple forms of subordination in society.
The expression “Theory of Intersectionality” was created by Kimberlé 
Crenshaw in 1989 and gained in profile in 1990 when the sociologist Pa-
tricia Hill Collins reintroduced the idea as part of her discussion about 
feminism in the United States thus contributing to increasing the gen-
eral applicability of her theory – that previously was more appropriate to 
African-American females – to all other women. Like Crenshaw, Collins 
defends the idea that the “patterns of oppression” are not only inter-related 
but are also influenced by every intersectional system in society (Collins 
2000, 42). According to Black feminists, and also to some white, the ex-
periences of class, gender and sexuality can only be properly understood 
when the influences of “racialization” we incorporate arguing that an un-
16 The term is theoretically and historically connected with the concept of “simulta-
neity” which was presented by the Combahee River Collective, a Black feminist organi-
zation active in Boston between 1974 and 1980, in what is known as the “Combahee 
River Collective Statement”, a key document in the history of Black feminism. The 
women in this group became aware that their lives and modes of resistance to op-
pression were profoundly marked by the simultaneous influences of their race, class, 
gender and sexuality and promoted a new understanding of African-American experi-
ences that challenges the analysis emerging from Black male social movements as well 
as those made by white feminist and heterosexual middle class interest groups of the 
dominant culture.
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derstanding of intersectionality is a crucial factor for achieving political and 
social equality. Collins in her theory defines intersectionality as “the focal 
point where two or more exceptionally powerful and dominant systems of 
oppression come together” and asserts that many people live with a com-
plex set of privileges in some areas and of oppression in others. She refers to 
the different intersections of social inequality as the “domination matrix” 
while G. Ritzer designates them as “vectors of oppression and privilege” 
(Ritzer 2007, 204). These terms show how the differences between people 
may be used as measures that oppress women and in the end change their 
life experiences. This analysis concludes that society is too complex to be 
reduced to finite categories and defends a holistic approach in the under-
standing of intersectionality. Patricia Collins’s theory is also designated as 
standpoint theory and it contends to represent the world from a particular 
socially situated point of view that claims epistemic privilege or authority.17 
The theoretical basis of this approach involves the notion that a perspec-
tive is the only vision of the world through which we have knowledge of 
society from our specific geographical location. On the other hand, knowl-
edge obviously becomes unique and subjective and it varies according to 
the social conditions in which it was produced. 
In my research, I also refer to feminist epistemology and to the philoso-
phy of science that study the ways in which gender exercises – or should 
exercise – influence on our conceptions of knowledge, on the cognitive 
subject and on the research practices and their justification. Indeed, these 
identify the manner in which our approaches and core conceptions and 
the attribution, acquisition and justification of the practices of knowledge 
systematically wrong women and other subordinate groups, and therefore 
they fight in order to be able to reformulate these conceptions and prac-
tices so that they may instead serve their interests. Several defenders of 
feminist epistemology and of the philosophy of science claim that the domi-
nant knowledge practices are disadvantageous to women because they ex-
clude them from research, deny them epistemological authority, defame 
their cognitive styles, which are considered “feminine”, and their modes 
17 A ‘perspectivist’ theory should specify: the social location of the privileged per-
spective, the scope of the privilege, the aspect of the social location that produces high-
er knowledge, the basis of its privilege, the type of epistemological superiority and other 
perspectives and means of access. 
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of knowledge. They claim that the theories those practices produce about 
women represent them as inferior and abnormal or as being important only 
when serving male interests, elaborating theories about social phenomena 
that render female activities and pursuits – or the power relations connect-
ed to gender – invisible and promoting knowledge (in the field of science 
and technology) that is not useful to those in subordinate positions, thus 
reinforcing gender and social hierarchies. 
Feminist epistemologists attribute these failures to the imperfect con-
ceptions of knowledge and to the scientific objectivity and methodology 
and seek to explain how such flaws can be surmounted and the reason 
whythe entrance of female researchers in the different areas, especially in 
biology and the social sciences, raised new questions, theories and meth-
ods and demonstrated how gender has had a role in these transformations 
while also defending these changes as social and cognitive improvements. 
The central concept of feminist epistemology is the notion of a situated 
knower and, therefore, of “situated knowledge”, that is, knowledge that 
reflects the specific perspectives of the subject with feminist philosophers 
interested in the way gender situates the cognitive subjects. They have 
three main approaches to this issue which are the standpoint theory, femi-
nist post-modernism and feminist empiricism. The different conceptions of 
the way gender situates the “knowers” also impact on the way feminists ap-
proach the principal problems in this area, such as: the setting up of femi-
nist criticism of science and of feminist science, the definition of the right 
roles of social and political values in research, the evaluation of the ideals 
of objectivity and rationality and the reformulation of the epistemological 
authority structures. Feminist epistemology perceives the knower as “situ-
ated” especially in relation to what is known and to other experts. It claims 
that people can understand the same object in different ways that reflects 
their diverse relationships with it. Due to their different physical locations, 
the observers who are in front of an object obtain different information 
from who are those far away and frequently represent it in relationship to 
their emotions, attitudes and interests and, as they have different styles of 
research and representation, they form distinct opinions about that same 
object, so we can conclude that human experience is relative to the point 
of view from which it is felt. Feminist epistemology seeks to provide a rep-
resentation of the social world in relation to universal human interests thus 
defying the perspective of the privileged that represents social phenomena 
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only in view of the interests of its class and puts forward these benefits as if 
coinciding with universal interests. It is, indeed, a critical theory – as critical 
as that presented by the Frankfurt School theoreticians, from Adorno to Haber-
mas – whose aim is to confer power on the oppressed so they may improve 
their situation and, therefore, represents the social world in accordance 
with their interests.
Throughout this essay I have referred to the place of the feminine sub-
ject in different areas of action and provided a brief critical analysis of femi-
nist epistemologies and some of their implications, considering the perspec-
tive, or standpoint, from which a person, or a selected group, sees the world 
and its problems at a certain moment in history. I furthermore referenced 
several female intellectuals who act in different fields of knowledge and put 
forward their perspectives on specific ways of contributing towards improv-
ing the world. Considering their agency, I am reminded of Gilles Deleuze’s 
wise words in his preface to Mille Plateaux (1980) 18 when he speaks of the 
rhizome19 and of the fact that the study of a theme is enriched when we 
gather together several points of view about it. Deleuze says that the rhi-
zome is a “stem” and not an “upright root”, as we have when we work in the 
scope of a scientific field. As it is a stem, we do not know how it is going to 
develop as it shall do so randomly and we also ignore its basic axis of growth 
as this will diversify, or as Deleuze says: “it will be gesticulating to one side 
and the other” and those different shafts will intersect and complement 
one another. We could thus consider that each “Disquieting Muse” that 
I mentioned, with her own epistemological identity, inherent to a space 
of scientific or artistic production, corresponds to a shaft of the Deleuzian 
rhizome and willcorrespondingly bequeath a unique and special legacy for 
the cultural development of her country.
18 Antonio Negri, the famous author of Empire, classifies this work as “the most 
important philosophical text of the twentieth century”.
19 In botany, a rhizome is a characteristically horizontal stem of a plant that is usu-
ally found underground, often sending out roots and shoots from its nodes. Nowadays it 
is a philosophical concept developed by Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari in their Capi-
talism and Schizophrenia (1972-1980) project. Deleuze calls it an “image of thought”, 
based on the botanical rhizome, which apprehends multiplicities.
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INTELLECTUALS AND THE FORMATION OF 
CULTURAL MEMORY:
NARRATORS OF THE, CONSTRUCTORS OF 
DENTITY
inês esPada vieira
In 1998, the Mário Soares and Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Foundations joint-
ly organised a highly important conference in Lisbon on the democratic 
transitional process in Spain. Besides the Portuguese speakers and their 
historical and juridical reflection on the Transition, the contributions from 
the “Spanish protagonists”, included, among others, the historical leader 
of the Spanish Communist Party, Santiago Carrillo,1 Gregorio Monreal, 
founder of the Basque Nationalist Party, and the former Secretary General 
of the UGT, Nicolás Redondo. According to their 1998 speeches, it would 
seem that the left was genuinely pacified by the negotiated nature of the 
Transition.2
Over a decade on, we find society and politics no longer experience 
this climate of forgetfulness that still prevailed in 1998. Regardless of the 
purposes underpinning the position taken by each of the political actors 
1 On the Transition, Santiago Carrillo stated at the time: “(…) what distinguishes 
this transition from others is that it was the result of a meeting, an agreement, a con-
sensus between what was the democratic opposition and those who were the so-called 
reformists of the National Movement. I think this meeting is a truly unique moment 
in the history of our country, a meeting which enables us to go from a dictatorship 
to a democracy without great upset, and which also enables us to begin to overcome 
the history of the two Spains. (…) [The transition] was neither the work of the il-
lustrious Francoists nor was it a popular revolution. It was, I repeat, a great national 
agreement”(Herrero de Miñon 1999, 47).
2 Nevertheless, the former Prime Minister Felipe González, also a participant in the 
aforementioned conference, had already warned against the existence of certain divi-
sive questions: “(...) In Portugal there is a date and a symbol of change. In Spain no-one 
can say when the transition begins. Yet, with the situation we have now, no-one can 
say when it will end either. Some widely-read authors with great authority claim that 
we are in the second transition” (Herrero de Miñon 1999, 51). 
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involved in the transitional process, this conciliatory approach did not de-
finitively hold perhaps because, as Aleida Assman put it in her essay “From 
Collective Violence to a Common Future: Four Models for Dealing with 
a Traumatic Past” (Assman 2010), silence may be a remedy but it is not a 
cure as it does not function in situations where the perpetrator is clearly 
stronger than the victims.
In this essay, Assman considers the case of the Spanish Civil War as 
a complex example of the oldest of her four proposals3: dialogic forgetting. 
Forgetting serves as a pragmatic recourse that societies deploy so as to be 
able to move forward in the aftermath of a traumatic event: “(…) self-
imposed dialogic silence is a model for peace designed and agreed upon 
by two parties that had engaged in violence in order to keep an explosive 
past at bay” (Assman 2010, 10). According to this author, this strategy of 
forgetting is very often found in conjunction with an amnesty enabling 
the burying of past hatreds and the attainment of a new social balance. 
Nevertheless, Assman maintains that in Spain the “amnesia and amnesty” 
formula only worked for the Francoist side because of what she calls asym-
metrical memory (ibid.11) – a memory that results from the prevalence of 
the victor’s narrative. The author even considers the Transition’s pacto del 
olvido (pact of silence) a unilateral pact. Furthermore, she adds that Law 
52/2007 introduced the republican version of the Civil War, thus bring-
ing an “abrupt” end to this pact. Precisely these aspects have given rise to 
controversy, because there is a significant section of society that does not 
take part in what they consider an extemporaneous debate on the past. 
There is no rigid clash between former Francoists and former Republicans 
on this matter. Much of the opposition to Francoism was, seven decades 
on from the end of the war, comfortable with the options taken in 1975-
1978. Moreover, drawing the conclusion today that the Transition pacts 
were imposed unilaterally might also be unfair, particularly bearing in mind 
the political and moral temperament of the key figures. 
3 Here, Aleida Assman systematically sets out four models for dealing with trau-
matic pasts: dialogic forgetting, or the pact of silence; remembering in order to prevent 
forgetting; remembering in order to forget and dialogic remembering.
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Whatever explanation we accept for the origin of the current situation, 
there can be no doubt that the Civil War and Francoism are at the centre of 
the Spanish public debate in institutions, such as the national parliament, 
as well as in informal circles, such as the media. In our view, the present 
discussion has been profoundly radicalised across all levels of reflection.
We would like to suggest that nowadays the memory of the Civil War 
and of Francoism is a dual and bipartisan memory. Two opposing narratives 
of this past coexist in society, both of them exercised under the umbrella of 
“historical memory”: one anchored within it and the other in contrast to it. 
The very term “historical memory” distinguishes the before from the after, 
as a means of dealing with the 20th century in Spain. The concept arouse 
out of a demand for the re-evaluation of the past from the standpoint of 
the Republican victims of the Civil War that had thus far been officially 
spurned. Symptomatically, the terms “memory” and/or “historical memory” 
have never once appeared in the parliamentary debates leading up to the 
enactment of the Amnesty Law in 1977 (see Aguilar 2008).
In this respect we follow Jan Assman (2004, 2007) and maintain that 
the memory of 20th-century Spain should be approached culturally and 
not be burdened down with the weight of judgement implicit to “historical 
memory”. A cultural reading of the subject enables us, like Jan Assman sug-
gests, to reach beyond a communicative and experiential memory, which is 
bound up with the question of witnessing and necessarily carries an expiry 
date. 
The two versions of historical memory create distinctly different objects 
and recreate them according to new perspectives. As cultural products, 
each object – tangible or intangible – represents an individual or a collec-
tive text, thereby susceptible to a foundational mythical meaning. However, 
cultural memory, as set out by Jan Assman, does not posit the question of 
difference between myth and history as it is interested less in historical facts 
than in history as it is remembered, i.e., the memories of this past. Accord-
ingly, we believe that, while always presented from a dualistic perspective, 
the memory of the Civil War is also a cultural memory. Memory moves from 
the historical events towards remembrance of the preterit moment and, 
after being thus transformed into myth, it illuminates the present, begin-
ning with its origins (Assman 2007, 52). Such dynamics works for the two 
dominant contrasting positions: the Civil War as an original myth serves 
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to understand, identify and justify the present, regardless of which side the 
individual or the group takes up.
Quite deliberately, we do not refer to two memories but rather to 
two narratives or a double memory. In our understanding, the cultural 
memory of the Spanish Civil War is inclusive, and duplicity forms part 
of its essence. What we cannot anticipate is the way in which the de-
bate shall unfurl or how memory will evolve over the course of time. 
The relics (Lowenthal 1985), the places of memory (Nora 1984), the 
“mnesic” marks (Todorov 2002) are contingent and circumstantial and 
do not enable any prediction of the future. We may, however, question 
in what way the disappearance of witnesses to the events will influ-
ence the understanding of the past when it is no longer viewed as the 
property of those who lived it and has become the exclusive heritage of 
individuals biographically separated from those times. This change may 
not be felt from the point of view of cultural memory, which, as we have 
seen, privileges not the specific historical events but rather what is re-
membered of them. As highlighted by Ricoeur (2000), memory defines 
itself by the presence of the past in the mind and also by the search for 
that presence. This does not necessarily relate to a past experienced by 
the subject; it may also relate to a past interpreted by the individual as 
a member of a specific group and therefore a participant in a collective 
memory.
Another important aspect of cultural memory is the identification of 
the individuals responsible for conveying this memory and extending it 
beyond an exclusively generational transmission, i.e., from parents to chil-
dren, which Ricoeur associates with the duty of memory (2000). Jan Ass-
man (2007) identifies different bearers of memory (spezielle Träger) that 
may or may not hold a direct relationship with the past they convey. The 
carrier of a particular cultural memory is no witness to the facts, is inde-
pendent of institutions holding political and economic significance and, 
like the subject matter making up this memory, is on a different plane, far 
from the demands of the daily situation – a plane which is in a way superior 
to and beyond mundane daily realities.
Members of the clergy, professors, writers, and the learned in general 
are, according to Jan Assman, the carriers of cultural memory. Based upon 
this affirmation, we may attempt to define intellectuals and their role as 
agents of memory. Due to chronology, the men gathered in Burgos, in the 
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media and propaganda services of Franco, do not correspond to the strict 
definition of spezielle Träger put forward by Jan Assman. Nevertheless, we 
may perceive their actions as protagonists in history and their importance 
as narrators of the past and builders of identity, aware that men are witness-
es conditioned by their own experiences and by a very particular context in 
the history of Spain and Europe.
We understand European Modernity as an aporia, the constant hesita-
tion and tension between two opposing sides of the same self, i.e. Moder-
nity as a “paradoxical”4 reality, within which the illuminating creations of 
art, technique, progress, reason and humanity (Bohrer 2008) coexist with a 
dark (Corm 2009) and catastrophic side (Gil 2008a). This paradox achieves 
its most dramatic expression in the support lent by some intellectuals to to-
talitarian ideologies. In truth, the aesthetic appeal of Nazism and fascism 
was immense to those in the intellectual and aesthetic vanguards. Imbued 
with a search for the new, for purity, rigour and totality, vanguardists found 
in totalitarianism yet another means for artistic expression, namely the aes-
thetics of the absolute. The testimony of yet another “betrayal by the cler-
ics” (adopting and de-territorialising the expression from the argument put 
forward by Benda (1927) sets down, according to Lepenies, the end of two 
illusions. First, that a higher morality supposedly inherent to the artistic 
and intellectual fields might work as a protective shield from Nazism, and 
secondly, that the Third Reich was against Modernity, when in fact it pro-
moted Modernity (see Lepenies 2008, 380). The Nazi and fascist totalitari-
anisms were peculiarly but also quite straightforwardly modern: the new, the 
vertical, the brotherhood, technology were all the rage. Herf (1984) terms 
the particular case of Nazi Germany “reactionary modernism”, in which 
4 Baudelaire is considered to have invented Modernity. According to Jorge Fazenda 
Lourenço, Modernity is not a victory over the old, it rather derives from the certain-
ty that tradition is a necessary condition for the existence of the new (see Lourenço 
2008, 11). In a short but very interesting text opening up the volume on Baudelaire e 
as posteridades do moderno, Fazenda Lourenço characterises Baudelaire’s modernity as 
“paradoxical”. The same adjective appears in texts by other authors. In the studies on 
Baudelaire and aesthetic Modernity this interpretation does not imply monotony but 
rather unavoidable evidence of dissonance as referred to by Isabel Capeloa Gil: “The 
dissonance of modernism is certainly its most consensual trait.” Correspondingly, Gil 
declares her conviction that “modernism is in fact a misnomer.” (Gil 2008b, 186) More 
than modernism, we should rather be talking of modernisms (ibid. 186-187).
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a völkisch tradition combines the signing up to modern technology with a 
rejection of liberal Modernity. This concept may be used to look afresh at 
the ambiguity of European Modernity.
The Spanish vanguard was born, alive and strong, in the very heart 
of the Primo de Rivera dictatorship (1923-1930). Mechthild Albert even 
terms 1925 as an annus mirabilis, in which diverse cultural manifestations 
“suggest that the Spanish vanguard will include a certain epigonality among 
its basic traits” (Albert 2002, 22). This same author perceives the Span-
ish case as exceptional and eclectic, observing how it is less about action 
and more about aesthetics: “With regard to Spain, a series of disconcerting 
contradictions, paradoxes and ambivalences are the sign of a problematic 
Modernity” (ibid. 23). 
The totalitarian agenda fitted perfectly the spirit of the vanguard and in 
Spain Ernesto Giménez Caballero (1899-1988) is a paradigmatic example of 
this. He was director of the La Gaceta Literaria — a journal first published 
on 1 January 19275 which soon became a meeting point for the Spanish van-
guard — and was also one of the first fascist ideologues. His example repre-
sents the benchmark as far as individual roles within the vanguard of fascism 
are concerned. The route taken by Giménez Caballero may be read literally 
from his works and activities both as a cultural figure and an editor. His Genio 
de España. Exaltaciones a una resurrección nacional y del mundo (1932) went 
on to become an ideological guide to the fascist takeover of Spain6 and is still 
considered by many as the foundational text of Spanish fascism. In this work, 
fascism is put forward as the ideology that will lead to the desired renewal of 
the Fatherland – a renewal inspired by the values of Catholicism and Empire 
based on the conviction of the universal mission of the Spanish race as the 
oracle of the world (Giménez Caballero 1983, 196 and 203).
5The date served to signal the baptism of the Generation of 27. In Memorias de un 
dictador he writes: “La Gaceta was the precursor to the Vanguard in Literature, Art and 
Politics. A policy that for two years was unifying and spiritual and from 1930 divergent, 
since the youth were becoming more politicized. And those who inspired communism 
and fascism in Spain arose from La Gaceta.”(Giménez Caballero 1981, 66).
6 In a note in the third edition of 1938, the author has already recognised the suc-
cess of his work and his exaltations: “(…) in it are the seeds of almost all the Termino-
logical and conceptual warring material of our Movement.
Up to the point where this book has been considered – both within and beyond 
Spain – as the spiritual justification of our Cause.”(Giménez Caballero 1983, 9).
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The process of winning over the crowds went down just as well in the 
masses as it did in the elites. However, contrary to the masses, the elites 
held a responsibility. As Ortega y Gasset had already asked in 1922: “Are 
there no men or are there no masses?” (Ortega 1999, 79 et seq.). In these 
early essays on the “invertebration” of Spain, the philosopher placed the 
onus of the issue very much on the masses (ibid. 84-85). 
Looking back nowadays, we are drawn to the conclusion that the intel-
lectuals have become diluted in the masses; they have also revealed the 
fragile nature of their spirit when confronted with the power of ritual and 
staged scenario. The same discourses, the same marches, the same volk-
lore, the same “teatro de las autopistas” seduced both the masses and the 
intellectuals. Politics made art was, in Lepenies’ words, when referring to 
Gottfried Benn, an 
art which had transferred all its morals into form, which had justified 
the world as a pure aesthetic phenomenon, [Benn] allowed himself 
to be seduced by a power which represented politics as a movement 
and the State as a work of art which, once again using the words of 
its promoter Alfred Rosenberg, described the “German will” as an 
“aesthetic will” (Lepenies 2008, 384).
The fact that erudite minds had been swept along by the current (while 
we should note that not all these minds let themselves be caught up)7 is yet 
another chapter in the history of the “betrayal by the clerics”.8 
7 In an essay entitled “Fiction of the political: the dangerous liaisons of totalitarian(s) 
and the avant-garde”, Isabel Gil approaches “the permeability of some [our italics] van-
guardist ethics to politics”, discussing the cases of the involvement of Gottfried Benn 
with Nazism, Ezra Pound with Fascism and António Ferro with Salazarism; she also 
reflects on the relationship between political commitment and the aesthetic perfor-
mance of these authors (Gil 2003, 298). Furthermore, Wolf Lepenies affirms that only 
circumstances beyond their own will led some intellectuals away from Nazism: “After 
1934, many German intellectuals would have gladly remained fascists – if only the 
Nazis had tolerated it” (Lepenies 2006, 49).
8 As we saw above, it was Julien Benda who, in 1927, accused the intellectuals of 
descending from the heavenly realm of the mind to this profane world of politics. Lep-
enies (2008) entitles his two lessons dedicated to the “grateful collaboration” of intel-
lectuals with Fascism and Communism in Germany(ies) also as “betrayals by clerics”.
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If we look closely, the tertúlias (the cafe-bar discussion groups) during 
the dictatorship of General Miguel Primo de Rivera or during the Second 
Republic all present the same scenarios even if with different social in-
teractions. Mónica and Pablo Carbajosa (2003) examined closely the “lit-
erary court” of José Antonio Primo de Rivera, which operated according 
to a specifically informal and reciprocal schema. The “court” followed the 
leader and guide – the Führer, il capo – who would point the way to the 
construction of a fascist state, and, in his turn, the leader – in this case, 
José Antonio – found legitimacy for his action via the ideological support 
of “his” intellectuals.
This promiscuity between intellectuals and power, and the consequent 
lack of independence in creativity and thinking, constrained by a particular 
political vision and action, might call into question the actual definition of 
the intellectual. 
Although still unnamed, the intellectual existed prior to the designa-
tion (Juliá 1998 and Lepenies 2008), and was symbolically born out of the 
affaire Dreyfus, in France, at the end of the 19th century. Right from the 
outset, the intellectual emerged in connection to newspapers, and the 
concept acquired thereby some of its definitive characteristics: the sense 
of mission, of the struggle against injustice, the notion of belonging to a 
clarified elite and the need/demand for constant public intervention and 
acting upon society. Inherent to its emergence as a social category or as a 
leading actor in the public domain, the intellectual role was bound up with 
an elitist sense of a group apart and exceptional when compared to other 
individuals. There is a characteristic that remains transversal to both time 
and authors: the intellectual thinks, and this thinking must be free from all 
sorts of constraints. The intellectual struggles against injustices, fights for 
the truth (Juliá 2004a and 2004b), and acts in society by means of a vigilant 
mind that observes the state of the world. According to Lepenies (2008), 
the “melancholics” are intellectuals obsessed with reflection, chronically 
dissatisfied, and suffering from this vision of the world. Said (2004), in turn, 
resorts to the Arab terms muthaqqaf (man of culture) and mufakir (man of 
thinking) in order to stress the taxing dimension of erudition burdening the 
intellectual. In the wake of these proposals, we have to ask what is it that 
distinguishes the intellectual from the philosopher. The answer is: action. 
This action might take place at the theoretical level, with the intellectual 
presenting his thoughts (solutions) regarding the problems of the society 
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and the world of which he is part. Simultaneously, his acting is related to 
the daily reality and the educational and pedagogic action referred to by 
Winock (1999). In democratic societies, intellectuals have the task of be-
ing a counter-power (Winock 1999), or a counter-discourse (Said 2004), 
surveying and assessing public life.
Within the context of totalitarian regimes, however, the situation dif-
fers because of the absence of freedom and the intellectuals’ ideological 
and economic dependence on power, which inescapably conditions their 
actions. Thinking under Francoism (Marsal 1979) or under any other op-
pressive regime is an arduous testing of the will and the mind, especially 
when the intellectual is also a political militant.
The case of the Burgos group, politically led by Dionisio Ridruejo and 
morally by Pedro Laín Entralgo,9 is symptomatic of the adherence of a seg-
ment of the intellectual society to the cause of fascism in Spain. In our opin-
ion, their action was not limited to the propagandistic reproduction of politi-
cal ideas. The men of the Burgos group, forced to take side with the rebellious 
movement as a result of diverse situations, which were not always voluntary 
in nature, had a project for Spain doubly anchored in the modern and in the 
traditional. Together, they imagined a future for the Fatherland, essentially 
from a cultural point of view, which they projected in an extensive produc-
tion of essays and art, especially in what is known as the “national press”.
Taking into consideration the prevailing aesthetic, political and histori-
cal context, we would like to argue that, while on the “dark” side of his-
9 On 30 January 1938, with the Civil War already at an advanced stage, Franco 
established the first government of Nationalist Spain in Burgos, with Ramón Serrano 
Suñer as Minister of the Interior. The young Dionisio Ridruejo had been a rising star 
in the Spanish Falange since the times of José Antonio; the brilliant rhetoric and the 
visceral enthusiasm with which he embraced the causes of “the authentic Falange” had 
bestowed upon him an aura of great respect. Hence, it was no surprise that the new 
minister and old comrade, who had handed the Servicio Nacional de Prensa to José An-
tonio Giménez Arnau, would now ask him to head the Servicio Nacional de Propaganda. 
With Antonio Tovar in charge of Radio, Juan Cabanas of Plástica, García Viñolas y 
Goyanes of Cinematografia and Luis Escobar of Teatro, Ediciones was entrusted to Pedro 
Laín Entralgo who began to build what would later be the Editora Nacional. Laín was 
then joined by his “amigos para siempre” Antonio Macipe, Luis Rosales, Luis Felipe 
Vivanco, Gonzalo Torrente Ballester and, later, Carlos Alonso del Real y Melchor Fer-
nández Almagro.” (Juliá 2002, 6) (The quoted extract from Santos Juliá refers to the 
words of Pedro Laín in his memories Descargo de Conciencia, 1976).
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tory, the Falangist intellectuals in Spain were just that in every sense of 
the word: cultured thinkers, social actors, educators of the public domain 
and “melancholics”. It was precisely the omnipresent and self-demanding 
ethical dimension, the moral sentiment governing their intellectual com-
mitment and action that enabled them, at the peak of the most orthodox 
fascist enthusiasm, to gain a certain margin for freedom of thinking. Ac-
cordingly, such clear signs of openness would end up taking physical shape, 
in the aftermath of the war, in Escorial, the magazine project founded in 
1940. With Ridruejo as its director and Laín the vice-director, the Escorial 
members of staff, a “pure Falangist” group of “José Antonio flavour” (Juliá 
2002, 9), “produced a cultural magazine, born with and for the new State, 
although they aspired to temper the gloomy ignorance of granitic Franco-
ism” (Gracia 2004, 224). While overtly on the side of the winners and 
evoking a redemptory Falange, the editorial manifesto of the first issue had 
more inclusive goals. The new magazine was to contribute to the “re-es-
tablishing of an intellectual community” and to take form as the “residence 
and viewpoint of the Spanish intellectuals” (Escorial 1940, no. 1: 7-12). 
These broad-reaching objectives, together with the content of the issues 
subsequently published, demonstrate that, in the immediate post-war envi-
ronment and under extremely arid cultural conditions, “Pedro Laín Entral-
go and Dionisio Ridruejo undoubtedly fostered the creation of one of the 
first areas of intellectual communication.” (Marichal 1995, 314)10 Slowly 
accessing reality from the perspective of the viability of implementing their 
national project, they progressively distanced themselves from both Fran-
coism and the Falangist movement. Later on, when faced with the choice 
between dictatorship and the basic principles of intellectual activity, they 
would not hesitate in their decision (ibid.).
10 In the text by Gonzalo Torrente Ballester (1976), “Escorial en el recuerdo”, in the 
volume in honour of Dionisio Ridruejo: de la Falange a la oposición, the author provides 
a witness account of the animus behind the Escorial magazine project. Torrente states: 
“Escorial was, then, the only possible platform or launch pad for unpublished or still 
slightly well-known writers, who had started before the war, or during it, or who were 
starting at the shadowy dawn of the post-war period.” To the names of participants to 
a greater or lesser extent well known, Torrente adds the recollection of the reality of a 
peregrine Spain: “(…) to whom Ridruejo would willingly have added many of those who 
were on a “pilgrimage” around the world and from whom those who were in Escorial 
never felt disconnected” (Torrente Ballester 1976, 66-67).
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Hence, from our viewpoint, the notion of the intellectual extends be-
yond any ideological dichotomy between right and left. As stated above, 
there is an ethical dimension to intellectuality that is supra-ideological. 
Valuing then the moral approach, as so often did the Falangist intellectuals, 
was precisely what enabled the men of Burgos to evolve both individually 
and as a generation towards liberal and humanist positions. Therefore, re-
locating the intellectual should not be interpreted as a radical alternative 
to the classical notion of intellectual but rather as a contribution towards 
widening our understanding of Modernity as a multiple and paradoxical 
reality.
We can approach the history of the intellectuality in Spain through news-
papers, which are both privileged pulpits for intervention in the public space 
and a repository of accounts that allow for reconstructings of the past. Whether 
in cultural magazines or in the more orthodox national media outlets, it was 
through the press that the official Francoist intellectuals reached out to their 
audiences in the exercise of their intellectual pursuits (Ayala 1945). The press 
is a mirror of the collective memory and contributes towards building or de-
stroying this same memory (Cuesta 2008). Returning nowadays to the texts 
published by intellectuals from the right and the left during the Spanish Civil 
War as material memories (Zelizer 1998), is to take measure of the past and 
gain an insight into the ways this past is helping to shape the present. 
If we choose to read the articles published in the “national press” as his-
torical data, they will reveal a rhetorical commitment beyond mere circum-
stance, a dedicated ideological militancy and an endured reflection. How-
ever, the texts are not mere historical objects; they are cultural documents 
pertaining to the immaterial cultural memory of Spain. Nowadays, they are 
remembered more in the mythical and symbolical sense Jan Assman refers 
to than factually. They convey a narrative of the past that transcend the 
mere factuality of the texts and their contexts and participates in a broader 
model for constructing and representing Spanish identity. As we have seen, 
this (as all identities) is an identity in process, unstable without ever col-
lapsing, oscillating between the two narrative poles we have identified.
More than seven decades on from the Civil War, thirty-five years after 
what has been considered a most exemplary democratic transition, the act 
of looking back is still wrought up in contradictory impulses. On the one 
hand, the urgency of peace and reconciliation, and on the other the sheer 
326
perplexity resulting from two facts: a dictator died in his bed and over one 
hundred thousand persons are still missing. The debate about the past is 
also a debate about its protagonists: whether individuals or collectives, pub-
lic or anonymous, heroes or victims. Spurning a tendentially Manichaeistic 
dichotomy, we purpose a reading, without disguise or labelling, of the role 
of the intellectuals who supported Franco after 1936. Without renouncing 
our own circumstances or convictions, we consciously adopt the stance of a 
researcher who must continue to cross borders, seeking to redesign maps of 
reading and to contribute not only to a renewed understanding of the past 
but also to the construction of the future.
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THE DESACATO CULTURE – THE CULTURE OF 
DISOBEDIENCE*
Jordi gracia
This lecture was thought up quite intentionally as a space of reflection 
around the attempt to formulate some of the roles that the intellectual has 
played within the context of contemporary Europe, and quite specifically 
within the context of Spain as it emerges from its Civil War, on its way to 
suffer the exile of an absolutely striking percentage of professionals: intel-
lectuals, reporters, writers, poets, film-makers, architects, sculptors. It was 
genuinely devastating for Spanish internal culture, which had to endure 
the real circumstance of restarting an intellectual life after the triumph of 
Franco’s regime’s and, thus, and without doubt, after a triumph of a fascist 
nature.
But so many times we tend to – or the left-wing historiography has so 
many times tended to – equal or associate fascism to the absence of a cul-
tural life. And that is absurd. The Spanish culture of the 1940’s, 50’s and 
partly the 60’s was dominated by the Francoist – Franquista – dictatorship 
and, as such, in the first ten to fifteen years experienced the development 
of a fascist culture – which is to say the alliance, transitional in some cases, 
between fascism, literature and intellectual life. From the onset, post-war 
Spain was not a cultural desert. It was, on the contrary, the space of intel-
lectual fascist rule. What happens is that our analysis today of that stage 
tends to underline, in full right, the poverty, the error, the insolvency of 
that fascist cultural project. But that fascist cultural project was built by 
intellectuals who were at some point even front-line intellectuals.
I do not know if the name of a character such as Ernesto Giménez Ca-
ballero will sound familiar to you or not, a man who was, before the war, 
one of the key-figures in the Spanish avant-garde in the 1920’s and 30’s. He 
was a brilliant essayist, an importer of modern culture from contemporary 
*  This text is a transcript of a conference delivered in a seminar at Universidade 
Católica Portuguesa on February 18, 2011.
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Europe and the founder of nothing more and nothing less than the Gaceta 
Literaria in 1927, which is to say one of the main organs of the avant-garde 
in Spain. Paradoxically, he is simultaneously the first Spanish fascist. He 
is the first who in fact acts in full throttle as an ideologue of what is the 
triumphant ideology in Italy, Germany and, in some measure, Portugal after 
the beginning of Salazar’s dictatorship.
Is it a paradox? Is it something we cannot explain? Giménez Cabal-
lero was a writer deeply committed to Modernity, in aesthetic, creative, 
imaginative, plastic, textile terms – he was a man who wore blue garage-
mechanic overalls and worked in these clothes – and he is the same man 
who believes that the ideological and political expression of the future is 
the ideology of fascism and, then, by extention, a totalitarian, dictatorial 
system. How does this creative potency of Giménez Caballero fit in with 
his complete disbanding as a creator after 1939, from the moment when his 
own people have won onwards, from the very moment in which the Fran-
quista dictatorship is established and the war is won? Giménez Caballero 
is one of the victors, but he disappears off the map: his ability for cultural, 
intellectual, literary, creative production after the war, with the victory of 
Franco, is dissolved. Even those who were victors and felt themselves as 
falangists – falangistas – and fascists came to realize the unfeasibility of de-
veloping any form of aesthetic Modernity in Franco’s Spain.
The processes of institutionalization of a complex regime, as with any 
other, are slow and sinuous. What role can an intellectual play in the con-
text of a dictatorship that nurtures as one of its central obsessions regulat-
ing the trade of Modernity, repressing the presence of European Modernity 
and pre-war Modernity? How does an intellectual act in such a context? 
What type of conduct can he develop, whether he is conqueror or con-
quered? 
I am under the impression that the decisive element to understand the 
role that an intellectual can come to play in this context is related to the 
ability to dissociate that which is the political system in which he lives in 
and that which is his intellectual project as an intellectual and as a creator. 
What is meant by the ability to dissociate is the ability to understand that 
which motivates him, as a creator, is going to be annulled, overshadowed, 
or marginalized by the political system in which it exists. Suppressed, mar-
ginalized or overshadowed fundamentally because that intellectual’s pro-
ject cannot fit into a system of power that is, in the end, suffocating. Does 
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this mean that one has to admit the defeat of the intellectual function? 
Does this mean that one has to renounce going on working as an intellec-
tual? Does this mean one has to give in to the norms, to public criteria, to 
censorship and renounce, then, to plant some form of a seed of Modernity 
in the Franquista system? I feel that the best examples of creators, of intel-
lectuals with the ability to transform the different areas of post-war Spanish 
culture were born out of their own ability to resist power. But to resist does 
not mean to fight it, it means to bear it, it means to resign oneself to go on 
working, but in silence or secrecy. It means to go on believing that Ortega 
y Gasset is one of first intellectual figures of contemporary Spain and that 
Juan Ramón Jiménez is one of the great poets of contemporary Spain; and 
to go on believing that Luis Cernuda, or Rafael Alberti, or the architect Jo-
sep Lluís Sert continue to be the true front figures of contemporary Spain, 
even though they are all in exile, even if none of them have the authoriza-
tion to be published in Spain, even if none of their names can be read in 
the Spanish press. To resist against that, to resist against accepting the new 
rules of the game was part of the fundamental function of the intellectual 
life of the decades of the 1940’s and the 1950’s. But why was it fundamen-
tal? Because it was an attitude of resistance which was aware of its failure or 
that it was never going to win. There would never be a way to make public 
the confidence with which they, in private, understood that the great Span-
ish modern culture was in exile and doomed to go underground in post-war 
Spain. Only with time would that form of resistance eventually generate 
some logics of continuity with the central streams of Modernity. The perse-
verance in honor of judgment was what allowed a few Spanish intellectuals 
within Spain to keep the faith that someday or another it would begin to be 
possible that the cultural hierarchies returned to the order that we partake 
in today. This is to say, that once again it could be said that Lorca was a lead 
poet of 20th century Spain, and so was Juan Ramón Jiménez, that Ortega y 
Gasset went on being one of the finest Spanish minds. The official culture 
of 1940’s, 50’s and 60’s Spain disseminated the opposite, but some minority 
sectors of the intellectual life, individual by individual, went on believing it.
From this viewpoint, the desacato culture, the culture of disobedience, 
would be embodied by those victors, fascists or falangistas, who tinge or 
rebel against the value system of their own power group. Disobedience 
operates by opposition to the official truth from within the victory itself, 
because the conformity to official and unanimous versions is impoverishing 
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and degrading. The culture of disobedience is that of those members of the 
intellectual, political and cultural community, who from within each of the 
groups that compose it are able to subvert the order of values and general 
attitudes of their own group.
One of the model cases of this attitude was Dionisio Ridruejo, the 
chief ideologue of falangismo in wartime Spain, with connections to José 
Antonio Primo de Rivera, to Agustín de Foxá, with the full group of first 
season falangismo ideologues and who, since 1942, after having taken 
office in top positions, after having been the new poet of Franco’s Spain, 
after having been the go-to speaker who everyone sought to energize 
the masses towards falangismo and towards victory, who after all this, 
in the year of 1942 and amidst Franco’s full triumphal victory, decides 
to write a private letter to Franco in which he mostly tells him: “This 
is not the Spain for which I have fought. We have not waged a war to 
have Spain go on as a traditionalist form of power, with the oligarchies 
left intact, where the national-syndicalist revolution has not been put 
under way, where the authoritarian and normative power of the Catho-
lic Church has taken over all scopes of civilian, cultural, moral and 
every other type of power… So, I have not waged a war for this. I am a 
falangista, not a franquista.” It goes without reminding that Franco had 
people shot for less than nothing. We are in the year 1942, executions 
are common, but to have Ridruejo shot would have meant a colossal 
political error, given that it would have amplified the legend of the hon-
ored falangista, that very same man that could muster the necessary 
courage to say to the Head of State and Caudillo that this Spain he was 
building did not respond to the ideological and programmatic reasons 
for which the Falange had waged a civil war. He began then to denounce 
the sectarian and dogmatic pettiness which Victory had imposed as an 
intellectual and cultural criterion upon the most valuable past. The 
culture of post-war Spain should not do without Antonio Machado, 
Miguel de Unamuno, Ortega y Gasset, Juan Ramón Jiménez, Cernuda 
or, even if he is a communist, Rafael Alberti. This is the attitude that 
Ridruejo begins to develop from within victory.
Ridruejo did not all of a sudden turn into an antifranquista revolu-
tionary, nor a liberal and a democrat. No: he goes on being a fascist, but 
not an uncultured or myopic fascist. He is a fascist that requires that 
the exercise of power by Victory be sound, intellectually respectable and 
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able to oppose to the quality begotten by those in exile the new quality 
begotten by Victory, precisely because he knew that the best intellectual 
values could be found outside the country. So much so that another of 
those early falangistas, Torrente Ballester, a much appreciated novelist 
of contemporary Spain, in the year of 1940, with the war just recently 
over, writes one of those symbolically fundamental pieces in which he 
formulates that very same diagnosis: the intelligentsia of contemporary 
Spain is in exile. And here we are without them. It is obvious that he 
does so not in order for there to be tolerance towards those in exile, but 
to reactivate national creation within national space. This is to say that 
for the people to start accepting from within that it is necessary to get 
to work and that it will be very difficult to match the level of national 
culture inside the country to the culture of exile. Because the culture 
begotten by those in exile is far superior from any point of view to that 
created in Spain’s national space and that they do know from inside the 
country’s borders. But that they know it, Ridruejo, Torrente Ballester 
and a few others, does not mean that they feel forced to act in favor 
of liberalizing, watering down or making the culture produced within 
Spain’s borders more permeable to the culture produced by those in 
exile. They know it but they do not do it.
Well, that is where the role of the intellectual with a will for disobedi-
ence to his own group begins. There is where someone like Ridruejo steps 
in, especially after the 1950’s, to consciously lead a political and intellec-
tual group that will say in public what they only dare to write in private. 
And so meaning that disobedience to social and public norm transcends 
the scope of what is private. Instead of making jokes about the faults of 
power in private, to share them in private. The key is in the potential of 
contagion of that specific intellectual. What are the virtues of Ridruejo? 
A prose, as essayist, that is clear, direct, flexible, malleable, brilliant and 
persuasive. By means of reasoned prose he is a man capable of ethically 
compromising those who have been his basic core of friends. All in all, 
nothing too subversive. As I have said before: to tend to making some-
what more permeable, more sensible, more depoliticized the cultural poli-
cies and conducts of the regime. And that in this way the national Spain, 
from within its borders, the official franquista Spain, can begin to reap 
the benefits of what should be common heritage because the winning 
falangistas need it too.
336
Of which group of friends do I speak of? Of a group of young writers and 
intellectuals who worked with Ridruejo in the office of Press and Propa-
ganda during the Civil War, in Burgos, since the year of 1938. Those we call 
by whim, because they called it so, the Grupo de Burgos, the Burgos Group. 
In it there are many names and nearly all of them were relevant in post-war 
culture. One of these I have already mentioned, Gonzalo Torrente Ballest-
er, a great novelist of 20th century Spain; Luis Rosales, Luis Felipe Vivanco, 
or even after that José María Valverde (another of those great intellectuals, 
and what is more in this case, a catholic of coherent progression towards 
communism). In the human surroundings of the group is also Camilo José 
Cela, Pedro Laín Entralgo (a key historian and intellectual throughout the 
post-war period); someone like Julián Marías, who was however never a 
falangista and some other names. I will not provide more because the argu-
ment does not require it, but these are critical names of the cultural life of 
20th century Spain.
Almost all of those I have named, if not every one of them, sooner or 
later accepted Ridruejo’s challenge. They accepted that, they should in fact 
put forth something of theirs so that they would not go on intellectually hu-
miliated in their own country and under their own regime. To be rid of the 
shame of going on accepting that one cannot quote Lorca because he was 
what he was, and that one could not quote Juan Ramón because he was in 
exile and that one could not quote, nor comment, nor exalt Luis Buñuel, 
the film-maker, because he was in exile. Or that you could not do the same 
with so many other names. Lecturers, university professors with columns 
in the newspapers and access to the best publishers began to rebel against 
that which had been the common judgment of their own power group. The 
dynamics that set some of these men under way, in this case Ridruejo, is a 
movement of exit, of detoxification, an hygienic movement which will no 
longer be merely cultural, but also political and ideological. So what is at 
stake is that the ability to contradict, dispute or question the beliefs of their 
own group is what assures one of the most prolific and renovating labors of 
the intellectual’s function.
The similarity of this profile with that of the engaged intellectual is de-
ceiving. I’d rather say that an intellectual takes on as his own commitment 
to build a space of values that are those in which he believes in his good 
conscience that he must make prevail in the public sphere. That is the form 
of commitment that it represents: it does not depend on a political party 
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– because that is the basic function of the sartrian notion of commitment, 
the one where the intellectual becomes nothing more than the one who 
socially broadcasts the ideology of a given party. The commitment of which 
I speak is of a fundamentally moral order, in which an intellectual will im-
agine and will attempt to materialize the strategies, the pathways, the con-
tacts, the people that will be able to be put to use to get a transformation of 
the very value system under way. And believe that this intervention in the 
public sphere and its modification are part of his obligations.
From the 1950’s onwards, Ridruejo engages in direct and frontal conflict 
with the regime: he is imprisoned, he founds a social-democratic party and 
becomes an oppositionist to Franco. He does. But the rest of his friends do 
not do so or begin to do so at a much slower pace. What he does achieve, 
nonetheless, is that that group of friends does in fact evermore conquer a 
certain boldness, a certain ability to not say what should not be said, not 
do what should not be done, not quote those who should not be quoted, 
not see those who should not be seen, not compliment books by those who 
should not be complimented, etc. This is to say that they progressively gain 
greater shares of conformity with their own conscience that before they did 
not have. But the one travelling more hastily and further is Ridruejo.
But this is not merely a fascist matter. The life of an historical commu-
nist like Jorge Semprún is organized around two fundamental axes. One: 
he was detained by the Gestapo in 1942 and sent to a concentration camp, 
the one in Buchenwald; he survived for a year and a half, involved in the 
protection networks of the French Communist Party from within Buchen-
wald camp – he was with the Spanish Communist Party (PC). From1953 to 
1963, for ten years, he is the main person responsible for reorganizing the 
intellectual cell (in this case, in the widest sense: painters, artists, poets, 
reporters, film-makers) of PC, working underground as is obvious. They 
never caught him. They caught everyone else, but never Semprún. He was 
the most handsome, the smartest, the one who spoke the most languages. 
Movie-like: the photos of those times fade it because they associate an at-
tractive and stunning young man with the very same author who writes the 
poems to La Pasionaria, or to Stalin’s death, in 1953… The emotional bra-
zenness of the poems Semprún publishes then under his name is that of a 
natural born Stalinist, genuine and without reservations. Well, in 1963 the 
Executive Committee of the Spanish Communist Party, obviously in exile, 
composed of Dolores Ibarruri, La Pasionaria or Santiago Carrillo, decided to 
338
purge Semprún from PC. Why? For motives of revisionism, because Sem-
prún has been in national Spain, within its borders, and he has taken stock 
of the disparity between the official political voice, of PC, what PC says 
from exile about what goes on in Spain and what Semprún knows is go-
ing on in Spain because he is in contact with very many people and has so 
realized the amazing discrepancy between what PC believes in and what it 
says in its publications, including in its projects for subverting order within 
Spain, and what indeed is taking place within Spain’s borders.
What is taking place has nothing to do with what PC says. Semprún has 
the courage and the commitment to face his own people and, in turn, to 
practice disobedience and point out the lies in the triumphalist diagnoses 
and calculations of PCE in what concerns subversive activity within Spain’s 
borders. It is an act of disobedience to the core beliefs and the criteria of the 
group to which he belongs. What is more is that in this case the purge from 
PC serves as a trigger to an evolution towards social-democratic leanings, 
towards positions that are far more respectful towards individual freedoms. 
He is a socialist humanist who accepts that the faith in which he has been 
living in submersion, the communist faith, was nonsense and a huge mis-
take, and a destructive and self-destructive one at that, which is the same 
thing that happened to Ridruejo. He was also one to discover, though on 
the fascist side, that what he had been living in was a monstrous error of 
beliefs, of immaturity, of rashness and one and the other corrected their 
respective paths.
Well there it is, I wanted to comment on those two examples, Sem-
prún and Ridruejo, as models of an intellectual with the courage to correct 
themselves, having first disobeyed what was the norm and law of their own 
group. The ability to question one’s own beliefs means to recognize that 
they might have been good at a specific moment, but not so indefinitely. 
It also means to maintain a critical and vigilant attitude not only towards 
one’s adversary or historical time, but also towards one’s own ideological 
and social environment, to assess if the reasons that justify one’s own value 
framework are no longer fair and understand then that what is necessary is 
to transform them. 
Jordi Gracia
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   Making of Citizenshipand the
The vertiginous transformation of the 
worldwide cultural situation, the many 
competing value systems and beliefs, 
radical pluralism, and the reliance of modern 
structures on the science and technology 
governing the entire knowledge industry and 
informational system all suggest intellectuals 
now serve as mere “interpreters” or as 
technocrats, “real-time” opinion-makers
 with media stars increasingly taking 
centre-stage in key areas of public life and in 
the production apparatus.
Does this mean we are confronted with a 
culture that has failed to establish an effective 
connection between intellectual work 
and the politics of local and transnational 
citizenship? How does the post-modern 
status of intellectuals differ from that of their 
forerunners? How can public-intellectual 
activities be improved?
These are some of the issues the authors of 
this book address from different standpoints. 
By capturing and expanding on some of 
the trends that the history of intellectuals, 
the history of ideas, politics, sociology, 
anthropology, African-American studies 
and Native-American studies have been 
exploring, this book will prove of interest to 
students and professionals in those areas.
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